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Once upon a time, throughout the heyday of classical economics, 
demography belonged to political economy. The supply of labour was one 
of the important endogenous variables in the systems of Smith, Malthus, 
Mill and Marx  . . .  One feature of neoclassical economics that distinguishes it 
from the classical version, is the removal of population as a variable 
(Samuelson 1985, p. 166-7) 
the connection between population growth and economic development  . . .  
is not a matter which appears very frequently in the modern discussions of 
the theory of development  . . .  But it figures large in earlier thought on our 
subject. In the classical outlook, to discuss development without 
considering the tendencies of population growth would have been to omit 
the most essential ingredient; and in this respect I am inclined to think that, 
with all its obvious imperfection, classical thought was of considerably 
more practical significance than most of the theoretical models of our own 
day. (Robbins 1968, p. 22) 
The present separation between demography and economic analysis can 
scarcely lead to a tenable theory of economic growth. (Kuznets 1954, p. 
167) 
theories of population  . . .  have received comparatively little attention 
from historians of economic thought in the last 25 years or so  . . .  the 
criteria of modern economic analysis are not perhaps the appropriate ones 
to use in appraising these writings. (Black 1985, p. 5) 
one should not accept without question the common assumption that the 
continuities between Smith’s enterprise and that of his nineteenth-century 
successors — those with whom he is normally lumped together as a 
‘classical’ economist — are more impressive than the discontinuities. 
(Winch 1997, p. 385) 
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Introduction 
 
With time, classic works grow. This can be taken both literally and metaphorically. 
It is literally true, in the sense that classic works, in unabridged modern editions, 
often are adduced with lengthy introductions and, in scholarly editions, a large 
corpus of footnotes and references, which together considerably increase the 
volume of the work, these annotations sometimes taking up as much or more 
space as the original work itself. In a more metaphorical sense, classic works grow, 
with time, through the increasing volume of their interpretations, distortions, 
appropriations, and reinterpretations. Adam Smith’s work is such a work par 
excellence. The volume of secondary literature on his oeuvre has taken indigestible 
proportions today, akin to fill an average municipal library, or, as Margaret 
Schabas (2003, p. 262) expressed it more picturesquely fifteen years ago: “The 
secondary literature on Smith is enough to sink a small boat”. It would certainly 
take Adam Smith himself, were he alive today, longer than it took him to write the 
Wealth of Nations just to read through the entirety of secondary literature and 
commentary on his work.1 
In other words, it appears rather challenging to say anything relevant or 
meaningful about this monumental author today that has not already been written 
or said, someplace, sometime, by somebody else.2 Yet, Adam Smith remains one of 
the most commented authors of the social sciences. To this day there are dozens of 
articles, entire books and doctoral dissertations on Smith written every year 
around the world, which both shows the vitality of the field and, perhaps, how 
much remains to be said about this major figure of world intellectual history.3 But, 
even presuming only a very moderate contribution by each new study, it seems 
particularly important, in such a field, to point out what exactly the aimed for 
value-added of yet another work on Adam Smith consists in, against the backdrop 
of this huge secondary literature. 
                                                        
1 More than 600 articles and 60 books (both authored and edited) on Smith squarely, and 
more than 4000 articles, and 300 books, that mention him in some connection at some 
length, have been consulted in the course of writing the present work (a number of them 
are listed in the extended bibliography at the end of the work), and this represents still 
only a fraction of the entirety of the secondary literature. It took Smith about eight years to 
write the Wealth of Nations (Ross 2010, p. xxvii-viii). 
2 “To say anything new on Adam Smith is not easy; but to say anything of importance or 
profit, which has not been said before, is well nigh impossible” declared L. L. Price (1893, 
p. 239) already more than a century ago. 
3 “We still pose questions to Adam Smith. And he still answers, even if both the questions 
and the answers change with time.” (Paganelli 2015, p. 363) 
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Economists are without doubt the group of scholars who have been the most 
interested, during the past two centuries, in the figure of Adam Smith. For most of 
the 19th and 20th centuries, the great majority of literature on Smith was thus the 
work of economists. And economists, today still, are considered by the wider 
public to quite naturally be the foremost experts on Smith. Economists, too, have 
long been, and still are in certain niche groups, interested in population questions. 
Robert Malthus, the writer probably the most closely associated, in public opinion, 
with the topic of population, and considered by many demographers to be the 
founding father of their discipline (much as Smith is regarded by many economists 
as the founding father of theirs), notably was, too, the first person to hold a chair of 
political economy in a university. When formulating his famous population 
principle, Malthus named Smith as one of his major inspirations. Yet, while the 
literature on Adam Smith is huge, and spans today the most varied of topics, very 
few works exist that deal squarely with Smith’s contributions to ideas on 
population. There are countless articles, chapters and entire books on Robert 
Malthus’ theory of population, but very few academic works that deal specifically 
with the ideas of Adam Smith on this subject. Reference to population in the 
context of Smith’s theory of development is literally absent from more recent 
writings on Smith.4  
It took humanity several hundreds of thousands of years to reach a 
population of one billion individuals. It took just over one century for that number 
to double. This century was the 19th century. It is estimated that world population 
grew from one billion to close to two billion between 1804 and 1927. This 
extraordinary growth of the world population during the 19th century was still 
surpassed, by far, during the 20th century. World population more than tripled, 
growing from 1.65 to six billion people between 1900 and 2000 (United Nations 
Secretariat 1999). In parallel, the world has experienced, over the course of these 
two centuries, a surge in urbanisation and industrialisation and an unprecedented 
growth in life expectancy and material living standards, accompanied — first in the 
wealthiest countries, but followed by all others in recent years — by an acute and 
equally unprecedented drop in birth rates. How is it that in this period of intense 
demo-economic change, so little of the immense body of commentary on Adam 
Smith has focused on his ideas on population and development?  
The general absence of the topic of population from recent Smith scholarship 
may only be explained, perhaps, by the combination of two factors: the deepening 
divorce of economics from demography over the last century (to some degree 
                                                        
4 Exceptions are Smith (2006b) and Kennedy (2008), who refer to population in relation to 
Smith’s stage theory of progress in the Lectures on Jurisprudence.  
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surely a normal effect of the ongoing division of labour between academic 
disciplines), and the fact that Smith was mostly studied, during this period, by 
economists. The role of population in the work of Adam Smith is a subject largely 
neglected to this day, accordingly, by both demographers and economists. By 
demographers, Adam Smith is seen mostly as an economist and as a proponent of 
liberalism. Most economists, I dare venture, although they may see Smith as 
founding father of their discipline and principally as an important contributor to 
economic thought, are aware that he was first a moral philosopher who wrote a 
treatise on moral philosophy — for which he became famous — before dedicating 
himself to the subject of political economy. But hardly anyone in both fields, I 
surmise, would concede that Smith was also a demographer, or that anything 
substantive and consequential on the topic of population forms an integral part of 
his work. Yet the topic of population was an integral part of both moral philosophy 
and political economy in the 18th century (Tomaselli 1988, 1995). It would be 
rather odd if Adam Smith, one of the century’s most prominent moral philosophers 
and political economists, did not have anything to say on the topic. 
For illustration of the neglect of Adam Smith in contemporary considerations 
of population in economics, out of the close to 1200 articles published in the 
Journal of Population Economics since its inception in 1988, around thirty articles 
mention Malthus, while only ten mention Smith. That both figures are extremely 
low, in relation to the whole number of articles published in this journal, can be 
explained by the publication in question being committed first and foremost to 
perpetuating the “New Home Economics” of Gary Becker, a research program not 
renowned for its particular interest in the history of thought (although Becker 
himself did express such interest early in his career). Out of the few articles that do 
show such an interest (even if most of them mention these authors only in 
passing), it seems fair, too, that Malthus be referred to three times as frequently as 
Smith in a journal devoted to “population economics”, given Malthus’ greater fame 
in this department. What is remarkable is that out of the ten articles that mention 
Smith, not a single one, in fact, does so in connection with his ideas on population; 
so that out of all articles ever published in the Journal of Population Economics to 
this day, while thirty articles mention Malthus’ ideas on population (about twice as 
many if we add those which refer to “Malthusian” ideas or theories without 
directly mentioning Malthus), not a single article even alludes to the ideas on 
population of Adam Smith.  
In the flagship interdisciplinary Population and Development Review (a large, 
if not the larger part of contributors to the journal are demographers and 
economists), only one article on Smith’s ideas on population has ever been 
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published (Spengler 1976), while this journal has in fact published quite a few 
articles entirely or largely concerned with the history of thought (compared with 
the Journal of Population Economics, in which this interest is extremely marginal). 
There is even a special series in the Population and Development Review called 
“Archives”, in which short extracts from the work of major past thinkers dealing 
with the topic of population are published and commented. One such extract of 
Smith’s work was published, too, in 1978. But, even here, in a journal devoted to 
questions of population and development, it is not Smith’s ideas on this larger 
theme that were selected, but an extract that deals with Smith’s advocacy of the 
free mobility of labour, feeding a common misconception that all Smith had to say 
on issues pertaining to population was confined to his treatment of the labour 
market.  
In the last forty years, there has been a renewed and increased interest in 
Adam Smith from the part of intellectual historians, among which not only 
historians of economics, but also of philosophy and all social and human sciences 
(and even of the natural sciences5). The publication of the collected works and 
correspondence of Adam Smith, starting in 1976, for the bicentennial of the 
publication of the Wealth of Nations, in particular, has spurred a renewed interest 
in Adam Smith, and has initiated a great wave of new Smith scholarship which has 
not yet ebbed out. Notably, this has led to a rehabilitation of his moral philosophy, 
which by then had taken a far second rank to his ‘economics’ in the general 
depiction of his legacy. The old “Adam Smith Problem” of the 19th century, which 
described a purported contradiction between Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments 
and his Wealth of Nations, the first being allegedly based on sympathy as a central 
principal of society’s functioning, while in the second this principal was held to be 
self-interest, was revised. The new consensus in Smith scholarship is that no such 
contradiction exists in actual facts, as neither sympathy is the sole governing 
principal of Smith’s moral philosophy nor self-interest the only one at work in his 
economic and political theory.6 Rather, both these human propensities play a role 
in Smith’s general view of society, an overarching theme of his works being the 
unintended social consequences of individual actions, and the ‘emergent order’ of 
the sum of individuals’ behaviour. In other words, in this more recent wave of 
Smith scholarship, a coherence was sought between his various works, the new 
Glasgow Edition of his works and correspondence presenting for the first time a 
                                                        
5 Adam Smith is mentioned in more than two dozen articles in the Journal of the History of 
Biology. 
6 Of course, precise positions around this general consensus vary. The Adam Smith 
Problem will be analysed in more detail in Chapter 1. 
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complete collection of all his published and unpublished books, essays, 
correspondence, and, importantly, the totality of the rediscovered notes of his 
lectures on jurisprudence and rhetoric. The different elements of Smith’s grand 
narrative, therefore, which had for the most part been forgotten by social 
scientists, Smith having come to be invoked for the most part by economists (and 
seldom read, at any rate in his entirety, by the majority of the latter), were thus 
reevaluated each individually, and the articulation between them became one 
overarching theme of the new Smith scholarship. The present work squarely falls 
within this tradition. 
That population does not play an important role in Smith’s system of thought 
seems to be, however, a largely held opinion even among historians of (economic) 
thought. Among the large volume of commentaries on Smith that were taken notice 
of for the present study,7 only a handful of published contributions deal principally 
with the subject of population. One short article from the 1950s is, as typical in this 
connection, essentially limited to Smith’s views on the labour market (Nilson 
1952). Two articles (both by the same author) and one book chapter (Spengler 
1970 ; Bowen 1976 ; Spengler 1976), which examine the issue in more detail, are 
from around the time of the bicentenary celebrations of the Wealth of Nations.8 
Two further contributions that deal squarely with Smith on population are very 
recent, and in fact yet unpublished (Brennan 2013 ; Sunna forthcoming). I shall 
point out further on how the present work variously differs and/or adheres to the 
works just cited. Schumpeter (1986 [1954]) and Robbins (1968) also mentioned 
Smith in some detail in their respective chapters on population theories. But 
overall, the topic of population seems to have been left out in the secondary 
literature on Smith over the course of the 20th century, just as Smith was generally 
left out of treatments of the topic of population in the history of thought (or 
mentioned only in passing, in connection with his labour market theories held to 
point to Malthus). 
There seems to be an increased interest in recent years in Smith’s 
“geographical economics” or “economic geography” (see notably the World Bank’s 
                                                        
7 See n. 1 above. 
8 None of these were, however, squarely contributions to the bicentenary conferences, as it 
appears. It speaks for the little general concern for Smith’s ideas on population that 
while Joseph Spengler was centrally interested in the topic of population in the 
history of economic thought and had already published one of his two articles on 
Smith and population, the editors of the volume of essays accompanying the 
bicentenary Glasgow edition of Smith’s works (Skinner & Wilson 1975), of which 
several of the chapters had in fact previously been published, chose to include a 
contribution by Spengler on “Adam Smith and Society’s Decision-makers” instead.   
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World Development Report of 2009). Smith’s contribution in this field is recognised. 
But even here it is not explicitly connected to his ideas on population. Such topics 
as population distribution are dealt with mostly in a static way and as ‘givens’. All 
in all, an integral treatment of Smith’s ideas on population and development is 
sorely lacking. This work aims to contribute to bridge this gap. 
The subject of the role of population in Adam Smith’s work is of particular 
relevance because of two confluent reasons. First, the discipline of demography 
(or, in the United States, population science), being one of the most recent of the 
human sciences to become a separate discipline, is usually traced by its 
practitioners to the early 19th century work of Malthus, more rarely to earlier 
authors (especially John Graunt and/or William Petty) (Demeny & McNicoll 2003, 
p. vii), but who are typically considered in isolation, i.e. independently from the 
wider intellectual movement of their respective period. By contrast, 18th century 
population theory, in the works of Hume, Montesquieu and Adam Smith notably, is 
comparatively little known by demographers.9 Rather, much as Adam Smith and 
other classical economists are generally considered by present-day economists 
only as forerunners to the more elaborate ideas of later economic theorists — as 
exemplified by Schumpeter’s influential claim that “by far the best piece of 
economic theory turned out by A. Smith” was the “rudimentary equilibrium theory 
of Chapter 7” that “points toward Say and, through the latter’s work, to Walras” 
(1986 [1954], p. 183) — earlier writers on matters of population are considered 
by most demographers only as forerunners and more rudimentary versions of the 
more complete ideas of Malthus and the neo-Malthusians. The 18th century 
controversy over the comparative populousness of ancient and modern Europe, 
involving notably Montesquieu, Hume and Wallace, for example, is usually treated 
merely as somewhat of a curiosum, and lumped together with everything that was 
written about population before Malthus as “pre-scientific” ideas on the subject 
leading up to Malthus, a view implicit in the titles of studies of these ideas 
containing the words “pre-Malthusian” (Stangeland 1904) or “before Malthus” 
(Gonnard 1929a, 1929b ; Black 1985 ; Hecht 1986) — much as ‘pre-Smithian’ 
economic theories are often so labelled and treated —, neglecting both how much 
Malthus himself was feeding on and taking up previously rehearsed themes 
(notably the population and inequality issue treated in much the same way as in 
                                                        
9 Researchers at the French Institut national d’études démographiques have however, 
within their effort to reedit the works of the physiocrats and the French literature on 
economics and society of the 18th century more generally, re-examined the ideas of the 
French-speaking and other European 17th and 18th century thinkers on population. See 
notably Théré (1999); Quesnay (2005 [1747-67]); Théré and Charles (2009); Théré, 
Charles, and Lefebvre (2011). 
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Malthus’ Essay by Wallace in his Various Prospects of Mankind, Nature, and 
Providence written four decades earlier) and how, conversely, these earlier debates 
developed themes not included in Malthus’ approach.10   
Yet this teleological way of conceiving intellectual history (and history 
generally) — as a linear progression or chain of events that by constant 
improvement produced the present situation or paradigm, rather than as an 
ongoing debate or confrontation of differing and often conflicting viewpoints, 
which can see many reiterations in different forms in successive periods —, while 
still being the largely dominant view of the history of their respective disciplines 
by most researchers in the natural as well as the human sciences, is today largely 
rejected by (intellectual) historians themselves. Herbert Butterfield famously 
named the teleological view of history “Whig History”, in his The Whig 
Interpretation of History in 1931, and the term has been largely adopted, as a 
pejorative denomination of the practice, by intellectual historians.11 This is 
relevant, with regard to population theory, particularly insofar as much of Malthus’ 
theory itself largely runs counter to the currently predominant neo-Malthusian 
paradigm. And this is true all the more of Smith’s, Hume’s and Montesquieu’s 
works that form the immediate context in which Malthus wrote. 
The first reason for the relevance of a study of Smith’s ideas on population is 
hence the importance of these ideas in their own right, i.e. qua population theory, 
as distinct from the ones of Malthus and other writers. This reason is, in other 
words, to uncover the demographic dimension of Smith’s thought, in order to 
unearth Smith’s contribution to the history of thought on population, his 
contribution — which may still be relevant today — to the discipline of 
demography, not yet a separate discipline in his own day, as is true for economics. 
The second reason for the importance of a study on Smith’s ideas on 
population is that in Smith’s work, concepts today subsumed under the notion of 
population are closely intertwined with all aspects of “the progress of society”. 
This subject, “the progress of society”, undoubtedly must be recognised as the 
overarching theme of Smith’s political and economic thought. This theme includes 
political, economic, sociological, cultural as well as demographic and geographic 
factors, namely the development of: government and governing institutions 
(including laws), the market, the division of labour, inequality (social classes), 
                                                        
10 For a differentiated treatment of the population theories and controversies of the 
second half of the 18th century in their own right see notably Whelan (1991). (Discussion 
of Smith here too is cursory, but which may be justified insofar as Smith did not squarely 
contribute to the controversies in question.) 
11 For a comprehensive study of Butterfield’s position see Sewell (2005). 
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manners and customs, capital and technology, all of which are connected in Smith’s 
account to the overarching theme of what I shall henceforth refer to as “the 
peopling process”, i.e. population, in its original meaning not of a quantity of 
people to be found on a particular territory but of the process through which a 
certain territory gets peopled, including the growth, spread and concentration of 
population in its contemporary sense. 
Foucault (2004 [1977-78], p. 69) noted that the word population, which he 
saw as a great 18th century conceptual innovation, originally referred, in both 
French and English, to the “process of populating a territory” (McNicoll 2007, p. 
829), deriving (rather than, as would be expected, the other way around) from the 
word “depopulation”, which still denotes exclusively the idea of process.12 
According to Théré and Rohrbasser (2011, p. 141-2), although the word 
“depopulation” appears in dictionaries before the word “population”, there are no 
grounds to affirm that the latter derives from the former. In the French-speaking 
literature, the word “population” seems to have found widespread use and 
acceptance during a relatively short time in the 1750s, notably under the impulse 
of Forbonnais, and the word seems to have been imported mainly from Spanish, 
where it was already longer in use. Also, both the meaning of quantity and of 
process have a long history. But the one of process seems to be more prevalent in 
the 18th century.13 Note that this meaning of process is also present in Malthus’s 
“principle of population”. To convey the meaning of the later “over-population” 
(understood as static quantity), Malthus himself used the word “over-
populousness” in the first edition of the Essay.  
                                                        
12 For a more recent and more detailed account than Foucault’s, see notably Le Bras 
(2000) and Tamba (2002), who also call out etymological dictionaries for attributing the 
first known use of the term “population” to Bacon. According to them, the word 
“population” was only substituted by later editors of Bacon for his own words (“number of 
inhabitants” and similar locutions), a phenomenon which also affects other 18th and 19th 
century editions of earlier authors. (Théré and Rohrbasser (2011, p. 141-2) dispute this: 
the word “population” can be found in Bacon, Le Bras was apparently relying on 
translations.) The first use of the word is attributed by Le Bras to Hume, with the meaning 
of process above described. (The notion of “quantity of people” was rendered by Hume, as 
in the title of his work, by the word “populousness”.) “Depopulation” is attested in 
Montesquieu (who never used the word “population”), but, according to Tamba, with the 
original latin meaning of “depopulatio”, denoting calamity and destruction. Hence 
“population” derives, he claims, from “depopulation” through a complex (and uncertain) 
history, whereby the prefix “de-”, in the original Latin, carried the meaning not of negative 
but of amplifier (as in “demultiply”), and only later, by resemblance with the prefix “dis-”, 
has “depopulation” been construed as a negative of something which remained to be 
coined, i.e. “population”, understood as the process of peopling. 
13 An interesting parallel of the dual meaning of process and of state of concepts used in 
the 18th century can be found in Hume, who affirmed about a passion that it is “an original 
existence, or, if you will, modification of existence” (Hume 1888 [1739], p. 415). 
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Both the late coming-into-use of the term “population”, and its change of 
meaning from process to quantity, can be attested in Smith’s writings. Thus, in the 
Theory of Moral Sentiments, the term “population” cannot be found (and neither 
the term “populousness”). While the topic of population is of lesser relevance for 
the subject matter of the Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith still mentions on a few 
occasions the number of people, which he renders by the expression “number of-” 
(twice), “myriad of-” or “multitude of inhabitants” (each once). In the Lectures of 
Jurisprudence (the Glasgow Edition volume in its entirety), both the terms 
“populousness” (five times) and “population” (eight times) appear. Along 
“populousness”, Smith is still reported to have used “number of inhabitants” 
(thrice) and “number of people” (nine times) to denote a quantity of people. The 
term “population” is here always used, quite clearly, with the meaning of the 
process of peopling. All these instances are in the set of notes discovered in the 
20th century by John Lothian. The earlier discovered Cannan notes and the ‘Early 
Draft of the Wealth of Nations’ do not contain the term,14 but both carry an instance 
of the word “depopulation” (in the sense of dispeopling). It is only in the Wealth of 
Nations that the use of the term “population” becomes much more frequent, 
appearing thirty-seven times in the text. Here, it is not always clear whether Smith 
denotes the process of peopling or the quantity of people by it. But even in the 
Wealth of Nations Smith still uses “number of people” more frequently (forty-two 
times; the term “populousness”, moreover, appears six times and “number of 
inhabitants” four times).  
The very second sentence of the Wealth of Nations reads: “According 
therefore, as this produce, or what is purchased with it, bears a greater or smaller 
proportion to the number of those who are to consume it, the nation will be better 
or worse supplied with all the necessaries and conveniences for which it has 
occasion”. This focus on per capita income as a measure of wealth by Smith has 
often been noted. But the link with population is seldom discerned. Foucault by 
contrast saw Smith’s engagement with population in this connection as 
instrumental in the established meaning the concept of population acquired (2004 
[1977-78], p. 70-81), Smith representing, according to him, a defining moment in 
the development of modern social science (1966). 
That there is such a thing as a peopling process, meaning the growth and 
settlement process of a population over a territory, which is inherent to and 
inseparable from the process of economic development as a whole, is a notion 
                                                        
14 For a detailed account of the different documents composing the Lectures on 
Jurisprudence Glasgow Edition volume and how they will be referred to in the present 
work, see the ‘Note on Notation’ at the end of this Introduction. 
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entirely foreign to most modern economists, more accustomed to see the growth of 
population in terms of “population pressure”, an obstacle to overcome rather than 
a positive force in the way of economic development. Yet in 18th century thought 
on progress, and certainly in Adam Smith’s work, this notion is not only present, 
but plays an important part in the overall theory, even if modern accounts almost 
unanimously fail to account for it. Smith’s “four stages” theory of economic 
development, notably, is essentially structured around and embedded in a 
narrative of a nation’s peopling process.  
Adam Smith is thus wrongly regarded as being a minor figure in the history 
of thought on population. Commentators on Smith and population moreover have 
laid undue stress on his chapter on wages and the labour market in the Wealth of 
Nations, where Smith describes demand for labour and its supply, i.e. population, 
being adjusted through the wage rate. In fact, Smith’s theory gives a much larger 
role to population dynamics. Population plays a large role, indeed, in the very 
definition of perhaps the single most fundamental concept of the Wealth of Nations: 
the market. The extent of the market is thus described by Smith as determined in 
large part by the physical proximity of individual economic agents one from the 
other, i.e. population density. In the course of the “natural progress of opulence” 
from a rural-agricultural society to an urban-industrial trading nation, the 
progressive state of (economic) affairs is maintained by ongoing population 
growth and the ensuing division of labour between town and countryside, making 
for the growth of cities. Thus, Smith does not only formulate a theory of population 
growth in Wealth of Nations, but Smith’s works also comprise fundamental 
elements of a theory of population movements and urbanisation. 
Smith’s work not only accords a larger role to population than a disconnected 
view of these scattered elements each by themselves could suggest, but these 
elements are in fact connected with one another in such a way as to make it 
possible to affirm that Smith developed a complete theory of population, which, 
moreover, is particular to him — even though this theory is only incidental to his 
larger concern with the material progress of nations and the means to favour it. It 
is not claimed that this theory was either very original, given the work of Smith’s 
predecessors, or is very remarkable in itself. Rather, population, like trade, plays 
an important role in his theory of economic development — his trade theory being 
another element for which Smith has long been criticised as not being original or 
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remarkable, and trade being equally closely intertwined with development in 
Smith’s thought.15  
Nor is it claimed that population is an independent variable, or is by itself the 
driving force or the prime mover to Smith’s theory (although there is in fact a case 
to be made for this position, in particular, with regard to the primitive state). 
Instead Smith’s theory of progress involves a series of factors, which are so 
imbricately related and dependent on one another that they cannot augment, or 
hardly so, but on a par. Thus the division of labour, capital accumulation, 
population, and the development of laws and government are all dependent on one 
another. As an element of the systemic view that Smith develops in the Wealth of 
Nations (as well as in the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Lectures on 
Jurisprudence), Smith’s treatment of population thus deserves the full attention of 
Smith scholars and anyone interested in the Smithian perspective on economic 
development.  
The subject of population is thus of great relevance to the study of Smith’s 
work and, conversely, Smith’s work may be of great relevance to the study of the 
subject of population. As will hopefully emerge from the ensuing chapters, what 
may be termed the “Smithian perspective” is, indeed, in many ways a more helpful 
heuristic to understand the interrelationship of different variables affecting and 
being affected by matters pertaining to population than the predominant neo-
Malthusian paradigm. It is therefore important to uncover the critical role of 
population in Smith’s work, both for a better understanding of Smith, and for the 
recovery of an important alternative view of population-economy 
interrelationships. 
Yet, the importance of the element of population in Smith’s thought has long 
been downplayed. A characteristic statement is made in the introduction to the 
Glasgow edition of the Wealth of Nations: 
Increasing population, whether a cause of economic growth, or as 
something to fear, was not highlighted. That may seem surprising. Others, 
among them Sir James Steuart, feared over-population, but it was possible 
to be as optimistic about the future in the mid-eighteenth century as at any 
time. The spectre of famine and of some diseases had been removed; the 
sharp rise in population and the problems of its concentration were yet to 
be. Hence it was easy to conceive the problem of economic growth as one of 
utilizing the labour force in ways which would most effectively meet the 
                                                        
15 This point, noted in the early 20th century by Williams (1929), was especially developed 
by Hla Mynt in a series of articles (1946, 1954-55, 1958, 1977). See further on this Elmslie 
(1994b) and Schumacher (2012,2013). 
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opportunities offered by the expansion of the market, either by 
improvements in the division of labour or by mechanization. (Campbell & 
Skinner 1976, p. 48) 
This statement presents a partial view of the role of population in Smith’s 
theory only, and it is strange that the Glasgow editors, familiar with the Lectures on 
Jurisprudence (referenced by them throughout the Wealth of Nations), in which 
population is articulated with Smith’s arguments concerning growth and 
development much more explicitly than in his published work, would present such 
an incomplete view of the subject. It is very hard, of course, even for a historian, to 
escape one’s own time, and the way the subject is here introduced and presented 
by the Glasgow editors is very characteristic of the neo-Malthusian perspective 
that was predominant all throughout the 20th century, but especially so in the 
1970s — when the rate of world population growth, higher than ever before or 
since,16 was a particular factor of concern. Thus the “spectre of famine” here 
evoked can be taken to quite clearly allude to the works of Ehrlich and the 
Meadows published a few years before the Glasgow Edition.17  
Famines as “positive checks” to population were of course made famous by 
Malthus (in whose work, it should be remarked, the “spectre of famine” had an 
actual positive — in the sense of “beneficial” — function, as we shall see in Chapter 
1). Smith, however, had framed the issue quite differently. It would be an 
exaggeration to state that the association of famines and population was entirely 
foreign to him. In his chapter on wages, when describing the “declining state”, 
characterising “a country where the funds destined for the maintenance of labour 
were sensibly decaying” (WN I.viii.26, p. 90), Smith wrote that “Want, famine, and 
mortality would immediately prevail in that class [the lowest], and from thence 
extend themselves to all the superior classes, till the number of inhabitants in the 
country was reduced to what could easily be maintained by the revenue and stock 
which remained in it” (ibid., p. 91), a sentence that may indeed have influenced 
Malthus’ treatment of the subject. But it is of significance that this sentence ends 
with the specification that if there was so little revenue and stock left in the 
country, it is because what was left had “escaped either the tyranny or calamity 
                                                        
16 The highest global population growth rates in history — above 1.8% per year — were 
registered in the two decades between 1955 and 1975, peaking at 2.06% between 1965 
and 1970 (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2015). 
17 The year 1968 saw the publication of three influential works (of unequal length) 
representative of the dominant neo-Malthusian perspective: Paul Ehrlich’s Population 
Bomb, Garrett Hardin’s ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ and Gunnar Myrdal’s Asian Drama. Four 
years later the Club of Rome published its authoritative Limits to Growth (Meadows, 
Meadows, Randers, & Behrens 1972). 
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which had destroyed the rest” (ibid.). This theme of tyranny and calamity in 
connection with famines is taken up again by Smith in Book IV. Here he held first 
that “a dearth never has arisen from any combination among the inland dealers in 
corn, nor from any other cause but a real scarcity, occasioned sometimes perhaps, 
and in some particular places, by the waste of war, but in by far the greatest 
number of cases by the fault of the seasons” (WN IV.v.b.5, p. 526), i.e. that 
shortages of agricultural produce were mainly natural not man-made events. Yet 
“a famine”, Smith continued, “has never arisen from any other cause but the 
violence of government attempting, by improper means, to remedy the 
inconveniences of a dearth” (ibid.). By thus explaining famines by institutional 
deficiencies, as would Sen and Drèze (1989) two centuries later, Smith was 
therefore not committing the sin that Malthus and Ricardo have, more fairly so 
than Smith, often been accused of: the one of biological determinism. This 
perspective, as we shall see, was foreign to Smith in general, who notably believed 
that nurture was far more important than nature in forming individual talents, as 
expressed in his famous porter and philosopher passage of the second chapter of 
the Wealth of Nations (WN I.ii.4, p. 28-9). 
Because “The spectre of famine and of some diseases had been removed”, 
Campbell and Skinner believed, and “the sharp rise in population and the problems 
of its concentration were yet to be”, “it was easy to conceive the problem of 
economic growth as one of utilizing the labour force in ways which would most 
effectively meet the opportunities offered by the expansion of the market”. This 
handling by Smith of the “problem of economic growth” is presented by the 
Glasgow editors as disconnected from the issue of population. Both elements 
invoked, the labour force and the extent of the market, are, however, in Smith’s 
account, connected to population. Population growth, indeed, augments both the 
labour force and the extent of the market, so that what lies at the origin of the 
expansion of market opportunities also serves to meet these opportunities. Rather 
than ignoring the question of whether “Increasing population” was seen as “cause 
of economic growth or as something to fear”, Smith in fact quite directly answers 
this question in his theorisation of economic development. As Smith expressed it in 
the four sentences concluding his chapter on wages: 
What takes place among the labourers in a particular workhouse takes 
place, for the same reason, among those of a great society. The greater
their number, the more they naturally divide themselves into different 
classes and subdivisions of employment. More heads are occupied in 
inventing the most proper machinery for executing the work of each, and it 
is, therefore, more likely to be invented. There are many commodities, 
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therefore, which, in consequence of these improvements, come to be 
produced by so much less labour than before that the increase of its price 18 
is more than compensated by the diminution of its quantity. (WN I.viii.57, 
p. 104) 
Counter to what Campbell and Skinner held, Smith here quite clearly presented 
population as a positive force in economic development, through the furthering of 
both technological development (invention) and the division of labour (the two 
being intimately linked in Smith’s account more generally) that it allows. 
In line with the way the topic was treated by the Glasgow editors, population 
is commonly viewed as being merely a passive by-product in Smith’s theory. Alvin 
Hansen, by contrast, recognised the central place of population and the reciprocal 
nature of causation in the interaction of population and economic development for 
Smith: 
Adam Smith regarded growth of population as at once a consequence and a 
cause of economic progress. Increasing division of labor would, he argued, 
bring about greater productivity, and this would furnish an enlarged 
revenue and stock, from which would flow an enlarged wages fund, an 
increased demand for labor, higher wages, and so economic conditions 
favorable for population growth. Now a growing population, by widening 
the market and by fostering inventiveness, in turn facilitated, he thought, 
division of labor and so the production of wealth. Thus he arrived at an 
optimistic conclusion. Population growth, he held, stimulated progress and 
this in turn stimulated further growth and expansion. In contrast, the 
pessimistic analyses of Malthus and Ricardo stressed the limitation of 
natural resources and the danger of an increasing population’s pressing 
down the margin of cultivation to a point at which real income would be 
reduced to a bare subsistence level. In this static analysis the more 
dynamic approach of Adam Smith was quite forgotten. If we wish to get a 
clear insight into the economic consequences of the current decline in 
population growth, it is necessary to return to the suggestion of Adam 
Smith and to explore more fully the causal interconnection between 
economic progress, capital formation and population growth. (1939, p. 2-
3) 
Hansen’s remarks remain pertinent today, and in the ensuing chapters shall 
be illustrated and developed. When presenting like ideas about Smith — to the 
effect that population is an important element in his system, and that it played a 
                                                        
18 Wages (the price of labour) augment because of the increase of stock (which heightens 
the demand for labour, as capitalists seek to employ their stock to employ labourers), as 
Smith had recalled at the beginning of the paragraph this sentence concludes. 
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definite positive role in the cumulative circle or ‘spiral’ of progress that 
characterises Smith’s theory of growth, at least in what he termed the “progressive 
state” — I often heard the objection ‘if for Smith population was such an important 
element, and played a positive role for growth, he would have unequivocally stated 
so’; or, alternatively, ‘if Smith stated the positive role of population less equivocally 
in the lectures of jurisprudence and other early work than in the Wealth of Nations, 
he must have changed his mind about it in the meantime’. But these are too simple 
objections. Not only did this not prevent earlier scholars from recognising this role 
of population in Smith, as was the case of Hansen, but one of the important roles of 
historians of thought, indeed, is precisely to examine the work of earlier authors in 
such a way as to bring out that which, though implicit, must have been obvious for 
a contemporary audience, but ceased to be so as time went by, because the often 
covert references to contemporary authors, works, debates, controversies and 
current events have become incomprehensible to later readers. The recuperation 
of such contextual clues can be carried out only by resituating the work in the 
context of its time: within the debates it contributed to, and by looking at what 
kind of audience was targeted and what position was argued as part of these 
debates, by deciphering the vocabulary characteristic of the times and the meaning 
contemporary to the author of words that are still used today but whose meaning 
might have evolved. While every author may have the intimate hope that she may 
still be read two centuries after her death, indeed, no author, unless clairvoyant, 
can knowingly contribute to controversies taking shape in the remote future. As a 
general rule, authors, whether of literature, science or philosophy, address a 
contemporary audience, making references to current ideas and events in such a 
way that they may be understood by their readers at the time of publication. 
Making implicit rather than explicit references can be as much stylistic choice, 
sparing the audience tedious and dispensable specification, as it can be a 
deliberate strategy to build complicity with the readers by flattering their 
intelligence. It may also simply be the usual way, at the time of writing, to refer to 
certain known ideas and connections that were then not yet in any way polemical, 
but only became so at a later point. Despite some explicit statements to this effect, 
the positive role of population in Smith’s major published work is indeed largely 
implicit, which warrants that it be disinterred. 
Indeed, when it comes to population as both effect and cause of economic 
development, Smith did not have a very contentious case to argue. Despite worries 
of the threat of overpopulation — through an implicit expression of the view of 
diminishing returns from population — conveyed notably in the works of Wallace, 
Quesnay, Cantillon and Steuart, the view of population as both cause and effect of 
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economic development was widely shared in the 18th century. As Schumpeter 
(1986 [1954], p. 240-1) put it:  
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries  . . .  Economists  . . .  With 
rare exceptions  . . .  were enthusiastic about ‘populousness’ and rapid 
increase in numbers. In fact, until the middle of the eighteenth century, 
they were as nearly unanimous in this ‘populationist’ attitude as they have 
ever been in anything. A numerous and increasing population was the most 
important symptom of wealth; it was the chief cause of wealth; it was 
wealth itself — the greatest asset for any nation to have. Utterances of this 
kind were so numerous as to render quotation superfluous. 
 
* 
In the development of political economy as a discipline, later called “economics”, 
Adam Smith was often called the founding father. But very selective use was made 
of him, in actual facts, by most later economists. The larger part of his narrative 
was ignored by the majority of the profession for the larger part of the 19th and 
20th centuries.19 Beginning with Ricardo, the greater part of economics came to 
deal with issues of distribution and the functioning of markets rather than with the 
historical development of society. Ricardo did devote attention to the long-term 
development of society, epitomised by his theory of diminishing returns to land, 
leading inevitably to a stationary state where economic development would cease. 
But, while the interpretation of the actual history of Europe and the world at large 
— with, at its centre, the question of the differential development of different 
people and societies — was the main object of the analysis of Smith and his 
Scottish contemporaries, this interest got significantly watered down with Ricardo 
and his predilection for the theme of distribution. As Ricardo signalled to Malthus 
in a passage of a letter of October 1820 (made famous through being quoted by 
Keynes in a footnote attached to the second paragraph of the General Theory):  
Political Economy you think is an enquiry into the nature and causes of 
wealth — I think it should be called an enquiry into the laws which 
                                                        
19 “successors cannot continue on the level of genius. One aspect of the great man, 
probably that which suits later conditions, is chosen, much of the rest probably rejected. 
The section of Smith’s work which was so chosen and developed till it became supreme 
was the first two books of the Wealth of Nations.  . . .  It is a paradox of history that the 
analytics of Book I  . . .  should have eclipsed the philosophic and historical methods in 
which [Smith] so revelled  . . .  But even so we cannot speak for the future.  . . .  the past 
certainly shows that each phase of social development produces its own philosophy and 
method in all the social disciplines.” (Macfie 1955, p. 82-83) 
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determine the division of the produce of industry amongst the classes who 
concur in its formation. No law can be laid down respecting quantity, but a 
tolerably correct one can be laid down respecting proportions. Every day I 
am more satisfied that the former enquiry is vain and delusive, and the 
latter only the true objects of the science. (Sraffa 2004a [1951], p. 278-9) 20 
Marginalist economic theory (or what has become known in the 20th century 
as neoclassical economics; see on the history of this term Aspromourgos (1986)), 
which became the mainstream of economic analysis from the late 19th century 
onwards (with a brief interlude during which this place was occupied by the 
historical school in Germany and institutional economics in the United States), 
took this development to the extreme. Smith’s grand narrative of the development 
of society was all but forgotten. Illustrative of this is the afterlife of Smith’s ideas on 
the division of labour. 
In Adam Smith’s view, productivity gains (i.e., the increase in per capita 
production and hence income, or simply: economic growth) are the outcome 
mainly of the development of the division of labour. One of the main if not the main 
factor in economic development is thus the division of labour. This idea is clearly 
stated in one of the first sentences of the Wealth of Nations. It forms a kind of 
leitmotiv of this work and is developed throughout. The idea that division of labour 
makes for impressive productivity gains has never been seriously disputed. Yet, 
quite oddly, while it can (as most of Smith’s ideas) be traced back much further in 
time (notably to Plato), it has, with some notable exceptions, never been seriously 
developed after Smith. Surreptitiously, the idea has been circumvented, even 
turned on its head by later scholars, among which there were Ricardo and Malthus, 
and later John Stuart Mill. The way these scholars analysed the market mechanism 
and economic development — diminishing returns (from land) now taking centre 
stage — has largely been retained until today (mostly Ricardo’s and Mill’s version, 
but through Keynes, arguably, also anew parts of Malthus’), and with it a somewhat 
schizophrenic treatment of Smith’s legacy has taken hold.  On the one hand, the 
validity of Smith’s idea of the productivity-enhancing effects of the division of 
labour continues to be upheld. Smith’s most famous example thereof, the division 
of labour between ten workmen in a pin factory, is frequently taught to this day in 
inaugural lessons of introductory economics classes and figures in the early pages 
                                                        
20 Four years and a half earlier, Ricardo had still stated in another letter to Malthus: “I wish 
much to see a regular and connected statement of your opinions on what I deem the most 
difficult, and perhaps the most important topic of Political Economy, namely the progress 
of a country in wealth and the laws by which the increasing produce is distributed” (Sraffa 
2004b [1951], p. 24). See further on this Hollander (1997, p. 1000). 
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of introductory economics textbooks. On the other hand, this is where the 
examination of this topic usually ends, as if there was nothing more to say about it. 
Smith himself, by contrast, organised his whole theory of trade and development 
around this idea and applied the concept both to the level of the firm (as in the pin 
factory), the city, the region, the country, and the world. There is thus in Smith’s 
work alone already a breadth of examples of fruitful use of the concept that would 
present the material for several research programs.  
The topic of the division of labour is intimately connected, in Smith’s theory, 
to what would later be called increasing returns; not in the narrow sense of factor 
proportions in particular production processes, in which this idea was usually 
discussed at the beginning of (and to a large degree throughout) the 20th century 
— i.e. “relating”, as Alyn Young (1928, p. 528) expressed it, “to the precise way in 
which some sort of equilibrium of supply and demand is achieved in the market for 
the products of industries which can increase their output without increasing their 
costs” —, but in the “simpler and more inclusive” (ibid.) sense of the progress of 
the whole society by means of the productivity gains obtained from the subdivision 
of tasks, professions, and industries, and the creation of new such tasks, 
professions and industries that this process entails.21 This idea was superseded, 
first, by Malthus’ and Ricardo’s insistence on the role of diminishing returns from 
land. In neoclassical economics, moreover, it got supplanted by the concentration 
on the realisation of market equilibria, whereby increasing returns (internal to the 
firm) were considered — largely because of the neoclassical habit, notably 
established by Marshall, of holding all else equal, whereas in Smith’s theory the 
different elements of the economic system are usually considered in their mutual 
interaction and co-evolution — to lead to monopoly and thereby to violate the 
hypothesis of perfect competition, necessary for the functioning of the theory 
(Sraffa 1926). 
The idea of an “international division of labour” has also survived into 
modern parlance (not that Smith ever used the phrase, but there was, too, an 
international dimension to the division of labour in his work — which did not 
include, it should be noted, complete specialisation of particular countries in 
                                                        
21 Schumpeter entitled this latter conception of increasing returns, implying change of 
technology, “Historical Increasing Returns” to distinguish it from the increasing returns 
that “occur within the given pattern of technological practice” (1986 [1954], p. 251). Both 
Young (in the appendix to his article) and Schumpeter (at the place just cited) illustrated 
the “inclusive”/“historical” type of increasing returns by a shift of a curve as opposed to 
movements along a curve, which could be used to depict increasing returns in a given 
production process. (It is likely that Schumpeter was inspired by Young for this analogy, 
though he did not refer to him at this point).  
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particular industries). But in the way it is used today, the phrase is usually nothing 
more than a synonym for international trade. It is true that in the theory of 
international trade, the idea of increasing returns has over the course of the 20th 
century known somewhat of a theoretical revival, and Smith is explicitly 
recognised by Krugman (1990b, p. 4) in this connection as being at the root of the 
“New Trade Theory”. But while elements of Smith’s insights can be discerned in 
this more recent research program, it deviates from Smith’s vision in important 
respect, notably by the erroneous association of increasing returns with large-scale 
production by single firms and the monopolistic type of competition that is 
assumed to ensue, an error which Young (1928, p. 527), building on Smith, had 
already drawn attention to.22 More significantly, however, the division of labour as 
a means of conceptualising the process of economy-wide increasing returns (or 
world-wide in the case of international trade) is conspicuously absent from the 
“New Trade” literature. Lip service is occasionally paid to the division of labour or 
the extent of the market, but without clearly defining what is meant by these 
concepts. (Krugman’s Walrasian obsession with necessarily being able to put 
anything meaningful he has to say in an academic context in mathematical model 
form — a necessity never felt by Smith, who was always concerned with 
expressing things in his writings in such a way that they might be understood by 
most anyone, and was rather circumspect of what was then called “political 
arithmetic” — also likely constrains the amount of Smith’s insights that Krugman 
and the New Trade theorists following in his footsteps could possibly incorporate.) 
Thus, while the idea of the division of labour and the productivity gains it can 
procure was never seriously disputed, and is upheld in modern economics to this 
day, its full implication is nowhere near to being taken into account. The division of 
labour is too often conceived today, when it is at all mentioned, in the very narrow 
sense only of the division of tasks within the firm (what Marx would term the 
“technical division of labour”), conveying the impression that Smith himself 
conceived it only in this narrow sense, an idea as pervasive as it is wrong, which 
one occasionally encounters even in the history of thought literature.23  
                                                        
22 Young did not, however, refer to the article by Sraffa cited above in this connection, 
which was published two years earlier in the same journal. 
23 Notably, Blitch (1983, p. 19); Chandra (2003, p. 46) and Chandra and Sandilands (2005, 
p. 465) inopportunely make this claim in an effort to commend Allyn Young’s contribution, 
which did not in fact require downplaying the import he made from Smith. What Chandra  
(ibid.) notably singles out as the element to which Young is described to have “extended” 
Smith’s views — “firm and industry level specialisation” — is explicitly described by Smith 
himself almost verbatim in the very chapter that carries the title which Young (1928, p. 
529) singled out as “one of the most illuminating and fruitful generalisations which can be 
found anywhere in the whole literature of economics”, in which Smith wrote: “it is upon 
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The concept of increasing returns is intrinsically linked with the emergence 
of economics as a field of study, if Adam Smith’ pin-factory parable can indeed be 
considered the founding myth of the discipline — as it is often presented in 
economics textbooks. That this phenomenon was progressively relegated to 
second order consideration and finally became totally ignored by economists owes 
much to the enduring imprint that Ricardo (and, in a different way, Malthus) left on 
the discipline. Increasing returns have been the subject of a renewed surge of 
interest in recent years, after their momentary reappearance in the single 
celebrated article by Allyn Young in 1928 and treatments in different guises 
throughout the 20th century. But while economists have now and then tried to 
rehabilitate the concept since, they have never liberated themselves of the 
persistent influence of the idea that decreasing returns are the more important and 
pervasive phenomenon at the economy-wide level and over the long run. Thus, for 
example, what was originally formulated as a criticism of mainstream economics, 
Herman Daly’s concept of a “steady-state economy”, had in fact no difficulty being 
absorbed by the mainstream (as decried by some ecological economists (Pirgmaier 
2017)), while “Despite its recent re-emergence to analytical importance, the 
phenomenon of increasing returns remains outside the central core of neoclassical 
economics” (Buchanan & Yoon 2000, p. 43). 
 “My subject may appear alarmingly formidable, but I did not intend it to be 
so.” Thus commences Allyn Young’s Presidential Address before section F 
(Economics and Statistics) of the British Association for the Advancement of 
Science, held in Glasgow on September 10th, 1928, and published the same year 
(Young 1928). The same year too were published the proceedings of the 
conference commemorating the sesquicentennial of the Wealth of Nations, held in 
Chicago two years prior (Hollander et al. 1928). That the next major anniversary of 
this work (the bicentennial of the Wealth of Nations, in 1976) would be held where 
he was speaking, Allyn Young could not know, of course. But that he chose to make 
                                                                                                                                                                  
the sea-coast, and along the banks of navigable rivers, that industry of every kind naturally 
begins to subdivide and improve itself” (WN I.iii.3, p. 32). Consider also Currie’s (1981, p. 
52, 55, 57) false claim,  on the same subject, that, while Young made the market a dynamic 
force in the growth process, Smith considered it merely as a fixed limit (which makes one 
wonder why Young would have looked for inspiration in Smith’s theorem in the first 
place); or his equally false claim (Currie 1981, p. 54) that for Smith economic progress was 
not linked to the division of labour but to international trade (this is quite an absurd claim 
in itself, considering how much stress Smith laid on the role of the division of labour in 
economic progress from the very first lines of the Wealth of Nations, but even more 
puzzling when one considers that for Smith, in any case, the development of trade — 
whether national or international — was, in any case, inextricably linked to the division of 
labour). 
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“Adam Smith’s famous theorem that the division of labour depends upon the 
extent of the market” the Leitmotiv of his address, “in much the way that some 
minor composer borrows a theme from one of the masters and adds certain 
developments or variations of his own”, was likely related to him holding his 
address in the city where Smith studied and taught. “That theorem, I have always 
thought,” wrote Young, “is one of the most illuminating and fruitful generalisations 
which can be found anywhere in the whole literature of economics” (Young 1928, 
p. 529).  
Smith’s “theorem” that the division of labour is limited by the extent of the 
market was thus brought to the attention of economists in Young’s justly famous 
article, amidst a controversy then raging in British (and American) economics on 
the question of increasing versus decreasing costs and returns and the question of 
external economies, often referred to as the 1920s cost-controversy. While Young 
wrote in the course of this controversy (one that he had himself helped to spark, 
with a noted review of Pigou’s 1912 Wealth and Welfare in 1913), he actually 
started his 1928 address and paper by declaring that it was not meant to 
contribute to this debate, one that Young felt was excessively constrained in 
outlook, but rather to show that the debate itself had to be resituated within a 
much vaster question, that of growth and development, the central theme of 
Smith’s Wealth of Nations (and possibly of classical economics as a whole). This 
theme had by then largely been relegated to the sidelines, if not abandoned 
altogether, by an economics profession that — as Nicholas Kaldor, a student of 
Young’s when he held his address, remarked fifty years later — had become used 
to “focusing attention on the allocative functions of markets to the exclusion of 
their creative functions” (Kaldor 1972, p. 1240). 
Young died in 1929. He was unable to react himself to the uses and readings 
that were made of his contribution — or indeed to contribute himself to the 
“formidable” research program that he had contributed to spark by the 
resuscitation of Smith’s ideas on division of labour and extent of the market. “On 
re-reading this paper after a lapse of many years,” wrote Kaldor (1972, p. 1243), “I 
feel convinced that it was so many years ahead of its time that the progress of 
economic thought has passed it by despite the attention it received at the time of 
its original publication. Economists ceased to take any notice of it long before they 
were able to grasp its full revolutionary implications.” Robbins (1968, p. 40) 
similarly stated: “it has always been an amazing thing to me that this path-
breaking development should have attracted so comparatively little notice.” This is 
not fully accurate. Joseph Schumpeter, too, had warned, in his posthumous treatise 
on the history of economics, that “This great economist and brilliant theorist is in 
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danger of being forgotten” (1986 [1954], p. 842). But what he wrote about Young 
in a piece published only a few years after Young’s death is maybe more relevant, 
namely that Young’s work “lives on in the work of others to an extent which it is 
impossible to estimate”; and: “Rarely, if ever, has fame comparable to his been 
acquired on the basis of so little published work” (Schumpeter 1935, p. 514-5). It is 
not an exaggeration to declare, indeed, that Young’s 1928 paper alone deeply 
shaped the thinking of an entire generation of development economists (the first 
such generation, in fact). Lauchlin Currie (another one of Young’s students) later 
observed that “Those economists who, like myself, have stressed the importance of 
an initially high and a sustained rate of growth (Rosenstein-Rodan’s Big Push, 
Leibenstein’s Critical Minimum Effort, my Breakthrough or Leading Sector 
Strategy, and others who advocated export and other policies without giving them 
special names) doubtless at some time or other have read Young on Smith” (1981, 
p. 59). Thus, while Young’s article did not find much resonance in general 
economic theory during the 20th century, it did heavily influence those economists 
of that century who were concerned with questions of growth and development, 
taking on more institutional presence after the foundation of the United Nations 
after World War II and the inscription of the development of the “Third world”24 as 
a major objective of international diplomacy during (and as part of) the Cold War. 
Young deeply influenced, notably, the two major post-war development 
economists Paul Rosenstein-Rodan and Ragnar Nurkse. Another noted 
development economist, Hla Myint, was also influenced by Young’s 1928 
contribution (an influence he only obliquely acknowledged25) to reconnect the 
Smithian theme of division of labour and extent of the market with the question of 
trade and development, then the subject of international debate.26  Nor did Young’s 
paper fall into oblivion after the wave of development economics of the 1940-60s 
ebbed out. In more recent decades, those economists associated with what has 
become known as the “New Growth” and “New Trade” theories (and the “New 
                                                        
24 The term was coined in a newspaper article by French demographer Alfred Sauvy 
(1952). 
25 Myint (1943, p. 20, n. 1); but also Myint (1946, p. 121); and Myint (1958, p. 319, n. 1). 
26 In 1949 Singer and Prebisch formulated their thesis on the terms of trade commonly 
viewed as having founded the “dependency” school of trade theory (Prebisch 1949 ; Singer 
1949). Wide-ranging debates on trade and development were held by economists over the 
following decades largely within the bodies of the United Nations. (Singer worked at the 
UN Department of Economic Affairs while Prebisch was employed by the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean [ECLA/CEPAL] (see further Toye & Toye 
2003). The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD] was 
established in 1964 as a permanent intergovernmental body.) 
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Economic Geography”) have again connected their research project to Young’s 
name — and, sometimes, through Young to Smith.27 
The deeper implications of Young’s restatement of Smith’s observations on 
the division of labour and the extent of the market, however, were indeed rarely 
grasped, or in any case not meaningfully incorporated in their theories by those 
authors who referred to Young, both in the mid-20th century (as noted by Currie 
1981, p. 59; and Perälä 2006) and at the century’s end (see on this Lavezzi 2003a ; 
Chandra & Sandilands 2005 ; Sandilands 2009). It may well be that the historical, 
sociological, demographic, geographic, legal and political as well as economic — in 
short the comprehensive — theory of the progress of society of Adam Smith, which 
Allyn Young alluded to, was largely impossible to be done justice to by a discipline 
that had come to see economic development almost exclusively through the lens of 
the growth of such statistical entities as the national rates of savings, investment or 
GDP. More specifically, between the preoccupation of Smith and his contemporary 
Enlightenment philosophers with the progress of society and the dominant 
paradigm of post-Marginal-Revolution economics, centred around the static 
allocation of resources with given factors of production (and factor proportions!) 
and constant returns to scale, there may have been too large a gap for Young’s 
eloquent but often obscure prose to bridge. In many regards, Young himself was 
maybe too deeply shaped by this paradigm. As Douglas North expressed it in his 
1993 Nobel memorial lecture:  
There is no mystery why the field of development has failed to develop 
during the five decades since the end of World War II. Neoclassical theory 
is simply an inappropriate tool to analyze and prescribe policies that will 
induce development. It is concerned with the operation of markets, not 
with how markets develop.  . . .  The very methods employed by 
neoclassical economists have dictated the subject matter and militated 
                                                        
27 Young is the starting point of Nurkse’s considerations on the “International Aspects of 
the Problem of Economic Development”, cited, with Smith, in the opening paragraph of the 
article (Nurkse 1952, p. 571). Young is cited by Rosenstein-Rodan in his “Notes on the 
Theory of the 'Big Push'” (1961, p. 60). Paul Romer cited Young in the article often 
considered the inauguration of the “New/Endogenous Growth” literature (Romer 1986a), 
and elaborated on the connection to Young in a working paper subtitled “Growth as 
Described by Allyn Young” (1986b). Paul Krugman (1993, p. 27) describes Young as the 
starting point for the theme of “circular causation” that he sees as one of the building 
blocks of the tradition (which he would like to resuscitate through a “Counter-
Counterrevolution in Development Theory”) that he names the “high development theory” 
of the 1940s-60s, amalgamating under this label the theories of Rosenstein-Rodan and 
Nurkse with the ones of Arthur Lewis, Gunnar Myrdal and Albert Hirschman (thus 
garnering the protest of the latter, who objected: “When I wrote The Strategy of Economic 
Development, my 'enemies' were exactly those people with whom my name is now being 
associated” (Hirschman 1998, p. 109); see further note 29 below). 
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against such a development. That theory in the pristine form that gave it 
mathematical precision and elegance modelled a frictionless and static 
world.  . . .  In the analysis of economic performance through time it 
contained [the] erroneous assumptions  . . .  that time does not matter 
(North 1994, p. 359).28  
This criticism of the disregard by 20th century development economists of the 
importance of time is quite to the point when one considers that although Young, 
in 1928, warned his readers that “An industrial dictator, with foresight and 
knowledge, could hasten the pace somewhat, but he could not achieve an Aladdin-
like transformation of a country’s industry, so as to reap the fruits of a half-
century’s ordinary progress in a few years”, this “Aladdin-like transformation of a 
country’s industry  . . . to reap the fruits of a half-century’s ordinary progress in a
few years” is precisely what the mid-20th century development economists seem to 
have wanted to achieve with such programmes as the “Big Push”, “Balanced 
Growth” or the “Critical Minimum Effort”, which Smith himself quite certainly 
would have decried as “folly and presumption” from the part of “m[e]n of system”. 
As Albert Hirschman poignantly observed in 1958, “the balanced growth theory 
reaches the conclusion that an entirely new, self-contained modern industrial 
economy must be superimposed on the stagnant and equally self-contained 
traditional sector” (Hirschman 1958, p. 52).29 
                                                        
28 It is not certain that North’s own “new institutional economics” very radically departed 
from this “Neoclassical theory” that he so vehemently attacked in his Nobel lecture. (There 
seems to be a trend, indeed, for Nobel laureates in economics to attack the very theories, 
paradigm and methodology that they themselves were so instrumental in setting up and 
consolidating and that they often fervently defended all throughout their career up to this 
point. John Hicks and Paul Krugman are an early and late case in point.) 
29 While Hirschman (rightly) criticised this particular ahistorical aspect of the theory, he 
was not in fact very far removed from the general outlook that most of his contemporary 
economists, which he criticised, had on the economy and the growth process. He very 
much shared both their conceptualisations and the idea that economic growth must be 
forcefully brought about through state action, as the market alone could not be trusted to 
produce growth. (He was also himself involved in economic planning, as financial advisor 
to the National Planning Board, and later private economic counsellor, of Colombia 
(Adelman 2013, p. 295-324).) As Nath perceptively notes in his critique of “unbalanced 
growth”: “Hirschman would like to have it both ways, as far as state action is concerned. 
On the one hand, he makes a bitter attack on balanced growth because this concept 
recommends extended action, and, on the other hand, in his concluding chapter he says: "  . 
. .  purely permissive sequences may be ineffective in inducing growth  . . .  the government 
may well have to take the first step in the more compulsive sequences."  . . .  in spite of 
Hirschman’s loud and bitter denunciations of balanced growth, it is difficult to see if he has 
any real quarrel with the concept” (1962, p. 146-8). Amartya Sen, similarly, stated that 
“Controversies on "balanced" versus "unbalanced" growth tend to leave the readers — at 
least, one reader — a little puzzled” (Sen 1960). (But then Sen went on to explain very 
clearly the difference between the two.) For a recent take on the issue see Alacevich 
39 
Kenneth Boulding (1971, p. 229) observed that “in the theory of economic 
development, one sometimes doubts whether all the modern refinements and 
mathematical models are much more than talmudic exercises on the fundamental 
insight of Adam Smith regarding the division of labor, the extent of the market, the 
impact of accumulation, and the effects of rising knowledge”. Indeed, as Santayana 
(1905, p. 284) famously wrote, “Those who cannot remember the past are 
condemned to repeat it”,30 and this is no different in the history of thought. It is no 
surprise, then, that 20th century economists, insufficiently read in the history of 
their discipline, kept on reinventing the wheel — a process that did not stop at the 
century’s turn. But reinventing the wheel without also reinventing the axle and the 
bearing will leave a vehicle unwieldy. 
The question of returns — diminishing or increasing — was from the 
beginning connected to population.31 It is from an increasing population and the 
ensuing need to farm lands of a lesser and lesser quality that the diminishing 
returns in Ricardo’s theory of rent (and before him, in the identical ones of 
Anderson [1777] and West [1815] (Schumpeter 1986 [1954], p. 252-4)) arise. And 
in Smith’s conception of increasing returns, it is, too, from an increasing population 
that the opposite result is derived: by augmenting the possibilities of division of 
labour, population growth occasions larger per capita production and income. A 
larger supply of labour (i.e. a larger population), according to Smith, allows for 
more division of labour, which augments the general level of productivity.32 
Without this incorporation within the peopling process, Smith’s theory of 
increasing returns by division of labour remains incomplete. Young alluded to this 
connection between division of labour and population. He remarked that “Senior’s 
positive doctrine is well known, and there were others who made note of the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
(2011). Despite these resemblances, however, it is perhaps not surprising that the very 
Smithian criticism of mid-20th century development theory that Hirschman formulated 
came from him, who had deeply engaged with Smith’s work since his arrival in America  
(Adelman 2013, p. 190, 212–13, 346, 400), and who would return more meaningfully to 
Smith in his work of intellectual history (Hirschman 1977) published at about the same 
time as the bicentennial edition of the Wealth of Nations. 
30 Much less known (and likely much less agreeable to those who tend to misattribute the 
sentence to Marx) are the lines immediately preceding, with clear undertones of 
Santayana’s conservative philosophy: “Progress, far from consisting in change, depends on 
retentiveness. When change is absolute there remains no being to improve and no 
direction is set for possible improvement: and when experience is not retained, as among 
savages, infancy is perpetual”. 
31 Both Schumpeter and Robbins treat of the subject within their respective chapter on 
population (Robbins 1968, p. 22-43; Schumpeter 1986 [1954], p. 247-52). 
32 See the concluding sentences of Smith’s chapter on wages cited on p. 24 above. 
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circumstance that with the growth of population and of markets new opportunities 
for the division of labour appear and new advantages attach to it” and that “They 
added nothing to Adam Smith’s famous theorem” (Young 1928, p. 529). But by 
writing of “population and of markets” (a distinction repeated several times in the 
paper), and by the very peripheral reference to the subject of population 
throughout his famous article, Young did in fact more to divert the issue of division 
of labour and extent of the market away from the intimate connection with 
geographic and demographic factors that it had in Smith’s theory than to draw 
attention to this connection. 
Those development economists like Rosenstein-Rodan and Nurkse who built 
on Young’s reconsideration of Smith’s thoughts on the division of labour and the 
extent of the market further neglected the connection between industrialisation 
and the peopling process, which is one of the reasons why they were led to regard 
the dependence of the division of labour on the extent of the market as constraint 
rather than opportunity. The other reason, already alluded to, was their belief — 
characteristic of mid-20th century development economics and diametrically 
opposed to Smith’s (and Young’s) thinking — that economic development was a 
process that needed to be launched and sustained by governments rather than 
proceeding gradually and autonomously from forces within society. From a 
Smithian perspective, Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) thus presented a false dilemma of 
heavy industry not being able to be launched ex nihilo in a largely agrarian and 
rural economy.33 Let alone the question of whether people would remain working 
on the land who did not produce anything — which was notably disputed by 
Schultz (1932), so that the consensus of agrarian economists mentioned by 
Rosenstein-Rodan (1944, p. 160) that there was a large untapped labour-force of 
disguisedly unemployed in rural areas did not in fact exist —, Rosenstein-Rodan’s 
view seems to amount to the proposition that, since, as Young, drawing on Smith, 
had brought forward, everything in the development process depends on 
                                                        
33 Rosenstein-Rodan (1943, p. 205) exposed the problem thus: “Let us assume that 20,000 
unemployed workers in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe are taken from the land and 
put into a large shoe factory.  . . .  If these workers spent all their wages on shoes, a market 
for the products of their enterprise would arise  . . .  The trouble is that the workers will 
not spend all their wages on shoes.” Less famous but equally telling is the way he put it in 
an article published the following year: “all the agrarian economists of the world agree 
that if those people were removed from the land agricultural output, far from falling, 
would increase. But these people cannot move away from the land, because there are no 
machines, tools or plants to give them employment elsewhere, and bare labour without 
equipment can produce nothing. Again, even if there existed tools and machines for them 
to use, there would be neither food nor shelter for them during the interval between 
leaving the land and finding work” (1944, p. 160). 
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everything else, for there to be any transformation at all, everything needs to 
change at once, and this could be brought about by outside influence only. There is 
no room in this view for an autonomous, gradual, organic type of change. Young, by 
contrast, had remarked, in line with Smith, that the conclusion “that no real 
economic progress could come through the operation of forces engendered within 
the economic system” was “repugnant to common sense” (1928, p. 535).34 For 
Smith, urbanisation and industrialisation depended on each other and 
urbanisation was the natural outcome of the progress of society — a process that 
could be hampered by the wrong policies, but did not need to be aided or brought 
about by government in order to proceed, as he developed notably in Book III of 
the Wealth of Nations. The peopling process (of which urbanisation is but one 
aspect) was seen by Smith as an integral part of the progress of society, as emerges 
clearly from a consideration of the conjectural history of humanity developed in 
the Lectures on Jurisprudence. For Smith, then, industrialisation and urbanisation 
were faces of the same coin: one does not build a shoe factory in disconnected 
space, and for good reasons. Industry (the 18th century equivalent of which Smith 
called manufactures) needs the backbone of urban agglomeration of workforce 
and infrastructure, which, once present, naturally leads to the development of 
industry. The peopling process is thus a central feature of the transition from a 
“backward” (in 20th century parlance) to a modern economy, and cities can 
naturally grow-up in a symbiotic interrelationship with their hinterland only (or 
with more far-away lands by foreign trade) and are not created ex-nihilo. 
The same cecity toward the role of the peopling process in economic 
development is evident even in those late 20th century writings specifically aimed 
at reconsidering the role of population in the development process — and building 
on the more recent revival of the theme of increasing returns in economics —, such 
as Becker, Murphy, and Tamura (1990a) and Becker, Glaeser, and Murphy (1999), 
in which population growth is held to be a positive force for economic 
development in countries already largely urbanised and industrialised, while being 
an obstacle to development in societies still largely rural and agrarian, without any 
consideration of how the latter category of countries are to evolve to the former, 
thus largely defeating the purpose of studies aimed at a better understanding of 
economic development. 
In an article published in 2007 in Afrique Contemporaine (a journal edited by 
the French Development Agency and mostly read by international aid and 
development practitioners), Jean-Marie Cour comments on a report by the agency 
                                                        
34 See also on this Young’s piece “Big Business: How the economic system grows and 
evolves like a living organism” (Young 1999 [1929]). 
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on the “Challenge of African agriculture”  (Devèze 2008). This report expressed the 
(common) fear that the productivity of African small scale farming could not keep 
pace with the fast growing population, leading to an increased dependency on food 
imports and foreign food aid on the continent. Several factors are identified as 
contributing to this dire situation of African agriculture, among which dwindling 
natural resources, the stagnation of agricultural yields and limited possibilities for 
farmers to expand or reconvert. Cour expresses a contrarian view. The analysis the 
report provides of the situation, he remarks, “does not tell us why African farmers 
are poor and little productive. To invoke climatic hazards, land insecurity, 
weaknesses and inconsistencies of agricultural policies and lack of professionalism 
and training of farmers and to try to remedy these is certainly useful,” he goes on, 
“but the first thing to do is to return to the source of the problem.” Cour’s analysis, 
indeed is another: 
If the Burkinabé farmer is poorer and less productive than his European 
counterpart, it is first of all because he has at his disposal a number of 
consumers, that is to say an internal market, several hundreds of times 
smaller. Tomorrow, this farmer will be able to produce a larger surplus, 
adopt more intensive production techniques, buy more inputs and increase 
the specialisation of his production only insofar as the market that he will 
have at his disposal will allow him to. Without this growth of the market, 
policy and agricultural projects can have in this regard only a limited 
influence. 
The first challenge is therefore to ensure that each African farmer has 
at his disposal a steadily growing market. If consumers — for the most part 
city dwellers — are able to purchase foodstuff from the rural areas at a 
reasonable price, and if cities are able to receive migrants decently, then 
the conditions for a progressive resolution of the problem are in place. 
To meet the challenge of African agriculture, therefore, we must first 
understand how the division of labour between producers and consumers 
operates. We have to address why and how cities attract migrants, and 
inquire what happens to the new urbanites. And we must understand how 
rural and urban areas interact. 
In one word, we must start by taking an interest in the settlement 
process [processus de peuplement], in the sense of the growth and 
redistribution of the population. This approach through the peopling 
process is the best way to become aware of the kind of restructuring that 
macro-economic and sectoral policies and donors’ interventions ought to 
strive to support and not to hinder. (Cour 2007, p. 363-4, my translation) 
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The very Smithian language of markets and division of labour that the author 
employs to make his point about the fruitful prospect that urbanisation potentially 
opens for African agriculture will have eluded few (except possibly Cour himself 
35). The last paragraph of the long quoted passage is thereby of particular 
importance for the perspective adopted in the present work. Cour’s remark that an 
understanding of the natural progression of the settlement process is crucial in 
order to recognise what dynamics policy makers and their advisers ought to 
support rather than hinder to favour economic development is indeed the main 
point Adam Smith makes, forcefully, in Book III of the Wealth of Nations. Like Cour, 
Adam Smith conceptualised the settlement process together with the process of 
economic development — the two being inherently linked, if not largely 
synonymous — through the lens of the division of labour, urbanisation being the 
spatial expression of the division of labour between food-producers and non-food-
producers. Rural and urban development were thus closely intertwined and 
mutually beneficial for Smith, and for local economic development to proceed, 
Smith stressed, it was crucial that this symbiotic process be encouraged and not 
disturbed at the regional level.36 
Cour’s complaint about the way the various specialists at present approach 
the question of economic development — namely that, even when population is 
                                                        
35 Cour declared in 2008, at a public conference at the AFD on African urbanisation, in 
response to a question from the audience, that he had little interest in and no knowledge 
of the history of economic thought. By contrast, Tiffen (2003), who a few years earlier 
formulated a very similar perspective on African development to Cour’s, expressly 
referred to and cited Smith (2003, p. 1345-47).  
36 One may also compare the citation from Cour to the following passage in the Lectures on 
Jurisprudence, in which the importance of both opportunities for the exportation of 
agricultural produce and of the internal demand for it is stressed: “There are many errors 
in the police of almost every country, which have contributed greatly to stop the progress 
of agriculture. Our fathers, finding themselves once in every two or three years subject to 
the most grievous dearths, to escape that calamity prohibited the exportation of corn. This 
is still the police of the greater part of Europe, and it is the cause of all that dearth it is 
intended to prevent. In a plentifull year the corn of Spain, tho' the most fertile country in 
the world, is not worth the cutting down. They suffer it to lye rotting on the ground, 
because they would get nothing for it. The cause of this is not the indolence of the people, 
as is commonly imagined. The fact is, the farmer, finding he cannot dispose of his corn this 
year, will not risk a crop next year, but turns his grounds to grass. Next year a famine 
ensues, and he sows more than can be disposed of for the following season. It is to be 
observed that this was one great cause of the depopulation of ancient Italy. Exportation of 
corn was prohibited by severe penalties, and the importation of it encouraged by high 
premiums. So that the Italian farmers had no encouragement to industry, not being sure of 
a market. In the latter times of the republic the emperors tried several methods of 
promoting the cultivation of the country, but being ignorant that the real cause of their 
want was the immense quantity of corn daily imported from Egypt and other parts of 
Africa, all their endeavours were ineffectuall” (LJ(B) 296-7, p. 525). 
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written about as a subject matter in this connection, any systematic view of the 
phenomenon in its dynamic dimension is absent — applies with equal force to 
contemporary readings of Adam Smith’s theory of economic development. The role 
of population is usually left out altogether, or mentioned only in passing. And when 
population is addressed, it is generally treated in an anachronistic way, in the 
sense that population, both as concept and field of study, is understood in its 20th 
century sense of a certain quantity of people inhabiting a certain territory. But, as 
already mentioned, the word population, having come into use in both English and 
French only in the second half of the 18th century, was describing, in its original 
meaning, the process of the growth and distribution of a people over a territory. 
The meaning of the term, therefore, was inherently dynamic. It corresponded, 
precisely, to what Cour refers to as “peuplement”, which can be rendered in 
modern English as either “peopling” or “settlement” (understood too as process) 
— a meaning still present in the contrary notion of “depopulation”, as famously 
noted by Foucault (2004 [1977-78], p. 69).  
While not dedicating any part of his work specifically to the subject of 
population, nor, by the same token, to the subject of “improvement”, both these 
phenomena are absolutely central to Smith’s conception of the progress of society, 
with the advance in wealth, improvement and population being inherently linked 
and largely inseparable. As Brennan  (2013, p. 5) remarks, “the connection 
between economic parameters and population” can well be thought, indeed, “to 
underlie  . . .  Smith’s grand intellectual scheme”. Without awareness of the 
historical meaning of the term “population”, however, the 21st century reader of 
the Wealth of Nation is likely to miss the important relationship Smith saw 
between these processes, manifest in expressions such as “restraining the 
population and industry of the country” (IV.v.a.8, p. 509), “The high wages of 
labour encourage population” (IV.vii.b.3, p. 566), or, most markedly, in the phrase 
“the progress  . . .  in wealth, population and improvement” (IV.vii.b.6, p. 567; 
IV.vii.c.23, p. 598; IV.vii.c.79, p. 625), appearing, with slight variations, fifteen times 
throughout the work.37  
                                                        
37 The exact phrase appears three times, at the places given above. With the term “wealth” 
omitted, and in slightly varying order of the terms, the phrase appears a further three 
times (at I.xi.m.7, p. 247; IV.vii.b.3, p. 566; and IV.vii.b.7, p. 568). In nine other places, the 
phrase “population and improvement” (or the inverse) is adduced with adjectives such as 
“increasing” or “advanced”. In these instances, “population” can be read as denoting a 
quantity (which increases). Sticking with the meaning of process, on the other hand, 
“increasing population” would be read as an acceleration of the process of peopling. Given 
the changing meaning of the term at precisely that time, it is difficult if not impossible to 
know which one of these meanings Smith precisely intended in each instance (or whether 
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When Smith wrote, in the second half of the 18th century, the relation 
between population (in the sense described), the location of economic activity, and 
economic progress was a common theme in political economy. Sir James Steuart 
wrote on the division of labour between town and country (Beckmann 1981); so 
had William Petty a century prior.38 Richard Cantillon also wrote on spatial issues 
in relation to prices (Hébert 1981). The shift away from spatial aspects (and with 
them population, at least in this connection) came with Ricardo and his new 
approach to explain trade, based on comparative advantage as opposed to the 
division of labour.  
It is only natural, then, that these issues mattered also greatly in Smith’s 
work. Yet, despite the importance of spatial and population aspects for Smith, 
notably for the very definition of the concept of the market, central to Smith’s 
analysis (as examined in Chapter 2), geographic considerations — as are 
demographic ones — are largely neglected in the huge secondary literature there 
is on Smith. There has been very little written, notably, specifically on Smith’s 
theory of urbanisation (and more largely location), in the 20th and the 21st century 
thus far, which is surprising given the regained interest in spatial aspects in 
economics in recent decades, spearheaded by Krugman’s (1994) writings, and the 
fact that Krugman himself specifically credited Smith as an influence in this regard 
(1990a, p. 4).39  
                                                                                                                                                                  
he always knew for sure). But in any case, the meaning (whether of an increasing quantity 
or an accelerating growth) is always inherently dynamic. 
38 A passage in Petty on the production of watches bears striking resemblance to Smith’s 
famous passage on the production of pins in the first chapter of the Wealth of Nations, and 
Petty there also explicitly ties this type of production to its dependence on an urban 
setting, as would Smith in the third chapter of the Wealth of Nations. On Petty’s spatial 
considerations, see Dimou and Pecqueur (2011). (And one could always go back even 
further for a similar treatment of the subject, of course, notably to the mid-14th century 
Arab philosopher Ibn Khaldun; on Khaldun, in this connection, see Von Sivers (1980); 
Weiss (1995) and Al-Hamdi (2006)). 
39 Among the few works that can be found which deal squarely with Smith’s approach to 
“regional science” or “economic geography” (the anachronism is duly noted), tribute has to 
be paid to the excellent excavation of Smith’s urban theory carried out by William Stull 
(1986), without much doubt the most complete of its kind, of which the unwarranted 
neglect even by those historians of thought explicitly interested in Book III and 
geographical aspects of Smith’s thought may only be explained, perhaps, by its publication 
in the Journal of Urban Economics, not greatly known for its contributions to the history of 
economic thought. Though it is essentially a critique of Smith’s approach in the spirit of 
Karl Polanyi (to whom is referred), Gene Mumy’s (1978/1979) account of the relationship 
between town and country in the Wealth of Nations also warrants mention for its 
completeness. Dow (1974) recounts the similarity of Smith’s theory of urban origin to the 
one of the French mid-20th century historian Henri Pirenne. None of these works, 
however, considers the urban theme in Smith within the larger perspective of the 
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Book III was often omitted from many reduced editions of the Wealth of 
Nations. A very small proportion only of the secondary literature on the Wealth of 
Nations (of the past half-century at least), moreover, is concerned with Book III. 
While we could explain this fact by reason of Book III being the shortest of all five 
books,40 this is not an entirely satisfactory explanation. Indeed, taking a stand here 
against Hollander, who thinks Book III is of little importance for Smith’s general 
argument (1998 [1976], p. 94), notwithstanding the lesser volume Smith devoted 
to this part of the Wealth of Nations, for him to have deemed these chapters worthy 
of being organised into a separate book, he must have considered them to be of 
particular importance to the overall argument, especially when we know how long 
Smith took to write what came to be his magnum opus, and how concerned he was 
with organising and presenting arguments in a logical and rhetorically effective 
way.41  
The theory of increasing returns by division of labour through an extension 
of the market, at the centre of Smith’s theory of progress in the Wealth of Nations, 
thus has to be considered within the 18th century vision of progress that 
incorporated the peopling process, without which the theory remains incomplete, 
as shall be analysed centrally in Chapter 2. In this view, population is a causal force 
in the progress of society through the increasing returns that society reaps from an 
extension of the market. This does not mean, however, that a view of the resource-
limiting effect of population growth —that can be associated with diminishing 
returns to population — does not also play a role in Smith’s theory. In fact, as 
Schumpeter (1986 [1954], p. 242, 247-52) — but not Robbins (1968) — 
recognised, these positions “are not the mutually exclusive opposites they seemed 
to be to so many people” (1986 [1954], p. 247).  
A sophisticated population theory, with some air of comprehensiveness, will 
necessarily incorporate elements of both positions. 18th century conjectural 
history, analysed under this angle in Chapter 1, notably, is such a comprehensive 
theory, incorporating both the negative feedback population growth can bring 
about in the short run, through the pressure it puts on a system of food 
procurement adapted to a smaller population, and the positive feedback it 
                                                                                                                                                                  
settlement process, of which it is, yet, one of the central features. With the exception of 
Stull, the role of population is eluded altogether. 
40 Books I, IV and V are almost exactly equal in length (260 pages, +/- 3, in the Glasgow 
Edition). Book II, with 100 pages, is less than half the size of these three. Book III, in turn, 
is, with only 52 pages, only half the size of Book II, and less than a fifth of the size of the 
three other books.  
41 Smith elaborates at length on the most effective ways to construct arguments in his 
Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. 
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occasions in the long run through increased division of labour and technological 
progress. The latter effect was indeed largely conceived, in this theory, as being a 
consequence of the first. Schumpeter (1986 [1954], p. 251) remarked that “there is 
no law of decreasing returns to technological progress” (italics in original), and 
technological progress can be understood, indeed, within the “historical increasing 
returns” that take place over the long run as an effect of population growth. Yet, 
any given technology is itself subject to diminishing returns, and in the theory of 
progress of 18th century (and earlier) conjectural historians, it is in fact the 
decreasing returns to a given technology of food procurement that push human 
societies to adopt superior means of subsistence. The diminishing returns that 
population provokes in the short run thus themselves are instrumental in the 
increasing returns that are its effect in the long run. Even Malthus, as we shall see 
in Chapter 1, usually credited exclusively with the resource-limiting view of 
population growth (to which his name has indeed been given), incorporated this 
logic into his argument.  
The integration of both the resource-limiting (diminishing returns) and 
resource-augmenting (increasing returns) view of population growth is very 
visible in Smith’s conjectural history developed in the Lectures on Jurisprudence 
(and more precisely the later discovered, more complete, set of student notes). 
This two-edged effect of population growth is present also in the Wealth of Nations. 
Yet, as the latter was read over the past century without a view to the integration 
between population and development in Smith’s thinking, the relation between 
these two interrelated effects of population on economic returns has been 
overlooked by most readers of Smith. The covert presence in the Wealth of Nations 
of these themes can be brought more fully to light notably by exploring how the 
four stages theory of the Lectures on Jurisprudence blends into the development 
theory presented by Smith in the Wealth of Nations, which is the approach taken in 
this work.  
* 
In French demographic writing the term “populationist” is generally used and 
understood to mean a position in favour of population growth. In English, the term 
is more rare, and more ambiguous. Schumpeter, in his monumental (posthumous) 
treatise on the history of economic thought (published in English), used the term in 
this sense. But the term “anti-Malthusian” is more generally preferred for this idea 
in the English literature. This latter term, however, is in fact extremely ambiguous. 
What does it mean precisely to be anti-Malthusian? Was Jean-Baptiste Say, for 
example, an anti-Malthusian because he was opposed to Malthus’ population 
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theory, or because he was opposed to his theory of general gluts? Or are these two 
inseparable? If so, was Ricardo both pro- and anti-Malthusian? More 
fundamentally, the position that is generally associated with the term “anti-
Malthusian”, when it is used, is one highlighting the negative consequences of 
population growth over its positive ones, and more generally one opposed to 
population growth and in favour of population-limitation. The problem is that 
Malthus himself — in any case in the first edition of his Essay on the Principle of 
Population, but also, surely, when the entirety of his work is considered — neither 
laid more stress on the negative consequences of population growth than on its 
positive ones (both of these play an important role in his theory in fact), nor was 
he opposed to population growth in general, but he was in fact very much opposed 
to the limitation of population by artificial means, so that all the positions generally 
associated with the term anti-Malthusian are in fact perfectly compatible, for the 
most part, with Malthus’ actual position, while such ideas generally called 
“Malthusian” are, more often than not, very much at odds with Malthus’ original 
thought. This general anachronistic and highly ambiguous use of the terms 
“Malthusian” and “anti-Malthusian” leads me to eschew both these terms in the 
present work. It also warrants the inclusion of a lengthy section on Malthus’ actual 
position, in relation to Smith’s, in the first chapter.  
A lot of confusion exists in the secondary literature as to the meaning of 
progress, and the role population is thought to play in it. The conclusion on 
whether an author has an “optimistic” or a “pessimistic” outlook with regard to 
population cannot be derived from his thoughts on the effects of population on 
industry, urbanisation and government alone, for example, without inquiring at the 
same time into whether these effects, independently from what brought them 
about, are deemed good or bad in themselves. Two authors may write the same 
thing about a particular issue, may derive the same effects from a particular cause, 
yet one approves of these effects and the other one doesn’t. Who of the two is an 
optimist and who a pessimist? The difficulty indetermining this becomes 
immediately apparent in this example — much more information is needed to 
judge than the one that is supplied. Yet it is in these limited ways, with little 
context provided, that the differences between writers are usually presented in the 
secondary literature and that the labels “optimist” or “pessimist” (with regard to 
the effects of population — and sometimes in an even larger sense, further diluting 
any meaning the word could have) are often used. And the same difficulty too 
besieges, for the same reason, the labels “populationist", “natalist”, or indeed 
“Malthusian” (in the very large sense it is used today — including meanings that 
are not only not representative of, but directly opposite to Malthus’s own position). 
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It may be best to avoid these labels altogether, then, and examine what writers 
wrote about the effects of population in a more limited ambition and perspective, 
which may ultimately be able to throw more light on the larger issues.  
The two fundamental insights concerning population and development that 
are contained in Adam Smith’s work are today, both of them, largely unknown, by 
economists as well as by demographers. To uncover these two fundamental 
insights, and restore to them their proper place in Smith scholarship, by 
reconnecting them to the rest of his oeuvre, is the primary aim of the present work. 
It is hoped, further, that this will contribute to revive interest for these ideas more 
generally, and specifically in the field of studies today commonly referred to as 
“population and development”. Both of these insights are in line with what has 
been referred to above as the “populationist” position. The first, however, could be 
assimilated with the “anti-populationist” (wrongly referred to as “Malthusian”) 
position if it is read in an incomplete manner (and has indeed been read in this 
manner and inspired such perspectives).   
The first of these two fundamental insights is the one today associated most 
commonly with the name of Ester Boserup (although, as we shall see in the first 
chapter, it was a common idea for millennia before she wrote): namely that 
technological innovation depends in large part (at the macro- i.e. the societal level) 
on pressure of population. Population growth, according to this idea, lays a stress 
on the relationship between man and nature. Man, at the outset — variously 
defined, either (in Abrahamic religious terms) as the time before “the fall”, or 
(before the advent of the Abrahamic religions and in secular accounts of human 
existence since) as a “state of nature”, or “savage state” — lives in small groups, 
from hunting and gathering, from hand to mouth, from nature directly, much as 
those animals he hunts. There is no surplus of food in this state of things, or only a 
small one, although not necessarily scarcity either.42 As population grows, 
                                                        
42 Whether the “state of nature” was (like the time before “the fall”) a state of plenty or at 
the contrary one of want was a question in debate in the second half of the 18th century. 
But even when regarded as a state of plenty, this is still compatible with no surplus being 
produced in the economic sense, as surplus (i.e. the storage of goods — as indeed 
production itself) necessitates that there be a reason for producing and storing, which is 
not the case if man can easily subsist from hand to mouth. Rousseau is generally 
associated with the position that the state of nature was one preferable to civilisation, in 
which man was, as in the biblical Eden, intrinsically good (but Rousseau clearly stated this 
to be a hypothetical, not a historical depiction; the aborigines of North America were thus 
regarded by him as already being subject to a form of civilisation, whereas for Smith and 
other conjectural historians they were taken as representative of the savage state, being 
the hypothesised first stage of society). Smith made pronounced statements in the opening 
passages of the Wealth of Nations on the stark contrast between the poverty of savages 
and the greater wealth even of mean workers in civilised society. We do not know, 
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however, much as in other species of animals, the balance between man and his 
ecosystem is disrupted. Those animals and plants the group lives from will become 
increasingly scarce, and there will be shortage of food. This shortage of food, in 
turn, spurns man on (who, at the difference of the other animals can move beyond 
his natural state) to introduce superior technologies of food-production, notably, 
and thus evolve to a more advanced state of society. 
This idea, which can be considered a “population-push” idea of technological 
development,43 forms the main causal mechanism of the progression of socio-
economic stages in Adam Smith’s “four stages theory” of economic development, 
referred to throughout the Wealth of Nations, but most completely laid out in his 
lectures on jurisprudence, only recently recovered in more complete form through 
the discovery of a second set of student notes. This idea can be found in many 
other authors’ work of the time, and even in Malthus’ work in fact (inspired as he 
was by Smith and his contemporaries), although, partly by Malthus’ own doing (as 
this idea did not square too well, in the eyes of contemporary and later readers, 
with the conclusions he wanted to draw from his work), partly by the 
appropriation of Malthus’ work by the neo-Malthusians, with their stress on the 
resource-consuming and scarcity-creating effect of population growth and their 
total neglect of the aspect in question, namely the technology-furthering effect of 
population (which is itself an effect of the first aspect), this idea fell largely into 
oblivion — so much so that the work of Ester Boserup in the 20th century, in which 
this idea played the central role, could be regarded as both novel and as ‘turning 
Malthus on his head’. 
The second fundamental idea on population and development to be found in 
Smith’s work is one that, by analogy with the term “population-push” could be 
referred to as “population-pull”.44 It consists in the idea that what Adam Smith 
recognised (after many others) to be the main engine of economic development, 
being the division of labour, depends on the size of population. While it forms its 
                                                                                                                                                                  
however, in which words he described the time before the “fall of man”, his theological 
teachings that Millar alluded to (as cited by Stewart, in his biographical essay of Smith; see 
Stewart I.18, p. 274), having left no known written trace. Whether the original state was 
conceived in religious or secular terms, and whether it was considered preferable or 
inferior to ulterior states, the idea that civilisation is a state posterior to it was, however, 
shared by all commentators.  
43 It was referred to thus by Simon (1978), and the term was generally adopted, notably in 
reference to Boserup, more recently for example by Strulik (1997) and Mortimore (2003). 
44 Simon (1978) contrasted Boserup’s “population-push” theory of technological 
development with the “invention-pull” theory, associated (wrongly — or in any case with 
insufficient justification) with Malthus. This opposition has become customary in writings 
on population and technology. See notably Mortimore (2003). 
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basis, as we shall closely examine in Chapter 2, this idea is also partly obscured by 
Smith’s famous rendering of this idea by the phrase “the division of labour is 
limited by the extent of the market”. The extent of the market, indeed, while it 
depends at the outset, and most fundamentally, on the size of population, comes to 
integrate many other elements as society progresses: physical infrastructure, 
technology, wealth, capital. These elements, however, are largely intertwined, and 
their definitions overlap to an important extent, and they are inseparably bound 
up, in any case, with the fundamental relationship described by Smith: that to 
divide labour, more than one individual is needed, and the more individuals there 
are, the more labour can be divided. The extent of the market, which holds such a 
pivotal role in Smith’s explanation both of trade and of economic development, is 
defined at the basic level by the size and concentration of population. In a way, of 
course, the principle that the division of labour is limited by the extent of the 
market is simply a different way of expressing the proposition that ‘necessity is the 
mother of invention’. When necessity and opportunity are held to be equivalents 
(or different ways of considering the same reality) the two propositions express 
essentially the same idea — i.e. the two alternative views of population exerting 
either a push- or a pull-agency on economic development are describing merely 
two facets of the same process, similarly to a glass filled to half its capacity 
described as either half-empty or half-full being two ways of depicting the same 
state. 
 
Outline of the work 
 
Within the four stages theory of socio-cultural development characteristic of the 
Enlightenment and used by Smith is contained a “population-push” theory of 
technological development (Chapter 1). This framework functions through the 
“necessity is the mother of invention” mechanism. But not only is necessity the 
mother of invention for Smith, opportunity also is. The division of labour is limited 
by the extent of the market, and the market is largely determined by population. 
Both by the growth in numbers and by the concentration of population and 
therefore shortening of distance are the opportunities for division of labour and 
thus technological advance augmented (Chapter 2). Population is thus both what 
creates hardship through a diminishing returns framework and what relieves this 
hardship through an increasing returns framework. While this can appear 
contradictory to economists trained in the negative feedback framework, Smith’s 
theory of economic development, and his way of conceiving causation more 
generally, is mainly structured along the opposite mechanism of positive feedback, 
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in which various elements reinforce each other in a circular cumulative fashion 
(Chapter 3).  
Further, the 18th century saw a large debate on the role of luxury on society, 
and notably on population: as by Rousseau and Price, luxury was thought by Smith 
to “weaken the powers of procreation”. This may seem far removed from 20th 
century conceptions of the demographic transition, but the way the interaction of 
wealth, fertility and “modernisation” was theorised in the 20th century is in fact in 
the direct lineage of 18th century conceptions of progress. While Smith’s ideas on 
population have never (to my knowledge) been studied from the point of view of 
demographic transition theory, his ideas on the subject, supplemented by Marx’s 
developments, can yield a theory more compatible with the historical record, it is 
argued, than the prevalent neo-Malthusian theory (Chapter 4). 
Chapter 1 
What’s been done? 
Dugald Stewart, Smith’s first biographer, highlighted the role in Smith’s oeuvre of 
what Stewart termed “conjectural history”: a theory of development derived, much 
like modern economics, from a particular behavioural theory universally 
applicable to humans. As this theory, used by many thinkers before and 
contemporary to Smith, featured (mostly) four stages of progress, Ronald Meek 
(1976b) termed it the “four stages theory” in the 1970s. Neither Stewart nor Meek 
remarked emphatically on the role of population within this theory. More recently, 
Craig Smith (2006b) and Gavin Kennedy (2008) have taken notice of it. Neither 
described it as a central feature of the theory, however. Yet the four stages theory 
is as much a theory of population as it is a theory of economic development. 
Malthus’ use of the categories of the four stages theory has also recently been 
remarked on, but here too the connection with population was not drawn. 
What I do 
By establishing a link between Smith’s treatment of the subject and the one of 
many of his contemporaries and predecessors who used the four stages 
framework, with a specific focus on the element of population, more light can be 
shed on the function of this theory, including in the Wealth of Nations. While totally 
ignored during the 19th century, for the simple reason that the lectures in which it 
has such a prominent place only became available to scholars, partly, through the 
student notes recovered by Cannan at the end of the 19th century, the presence and 
importance of the four stages for Smith’s development theory in the Wealth of 
Nations has been disputed in the 20th century, notably by Hollander (1998 [1976]). 
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Stewart and other contemporaries such as Millar had stressed the connectedness 
of Smith’s lectures and published works by an insistence, notably, on the 
importance of conjectural history as a connecting element. By analysing the four 
stages theory through the prism of population theory, which it ceased to be 
regarded as during the 19th and 20th centuries, further connections can be 
recovered between this theoretical tradition and arguments made in the Wealth of 
Nations.  
The thought of Malthus, through its reinterpretation by neo-Malthusianism, 
has become associated principally with the idea of a negative influence of 
population growth on society and the need to curtail population growth. This, 
however, was never Malthus’ own position. The threat of over-population was 
invoked by Malthus primarily to refute the prospect of an abolition of social classes 
raised by Godwin and Condorcet, which explains the wrath he drew from Marx. He 
never advocated for an end to population growth, which in his 18th century 
perspective signalled an end of progress itself. In past decades some attention was 
paid to Malthus’ ideas in favour of population growth formulated in the form of 
theodicy in the last two chapters of the first edition of his Essay on the Principle of 
Population. While Malthus’s use of the categories of the four stages theory has been 
noted, the role of population in the four stages theory was however not linked to 
his thought. By a comparison of Malthus’ arguments with the ones made by earlier 
authors along four stages theory lines, it can be shown that Malthus substantially 
drew on this tradition, which throws further light on the theoretical configuration 
of his argument. The entire argument of the essay, including its anti-egalitarian 
element, can be shown to derive from four stages theory thinking indeed, with 
slight deviations in particular (though significant) junctions only. 
Chapter 2 
What’s been done? 
Young (1928) uncovered the importance of Smith’s ‘theorem’ that the division of 
labour is limited by the extent of the market. He mentioned population in this 
regard, but through his distanced and furtive engagement with this theme (in the 
1928 article at least) he drew attention more away from the demographic 
connection than toward it. He entirely ignored the geographical element. Later 
development economists who drew on Young, such as Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) 
and Nurkse (1952), as well as more recently Krugman, paid more attention to 
geographical elements, but entirely ignored the demographical element. Outside 
the literature concerned specifically with economic development, Smith’s thoughts 
on the division of labour and the extent of the market, interpreted through Young 
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and later through the prism of Keynesian theories, were given entirely different 
meanings. As the market is a concept that over the past centuries has evolved from 
a mostly geographical and material conception of the exchange process — the 
physical channels through which trade is effected — to a symbolic designation of 
the exchange process itself and a synecdoche for the institutions of a capitalist 
economic system, Smith’s phrase was reinterpreted, anachronistically, to fit the 
new conception of markets. While this may have better fitted the needs of modern 
macroeconomics, concerned with economic growth in advanced capitalist 
economies, it became largely irrelevant to the question of economic development, 
and as such became, too, largely disconnected from Smith’s original ideas, 
concerned as he was, principally, with the issue of the progress of society (in pre-
Industrial Revolution Scotland).     
What I do 
To recover the meaning of “the market” for Smith, and of his idea that “the division 
of labour is limited by the extent of the market”, Chapter 2 resituates the issue 
within the framework of Smith’s development theory, by reconnecting the market 
to both its geographic and its demographic dimensions. By disconnecting the 
concept from the modern acceptations of both ‘capitalist institution’ and ‘aggregate 
demand’ and reconnecting it to what the market described for Smith — a vehicle 
for exchange, essentially of a physical nature —, the idea of a limitation of the 
division of labour by the extent of the market can more aptly be reconnected to the 
entirety of Smith’s development theory, as contained in his four stages theory, 
describing both the process of economic growth and of population. It is through 
population growth, indeed, that the market is (and can only be) originally 
augmented in the setting of the early stages of society, where technology, capital 
and large-scale political intervention are not yet accessible. Seen in this light, 
reconnected to its demographic and geographic dimension, the Smithian theory of 
a natural progress of opulence — itself a part of the four stages theory — fits in 
seamlessly with his ideas on the division of labour and the extent of the market, 
without invoking the need for a “big push” (Rosenstein-Rodan 1961) or “critical 
minimum effort” (Leibenstein 1957) that are entirely foreign to Smith’s 
conceptualisation of the development process.   
Chapter 3 
What’s been done? 
Schumpeter (1986 [1954]) and Hollander (1973) have most praised Smith for his 
theory of equilibrium price, relying on the mechanism of negative feedback. This 
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mechanism was to underlie, to a large extent, the way economic theories and 
models were constructed in the 19th and 20th century, of which Smith can thus be 
construed as a herald.  
Much of the debate on Smith in the 19th century has concerned the factors 
responsible for effectuating change in the relationships between theoretical 
elements of the system drawn out by Smith. This concerns notably the relationship 
between division of labour and capital accumulation. Capital accumulation 
(Brewer 1989) and division of labour (Loasby 1997) were variously held as the 
prime mover, or as the most important element responsible for economic growth 
for Smith. Smith’s thoughts on primitive accumulation were famously, too, the 
starting point of Marx’s consideration of the subject. Marx spoke of a “defective 
circle”, a formulation taken up by Nurkse in his thoughts on the matter inspired by 
Young. The division of labour – extent of the market relationship was here 
essentially conceived as a deadlock to break out of, and this is how it entered 20th 
century development economics.  
Similarly, in the theory of town-country interaction at play in Smith’s view of 
the “natural progress of society” and the “unnatural and retrograde order”, recent 
contribution have focused on the sense of causality and the direction of the 
cumulative causation of urban and rural development, and whether Smith can be 
taken to have been consistent with how his objective in Book III of the Wealth of 
Nations is interpreted  (Bowles 1986 ; Bell 1992 ; Pack 1995 ; Blecker 1997 ; 
Paganelli 2013 ; Schumacher 2013). 
Finally, much has been said and written on the possibility of continuous 
progress in Smith’s theory of development, with interpretations differing sharply 
between those who see the main weight on the limits to growth (Heilbroner 1975 ; 
Wrigley 1988 ; Alvey 2004) and those who emphasise the continuous prospects for 
growth in Smith’s theory (Himmelfarb 1984 ; Winch 1992a, 1996). 
What I do 
Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 describe, respectively, a push- and a pull-action of 
population on economic and technological progress. These two, while two faces of 
the same coin, are also integrated by Smith through a positive feedback 
mechanism, or what Gunnar Myrdal termed “the principle of cumulation”. 
This circular way of conceiving of causation (with population notably seen as 
effect and cause of economic development) is not limited to population but 
concerns all elements connected in Smith’s theory of economic development.  
Thus, between division of labour and capital accumulation as prime causal 
elements, we do not need to choose. Much as population, and most any element of 
56 
Smith’s system, they are interconnected and depend, mutually, on each other. This 
can be shown by connecting the issue of the dependence of the division of labour, 
capital accumulation and the extent of the market on each other to the theme of 
the “slow progress of opulence” as conceptualised by Smith, more clearly than in 
the Wealth of Nations, in the Glasgow lectures and the ‘Early Draft’ of the Wealth of 
Nations. Here too, then, Smith’s early work is an important piece of the puzzle. 
Modern economics obscure the issue through their principal reliance on negative 
feedback mechanism. The “slow progress of opulence” as conceptualised by Smith 
can be better understood by conceiving of it as a positive feedback loop: in the 
early stages of society, the development process is a very slow and gradual one, 
because all the elements necessary for development (division of labour, capital 
accumulation, trade, population, etc.) are present only in small quantity and 
thereby limit each other’s progression. As any and all of these elements increase 
(on a par), the process gathers momentum and ‘takes off’. Mid-20th century 
development economists (and economists to this day) have wrongly interpreted 
the early stages of development as ones of stagnation (as in Nelson’s (1956) “low 
level equilibrium trap”), instead of incremental steps toward an accelerated 
progression.  
Chapter 4 
What’s been done? 
Neither Smith nor Malthus nor Marx theorised on the demographic transition, 
which could only be discerned after their deaths (it was first conceptualised in the 
1920s) although the fall in death rates had in fact set off while they were still alive. 
All three thinkers, however, theorised on the interplay between wages, wealth, 
mortality and fertility. Smith’s thoughts on this issue have never been analysed 
from the angle of the demographic transition.  
There has been an increased interest from the part of economists, in the past 
few decades, in the question of the interplay of the demographic transition and the 
industrial revolution (Lucas 1996 ; Galor & Weil 2000 ; Galor 2005 ; Bar & 
Leukhina 2010). A particular theme has been the one of the “demographic 
dividend” (Mason 1988 ; Kelley & Schmidt 1995 ; Higgins & Williamson 1997 ; 
Bloom & Williamson 1998 ; Bloom, Canning, & Sevilla 2001): as the number of 
“dependents” (children and the elderly) diminishes in a society, which happens 
when the population growth rate has been high for a while, due to decreased death 
rates, but is beginning to decline due to falling birth rates, this is believed to open a 
particular window of opportunity for a society, as a particularly large proportion of 
the population is in working age and can thus contribute to national wealth 
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formation. Conversely, having a large number of dependents due to either high 
birth over deaths (many children to care for compared to working adults) or low 
birth and death rates having been observed for a while (many old people as 
compared to working adults) is believed to make for lower economic growth. This 
model is then used to explain the industrial revolution in Europe and the more 
recent take-off of developing countries. The argument had previously been stated 
negatively by Coale and Hoover (1958). 
The way the issue is framed by the literature around the “demographic 
dividend” and the connected literature on the question of the relationship between 
demographic transition and industrial revolution relies on Becker’s (1960, 1962) 
“economic analysis” of fertility and human capital, the former of which he 
professed to have derived from Malthus. In that theory, children are considered as 
“consumption goods” for parents, but they can be made “production goods” 
through investments by parents in “child quality” (human capital) which they 
would substitute for “child quantity”, thus reducing costs and augmenting revenue 
of families. Becker did not divulge why families would engage (or fail to engage) in 
such substitution. In the recent literature on the interplay of demographic 
transition and industrial revolution, Becker’s theory is connected to the “new 
growth theory” of Lucas (1988) and Romer (1989): parents start investing in their 
children because of “external economies” making this worthwhile. This is 
conjectured to have set off the demographic transition, where and when it has 
occurred. The major problem with this theory is that the demographic transition 
was set off not by a fall in the birth rate, but by an earlier fall in the death rate, 
which remains unexplained and plays no role in the theory. 
What I do 
While Smith’s thoughts on the interplay of wages, wealth, fertility and mortality 
have never been analysed from the angle of the demographic transition, it would 
appear that, especially if he is read through Marx’s rather than through Malthus’ 
interpretation (both of which is possible), an alternative theory of the 
demographic transition to the one suggested by the “new home economics” in 
recent years can be derived from his thoughts on the matter. In this theory, rather 
than the fall in fertility being occasioned by investments in human capital, which 
then occasion a rise in living standards, it is the rise in living standards, made 
possible by the deeper division of labour in more populous modern nations, that 
occasion both a fall in fertility and possible investments in human capital, on a 
society-wide rather than family-specific scale. At the difference of the micro-
economic theory that has been derived from the “new home” and “new growth” 
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theories, this theory takes into account the evolution of the institutional 
environment that both derives from and occasions the changes associated with 
economic development. 
 
* 
 
A topic I was always interested in, and which indeed formed one of my main 
motivations for pursuing my subject (as noted in the “preliminary notes” at the 
beginning of this work), but which I only got to properly integrate into my research 
at an advanced stage, is the universalist dimension of Smith’s theory and its 
strongly anti-racist flavour. Considerations of this nature are thus (with the 
exception of a full section in Chapter 1, the last Chapter I composed, in which a 
wider angle is taken on this issue), largely confined to the footnotes. 
 
A Note on Notation 
A few particular notation practices have been adopted in the present work that 
need to be clarified, concerning the references to Smith’s works and the way 
quotations have been handled.  
Orthographically, the work is following British (and more specifically South 
African) English. I have, however, used different types of quotation marks in 
specific ways, according to the following rules.45 
Emphasis (italics) in quotations are usually commented on in modern 
practice, pointing out (usually in parentheses) whether the emphasis is by the 
author quoted from or was added by the author quoting. In the present work, to 
avoid tedious repetition, all emphases are mine unless otherwise indicated.  
In order not to overburden the text with punctuation marks, I have decided 
to leave capitalisation or non-capitalisation intact in quotations, both when using a 
quotation that starts with a capital letter inside a sentence and when starting a 
sentence with a quotation that begins in the middle of an original sentence (with a 
word hence not capitalised), instead of changing the capitalisation and put square 
brackets around single letters.  
                                                        
45 It seems necessary to clarify the use of these different types of quotation marks, not only 
because their use and its meaning differs between different English-speaking countries, 
but also because their use has always varied according to particular authors (many of 
them not conforming to ‘official’ rules laid out in manuals of styles), and seems to be 
undergoing important change particularly in the last few years under the influence of the 
internet. Their current meaning is therefore in flux. For a discussion of these issues see 
notably Heisel (2014). 
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Omitted passages of quotations are indicated by three dots with a single 
space between them and two spaces around them (looking thus:  . . .  ).  Other 
modifications of quotations (insertions of individual words or letters or of 
clarifications, where this improves readability), avoided as far as possible, are 
noted, as is customary, by square brackets.  
Quotations within quotations (i.e. an author quoted quoting someone else 
within the quotation) are distinguished by the quotation marks used. I have used 
curly double-quotation marks (“  ”) for my own quotations, and straight (double) 
ones ("  ") for quotations within quotations. Single curly quotation marks (‘ ’), in 
addition to their use for the documents within the Glasgow edition (as explained 
below), I have used not for quotation, but to signal a familiar or modern expression 
or concept used for the purpose of making a point more straightforwardly, but 
without claiming that the expression in question is literally the same or adequately 
explains the point under consideration. For quotations within quotations, where 
authors quoted used single quotation marks when quoting verbatim, I have 
changed these to (straight) double quotation marks ("  "); I have left them as single 
quotation marks (changed to straight — ' ' — ones if within quotations) only 
where the authors quoted themselves used them in the way just indicated (i.e. not 
to quote someone else).  
Especially in Chapter 1, dealing with 18th century theories of socio-cultural 
evolution, I have, insofar as “savages” and “civilisation”, “rude” and “refined” 
people are concerned, followed Sebastiani’s (2013, p. xi) method of omitting 
quotation marks around these words at every instance (except where I am directly 
quoting), for not overburdening the text. This should not be read as an 
endorsement by me of these categories — although I believe that some kind of 
categorisation of societies at different levels of economic (political, social...) 
development is useful for the study of such differences and their causes (unless we 
want to reject the very idea of development), and the new euphemisms of 
“underdeveloped”, “undeveloped” or “developing” countries (or the longer French 
— this might be a tautology — “en voie de développement”: “in the course of 
development”) are not fundamentally better, more precise, or less insulting than 
the older ones.46 As Douglas Stone, Bruce Patton, and Sheila Heen of the Harvard 
                                                        
46 Of course, the latter terms usually refer to countries, to none of which, in the 21st 
century, the 18th century categories of “savages” or “barbarians” could be applied, which 
were even at the time, indeed, applied only to societies whose political organisation, by 
definition,  did not yet resemble modern states. There are, however, even today still, such 
societies to be found around the globe, living within the territory of modern states — often 
stretching over the territory of more than one state at a time, being nomadic people not 
living within a clearly delimited territory — to which these categories, as understood by 
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Law School’s Negotiation Program note, “There Is No Such Thing as a Diplomatic 
Hand Grenade” (1999, p. xvii).47 
In the present work, all references to Smith’s oeuvre in the wider sense 
(including his published works, student notes on his lectures, the few fragments of 
his manuscripts that were spared from the flames,48 and what has been recovered 
from his correspondence) are to the six volumes of the “Glasgow Edition of the 
Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, Commissioned by the University of 
Glasgow to celebrate the bicentenary of the Wealth of Nations”.49 For readability’s 
sake, I have adopted the following practise when referring to the volumes 
comprising the Glasgow edition as well as the works contained in them:  
When referring to the Glasgow volumes within the text, I have written out 
their titles in full (except for the Wealth of Nations, for which I have omitted, as has 
long been customary, the “Inquiry into the Nature and Causes” part). I have also, as 
for books named in the text in general, italicised the Glasgow volumes’ titles. This 
also allows the reader to differentiate, in the text, between references to Smith’s 
lectures and references to the Glasgow volumes containing student notes of these 
lectures. Thus, when I write of the lectures on jurisprudence or the lectures on 
rhetoric, I am referring to the actual lectures held by Smith, whereas when I write 
of the Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres I am 
referring to the Glasgow volumes.50  
When referring, in the text, to particular works included in the various 
Glasgow volumes (such as the essays in the Essays on Philosophical Subjects), I have 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Adam Smith (as will be examined in detail in Chapter 1), still apply, insofar that they are 
hunter-gatherer or pastoral people.  
47 “Desperate for a way out of the dilemma, we wonder if it is possible to be so tactful, so 
overwhelmingly pleasant that everything ends up fine. Tact is good, but it’s not the answer 
to difficult conversations.  . . .  Coated with sugar, thrown hard or soft, a hand grenade is 
still going to do damage.” (ibid.) 
48 Smith, from his deathbed, famously ordered the near entirety of his manuscripts to be 
destroyed by fire (Ross 2010, p. xxxi, 435-8). The execution of his wish has long been a 
source of both regret and conjecture for intellectual historians. 
49 One exception are the ‘Anderson Notes’ referred to in Chapter 1, which were not 
included in the Glasgow edition. See below p. 108 et seq. The Glasgow edition was first 
published (in hardcover by Oxford University Press) between 1976 and 1983 and quickly 
became the standard scholarly edition thereafter (facsimile reproductions of the six 
volumes were published in softcover by LibertyFund between 1981 and 1987). 
50 In the case of the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations (and the Essays 
on Philosophical Subjects), as these Glasgow volumes quite logically retained the titles of 
the published works they essentially contain, I may occasionally refer to another edition 
than the Glasgow edition when mentioning them (with italicised title) in the text, but this 
will be clear from the context. 
61 
used either full or abbreviated titles, non-italicised and put in single inverted 
commas. I am thus referring, for example, to ‘History of Astronomy’, the ‘Early 
Draft of the Wealth of Nations’ (or just ‘Early Draft’) and ‘Considerations 
concerning the First Formation of Languages’. 
When referring to Smith’s works in the footnotes as well as in parentheses 
after quotations (to indicate the passage the quotation appears in) or after 
descriptions, summaries or paraphrases of what Smith wrote or is reported to 
have said in his lectures (to indicate where such statements are made), I have 
adopted the now customary abbreviations of the Glasgow editions. For the 
Glasgow volumes, these are: 
 
TMS   Theory of Moral Sentiments  
WN   Wealth of Nations  
EPS   Essays on Philosophical Subjects 51 
LRBL   Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres  
LJ   Lectures on Jurisprudence    
Corr.  Correspondence of Adam Smith 
 
For the following works, contained in Essays on Philosophical Subjects and Lectures 
on Jurisprudence, I have also used the Glasgow edition abbreviations, being: 
 
- in EPS: 
 
 Astronomy ‘The Pinciples which lead and direct Philosophical 
Enquiries; illustrated by the History of Astronomy’ 
 Stewart ‘Account of the Life and Writings of Adam Smith’ 52 
                                                        
51 The book with the full title Essays on Philosophical Subjects. By the late Adam Smith, LL. 
D. Fellow of the Royal Societies of London and Edinburgh, &c. &c. To which is prefixed, An 
Account of the Life and Writings of the Author; by Dugald Stewart, F. R. S. E. was first 
published in 1795 by Smith’s friends and literary executors Joseph Black and James 
Hutton, containing the essays Smith left them to be published after his death, as well as 
Stewart’s Account, commissioned for this volume (see next note). The Glasgow volume 
also contains Smith’s earliest published texts (his contributions to the Edinburgh Review 
and the Preface and Dedication to William Hamilton’s Poems on Several Occasions). 
52 The Account was first read by Steward before the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 1793 
and published in 1794 in the society’s transactions, before appearing in the Essays on 
Philosophical Subjects the following year. The version included in the Glasgow edition is 
the one revised and published by Stewart himself in the 1811 book Biographical Memoirs 
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External Senses ‘Of the External Senses’ 
 
- in LJ: 
  
 LJ(A) Lectures on Jurisprudence, Report of 1762-3
  
LJ(B) Lectures on Jurisprudence, Report dated 1766 
ED ‘Early Draft’ of Part of the Wealth of Nations  
FA First fragment on the division of labour  
FB Second fragment on the division of labour 
 
While the Glasgow edition abbreviations of the Glasgow edition volumes has 
been almost universally adopted in the secondary literature, the Glasgow edition 
abbreviations of the works within the volumes are somewhat less commonly used. 
Also, while the abbreviations of the Glasgow volumes are generally used by Smith 
scholars, the manner of referring to particular passages within these volumes that 
the editors of the Glasgow edition implemented is less widely used, which is 
probably due at least in part to the somewhat confusing nature of this referencing 
style. Indeed, while in the case of Smith’s published works, references are made to 
the chapter, section and paragraph numbers, in the case of the lecture notes the 
same references are to the section and the page numbers of the original 
manuscript, which also figure in the margin of the lecture note volumes. And in the 
case of the ‘Early Draft’, a still different and rather obscure referencing style was 
adopted within the Glasgow edition. 
For Smith’s published works, the editors of the Glasgow edition adopted the 
practice of referring to number of Part, Section, Chapter, Section, Paragraph (in 
Theory of Moral Sentiments), Book, Chapter, Section, Paragraph (in Wealth of 
Nations), or just Section and Paragraph (for all other published works) by a 
combination of letters and numbers, so that the passages in question could be 
more easily located in other editions of these works (thus, as explained in the ‘Key 
to Abbreviations and References’ in the Glasgow edition volumes, TMS I.i.5.5 
denotes The Theory of Moral Sentiments Part I, Section i, Chapter 5, § 5 and WN 
V.i.f.26 The Wealth of Nations, Book V, Chapter I, sixth division, § 26). In the 
secondary literature, while this style is sometimes used, authors often use the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
of Adam Smith, William Robertson, and Thomas Reid, with some further additions made by 
Stewart in later years. 
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Glasgow edition page numbers instead, which makes for shorter references. Also, 
as the Glasgow edition is the one today used generally in Smith scholarship, the 
reference to paragraph numbers in order to consult other editions is not anymore 
very useful. 
In the case of the lecture notes, by contrast, references within the Glasgow 
edition to particular passages use the page numbers of the original manuscripts, 
also listed in the margins of the volumes in which the notes appear. This was 
justified by the fact that paragraphs are very few in the original manuscripts, 
especially the ones recovered by Lothian, and some paragraph breaks were 
inserted for readability by the editors only. But, at the difference of the paragraph 
numbers in the Wealth of Nations and Theory of Moral Sentiments Glasgow 
volumes, the manuscript page numbers are not useful to consult other editions of 
the notes. The edition of the set of notes from Smith’s jurisprudence lectures 
published by Cannan, indeed, does not reference the original manuscript’s pages, 
and there is no other edition of the Lothian notes of the jurisprudence lectures at 
all as yet. And with the availability of the notes in edited format, few scholars will 
consult the original manuscripts. Hence, also, most references in the secondary 
literature actually use the Glasgow edition page numbers. 
To make it particularly easy to locate particular passages, I have in this work 
opted to quote the passages in Smith’s works using both the Glasgow edition 
nomenclature of chapter, section, and paragraph/manuscript page numbers and 
the Glasgow volume page numbers (with a note to be made shortly on the manner 
of quoting from the ‘Early Draft’). Passages are thus referred to in this way: 
 
WN IV.vii.b.10, p. 570 refers to: Wealth of Nations, Book IV, 
Chapter VII, Section 2, paragraph 10, on page 570 of the Glasgow 
edition volume. 
 
When paragraphs stretch over two and sometimes several pages, as they often do, 
as when pages contain several paragraphs, this allows the passages in question all 
the more easily to be located. 
The fourth and fifth volume of the Glasgow edition contain student notes of 
Smith’s lectures on rhetoric and jurisprudence of 1762-64, recovered by Edwin 
Cannan and John Lothian, respectively, at the end of the 19th and in the mid-20th 
century. Lectures on Jurisprudence contains both sets of student notes of Smith’s 
jurisprudence lectures that the academic world has so far come into possession of: 
the ones first discovered and published by Cannan at the end of the 19th century, 
and the ones discovered in the mid-20th century by Lothian (together with the 
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notes on the rhetoric lecture, and believed to have been written by the same 
person) and published for the first time in the Glasgow edition. These two sets of 
notes are referred to, in the Glasgow edition volume they are both published in and 
throughout the Glasgow edition, as well as in Smith scholarship (generally) since, 
as LJ(B) and LJ(A), respectively (sometimes written LJ.B and LJ.A to avoid 
parentheses within parentheses). In the Glasgow edition volume, they appear in 
the opposite order of their discovery and first publication, i.e. the notes first 
published by Cannan in 1896 as Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue and Arms. 
Delivered in the University of Glasgow By Adam Smith. Reported by a Student in 1763 
and edited with an Introduction and Notes by Edwin Cannan, denoted LJ(B), appear 
second in the volume, and the notes recovered in the mid-20th century by Lothian, 
as LJ(A), first. This order was not explicitly justified by the Glasgow editors, but it 
follows the chronological order of the academic years the respective lectures were 
believed by them to have been delivered in (the Cannan notes in 1763-4 and the 
ones more recently discovered by Lothian in the preceding year 1762-3; see the 
introduction to Lectures on Jurisprudence, p. 7-9). This makes the use of “first” and 
“second” set that one often encounters in the secondary literature ambiguous, as 
this could refer either to the order of their discovery, their first publication, their 
appearance in the Glasgow edition volume, or the delivery of the lectures they are 
believed to respectively pertain to. And while of these four elements, the order of 
the first two (time of discovery and of publication) and the order of the last two 
(appearance in the Glasgow edition volume and years the lectures that the notes 
pertain to were held in) are identical, respectively, the order of their discovery and 
publication is the opposite of the order of their believed original generation and 
appearance in the Glasgow volume. It will be clear, where quotations are provided, 
which notes are referred to (the Glasgow notation — in this case LJ(A) and LJ(B) — 
having been used in parentheses after quotations, as indicated above). But as far as 
references in the text are concerned, it is important to point out that when 
mentioning the “second set”, the “new set”, or the “more recent set” of notes, I 
always indicate thereby the order of discovery and first publication of the two sets, 
not the opposite order of the respective academic session they were apparently 
taken in and of their appearance in the Glasgow volume. Thus “first set” signifies 
the notes that Cannan discovered in 1895 and published the following year, 
appearing second in the Glasgow volume (LJ(B)); “second set” the notes discovered 
by Lothian in 1958, appearing first in the Glasgow volume (LJ(A)). In order to 
avoid ambiguity, I have generally opted to indicate the two sets of notes by the 
professor who recovered the respective set for the academic world. Hence the first 
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recovered set (LJ(B)) is referred to as the Cannan notes, the second (LJ(A)) as the 
Lothian notes. 
With regard to quotations from the Lectures of Jurisprudence, it must be 
remarked that the basis (the original manuscripts) was written by students 
without great concern for standard and unified orthography. This is true especially 
of the Lothian notes, which, although clearly much more complete with regard to 
the subjects treated than the Cannan notes, were much more poorly written in 
terms of grammar and punctuation (and sometimes syntax, which generally 
signals an omission of words by the student). Therefore, much editorial effort was 
necessary to render the published text readable, but much care was taken thereby 
to give an accurate idea of the original manuscript, which necessitated a large 
amount of notes and symbols within the text (especially for the Lothian notes, but 
the Cannan notes were also reedited on the basis of the original manuscripts with 
greater concern for exact representation of the original than Cannan had). This 
faces the scholar quoting from the Glasgow volume with the question of how much 
of these signalisations to include in quotations. After some thought, I have decided 
to do away with all such signalisation when quoting from Lectures of Jurisprudence, 
signifying crossed out or unreadable words (which I have simply omitted), page 
breaks in the manuscript and minor alterations by the editors (omission of 
repeated words, as well as words added by the editors to render the text more 
readable where words were obviously missing from the manuscript and could be 
easily guessed, which I have adopted as is without signalisation). Passages from 
the verso pages of the manuscript, which the editors believe to be notes added 
later by comparison with other student notes or after attendance of Smith’s 
complementary class, and which are specially signalled in the text of the Glasgow 
edition by particular brackets, I have also included without particular mention. The 
reader is directed to the Lectures of Jurisprudence for the full particulars of the 
quotations. 
Mention should also be made at this point of the way quotations from the 
‘Early Draft of the Wealth of Nations’ have been referenced in the present work. 
The ‘Early Draft’ is contained at the end of the Lectures of Jurisprudence Glasgow 
volume. As for the lecture notes in this volume (and the ones in Lectures on 
Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, also discovered by Lothian together with the second set 
of jurisprudence lecture notes), numbers in the margins of the ‘Early Draft’ do not 
denote the number of the paragraph of the chapter or section, as they do in the 
Wealth of Nations and Theory of Moral Sentiments Glasgow volumes, but denote 
instead the page number of the original manuscript. Yet, without justifying this or 
pointing this out anywhere (to the best of my knowledge), the editors of the 
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Glasgow edition decided to refer to the ‘Early Draft’, within the Glasgow edition, 
not using the manuscript pages (provided in the margins of the ‘Early Draft’ in the 
Glasgow volume) but by chapter and section of the ‘Early Draft’. The ‘Early Draft’ is 
indeed divided into chapters and sections, ones that were meant originally by 
Smith, it can be supposed, to become complete chapters in the final version of the 
Wealth of Nations (but the final chapters and sections in the Wealth of Nations are 
in fact very differently numbered from the ones in the ‘Early Draft’, which indeed 
was but an early draft). The great problem with this way of referring to the ‘Early 
Draft’ is that in the Glasgow edition it is in fact, as already mentioned, the page 
numbers of the original manuscript of the ‘Early Draft’ that appear in the margins, 
but which are not used in references to the ‘Early Draft’ within the Glasgow 
edition, while the same Glasgow edition of the ‘Early Draft’ does not contain in any 
clearly readable way the paragraph number of chapters and sections,  which are 
used in references within the Glasgow edition. The reader thus has to count the 
paragraphs and section in the ‘Early Draft’ in order to follow a reference, while the 
page numbers of the original manuscript in the margins serve no useful purpose. 
This confusing way of referring to passages in the ‘Early Draft’ within the Glasgow 
Edition is most likely the reason that this notation has not been adopted in the 
secondary literature. As with the lectures of jurisprudence notes, references in the 
secondary literature are generally to the page number in the Lectures of 
Jurisprudence volume. In the present work, I have adopted the same notation as for 
the rest of Smith’s work: referring both to the number in the margin in the Glasgow 
edition (denoting, in the case of the ‘Early Draft’, as of the lecture notes, the page 
number of the original manuscript) and to the page number in the Glasgow edition 
volume, instead of the confusing reference to chapter, section and paragraph 
number of the ‘Early Draft’ within the Glasgow edition. 
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Everything of importance has been said before by somebody who did 
not discover it. (Whitehead 1917, p. 362) 
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Chapter 1 
 
Population and Conjectural History 
 
 
 
Then, I said, let us begin and create in idea a State; and yet 
the true creator is necessity, who is the mother of our 
invention.  
Plato, Republic, Book II  
(transl. Benjamin Jowett) 
 
1. Introduction 
Writings on theories of socio-cultural evolution, and in particular on the type 
common in 18th century Scotland, usually cite some part or other from a section of 
Dugald Stewart’s ‘Account of the life and Writings of Adam Smith’. In this segment 
of his biographical essay, Stewart first remarks how the ‘Considerations 
concerning the First Formation of Languages’, one of Smith’s earliest writings, 
“deserves our attention”, chiefly, “as a specimen of a particular sort of inquiry, 
which . . . seems, in a peculiar degree, to have interested Mr Smith’s curiosity.” 
Indeed, Stewart continues, “Something very similar to it may be traced in all his 
different works, whether moral, political, or literary” (Stewart II. 44, in EPS, p. 
292). Stewart then describes the method in question. He first remarks that: 
When, in such a period of society as that in which we live, we compare our 
intellectual acquirements, our opinions, manners, and institutions, with 
those which prevail among rude tribes, it cannot fail to occur to us as an 
interesting question, by what gradual steps the transition has been made 
from the first simple efforts of uncultivated nature, to a state of things so 
wonderfully artificial and complicated. (Stewart, II.45, p. 292) 
Yet, Stewart notes, since most of what we are interested in, in this 
connection, happened before there were any written records, history proper gives 
us only little information (ibid.). “In this want of direct evidence,” then, “we are 
under a necessity of supplying the place of fact by conjecture”. And thus men’s 
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actions in previous ages must be traced “from the known principles of human 
nature” and “the circumstances of their external situation”, using “the detached 
facts which travels and voyages afford us  . . .  as land-marks to our speculations”. 
And Stewart proceeds to christen this “species of philosophical investigation”, 
accordingly, “Theoretical or Conjectural History” (II.46-8, p. 293; italics in original).  
This method of tracing events “from the known principles of human nature” 
had been used, too, by Machiavelli, one of the authors most admired by Smith,1 
who wrote in 1516 that “passions and dispositions remaining in all ages the same, 
naturally give rise to the same effects” (Machiavelli 1883 [1537], p. 475).2 And the 
use of “circumstance” to explain the differences between societies found a 
prominent place in Montesquieu’s work.3 As John Millar remarked: “The great 
Montesquieu pointed out the road. He was the Lord Bacon in this branch of 
philosophy. Dr. Smith is the Newton” (Millar 1803 [1787], p. 429-30; EPS p. 275, 
Meek 1971, p. 12).  
Stewart’s expression “conjectural history” (but not “theoretical history”, 
interestingly) has been universally adopted to denote this type of theorising about 
the development of human societies. The terms “philosophical history” or 
“philosophy of history” have also been in use (see for example Flint 1894). Duncan 
Forbes (1954), linking the issue to political debates, wrote of “‘Scientific’ 
Whiggism”. The particular theoretical framework adopted by Adam Smith and his 
contemporaries was dubbed the “four stages theory” by Ronald Meek (1971, 
1976b).4 This label has stuck and shall be used here throughout to refer to the 
                                                        
1 He was one of the few thinkers cited repeatedly in the Wealth of Nations (at III.iii.19, p. 
407, V.i.g.2, p. 790, and V.ii.a.6, p. 819), and in the Lectures on Rethoric and Belles Lettres 
(ii.70, p. 115) is reportedly praised by Smith as “of all modern Historians the only one who 
has contented himself with that which is the chief purpose of History, to relate events and 
connect them with their causes, without becoming a party on either side.” 
2 In Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livius, Book III, Chapter 43, §1. See further 
Skinner (1975, p. 170) and Winch (1992a, p. 92, fn. 10). Note the use, by Machiavelli (in 
this translation), of the word “naturally”, frequently used too by Smith: Smith’s “natural 
progress of opulence” was one proceeding “naturally” from human propensities, without 
conscious direction by a central authority. 
3 In the Anderson notes, to which will be further referred later, Smith is reported to have 
had this to say about Montesquieu: “Monsieur de Montesquieu is one of the most singular 
Men that has ever been in the World for he possesses four Things which are never almost 
united. An excellent Judgment, a fine Imagination, great Wit, and vast Erudition”. For 
Montesquieu’s influence on Smith in general, and particularly on his historical method, see 
Clark (2008). 
4 Initially (in Meek 1971) with quotation marks around “four stages” (as “the "four stages" 
theory”), which were later (in Meek 1976b) dropped. In the secondary literature since, 
one finds various orthographies (“Four Stages Theory”, “Four Stages theory”, “four-stages 
theory”, etc., with or without quotation marks variously placed, but generally without). 
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common theory of the authors considered: principally Franklin, Smith, Kames, 
Dalrymple, Helvétius and Blackstone in the 18th century, and Pufendorf and other 
natural law theorists in the 17th.   
This particular narrative of human progress showed a remarkable degree of 
uniformity between the different authors who elaborated it and made use of it. 
Several elements can be found repeatedly throughout and are defining of the 
theory: the emergence of social classes, property rights, government, laws, division 
of labour and arts and sciences, being all interrelated, are explained, starting from 
a state of society (the savage state) in which all these were as yet missing; and four 
particular stages, defined by the prevailing mode of subsistence, are thereby 
distinguished.5 The central driving force of this process of evolution of society is 
the growth of population and the necessity it induces to innovate and introduce 
new technologies, institutions and rules of conduct. It is with this role of 
population and necessity in the theoretical framework of the four stages theory, 
and the importance of this theoretical framework in both Smith’s and later 
Malthus’ work, that the present chapter is centrally concerned. 
In this connection, it is interesting to compare Stewart’s exposition of 
conjectural history related above to a statement made 200 years later by Ester 
Boserup: 
Little is known about the prehistoric change from food gathering to food 
production, and although new information on prehistoric populations and 
the technology they used is steadily being obtained by archeological 
research, we still have to rely on speculation more than on facts. (Boserup 
1981, p. 31) 
As will have been noted by those familiar with the subject of population and 
development from the short exposition of the four stages theory and the role of 
population therein given above, indeed, this is not the only resemblance between 
Boserup’s writing and the present subject. Boserup developed a theory of 
development in which population played a crucial positive role for the 
development of more advanced subsistence technologies. And population was 
playing precisely the same role in the conjectural history of the Enlightenment 
philosophers and earlier natural law theorists. Boserup’s famous contribution to 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Meek’s own (1976b) spelling (without capital letters nor quotation marks nor hyphen) has 
been adopted here. 
5 Sometimes the stages were only three, and sometimes more than four, in different 
expositions of the theory, but the essential features of the progression were sensibly the 
same despite such differences, and the label four stages theory is generally used invariably 
for all (as it was originally by Meek). 
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the debate on population and development in the mid-20th century (Boserup 1965, 
1981) in fact bears a striking resemblance to the way Adam Smith conceptualised 
the same subject in his Glasgow lectures. That this position is today known among 
social scientists as the “Boserupian” position only shows the value of not 
neglecting the history of thought in current theorising. The idea that population 
pressure leads to technological development was fully developed in the theories of 
Enlightenment scholars two full centuries before Boserup’s work on the issue, and 
this rather straightforward idea is in fact very much older, the natural law 
theorists having been mainly influenced in this regard by writings of Antiquity and 
the Bible.  
Although seldom treated as such, the four stages theory undoubtedly is a 
product of and contribution to the general debate about population questions in 
the second half of the 18th century,6 which is likely why Malthus also felt inclined 
to use it as frame of reference in his Essay on the Principle of Population. The 
classification of human societies that can be found in the four stages theory, 
moreover, itself inherited from classical sources and the natural law tradition, 
further found use, with ever so slight variations, in all subsequent sociological, 
anthropological and ethnological research in the 19th and 20th centuries, so much 
so that the theory can be considered in many respects as foundational in the 
creation of modern human sciences as a whole. 
The one central element used as a causal variable in the explanation of the 
succession of stages in 18th century theories of socio-cultural evolution, including 
the version formulated by Adam Smith, is thus the growth of population. By a 
precise sequence of steps, involving population growth disrupting the balance 
between human societies and the ecosystem which provides them food, and the 
shortage of food thus created offering an opportunity for the accidental discoveries 
of naturally curious and creative human beings to find wider application, ushering 
in technological revolutions, population growth ultimately takes human societies 
to higher stages of development. This view of population growth being the original 
source of economic development (or in any case a crucial link in the causal chain 
leading to it) appears to be in stark contrast with the Malthusian view of 
population growth as an explanation for the impossibility of the progress of society 
as considered by Condorcet and Godwin. Yet, Malthus himself adopted the 
classification of human societies into the different types contained in the four 
stages theory and in fact used this framework to demonstrate the eternal and 
overarching validity of his population principle. The Malthusian population 
                                                        
6 For an overview of these see notably Whelan (1991).  
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principle itself, indeed, is intimately linked to (if not identical with) the way the 
interaction between population growth and the environment was conceived in the 
four stages theory. And Malthus himself also did, through what he called the “goad 
of necessity”, recognise the stimulating role of population growth to human 
industry that was a central element of four stages theory.  
As we shall see, however, Malthus deviated from this theory, or from the way 
it had generally been used until then, by the change of some assumptions, and, 
more significantly, by an important change of focus, which set the “population 
principle” (already contained, in substance, in the four stages theory) on a different 
track. Having been used until then principally to explain the progress of laws and 
government and justify the existence of private property, it became a tool for those 
arguing against the “perfectibility of society” (its appropriateness and its very 
possibility) understood as leading to perfect economic and political equality of all 
members of society. Yet, the “population principle” was in fact for Malthus, in line 
with the four stages theory, still a theory of progress. Misunderstandings about this 
until this day can be attributed in no small part to the ambiguity of the word 
progress, which was never well defined to begin with, but which also underwent 
an important change of meaning at the end of the 18th century. 
For these reasons the four stages theory is not only an important subject for 
the study of Smith’s theory of progress, it is also an important subject for the 
broader study of population theories in the 18th century. Yet, the authors studied in 
this paper — including Smith, with regard to the content of his lectures on 
jurisprudence, and especially the content of the later discovered set of notes on 
these lectures — are all but absent from common studies of “pre-Malthusian” 
population theories, from early 20th century works like Stangeland (1904) and 
Bonar (1931) to more recent ones like Spengler (1972) or Caselli, Vallin, and 
Wunsch (2006). This is less surprising for Smith, with regard to the subject of the 
present chapter, the more detailed (and in this regard more relevant) set of lecture 
notes on jurisprudence having re-emerged only in 1958 and first been published in 
1978, this set being the one containing the more explicit mentions of the role of 
population in the four stages theory. The absence from studies of population 
theories of the other authors considered in this chapter, and of the four stages 
theory as a common way of conceiving the role of population for economic 
progress more generally, is more striking. Even Ronald Meek, although he 
mentioned it, did not pay great attention to population and its causal role in the 
four stages theory, including in Smith’s version, in his foundational study of this 
intellectual tradition (Meek 1976b). This is all the more surprising as Meek was 
interested in both population questions and Marxist theory — he edited a book 
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(Meek 1954b)7 with selected texts of Marx’s and Engels’s response to Malthus 
population theory, more than twenty years prior to Ignoble Savage — and he saw 
the four stages theory as a precursor to Marx’s historical materialism (Meek 
1954a), following Pascal (1938). Tying in these two themes — the opposition 
between Marx and Malthus and the positive causal role of population in four stages 
theory, itself conceived as precursor to historical materialism — would have 
presented itself, but Meek did not follow this route.8 
“Pre-Malthusian” is put in inverted commas above, for the significant break 
represented by Malthus’ theory which this term implies is hard to observe in actual 
facts. The debate that Malthus’ Essay stirred (and has continued to stir — if later 
expressions on the subject of population that have been associated with his name 
can be deemed at least in some respects to have rightly been so) is indeed very 
considerable. But neither the arguments presented in the Essay nor the way they 
were presented were very novel. Schumpeter noted that “the ‘Malthusian’ 
Principle of Population sprang fully developed from the brain of Botero in 1589” 
and that “the ‘law of geometric progression,’ though not in Botero’s work, was 
suggested by Petty in his Essay concerning the Multiplication of Mankind (1686), by 
Süssmilch (1740), by R. Wallace (1753), and by Ortes (1774), so that, within this 
range of ideas, there was nothing left for Malthus to say that had not been said 
before”. Schumpeter further lists “Franklin (1751), Mirabeau (1756), Steuart 
(1767), Chastellux (1772), and Townsend (1786)” as among “the eighteenth-
century authors who, without committing themselves to this particular 
mathematical form, stated that population will always increase to the limit set by 
the supply of means of subsistence” (Schumpeter 1986 [1954], p. 244-5). Among 
these, Chastellux’s De la Félicité publique, ou Considérations sur le sort des hommes, 
dans les différentes époques de l'histoire is an especially clear example of the 
widespread use of conjectural history in the period by which, according to Meek 
(1976b), this method had become an orthodoxy. 
Smith too had noted the tendency of population to conform to the means of 
subsistence, not only in the Wealth of Nations, where he remarked in his chapter on 
wages that “Every species of animals naturally multiplies in proportion to the 
means of their subsistence, and no species can ever multiply beyond it” (WN 
i.viii.39, p. 97), but also in his earlier major work, in which he noted, in the passage 
where the second reference (of three in total) is made to an “invisible hand” in all 
                                                        
7 In a later edition the book was called Marx and Engels on the Population Bomb, most 
probably for marketing reasons; the original less sensational title is Marx and Engels on 
Malthus. 
8 This shall be attempted, to some extent, in the last chapter of the present work. 
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of Smith’s works, that “The produce of the soil maintains at all times nearly that 
number of inhabitants which it is capable of maintaining” (TMS IV.1.10, p. 184).9 
 This theme of population conforming to the means of subsistence (and hence 
of population growth pressing on the means of subsistence) plays a central role, 
also, in the four stages theory. Indeed, as Jacob Hollander — visibly more informed 
on the subject than Stangeland and Bonar cited above (p. 73) — noted at the 
Sesquicentennial of the Wealth of Nations: 
The eventual pressure of mankind upon subsistence had been noted by 
writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, to the extent of 
becoming a commonplace in conjectural history. . . . Malthus entered the lists 
with a weapon sharpened and furbished, but not new in the sense of one 
theretofore unknown or even unused. (Hollander 1927, p. 190) 
In what follows I shall attempt to elucidate the seemingly paradoxical 
relationship between the “positive” role of population growth in four stages theory 
and the “negative” role it plays in Malthus’ work — paradoxical only to those, 
indeed, who read 18th century views on population through the prism of such later 
categories as Malthusianism or “Populationism”. Winch (1993) presents a 
convincing case for considering the common conception of the “break” represented 
by Malthus’ theory as being one away from moral and ethical concerns  as just as 
much of a dead-end.10 As shall be developed below, however, with regard to the 
particular use Malthus made of the population mechanism outlined in the four 
stages theory, Malthus’ work did represent a break, or at least a shift.  
The central theme of this chapter is the role of population in the four stages 
theory as laid out by Smith. To establish a link between this role given to 
population in Smith’s lectures and the more hidden nature of the role of population 
growth in the Wealth of Nations — hidden to those, that is, who read Smith without 
the intimate connection between population and progress in 18th century thought
in mind — will be the aim of later chapters. To lay the groundwork for the 
examination of the role of population in Smith’s four stages theory, we shall first 
consider the role of conjectural history in Smith’s work overall, uncovering 
possible reasons for its neglect until now in relation to the general evolution of 
Smith scholarship.  
On this note, it will be apposite to return briefly to the term used by Duncan 
Forbes to speak of conjectural history: “Scientific Whiggism”. This term has to be 
                                                        
9 At LJ(A) iii.47 (p. 159), Smith is also reported as stating that “the number of men is 
proportion'd to the quantity of subsistence.” 
10 Winch’s particular targets in this respect are Himmelfarb and Dean, and in a different 
regard Samuel Hollander. 
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related, of course, to the teleological view of history designated “Whig history” by 
Butterfield (1931). That a direct reference to Butterfield’s work is absent from 
Forbes’ (1954) article — Butterfield is cited once, but no reference is provided nor 
the connection with the title of Forbes’ article explicitly drawn — underlines an 
argument made in the present chapter, with regard to the theory of socio-cultural 
evolution prevalent at the end of the 18th century: that references to a well-known 
theory can be highly implicit and yet be perfectly understood (indeed, in a more 
general sense, the very way language functions relies on these types of automatic 
associations by people); but that these types of references may become largely 
undecipherable at a later date, when the idea, occurrence or theory in question, 
which is referred to, has lost its prominent and well-known character. L. P. 
Hartley’s phrase “the past is a foreign country” is overused, but to the point. The 
point here is that not only do “they do things differently there” (as Hartley added), 
but that a foreign language is also spoken in the past — not only literally so, but 
also in the sense that one and the same language becomes foreign over time, not 
merely through the evolution in grammar, syntax and vocabulary, but, too, through 
the loss of automatic associations with things no longer in the public debate or 
otherwise familiar to us, and the difficulty therefore of understanding what is 
implicit in past author’s texts. As was noted in the General Introduction, one of the 
principal aims of intellectual history may well be to unearth and explain such 
opaque references in old works for a contemporary audience.  
In the following section, we shall first take somewhat of a detour, but only to 
better ground the subject, considering the four stages theory in its wider temporal 
and spatial context. This section aims both to put the 18th century four stages 
theory into historical and geographical perspective, and to examine its contentious 
relation with the theme of universalism, particularism and cultural imperialism in 
the description of humanity and human nature. It will be argued that the four 
stages theory overall, and Smith’s work as a whole, are of a universalist nature, by 
not giving a causal role to inborn characteristics in the explanation both of 
individuals’ and of societies’ socio-economic development. The third section 
considers the role of the four stages theory in Smith’s overall work, including its 
disputed role in the Wealth of Nations, while the fourth section will examine for 
what reasons this role has long been overlooked. It will be argued that the 
universalist dimension of Smith's work was the main factor in the hostility that 
19th century German scholars garnered against Smith ― an hostility out of which 
the famous Adam Smith Problem grew, which postulated a dichotomy within 
Smith’s oeuvre ― in the midst of an intellectual climate in German-speaking lands 
which highlighted the particularism of German culture, language and nation in an 
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effort to bring about a German nation-state. Through the high repute and major 
influence of German universities in the late 19th and early 20th century the 
dichotomy view of Smith got imported into the United States, the epicentre of 
economics in the later 20th century, surviving notably, in different shape, in the 
Chicago School’s reading of Smith. Section 5 looks at how precisely the interaction 
of population and progress is conceptualised by Smith through this theory. Section 
6 provides the necessary immediate historical and theoretical context, showing 
how the causal role of population in the progression of stages had a central 
position in the four stages theory not just in Smith’s work, but in the work of a 
number of authors in Britain and France who wrote at about the same time and 
made use of this theoretical device. By showing that this conceptualisation of 
population was quite commonplace at the time, it will be easier to concede to the 
sparing passages from Smith’s transcribed lectures we have to content ourselves 
with on this question their proper bearing. These passages may thus be all the 
more readily linked to themes by Smith in the Wealth of Nations, which will be 
developed in the following chapters. Section 7 looks at Malthus’ idiosyncratic use 
of the four stages theory, showing both the continuity of Malthus’ work with this 
theoretical tradition and his deviation from it, especially as regards the purpose of 
the use he made of its theoretical elements. Section 8 concludes. 
The following three sections (2-4) thus deal with the nature and history of 
the four stages theory, occasionally alluding to several aspects of the theory in the 
course of the investigation, but not examining the theory itself in detail. These 
sections are written largely in the style of intellectual history and sometimes meta-
analysis, tracing the reception of the theory and the history of its history, i.e. of 
secondary literature on the topic. The population aspect of conjectural history is 
not the prime focus of these sections. The subsequent three sections (5-7) examine 
the theory itself, on the basis of primary texts, respectively by Smith, several other 
18th century writers contemporary of Smith, and Malthus. These sections are 
written more largely in the style of doctrinal history, except for the section on 
Malthus which combines both approaches. Some readers may hence prefer to read 
sections 5 to 7, or in any case section 5 and 6, dealing with the theory itself, before 
reading sections 2 to 4 that deal with its universalist nature, its importance in 
Smith’s work as a whole, and what is argued to be the reasons this importance has 
long been overlooked and remains disputed to this day. 
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2. Social evolution as universalist theory of 
progress: historical and cross-cultural context 
“Improvement”, “modernisation”, “economic development” and “socio-cultural 
evolution” are terms that have been used successively, and at times 
interchangeably, since the 18th century.  These terms may contain subtle 
differences, depending on who uses them, and in which decade or century, but 
essentially they all refer to the idea of progress, conceived as a general movement 
of societies from a less to a more “refined” state.  This way of conceiving of all 
human societies as being situated on some sort of continuum from a low or simple 
(“primitive”, “savage”, “under-developed”, “developing”, “poor”, “indolent”, 
“backward”, etc.) to a high or complex (“civilised”, “developed”, “rich”, 
“industrious”, “industrialised”, “advanced”, etc.) stage still runs through all the 
social sciences. This methodology is indeed so intricately bound up with the 
emergence of these fields, and has so much shaped their categories of 
interpretations, that it seems difficult to properly separate it from the various 
disciplines that compose the social sciences themselves.11 Having great 
implications for what precisely it means to be human, what distinguishes man 
from other animals, and one human group from another, it goes well beyond the 
human sciences, indeed, being of fundamental interest also to clerics, philosophers 
and biologists.  
There was notably vigorous interest in the first half of the 18th century in the 
great apes described by European travellers at the end of the 17th, just as the 
American Indians (and to a lesser degree the “savage” tribes of Africa and 
Australasia) made for intense debate about the origin of humanity and the 
boundaries (and respective advantages or moral superiority) between “savages” 
and civilised society. The “Orang-Utans” (a name used throughout the 18th century 
for all great apes) also fostered debate about the boundaries between (savage) 
man and animals. Rousseau notably considered the Orang-Utan to be equivalent to 
savage humans (he made reference to people raised by animals). Linaues classified 
the Orang-Utan in the same genus Homo as man. Buffon (although not entirely 
consistently) drew a clear boundary between apes and humans, making human 
language and sociability a defining feature of humanity. This view was generally 
                                                        
11 Wallerstein (1984, p. 102) holds that “the concept of development is not merely one of 
the central components of the ideology both of western civilization and of world social 
science but is in fact the central organizing concept around which all else is hinged.” 
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adopted by the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment (with the notable exception 
of Mondobbo).12  
The central challenge of these debates was to find an explanation for the 
diversity, not only linguistic and cultural, but also social, political and economic, 
between the different human groups that inhabited the earth. To explain the 
different levels of ‘sophistication’ of different human groups, at least two 
fundamental options offered themselves: explaining these differences as being 
essential and atemporal, which implies seeing human groups as being naturally 
different (and generally some as being naturally superior and inferior); or positing 
a common human nature, and seeing present differences as the outcome of some 
temporal process. Both these options have been chosen at times to varying 
degrees, and the tension between the two still runs through political and social 
thought today. While these two different ways of conceiving of human differences 
were also found in the 18th century (notably embodied in the different 
perspectives of monogenism and polygenism), the dominant idea in Enlightenment 
philosophy was the one of a unitary human race, further linked to the perspective 
of the fundamental equality, at birth, of the individuals composing the different 
societies, which found its way into the American declaration of independence 
(1776) and the Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen (1789) ― both 
written at a time, it should be noted, when slavery was still legal in both North 
America and the French colonies (as it was in Greece when the word democracy 
was coined), and people of African, Native-American and Asian origin were far 
from enjoying equal rights to people of European descent, not to mention women 
to men. Major enlightenment thinkers were divided on the question of equality 
between what came to be regarded as the world’s principal ethnic groups, with 
some explaining human differences by external circumstances like climate and 
geography, as epitomised in Montesquieu’s Esprit des Lois, while Voltaire, Hume 
and Kant, notably, were noted for more ethnically essentialist views.13 
                                                        
12 See on these various debates Sebastiani (2013), particularly pp. 46, 66-70, 83-5, 106. 
13 This is not to deny the intricacy of the interplay between physical and moral causes, 
notably in the determination of “national characters”, in the works of major Enlightenment 
thinkers. On Montesquieu and Hume’s respective views on this and their influence on 
Smith see Chamley (1975). Nor are the categories of monogenism and polygenism 
sufficient to describe 18th century attitudes on race: they do not strictly overlap with 
universalist and particularist views on human society respectively, and views that would 
today be considered “racist” have been expressed by people in both camps. Voltaire’s and 
Hume’s racist views (both are generally considered polygenist; in Hume’s case this is hard 
to attest) have notably been widely discussed. On Voltaire see for example Poliakov (1982, 
p. 55-6). Hume’s reputation in this department rests on a single, infamous, footnote, but 
which has allowed him, according to Richard Popkin (1978, p. 211, which sparked a long 
debate on this issue), to become (deservedly or not) “the favorite authority for the 
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The idea of the predominance of nurture over nature and the basic equality 
of all men at birth is very present in Smith’s work, embodied in his famous view 
that:  
The difference of natural talents in different men is, in reality, much less 
than we are aware of; and the very different genius which appears to 
distinguish men of different professions, when grown up to maturity, is not 
upon many occasions so much the cause as the effect of the division of 
labour. The difference between the most dissimilar characters, between a 
philosopher and a common street porter, for example, seems to arise not so 
much from nature, as from habit, custom, and education. (WN I.ii.4, p. 28-9) 
14 
And the same unity of human nature he saw between the different individuals of 
“commercial society”, Smith also saw between people of different nations. 
Remarkably, there is not one disparaging comment to be found about the members 
of any other nation or people that is not explained by another circumstance than 
the mere belonging of their members to this particular ethnic, linguistic or 
religious group throughout the entirety of Smith’s work — to be contrasted with 
the racist commentary to be found notably in the work of (among other 
Enlightenment thinkers) Hume, Voltaire, or Kant.  
At one point in the Wealth of Nations, Smith makes a comment that, taken out 
of context, could be read as a ‘racist’ one: “for we must acknowledge, I apprehend, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
extreme racists, and the central figure to be combatted by the humanitarians.” Hume 
revised this footnote, which originally described “all other species of men (for there are 
four or five different kinds)” as “naturally inferior to the whites”, substituting “negroes” 
for “all other species of men”, thus making his racism more targeted, as well as removing a 
possible reference to polygenism; see on this Immerwahr (1992). This aspect of Kant’s 
thought has only fairly recently been given detailed attention. For a review of the 
literature see the introduction to Mikkelsen (2013). Blumenbach, Buffon, and Linnaeus 
had classified humans into four or five different species, which can be regarded as 
ancestors of the 19th century racial categories. The Enlightenment category of “whites” 
Hume refers to was not yet definite; Franklin had still spoken, in an essay referred to later 
in this chapter, of “the  Spaniards, Italians, French, Russians and Swedes” as being 
“generally of what we call a swarthy complexion; as are the  Germans  also, the  Saxons 
only excepted, who with the  English  make the principal body of white people on the face 
of the earth” (Franklin 1755, last §). Two fairly recent books discuss ideas on racial, sexual 
and cultural differences in the Enlightenment, particularly in the British context, in great 
detail and offer a good summary of the various debates on the often overlapping topics of 
human differences and human progress: Roxanne Wheeler’s (2000) The Complexion of 
Race and Silvia Sebastiani’s (2013) Race, Gender, and the Limits of Progress. For an earlier 
resource see the volume edited by Pagliaro (1973). 
14 The porter-philosopher contrast to illustrate the equality of talents of humans at birth is 
already exposed in the Cannan notes (LJ(B) 220-1, p. 493), the ‘Early Draft of the Wealth of 
Nations’ (ED 26-9, p. 572-7) and the ‘First Fragment on the Division of Labour’ (FA 1, p. 
583).  
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that the Spanish creoles are in many respects superior to the ancient Indians” 
(IV.vii.b.7, p. 568-9). Read in context, however, it becomes clear that by “superior”, 
Smith does not denote the ‘value’ of the ancient Indians as human beings, nor their 
capacity to comprehend or undertake anything a “creole” (or  a European) could, in 
the same circumstances, but simply that the present creoles are more advanced, on 
the spectrum from savagery to civilisation. The passage is directly preceded, 
indeed, by this one: “the populousness of every country must be in proportion to 
the degree of its improvement and cultivation. In spite of the cruel destruction of 
the natives which followed the conquest, these two great empires are, probably, 
more populous now than they ever were before: and the people are surely very 
different”. This passage appears, indeed, in a section entitled “Causes of Prosperity 
of New Colonies”, and Smith had stated five paragraphs earlier that “The colonists 
carry out with them a knowledge of agriculture and of other useful arts superior to 
what can grow up of its own accord in the course of many centuries among savage 
and barbarous nations” (IV.vii.b.2, p. 564). The ancient Indians did not possess this 
knowledge (yet), hence were (from the point of view of the progress of society) 
inferior to the present creoles. Smith’s use of the vocabulary of “savage” and 
“barbarian” (and superior and inferior) in general must be read in this way, as will 
become clear from the textual examination in the remainder of this chapter. 
The idea of progress, and the theories based on it, referred to by Margaret 
Hodgen (1964, p. 380, 483) as “progressivism”, allow for universalist theories of 
human progress. What I mean by a universalist theory of progress is one where a 
unitary conception of human nature is used, and all differences between people are 
not explained by reference to the peculiar characteristics of their race, culture, or 
language, but rather these aspects themselves are explained by other, external 
circumstances.15 But explaining the differences between communities and peoples 
by situating them on a temporal scale of progress common in its essential features 
to all human societies requires first that such a universal theory of societies’ 
progress be devised. Montesquieu had differentiated between savages and 
barbarians, and thus introduced a certain gradualism in the distinction between 
different levels of “sophistication” of human groups, but he did not himself 
elaborate a theory of the passage from one of these stages to another (which was 
not necessary for his essentially geographic and climatic explanation of why one 
                                                        
15 The characteristics of different languages, indeed, were also explained by Smith by the 
circumstances of particular people (in particular the stage attained between savagery and 
civilisation, defining the material needs including for different features of language, but 
also the history of a people’s contact with other people) in his ‘Considerations Concerning 
the First Formation of Languages, and the Different Genius of Original and Compounded 
Languages’. 
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group was in one state or another). Other Enlightenment thinkers, notably Adam 
Smith, conceived a theory of the progress of human groups through these stages.  
Yet, establishing such a theory through historical enquiry is difficult, insofar 
as for already civilised societies what we are interested in lies hidden from us in 
the remote past, as Dugald Stewart observed.16 Stewart had also remarked, as 
reported above, that “In such inquiries, the detached facts which travels and 
voyages afford us, may frequently serve as land-marks to our speculations” (II.46, 
p. 293). It is indeed much simpler to observe different societies in the present than 
to accurately reconstruct the past of a single society through all of its history (a 
history which cannot properly be observed at all, but only gotten at indirectly, 
through written records as far as these are available, and other sources even more 
difficult to obtain and interpret). Thus scholars have often substituted the first 
exercise for the second. It is not entirely unproblematic that by so proceeding the 
theory largely presupposes what it sets out to explain: that there is a gradual 
progress of human societies and that the “savage” societies we can still observe 
today must thus be a reflection of what the now “civilised” ones looked like in the 
past. That is, different societies co-existing at the same time have been compared 
to each other, in their current state, in order to derive from that comparison a 
general understanding of how societies evolve (which in turn was used to explain 
the very differences between human societies from the observation of which the 
theory was derived). An analysis of the discrepancies between different societies in 
space has thus been used to establish theories of the evolution of one and the same 
society through time. Arland Thornton (2001), in a work critical of the practice, 
ingeniously refers to it as “reading history sideways”. It may be noted that this, of 
course, is precisely what evolutionary biologists do by observing fossils and other 
remains of past times and inferring from them how present species have evolved. 
It has often been remarked that Darwin was inspired by the thinkers of the 
Scottish Enlightenment.17 
The practise of “reading history sideways” has ancient roots. It can be 
discerned in Greek and Latin writers of Antiquity and in those medieval historians 
and philosophers in- and outside Europe who translated and elaborated on the 
                                                        
16 “On most of these subjects very little information is to be expected from history; for long 
before that stage of society when men begin to think of recording their transactions, many 
of the most important steps of their progress have been made.” (Stewart II. 44, in EPS, p. 
292) 
17 See notably Schweber (1980); Gordon (1989) and Marciano and Pelissier (2000) ; see 
further on this the annex to Chapter 3. 
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former.18 A form of conjectural history resembling the 18th century four stages 
theory can thus already be found in Lucretius (99-55 B.C.), who indeed inspired 
the Scottish Enlightenment philosophers (Harris 1968, p. 26-27; Meek 1976b, p. 8; 
Emerson 1984, p. 69-70).19  
As to define is to delimit, human groups have always quite naturally defined 
themselves by contrast with others; and as the very delimiting of societies and 
nations is generally tied to histories of conquest and domination, other groups 
were generally depicted as inferior or lacking in some respect, thereby elevating 
the group itself and fostering pride in belonging to it.20 In the same vein, the term 
and concept of civilisation can be properly defined only by contrast with that 
which it is not: savage, unrefined, uncultivated. The word “barbarian” has from its 
origin had the pejorative undertone it still carries today: the one of a foreign 
people, of the other, and of a low level of sophistication (Hall 1989, p. 3-13; Pocock 
2005, especially chapters 1, 8, 9, 11 and 15). It was defined by contrast to the 
ancient Greek “polis”, the citizen of the civilised world (Equivalents of the term can 
be found in many languages). One can thus note the circularity in the definition of 
both barbarians and civilisation, depending on each other.21  
Yet, while highly subjective and generally ethnocentric criteria are often used 
to define on what side of the savage-civilised divide a particular people or class of 
people is to be situated, there can be (and have been), at least in theory, objective 
criteria of what it means for a society to be civilised. Thus, while considering other 
people as inferior in some respect seems to be intimately tied to the very process 
of self-identification and self-definition of human groups, the contrast between 
civilisation and savagery is not, in itself, necessarily derogatory or ethnocentric. 
The positive connotations attached to civilisation and the negative ones attached 
to savagery have indeed been at times entirely inverted, such as in the 18th century 
                                                        
18 For a detailed analysis of the historical roots of what came to be known as the 
“comparative method” in the 19th century, especially in ancient Greek thought, see Nisbet 
(1969, p. 189-96). 
19 According to Harris (idid.), “in the matter of sociocultural evolution, the Enlightenment 
merely restored an existing ancient doctrine to a position of intellectual respectability. 
Thus, all evolutionary thought during the Enlightenment betrays the influence of the great 
first-century-B.C. Roman materialist-poet-philosopher, Lucretius.” 
20 Thus people’s endonyms (names people use to refer to their own group, in their own 
language) are usually flattering, while exonyms (other peoples’ names for a people, in the 
other peoples’ languages) are usually belittling if not insulting in their respective original 
meaning (Matisoff 1986). 
21 The term and concept of civilisation is said to have come about only in the 17th century 
and taken on its contemporary meaning in the 18th, but it was itself only a transposition of 
the ancient term polis (Pagden 1988a). 
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debate about the ‘noble savage’ and the 19th century romantic movement with its 
‘return to nature’ allegory, both having survived into the present and being 
integrated in varying degrees in different strands of the environmentalist 
movement.22 Refined manners were usually seen as a sign (seldom a cause) of 
civilisation, but even here the fronts were not marked clearly. Rousseau indeed 
saw savage man as having superior moral virtue to civilised one, and one can find a 
similar idea in Smith.23 In the same vein, the dichotomy described by Robert 
Wokler (1995, p. 34) between the passions that animate savages and barbarians 
versus the reason of civilised man as being instrumental in the elaboration of four 
stages theory is a simplification, insofar as Hume and Smith, notably, did not 
believe that the passions had been supplemented by reason in the civilised state. It 
was the natural moral sentiments (i.e. passions, just like the “natural desire to 
better our condition” is one) which still determined man’s behaviour and 
consequently his condition, in the civilised state as ever before.24 This is an 
element which Malthus, significantly, took over from Smith, and used against 
Condorcet and Godwin — although, as we shall see, in some respects he actually 
resembled the latter two more than the first.25 
                                                        
22 As such, Roxanne Wheeler’s argument that the role of the four stages theory was 
neglected as ancestor of present day racism seems misguided (see Wheeler 2000, p. 197, 
188, 190). It was rather the reaction to the “natural history” contained in the four stages 
theory, with its unitary view of humanity and human nature, that ushered in the first 
formulations of “scientific racist” arguments prior to the nineteenth century, notably by 
Edward Long (on this see Sebastiani 2013, p. 103-31). 
23 Notably his description, admirative in tone, of the courage, combative spirit and bravery 
of pain and torture of savages at TMS V.2.9, p. 206, followed by his remark that: “There is 
not a negro from the coast of Africa who does not, in this respect, possess a degree of 
magnanimity which the soul of his sordid master is too often scarce capable of 
conceiving”; as compared with the rather negatively presented “unwarlike” character of 
the inhabitants of the “improved parts of this country [Scotland]” at LJ(B) 331, p. 541-2, 
which one also finds in Book V of Wealth of Nations in the discussion of the negative effects 
of the division of labour (and hence civilisation). Fleischacker (2011, p. 26) takes the first 
passage somewhat out of context, however, when he comments that Smith lauds the 
magnanimity of Africans and Native Americans over Europeans and omits that this 
“magnanimity” concerns specifically the bravery of savages of torture, which Smith 
explains, precisely, by the peculiar characteristic of the savage state as distinct from 
civilisation, and not in cultural or ethnic terms at all. Also, although Smith was not 
absolutist about it, as these discussions attest, it is very clear from the entirety of his work, 
and the great stress he laid on the idea of progress, that he thought that civilisation was an 
“improvement” over savagery.   
24 As remarked before, this had antecedents in Machiavelli, who indeed had himself been 
an avid reader of the classics, just as the Enlightenment philosophers were. 
25 See below p. 145. 
85 
Interpreting conjectural history, or theories of social evolution (more 
generally referred to by Hodgen (1964) as “progressivism”) as eurocentric (as 
Hodgen does), ironically, may actually itself be tainted by eurocentrism. 
Proclaiming the application of theories of progress and social evolution onto non-
European societies to be eurocentric supposes, indeed, that progress and evolution 
are ideas (and phenomena) somehow inherently European in nature, thereby 
elevating European society to a level above all others, thus arriving precisely at the 
result that is criticised as being the starting point of “eurocentric” theories of social 
evolution. In fact, theories of progress much like the ones of Renaissance and 
Enlightenment European thinkers can be found in non-European works of the 
Middle Ages. The Persian Alberuni and the Arab Ibn Khaldun are cases in point 
(both shall be considered in more detail in section 5 below).26  
“That "the human and the social sciences, or at least a certain number of 
them, were born during the 18th century" is a largely accepted view” writes 
Christopher Fox (1995, p. 1), citing Sergio Moravia (1980, p. 247), himself referring 
to Gusdorf’s work.27 This view, linking the birth of the human sciences notably to 
Hume’s “science of man”, stands in opposition to Michel Foucault, who famously 
saw the human sciences (the contemporary disciplines composing them, in their 
modern form) as having been able to develop only after 1800, with the period 
around 1775 representing a clear epistemic break in intellectual history (Foucault 
1966).28 Both views share the idea that the Enlightenment carried with it concepts 
and theories, allowing for fields of enquiries, which were all entirely new, and, by 
the same token, see the human sciences as based on ideas that were all European 
in origin. As was touched upon in this section, this view may not be warranted. 
Hodgen notably concludes from her elaborate reconstruction of 16th and 17th 
century anthropological thought, with reference to ancient sources, that in this 
                                                        
26 The fact that both of these writers were themselves inspired by ancient Greek 
philosophers does not weaken the point. Indeed, it is largely through scholars in the ‘Arab 
world’ that ancient Greek thought was carried over (via Constantinople/Istanbul, 
Andalusia and the Italian trade ports) into Renaissance and Enlightenment Europe, and in 
the process scholars of various origins necessarily influenced each other. As far as 
economic theory is concerned, see on this the volume edited by Gazhanfar (2003).  
27 Georges Gusdorf devoted four volumes (IV, V, VI and VIII, all published in the 1970s) of 
his monumental study of encyclopaedic proportion (spanning fourteen books in total), Les 
sciences humaines et la pensée occidentale, to the human sciences in the Enlightenment. 
Particularly relevant is volume VI (Gusdorf 1973). 
28 For a useful summary of both Foucault’s position and its critics see Christie (1993, p. 6-
8). While rejecting Foucault’s position in the absolute, Christie offers a useful discussion of 
the problems in delimiting the human sciences, both conceptually and historically (1993, 
p. 1-5). On Foucault’s critics see further Fox (1995, p. 3-4 and corresponding notes).  
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field “recent centuries have witnessed little that warrants the title of theoretical 
innovation” (Hodgen 1964, p. 484).29  
The significant “epistemic break” that Foucault postulates to have occurred 
around 1775 is related in no small measure to the view of the emergence of 
political economy as an independent field of study, linked itself to the publication 
of the Wealth of Nations at precisely this moment in time. But, as shall be 
elaborated in the following two sections, the significant break-away from wider 
moral- and political-philosophical — and, of particular importance for the purpose 
of the present study, jurisprudential — concerns of Smith’s “economic” work, 
which was postulated in the 19th century and continued to be a largely accepted 
idea in the mid-20th century, surviving in the social sciences until today, is hard to 
reconcile with the entirety of Smith’s oeuvre, including, significantly, the content of 
his Glasgow lectures on jurisprudence recovered at the end of the 19th and in the 
20th century. Jurisprudence, indeed, took a central place in the study of man in the 
18th century, with political, moral and economic questions being largely subsumed 
under it.30 As the next section intends to establish, following Stewart’s famous 
remarks considered above, the historical method is of central importance 
throughout Smith’s work. That method, as materialised in the four stages theory, 
comprised population growth as a central explanatory element of the progression 
of socio-economic stages. This must also be seen in the context of the late 18th 
century, when what would today be called “demographic” concerns were 
inseparably linked to political and economic doctrines, as Foucault himself 
                                                        
29 Her position is worth quoting in full: “The study of man in the Western world is not 
young. It is one of the oldest subjects of serious thought. Neither sociology nor 
anthropology sprang de novo and fully formed from the reflections of their presumptive 
"fathers," Auguste Comte and Sir Edward Burnett Tylor; and even those bold spirits who 
have recently traced the antecedents of the two disciplines as far back as the eighteenth 
century — to the Encyclopedists and the Scottish moral philosophers — have reached 
back only part of the way. To fix casually upon any handful of recent scholars as 
"founders" or "originators" is always a disservice to intellectual history.” (Hodgen 1964, p. 
7) 
30 As J. G. A. Pocock (1981, p. 366) put it: “We are now [in the mid-18th century] in the era 
of a revived and modernized natural jurisprudence, based on the notion that an intensive 
study of the variations of social behaviour throughout space and time would reveal the 
underlying principles of human nature on which the diversities of conduct were based and 
from which lois took their esprit. Jurisprudence, whatever it was like as the formal study of 
law, was the social science of the eighteenth century, the matrix of both the study and the 
ideology of manners.” Similarly, Kelley (1980, p. 136) argues that “What has been 
regarded as the birth of social science, in fact, can also be seen as the fulfillment in certain 
ways of legal tradition.” (See further n. 107 on p. 127 below.) 
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demonstrated through his inquiry into the concept of population and its central 
place in the emergence of modern social sciences and statecraft.31  
Thus, the four stages theory, and at any rate conjectural history more widely 
conceived, have a long history. The many references to classical sources where it 
was used (some of which we will encounter below) sufficiently attest that Dugald 
Stewart did not know enough when he declared it to be a “sort of inquiry, which, so 
far as I know, is entirely of modern origin” (Stewart II.44, EPS 292).32 Islamic and 
Hindu scholars of the middle ages had taken up this line of enquiry, found in 
ancient Greek and Roman  literature,  long before it caught the interest of the 
French and the Scots (and before them the Dutch Grotius, Hobbes and Locke in 
England and the German Pufendorf, to varying degrees). Beyond this wide 
circulation, the four stages theory makes for (and seems to have always been used 
as) a universalist theory of progress, whereby human differences are explained by 
geographic and climatic circumstances mostly. We shall consider at present the 
centrality of this theory in Adam Smith’s work. 
 
3. Conjectural History throughout Smith’s Œuvre   
Some modern authors have written about a theory of growth by Smith as distinct 
from his theory of development and his theory of history. In the first category is 
often put something derived from Books I and II of Wealth of Nations, with 
emphasis on demand and supply, prices, and division of labour and capital 
accumulation, viewed as a relatively short term analysis (Thweatt 1957 ; Spengler 
1959a, 1959b ; Anspach 1976 ; Kim 2001). Under his “development theory” some 
authors have treated Smith's rural-urban historical theory developed in Book III, 
depicted as a more long-term view of development (Khan 1954 ; Singh 1959 ; Bell 
                                                        
31 On the inseparable nature of demography and economics in the late 18th century, see 
notably Tomaselli (1995). 
32 Equally misguided are modern repetitions of this idea, such as by Reid (1989, p. 59), 
who writes that “We are now all so familiar with the stadial analysis of societal evolution, 
perhaps through the writings of Hicks or Rostow, that this great intellectual innovation of 
Adam Smith is frequently taken for granted. It is so useful to regard progress as having 
taken place by a sequence of stages that it is now hard to imagine that this view had no 
coherent form before the Scottish Enlightenment.” Reid cites Meek in this connection, but 
although Meek, in his zeal to want to make Adam Smith the discoverer of something, may 
have implicitly conveyed this idea, he was far too careful a scholar and dedicated a 
historian to have ever put it in such categorical terms. Meek (1976b) recognised that what 
he called the four stages theory was present in some form or other in many earlier — and 
some much earlier — “strands of thought”, but was unwilling to see these earlier versions 
as entirely the ‘real thing’ yet. Possible reasons for this will be touched upon in the 
following section. 
88 
1992 ; Blecker 1997); while his four stages theory of Book V, but especially as 
formulated in Lectures on Jurisprudence, is referred to as his theory of (economic) 
history (Brewer 2008). But of course these categorisations are entirely arbitrary as 
well as being anachronistic. Smith himself was interested in the historical 
development of man in society, which he considered from different angles, but as a 
unified subject. The overarching theme was what Smith himself called the 
“progress of society”. There was no need for him to divide this subject into 
different modern categories (growth theory, development theory, economic 
history) which obviously were entirely foreign to 18th century thinking in general 
and Smith’s thinking in particular. The four stages theory, moreover, and more 
generally the comparative analysis of savage and civilised societies, was not 
merely a particular aspect of Smith’s consideration of the progress of society. It 
was, rather, the overarching theme that underlay all his thinking on the matter and 
stretched to considerations of most every other subject.  
This particular frame of reference, as Meek points out (1976, p. 115) with 
reference to Dugald Stewart, was one that occupied Smith till the end of his life, 
and to the degree of ‘obsession’ (use of the term is Meek’s).33 We are told by John 
Millar, as reported by Stewart, that Smith’s course on moral philosophy at Glasgow 
University, where he was appointed in 1751, “was divided into four parts”, of 
which: 
In the third part, he treated at more length of that branch of morality which 
relates to justice.  . . . Upon this subject he followed the plan that seems to 
be suggested by Montesquieu; endeavouring to trace the gradual progress 
of jurisprudence, both public and private, from the rudest to the most 
refined ages, and to point out the effects of those arts which contribute to 
subsistence, and to the accumulation of property, in producing 
correspondent improvements or alterations in law and government. This 
important branch of his labours he also intended to give to the public; but 
this intention, which is mentioned in the conclusion of the Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, he did not live to fulfil. (Stewart I.18-9, p. 274-5) 
                                                        
33 The exact phrase Meek uses is that Smith “came near to being obsessed with” the four 
stages theory. Meek refers to Stewart but these were not Stewart’s words. The relevant 
passages in Stewart are the ones cited on page 65 above, and one where Stewart relates 
Millar’s memories, according to which: “The same turn of thinking was frequently, in his 
social hours, applied to more familiar subjects; and the fanciful theories which, without the 
least affectation of ingenuity, he was continually starting upon all the common topics of 
discourse, gave to his conversation a novelty and variety that were quite inexhaustible  . . .  
and of which his lively and circumstantial descriptions amused his friends the more, that 
he seemed to be habitually inattentive, in so remarkable a degree, to what was passing 
around him” (Stewart II.54, p. 295) 
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Fortunately, we can today form a very good idea of what such a treatise as Millar 
alludes to would have looked like from the detailed student notes of Smith’s 
jurisprudence lectures that are published in Lectures of Jurisprudence. It is true that 
Smith never got to publish that “account of the general principles of law and 
government, and of the different revolutions they have undergone in the different 
ages and periods of society”, which he had announced to “endeavour to give” in 
“another discourse” in the last paragraph of the Theory of Moral Sentiments. Smith 
“partly executed this promise”, he himself announced in the ‘Advertisement’ to the 
6th edition of Moral Sentiments, “In the Enquiry concerning the Nature and Causes of 
the Wealth of Nations [sic] . . . at least so far as concerns police, revenue, and arms” 
(TMS, p. 3). But, over and above this partial treatment of the subject in Wealth of 
Nations, the comparative analysis of the political, economic, moral, cultural, and 
individual and social conditions of societies of the “savage” and the “civilised” type 
is one that runs through Smith’s entire oeuvre.  
Smith takes up this theme, in 1756, when discussing Rousseau’s Discours in 
his Letter to the Authors of the Edinburgh Review (EPS, p. 242-56), his second ever 
published piece (appearing only six months after and in the same journal as his 
very first). Further, it is in connection with the wonder of “savages” about natural 
phenomena that the first mention of an “invisible hand” occurs in Smith’s works 
(of three in total), in section III of the ‘Principles which lead and direct 
Philosophical Enquiries; Illustrated by the History of Astronomy’, described by 
Smith himself in a letter to Hume as a “juvenile work” (Corr. 137, p. 168). That 
section, significantly, opens with the phrase “Mankind, in the first ages of society, 
before the establishment of law, order, and security” (Astronomy III.1, EPS p. 48).  
In the Theory of Moral Sentiments, many comparisons are drawn between 
individuals in “rude” and “civilised” societies, especially in part V,34 but also in 
parts II, VI (written after Wealth of Nations) and VII.35  
Smith’s ‘Considerations concerning the First Formation of Languages’, first 
published in 1761, two years after the first edition of the Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, is the essay that was described by Dugald Stewart, in the terms already 
cited at the beginning of this chapter, “as a specimen of a particular sort of inquiry, 
which  . . .  seems, in a peculiar degree, to have interested Mr Smith’s curiosity”, 
                                                        
34 See V.1.9, p. 199 and V.2.7-15, p. 204-10. The first of these passages in particular is quite 
remarkable for its cultural relativism (two centuries before that term was coined). See 
Fleischacker (2011) for a detailed treatment of Smith’s cultural relativism (containing 
some imprecision, however; see footnote 23 above).  
35 See II.iii.2.4, p. 100-1; VI.ii.1.12-13, p. 222-3; VII.ii.1.28, p. 282; VII.ii.1.34, p. 288; and 
VII.iv.36, p. 341. 
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which Stewart termed “Conjectural History” and that according to him “may be 
traced”, in some form, “in all [Smith’s] different works, whether moral, political, or 
literary”. Smith, in the essay on the origin of language, considers the formation of 
languages in a hypothetical setting among savages. An actual comparison between 
the situation of “Savage nations on the coast of Africa” and “Wherever the 
Inhabitants of a city are rich and opulent” appears in lecture 23 of Smith’s lectures 
on rhetoric (LRBL, p. 137), amidst a discussion of the effects of commerce and 
opulence on the refinement of arts and manners (and more specifically “the 
improvement of Prose”), with mention, too, of “the first ages of Society”. (Lecture 3 
covers the material corresponding to Smith’s essay on the formation of language, 
of which the notes resemble the essay in every respect.)36  
Mentions of savage, rude, and civilised nations, and of the different ages of 
society in the Lectures on Jurisprudence (both sets of notes reporting lectures held 
by Smith in the early 1760s as well) are too numerous to be reported here, but 
some will be considered in the following sections.  
In the Wealth of Nations, finally, it is in the fourth paragraph of the opening 
section (WN 4, p. 10) that Smith first compares “savage nations of hunters and 
fishers” and “civilised and thriving nations”, announcing a theme that runs through 
the entire work. In the same “Introduction and Plan of the Work”, Smith tells us 
about the object of the first four books of the Wealth of Nations being “To explain in 
what has consisted the revenue of the great body of the people, or what has been 
the nature of those funds which, in different ages and nations, have supplied their 
annual consumption” (WN 9, p. 11). Every book of Wealth of Nations begins with a 
comparison of rude and civilised societies.37 And savage, rude or barbarous 
nations are mentioned, and compared with civilised or commercial ones, or the 
rude, barbarous or civilised state or age of society are discussed, at regular 
intervals from the first to the last pages of Smith’s opus.38  
                                                        
36 The student notes on these lectures on rhetoric published in the corresponding Glasgow 
edition volume (first published by John M. Lothian, who discovered the notes, in 1963) 
pertain to the session of 1762-3. But Smith had already been teaching rhetoric since 1748. 
37 In Books II and V, the comparison appears in the first two paragraphs, respectively. 
Book III mentions “civilised society” in its first sentence. In Book I, the comparison is 
reintroduced mid-way through Chapter 1, after the pin factory passage, having been 
announced in the ‘Introduction and Plan of the Work’ just before the beginning of Book I. 
In Book VI the comparison appears towards the end of the first chapter (IV.i.33, p. 448). 
38 Use is made of the categories of analysis of the four stages theory in the Wealth of 
Nations in the form of: “ages and nations” (8-9, p. 11; I.viii.41, p. 99; III.i.2, p. 377; III.ii.9, p. 
387; IV 2, p. 428; IV.vii.a.19, p. 563; IV.vii.b.55, p. 587; V.i.f.38, p. 774), “rude(st)”, 
“advanced”, “civilized”, “commercial”, (and “every”) “state of society” (I.i.4, p. 15; I.vi.1-3, p. 
65; I.x.b.3, p. 117-8; I.xi.e.28, p. 206; I.xi.m.7, p. 247; II.1, p. 276; V.i.a.2-3, p. 689-90; V.i.a.6, 
91 
 It is significant to note, in this respect, that the Wealth of Nations, according 
to Millar, as reported by Stewart, actually grew out of the same lectures on moral 
philosophy as the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Lectures on Jurisprudence. 
The first of the four parts of those lectures was, Millar reports, devoted to theology, 
the second contained the material of Theory of Moral Sentiments, the third, as cited 
above, was made up of the contents of Lectures on Jurisprudence, and the fourth 
comprised the germs of the Wealth of Nations (Stewart II.18-20, p. 274-5). And for 
anyone who would doubt whether Smith may not have given up this line of 
enquiry (i.e. the four stages theory as frame of analysis) at some point in his career, 
one of the last of Smith’s works, which he had been working on late in life and left 
to be published after his death (Ross 2010, p. xxx, 91; introduction to EPS), the 
essay On the Imitative Arts, contains, too, a comparison of savage and civilised 
nations (in part II, starting EPS p. 187) as does indeed part VI of Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, written after Wealth of Nations. This theme, and its corresponding 
language of barbarism and civilisation, is so ubiquitous in Smith’s entire work, 
including the Wealth of Nations, in fact, that the question must be, not so much why 
this theme was in recent decades given renewed attention, but why it was so 
utterly neglected for so long by the large majority of  Smith scholars. It is with this 
question that the following section is principally concerned. Before turning to this 
theme, however, some further observations must be made on the four stages 
theory and the Wealth of Nations. 
According to Samuel Hollander, as far as Wealth of Nations is concerned, the 
statements by Stewart and by Smith himself on the importance of the (conjectural) 
historical investigation in Smith’s work, discussed in the introduction of the 
present chapter and at the beginning of this section, only apply to “particular 
sections of Books III and V”.39 Thus, Hollander held, “Smith’s main object in the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
p. 692; V.i.a.8-11, p. 694-5; V.iii.1, p. 907; V.iii.5-9, p. 910-1), “barbarous (and uncivilized) 
state”/ “nation(s)” / “countr-y/ies” (I.iii.3, p. 34; I.iii.8, p. 36; I.ix.16, p. 112; I.xi.c.4, p. 178; 
I.xi.c.6, p. 180; I.xi.m.7, p. 247; I.xi.m.11, p. 250; I.xi.n.3, p. 257; III.iv.24, p. 427; IV.vii.2, p. 
556; IV.vii.b.2, p. 564-5; IV.vii.b.4, p. 567; IV.vii.c.100, p. 634; V.i.a.35-44, p. 703-8; V.i.b.5, p. 
711; V.i.b.15, p. 717; V.i.e.2, p. 731; V.i.e.29-30, p. 754; V.i.f.20, p. 765; V.i.f.40, p. 776; 
V.i.f.51, p. 782-3; V.ii.k.20, p. 878), “civilized (and thriving) nation(s)” / “societ-y/ies” / 
“countr-y/ies” (4, p. 10; I.i.11, p. 22-3; I.ii.2, p. 26; I.iii.5, p. 34; I.iii.8, p. 36; I.iv.11, p. 44; 
I.vi.24, p. 71; I.viii.39, p. 97; I.xi.d.3, p. 194; I.xi.g.26, p. 221; I.xi.n.3, p. 257; I.xi.p.7, p. 265; 
III.i.1, p. 376; III.iii.15, p. 407; IV.i.33, p. 448; IV.v.b.4, p. 525; IV.vii.b.1, p. 564; IV.ix.38, p. 
679; V.i.a.5; p. 691; V.i.a.11, p. 695-6; V.i.a.36-40, p. 704-6;  V.i.a.44, p. 708; V.i.b.5-7, p. 711-
2; V.i.b.19, p. 719; V.i.e.2, p. 731; V.i.f.50-4, p. 782-5; V.i.f.61, p. 788; V.i.g.10, p. 794; 
V.ii.a.16-21, p. 822-4; V.ii.e.8, p. 843), “ages of society” (I.iv.3, p. 38; V.i.a.10, p. 695), “stages 
of improvement” (I.xi.e.27-28, p. 206). 
39 Clark (2008, p. 144) holds, by contrast, that “The fourth Book, likewise, is conceived as a 
further broadening of the historical analysis of Book three”. 
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Wealth of Nations was the formulation of a reform programme on the basis of an 
analytical model of the operation of a capitalist exchange economy” and “The 
historical analysis is best viewed as a digression” (1998 [1976], p. 87-8). Let alone 
the anachronism of claiming Smith’s 18th century writings to be primarily 
concerned with “a competitive capitalist exchange economy”, this refusal to 
concede to Smith’s comparative historical analysis an actual relevance in the 
Wealth of Nations led Hollander notably to espouse the view — reminiscent of 
proponents of the Umschwungstheorie, but equally typical of some late 20th 
century readings of Smith, both of which we shall look at in the next section — 
according to which, in the Wealth of Nations, “the proposition that self-interest is 
the governing motive throughout time and space as far as concerns man in his 
economic affairs is Smith’s fundamental axiom” (ibid., italics in original). In fact, 
even in the Wealth of Nations alone (i.e. disregarding the Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, where many other motives of human behaviour are discussed, 
including in economic affairs), the self-interested motive as main organisational 
basis of economic matters is not independent of time and space, but is a specific 
feature of commercial society, while in hunter and pastor societies, and even in 
feudalism, economic affairs still rely mainly on personal relationships and ties of 
submission and dependency. Thus, immediately preceding the most famous 
statement of the importance of self-interest by Smith (“It is not from the 
benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, 
but from their regard to their own interest”), Smith had stated that “In civilised 
society [man] stands at all times in need of the cooperation and assistance of great 
multitudes, while his whole life is scarce sufficient to gain the friendship of a few 
persons.  . . .   But man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, 
and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only” (WN I.ii.2, p. 26). 
The key phrase here is “in civilised society”. In savage society, indeed, man is not in 
need of the assistance of great multitudes, but only of the relatively few members 
of his tribe, whom he is closely related to and has other ways to deal with, 
including in ‘economic affairs’, than through self-interest alone.40 The contrast 
Smith here draws between savage societies and civilised nations, far from being a 
digression, is precisely the means by which he illustrates how advanced countries, 
despite greater inequality in wealth, can achieve greater material well-being even 
for the poorest members of society than savage nations.41  
                                                        
40 See further on this p. 176-178 in the next chapter. 
41 See on this notably Hont and Ignatieff (1983). The characteristic statement is made by 
Smith in the last paragraph of the first chapter of the Wealth of Nations (p. 23-4). 
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It is true that references in Wealth of Nations to the four stages theory proper 
are for the most part of a rather implicit nature. Although Smith opens nearly every 
book of Wealth of Nations with a consideration of the “early” or “rude” stage of 
society (see above p. 90), which sufficiently shows the importance of this general 
frame of analysis for the Wealth of Nations, Smith here always only refers to the 
four stages framework.42 He never explains it or even presents it in full. The closest 
we come to a full exposition by Smith of this theory is in Book V, but even here it 
lacks the detailed description that it was given in Smith’s lectures. And while the 
four stages theory is never laid out in full in the Wealth of Nations, neither is the 
passage of stages explained by the mechanism characteristic of the theory.43 In fact, 
neither is this mechanism outlined in the set of lecture notes published by Cannan 
in 1896, which were hence available to the academic and wider public for the 
whole of the 20th century. It is only in the set of lecture notes on jurisprudence first 
published in 1978 that the causal mechanism behind the passage of stages as we 
can find it in typical accounts of the four stages theory, some of which we shall 
examine in Section 6 below, is clearly explained. Smith’s explanation of how 
nations pass from one to the next of the four institutional and economic stages, i.e. 
by population growth pressing on the means of subsistence and thus prompting 
technological revolutions, was thus not available to the public in its fully 
formulated form before the publication of the second set of notes on Smith’s 
jurisprudence lectures in the Glasgow edition.  
The explanation of the development of society from savagery to civilisation 
through the joint progression of population, division of labour and capital 
accumulation, on the other hand, already fully present in the lectures,44 was in fact 
laid out in great detail in the Wealth of Nations.45 Hollander (1998 [1976], p. 87-9) 
held that the “analytical model” explaining the growth and development of society 
in the Wealth of Nations was clearly distinct from the approach of the “Scottish 
Historical School”. But Smith’s explanation of development in the four stages 
theory (by population growth pushing on subsistence and inducing technological 
development) and the explanation of development in the Wealth of Nations 
                                                        
42 An extensive list of such references is given in n. 38, p. 86 above. 
43 As noted by Hollander (1998 [1976], p. 89). 
44 The contentious question of the presence and role of capital accumulation in the 
Lectures of Jurisprudence is addressed in fn. 46 below, and more largely in Chapter 3. 
45 For a famous exposition of the assessment that the central question of the Wealth of 
Nations, to which the theory of productivity growth through division of labour is the 
answer, is the differential material well-being of savages and the poor in commercial 
society, see Hont and Ignatieff (1983). 
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(through expanding markets, capital accumulation and division of labour) are 
complementary features of the same theory, which to a large extent is already 
present in the Lectures of Jurisprudence. Where the Wealth of Nations and the 
Lectures overlap in their explanation of the development process, there is no clash, 
as Hollander (1998 [1976], p. 88) himself observes. Where elements are missing in 
one or the other instance, they can easily be integrated in the general framework.46 
As we shall see, population growth as a moving force is one notable connecting 
element of the explanation of development in the Lectures of Jurisprudence and the 
Wealth of Nations (and, insofar as that work deals with this theme, the Theory of 
Moral Sentiments).  
It is very clear in the second set of lecture notes on jurisprudence, not only 
how the passage from stage to stage unfolds, but also what is the underlying causal 
element. It is the growth of population which progressively creates shortages, by 
exerting pressure on the local ecosystem, hence forcing society to adopt a new 
technology of subsistence. Hence population pressure creates problems, but it is 
these problems which, by calling for solutions, lead society to higher stages of 
evolution. This also involves the progress of division of labour and exchange, the 
accumulation of stock, the introduction of laws and government, the introduction 
of private property and economic (and social and political) inequality (social 
classes). All these elements are present and important in the Wealth of Nations too. 
Smith there also links them to the different stages, in the same way as in the 
lectures.47  
We could take the fact that Smith does not clearly outline the four stages 
theory in the Wealth of Nations as a sign for a distancing by him from this theme in 
                                                        
46 The most notable absence in the lectures when compared with the Wealth of Nations 
(the only true innovation in the Wealth of Nations in this respect, but which is not essential 
to the theory of development as already present in the Lectures of Jurisprudence) is the 
notion of productive and unproductive labour, which was very likely an inspiration from 
the Physiocrats upon Smith’s visit to France. Smith tied this to his theory of the differential 
productivity of different employments of capital, and through that to his theory of the 
natural progress of opulence — but the latter may also be derived, in fact, and perhaps 
more naturally so, from the sequence of development outlined by the four stages theory. 
The importance of the accumulation of capital (or stock) for the development of the 
division of labour is also often today still ascribed to Smith’s contact with French thinking 
(an enduring influence of the “Umschwungstheorie”, which we shall look at in the 
following section). This feature of Smith’s thinking was, however, already fully present in 
the lectures on jurisprudence as well as in the ‘Early Draft’. See especially LJ(B) 286, p. 
521; and further LJ(A) vi.35, p. 344; vi.38, p. 345; vi.93-4, p. 365; vi.127-30, p. 377-8; 
vi.138-57, p. 382-9; LJ(B) 140, p. 454; 233, p. 498; 244-70, p. 504-15; 282-326, p. 519-38; 
ED 35-37, p. 576-7; 41-3, p. 577-9; 45-6, p. 580.  
47 Details of presentation of course sometimes vary, as do the purposes for which Smith 
invokes elements of the four stages theory at different instances. See on this Okan (2016). 
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his second major published work.48 But his constant references to it throughout, in 
connection with a wide variety of subjects, makes this an unlikely possibility. It is 
more likely that Smith considered the theory so well known, at the moment of the 
book’s writing, that explicit references to it were not necessary. With this 
supposition, I am not formulating some esoteric claim about what Smith really 
meant, as opposed to what he actually wrote in the Wealth of Nations. Rather, I am 
following, first, what Smith himself stated to have been his intention, and what he 
considered at least the partial fulfilment of it by the publication of the Wealth of 
Nations, in the last paragraph of the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the 
Advertisement to the sixth edition of the latter work, respectively, both referred to 
above, as well as in his correspondence (see a letter to Rochefoucauld, 1st of 
November 1785, in Corr., p. 287); second, I am relying on the accounts of Stewart 
and Millar of the origin of the Wealth of Nations in Smith’s teachings on 
jurisprudence, and of the central place of conjectural history therein, also referred 
to above; finally, I am drawing on the historical investigation by Meek, showing a 
very widespread use and knowledge of the four stages theory in the second half of 
the 18th century (Meek 1976b, p. 177-230). The accounts by Smith himself and by 
Stewart and Millar show that Smith’s jurisprudential theories (in which the four 
stages theory clearly has a central position) always formed, and were always 
conceived by Smith, as an important part of an integrated whole. And Meek’s work 
allows one to conclude that references to the four stages theory, at the time of the 
publication of the Wealth of Nations, did not need to be very explicit to be 
understood. Yet, only a few decades later (after Smith’s death), this was no longer 
the case, and the indefinite references Smith makes to this theory in the Wealth of 
Nations were for the most part indecipherable for 19th and still more so for 20th 
century readers. Thus the explanation of development in the Wealth of Nations, to 
the effect that the progress of society is spurred by the division of labour, which 
depends on the extension of the market and the accumulation of capital, ceased to 
be read as a theory of socio-cultural evolution along four-stages-theory lines. We 
shall at present explore possible reasons for this. 
 
4. The dichotomy view of Smith and the neglect of 
the historical dimension of the Wealth of Nations 
The informed contemporary scholar (familiar with the Lectures of Jurisprudence) 
can easily discern the four stages at the different instances of their mention in 
                                                        
48 This is the position taken by Hollander (1998 [1976]). 
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Wealth of Nations: the savage and barbarian, i.e. hunting and pastoral stages, 
frequently compared with civilised, i.e. commercial, society, and the agricultural 
stage, considered centrally in Book III, with regard to historical Europe, and with 
regard to contemporary North America throughout. The unsuspecting reader of 
the 19th and 20th centuries, not familiar with the wider context of comparative 
considerations of savagery and civilisation in Enlightenment Europe and the 
degree to which Smith participated in and was inspired by this debate, would not, 
however, have been able to properly interpret them.   
A particularly striking example of this is Marx, who, in his introduction to 
Grundrisse (a manuscript not meant by Marx to be published, but which eventually 
was, first in part in 1903) accused both Smith and Ricardo of projecting the 
modern, individualistic and commercial men of civil society back into the tribal 
societies of the past through their use of the “isolated hunter” in their theories of 
value and distribution — the famous “Robinsonades” (Marx 1983 [1903], p. 19).49 
This criticism may be justified for Ricardo, who adopted Smith’s categories without 
regard for their historical dimension nor awareness of their connection to Smith’s 
wider theory (and thus he likely contributed to this connection being neglected in 
subsequent economic thought). In Smith’s case this criticism was entirely 
unjustified, however, for the image of the hunter is used by Smith precisely within 
the framework of his (conjectural) historical model, and he explicitly recognised 
that nations of hunters entertained more communal life-stiles (notably the absence 
of a distinction of ranks and private property), which is indeed why Pascal (1938) 
and Meek (1954a) saw him as precursor (ironically given Marx’s criticism) to 
Marx’s historical materialism.50 The same can be said for Karl Polanyi and others 
in the 19th and 20th centuries who repeated Marx’s charge of Smith.51 
Thus the four stages theory as forming an important part of Adam Smith’s 
work was largely forgotten in the 19th century. A characteristic statement of this 
oblivion can be found in an 1887 biography of Smith. Speaking of Book V of the 
Wealth of Nations, the biographer remarks how “The portions of this book which 
deal with the expenses of defence, and of the administration of justice, do not 
require notice here. They are of a nature largely historical, and there is not much 
                                                        
49 Smith may indeed have been inspired by Defoe’s novel, especially in his use of the 
metaphor of a shipwreck in his exposition of the four stages theory, but see Hont’s remark 
on this (below p. 102). 
50 For textual examination of this see below p. 148. 
51 Concerning Polanyi, see in this regard n. 39 on p. 194 in the next chapter. 
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that is specially characteristic of their author in them.” (Haldane 1887, p. 134).52 
The part relegated to insignificance and described as uncharacteristic of Smith in 
this statement is precisely the part of the Wealth of Nations where we come closest 
to a full exposition by Smith of the four stages theory, and where most prolonged 
use is made of it. As Duncan Forbes remarked, and as we have seen in the previous 
section, Haldane was wrong in seeing this part of Smith’s work as uncharacteristic 
of him. Not only did this line of enquiry occupy Smith throughout his life, as 
Stewart noted, but it can properly be regarded as “the historical frame of reference 
of the Wealth of Nations” (Forbes 1954, p. 648). But it is only in the late 20th 
century that the central place of the four stages theory and conjectural history in 
general in Smith’s work as a whole was rediscovered (Hont 2010, p. 101-2). Apart 
from the non-availability of a large part of the material from Smith’s lectures 
throughout the 19th century, this relative oblivion can only properly be understood 
in connection with the history of Smith’s reception and Smith-scholarship and the 
development of economics in relation to the other social sciences (these two being 
linked, insofar as Smith scholarship has been for the greater part of the 19th and 
20th centuries the work of historians of economic thought, who themselves were 
generally economists).  
In the late 19th century an influential view in Smith scholarship was the one 
of “das Adam Smith Problem”, first suggested by Knies (1853) and formulated in its 
full version by Skarżiński (1878), that saw the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the 
Wealth of Nations as contradictory and as such the whole of Smith’s work as being 
disjoined and not being a coherent whole.53 It was claimed that Smith had 
abandoned his earlier views of human nature and human conduct based on 
sympathy, as formulated in the Theory of Moral Sentiments, and espoused instead a 
view based on self-interest in the Wealth of Nations, which was attributed to his 
exposure to the views of Helvétius and Holbach during his sojourn in France (what 
came to be known as the “Umschwungstheorie”). The Adam Smith Problem had 
itself grown out of earlier charges against Smith — and the “Smithianismus” of the 
“Smith’sche Schule” — formulated by authors in Germany. Müller (1809, 1983 
[1809]), List (1910 [1841]), and Hildebrand (1848) had attacked, from different 
angles, Smith’s “cosmopolitanism”, excessive rationalism (while Smith was in fact, 
                                                        
52 The biography in question is not one that has become a reference. It received a scathing 
review in the Spectator the same year ("Haldane's Life of Adam Smith" 1887). But, maybe 
precisely by virtue of being a rather mediocre sample of writings on Smith of the period, it 
is reflective of economists’ views of the philosopher at that moment in time. 
53 For a summary of the nature and genesis of Das Adam Smith Problem, see D. D. Raphael 
and A. L. Macfie’s introduction to Theory of Moral Sentiments (p. 22-5). For a more 
thorough treatment see Montes (2003a, p. 64-78). 
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with Hume, a critic of rationalist thought), his individualism, and his purported 
universal laws without regard to historical and geographical particularities.54 
These accusations have to be seen in historical context. While Müller, at the 
beginning of the 19th century, was writing in a German-speaking milieu still largely 
favourable to Smith, this had changed considerably two decades later. There was 
an economic basis for the attack on Smith’s “cosmopolitanism”, lying in the belief 
that, counter to Smith’s views, underdeveloped countries needed to protect their 
nascent national industries — i.e. the infant industry argument, for which List 
remains famous to this day, and to which Smith was hostile, although not without 
nuance.55 The more general context, however, was the one of a growing German 
national sentiment in an era when Germans were as yet only a collection of people 
sharing a common language and culture (abstracting from the large variability of 
local dialects and customs) without a unitary state. The Napoleonic wars had 
displayed to the rest of Europe the might of the French nation-state, to which 
neighbouring Germans, politically divided, felt vulnerable, and Britain, which also 
was a nation-state (of sorts) with considerable power, was viewed with a mix of 
envy and suspicion.56 The consolidation of a German national identity relied at 
least in part on the singling-out of what was particular to Germany and Germans 
(culturally and linguistically, as no political union existed) as distinct from other 
countries and people (an exclusionary attitude which would escalate in a very ugly 
manner in the second quarter of the twentieth century), which can explain part of 
the attack of what was viewed as Smith’s cosmopolitanism. The universalist 
Enlightenment rhetoric from Britain and especially from France (the Wealth of 
Nations was — not coincidentally — linked to French thought by the theoreticians 
of “das Adam Smith Problem”) was viewed with cynicism outside France, as 
                                                        
54 Ironically, as in Marx’s case, List’s own stadial theory of development (which he 
necessarily developed without knowing Smith’s lectures) in fact resembled the one of 
Smith closely. 
55 Smith pondered and rejected the logic of the infant industry argument in the absolute 
(WN IV.ii.13-4, p. 458; IV.ix.26, p. 672). He did recognise that poor countries may never 
have been able to build ships and trade without some temporary monopoly (IV.vii.c.95, p. 
632). But this, Smith thought, would in fact have been better for them at this stage of 
development. He also considered that traders should be granted a temporary monopoly 
for beginning particularly hazardous trades. But this concerned traders in civilised 
countries for enterprises in barbarous ones, which can only by a large stretch be made out 
to be an argument for industry protection (V.i.e.30, p. 754-5). 
56 Social conditions of the English working classes in the first decades of sustained 
industrialisation in England were watched with wariness in the still largely agrarian 
German countries. 
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universalism in Napoleonic times meant universalism under French rule.57 Equally 
importantly, Smith’s advocacy of the non-interference of the state in economic 
affairs was viewed as a call for the retreat of the state from political affairs in 
general, which did not square well with the preoccupations of German intellectuals 
at the time, concerned first and foremost with bringing about the German nation-
state in the first place. In the midst of this desire to create an as yet non-existent 
German nation-state, strong and pro-active institutions related to statehood, able 
to take on national affairs, including of an economic nature, were called for and 
idealised. 
It is in this context that the accusation of Smith as representing a British 
viewpoint and British interests must be viewed (while the simultaneous charge of 
his cosmopolitanism may seem contradictory): whereas the British, who already 
possessed a strong nation-state could afford to be cosmopolitan and to reduce the 
involvement of the state in economic matters, it was argued, this attitude was 
unsuitable for the Germans, who were yet to create their strong state, and thus the 
advocacy of a universal cosmopolitanism (or free trade) would work for Britain 
but against the Germans. This attitude to the national question and hostility to 
“cosmopolitan views” in mid-19th century Germany spanned the entire political 
spectrum.58 Müller, List, and Hildebrand differed in the degree of their nationalist 
fervour, but all espoused this outlook (List aimed for an eventual cosmopolitanism, 
but with stronger individual nations59). 
The Adam Smith Problem was effectively challenged at the end of the 19th 
century, especially with Edwin Cannan’s publication of the first set of lecture notes 
on jurisprudence, which corroborated the view of the unity of Smith’s work as 
presented by Millar and Stewart, notably by showing that the views contained in 
the Wealth of Nations were all present in Smith’s thought in rather well-developed 
form before his departure to France. The “Problem” still continued to be an 
influential view, though one more seldom discussed. The rediscovery of a second 
set of lecture notes on jurisprudence in the mid-20th century gave still more 
support to the coherence view. The second set of notes also brought out more 
clearly the central place of what Stewart had termed conjectural history in Smith’s 
                                                        
57 The intellectual mood in 19th century German, between the rejection of modernity, 
associated with French imperialism, and exultation of Kultur and Volk, is well captured in a 
just published book by Pankaj Mishra (2017; see especially p. 18 and 45).   
58 For a good account of the reception of Smith in this German context of the time, see 
Gottfried (1977). 
59 Celebrated by the Nazis as an original theoretician of “Germanhood”, List was invoked 
too as inspiration for the European Union, for his advocacy of the German Zollverein 
(Tribe 1995, p. 32-7). 
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works as a whole, some passages in the Lectures on Jurisprudence (both sets of 
notes) resembling so much certain passages in the Wealth of Nations that it is very 
difficult to maintain that these two are works which deal with totally different 
subjects and should be seen as distinct, both in the theory they lay out and the 
theoretical framework they rely on. As Hont (2010, p. 101-2) put it: “Once the 
student notes revealed the precise shape of Smith’s four-stages theory and its 
surprisingly central use in his Glasgow lectures, its submerged presence in the 
Wealth of Nations also became clear.” With the late-20th century publication of the 
Glasgow edition, in which a never before available breadth of Smith’s work was 
presented in a coherent way, the “Problem” view was thus finally widely discarded 
among historians of thought, although it continued to live on in non-specialists’ 
views of Smith (and continued to spark new debates among specialists too; see 
Montes (2003a, p. 78-82) for a review). 
 The remembrance of the importance of the four stages theory for Smith’s 
work as a whole since the 1970s we owe in no small part to Ronald Meek. Meek’s 
Social Science and the Ignoble Savage (Meek 1976) is a foundational study of the 
emergence, shape and scope as well as the overall importance of this theory in the 
Scottish Enlightenment debate about progress and human nature. This study was 
published the same year as the bicentenary edition of Wealth of Nations, of which 
Meek was also initially one of the editors, together with Andrew Skinner and Roy 
Campbell (although Meek later resigned from this position to concentrate on 
editing the Lectures of Jurisprudence (Skinner & Brown 2008, p. 212)). Thus, 
besides remaining an advisory member of the editorial board of Wealth of Nations, 
Ronald Meek, appropriately, became the main editor60 of the volume of the 
Glasgow edition of Smith’s works entitled Lectures of Jurisprudence (the name by 
which these lectures are since universally referred to), in which the four stages 
theory takes centre stage — and especially so in the more extensive lecture notes 
that form the first and larger part of the volume, discovered only in the mid-
twentieth century, and published (and extensively formatted and annotated to 
render them in readable print form) for the first (and still only) time in this edition. 
In the Glasgow edition of Wealth of Nations, the link between the ideas expressed 
by Smith therein and the ones contained in his earlier writings (as well as in works 
of other authors contemporary and anterior to Smith) is continuously drawn by 
the editors through cross-references in the footnotes. It thus becomes much more 
apparent when reading Smith’s work as a whole in the Glasgow edition that there 
is coherence and that there is a commonly shared structure and a paradigmatic 
                                                        
60 As the two other editors, D. D. Raphael and P. G. Stein “wish[ed] it to be known”, the 
“main part of the editorial burden” of the volume was carried by Meek (LJ, p. 43). 
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framework that runs through all of Smith’s work. This concerns the moral and 
economic dimensions of Smith work as much as the ‘conjectural-historical’ one.61 
However, there was also in the 20th century an important movement in 
economics, epitomised by the “Chicago school”, taking on more and more influence 
on the discipline towards the end of the century, which came to represent Smith 
solely in a narrowly economic way, and once again separated his economic ideas 
from his moral ideas (Winch 1997 ; Evensky 2005).62 In the late 19th and early 20th 
century, German universities were seen in America as a model to emulate and 
German was widely spoken by American scholars, many of whom were educated in 
Germany. Many “anti-cosmopolitan” ideas (nationalistic and protectionist) were 
earlier developed in conjunction in Germany and the US, in similar economic and 
political contexts (the common goal being to build a strong national economy in the 
shadow of Britain) notably by Hamilton and List. By the same channels, the charges 
by the German scholars against Smith were likely imported into the US. The 
dominant (in the 1920s) American institutionalist school of economics (Rutherford 
2000) was inspired by the German Historical School. Richard T. Ely — under whom 
both Commons and Veblen, generally considered the two central figures of 
American Institutionalism, had studied — had himself studied under Karl Knies, 
                                                        
61 It is generally considered that the Glasgow edition put the nail in the coffin of the Adam 
Smith Problem, at least as far as Smith scholarship proper is concerned (the “problem” has 
survived in economics and the social sciences more generally as Dixon and Wilson (2014) 
elaborate on). In the introduction to the Glasgow edition of the Theory of Moral Sentiments, 
the editors Raphael and Macfie note: “the so called ‘Adam Smith problem’ was a pseudo-
problem based on ignorance and misunderstanding. Anybody who reads The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments, first in one of the earlier editions and then in edition six, will not have 
the slightest inclination to be puzzled that the same man wrote this book and The Wealth 
of Nations, nor to suppose that he underwent any radical change of view about human 
conduct.” (TMS, p. 20).  Hont describes the two works as parts of the same intellectual 
project: “Smith had a consuming interest in both the domestic and external, moral, and 
economic patterns of competition, and his analysis of all these aspects contributed equally 
to his theory of commercial society. Economic competition was the subject matter of the 
Wealth of Nations, whereas the artificial morality of commercial man was the central 
theme of the Theory of Moral Sentiments. The two books together provide a complete 
analysis of market behavior. In these works, Smith merged and reworked insights that 
were first adumbrated by Pufendorf, Nicole, and other French moralists.” (Hont 2010, p. 
50-1) 
62 On the Chicago School, see the volume edited by Emmett (2010). In a contribution to the 
volume dealing specifically with the reading of Smith, Steven Medema (2010) observes 
some differences between the earlier (Viner, Knight) and later (Becker, Stigler) members 
of the Chicago School with regard to the narrowly economic reading of Smith, though not 
with regard to the purported divorce of the Wealth of Nations from Smith’s earlier work. 
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who first suggested the Umschwungstheorie.63 In line with the dichotomy view 
developed in Germany, Commons (1931, p. 650) would claim that Smith isolated 
economics from jurisprudence and ethics (while Smith in fact taught both of the 
latter, and what is today considered his economic work originated in his 
jurisprudence lectures), and described Institutional economics as breaking with 
the Wealth of Nations by reintegrating these dimensions. 
Jacob Viner, one of the initiators of the Chicago School, in his famous article 
on “Smith and Laissez-Faire” fully embraced the “Adam Smith Problem”, holding 
that Smith was unaware of the fundamental contradiction in his philosophy and 
claiming furthermore that the extensive additions to the Theory of Moral 
Sentiments Smith engaged in towards the end of his life were made at a time Smith 
was “elderly and unwell” and “had lost the capacity to make drastic changes in his 
philosophy” (1927, p. 217).64 But Viner went further than the original Adam Smith 
Problem — at the same time inverting the value-judgment — by not only holding 
that “there are divergences between them [the Wealth of Nations and the Theory of 
Moral Sentiments] which are impossible of reconciliation”, but that “the Wealth of 
Nations was a better book because of its partial breach with the Theory of Moral 
Sentiments” (Viner 1927, p. 201).65 Viner is echoed by Stigler, writing that “Smith’s 
professional work on psychology (in the Theory of Moral Sentiments) bears 
scarcely any relationship to his economics” (1960, p. 44) but that (as far as his 
economic work is concerned) “the correct way to read Adam Smith is the correct 
way to read the forthcoming issues of a professional [economics] journal” (1969, p. 
221).66 The new restrictive self-conception by economists of what their discipline 
is and should be about was thus applied to the way the 18th century moral 
philosopher Adam Smith should be read. In this representation of Smith as 20th 
century economist it was claimed that Smith’s economic ideas could legitimately be 
                                                        
63 The link between American Institutionalism and the German Historical School (and in 
particular Knies) was underlined by both Ely and John Maurice Clark, the latter also 
having studied under Knies (Kiekhofer et al. 1932). 
64 It is not clear why Oslington (2012, p. 289) believes that Viner suggested “that while 
there are differences between the two books, they are part of a larger and consistent 
system”, especially as Osliongton’s ensuing explanations seem to rather suggest the 
opposite. His documentation of Viner’s distancing himself from his earlier dichotomy view 
later in life is more convincing. 
65 It may be worth mentioning that Viner wrote his dissertation under Frank Taussig in 
Harvard, and Taussig, himself of German origin, had studied political economy in Berlin for 
a semester in 1879 (Schumpeter, Cole, & Mason 1941, p. 340), just after the publication of 
Skarżiński’s (1878) book in which the Umschwungstheorie was developed at length. 
66 For more examples reflective of this view from Stigler and others see Montes (2003a, p. 
66). 
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divorced from the rest of his work, with its many non-economic dimensions, which, 
according to this representation, in any case played only a subsidiary and non-
essential role in his ‘economic work’: the Wealth of Nations.  
The disjoined (and flawed) 19th century reading of Smith, developed mostly 
in Germany, thus got imported into the United States, which in the 20th century 
gradually became the new centre of gravity of the economics discipline. But while 
the 19th century German scholars, in formulating “das Adam Smith Problem”, saw 
the claimed divorce of Smith’s economic ideas from his moral theory as a problem 
and a contradiction in Smith, which they criticised, a large part of the economics 
profession of the late 20th century on the contrary took pride in this divorce, taking 
it as a ground on which to entirely discard the moral and other dimensions of 
Smith’s work (doing the same for economics in general). Smith was hence now 
praised, very much in spite of himself, just as he had before been criticised, for 
conceiving of economic mechanisms without regard to moral and other aspects 
and for apparently discovering economic truth independently of moral philosophy. 
Thus late 20th century economists, while implicitly accepting the content of “das 
Adam Smith Problem”, no longer considered it as a problem. Smith’s moral ideas, 
and as a corollary also his historical ideas, in fact much everything in Smith that 
could not be conceived of in a narrowly economic way (whereby “economic” itself 
here denotes the narrow way of conceiving of economics that had become the 
norm in modern mainstream economics), was disregarded, and the absence of 
moral considerations in this narrowly economic reading of Smith (entirely an effect 
of this reading, and thereby of the disregard by modern economists of the moral, 
historical, etc. dimensions of Smith’s thought, and in no way a real absence of these 
considerations on the part of Smith himself) was now praised rather than 
criticised.67  
                                                        
67 For a detailed examination of the pervasiveness of the “dichotomy view” of Smith 
represented by the Adam Smith Problem in the 20th century, see Dixon and Wilson (2014). 
It may be remarked that, while the meaning of political economy, now having become 
‘economics’, itself had been very much narrowed down (as compared to the ‘classical’ 
period when it reached out to all domains of what are today called the social sciences), 
notably by Lionel Robbins’s definition, restraining the discipline of economics to 
considerations of the allocation of limited means to unlimited wants, and later by Gary 
Becker’s and Theodore Schulz’s “economic perspective”, denoting a rational way of 
decision making aimed at maximising individual well-being, these latter authors, and 
especially Becker, in turn started applying this “economic perspective” to domains that 
were not anymore regarded as “economic” in this narrow perspective: e.g. Becker’s 
“Economics of discrimination” and his “Economics of the Family”, launching the “New 
Home Economics”, in concert with Schultz’s considerations on “Human Capital”, and 
Coase’s offshoot into contract and legal theory, founding the “Law and Economics” school 
among others. Yet this movement, generally described by critics within and without 
economics as “Economics Imperialism” was in fact only reclaiming territory that had been 
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That the view that Smith’s “economics” can without difficulty be separated 
from other parts of his work garnered widespread acceptance in the 20th century, 
at least until the publication of the Glasgow edition, can also be traced through the 
shortened editions of the Wealth of Nations being published throughout the 20th 
century, with the parts seen as non-economic often being omitted, and thus 
becoming less and less known by economists, at the time the primary readers of 
the work. This is true also of the crucial historical (or ‘conjectural-historical’) 
dimension of Smith’s work, as exemplified by the remarks on Smith’s conjectural 
history, a century apart, of Haldane (cited above p. 96) and Hollander, according to 
whom Smith’s historical theory, in the Wealth of Nations, was a mere “scaffolding” 
adduced to his economic theory, and non-essential for the interpretation of the 
latter (Hollander 1998 [1976], p. 94). In this narrowly economic perspective, then, 
which was the predominant one in the latter part of the 20th century, at least 
among economists, the historical development theory of Smith was recognised as 
being of central importance neither by economists nor by a significant part of 
historians of economic thought. 
In the preceding section, the various references that Smith makes to societies 
in the four different stages of development throughout the entirety of his oeuvre 
were laid out, leaving little doubt that this was an essential theme in Smith’s work 
as a whole. The accounts of Stewart and Millar both establish that the theme of 
conjectural history was a crucial part of Smith’s teaching and research, and that it 
was inseparably bound up with the rest of his work, which was always conceived as 
a coherent whole. We next looked at the possible reasons for the oblivion of this 
important theme in Smith’s work. It was suggested that the Adam Smith Problem 
— started in Germany in a particular cultural and political context, but which 
implanted the idea of a dichotomy between the two of Smith’s major works, and by 
that token of an incoherence in his work more generally, on a wider scale —was 
complemented in the late 20th century by the reading of Smith by an economics 
discipline which, inverting the argument of the German scholars of the 19th 
century, took pride in the severance of economics from moral and historical 
elements. The idea that Smith was either contradicting himself, or that his earlier 
ideas did not matter for his later ones (the difference is a mere change of 
emphasis) thus lived on. Since the publication of the Glasgow edition, the various 
not strictly economic aspects of Smith’s work have received more attention from 
                                                                                                                                                                  
abandoned by the new restrictive definition of the discipline, but by applying a particular 
methodology (and, quite ironically, a particular, and particularly reductive, psychological 
theory of human behaviour) to which the discipline had been reduced by this restrictive 
definition. 
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the part of historians of thought, although most economists continue (maybe not 
surprisingly) to view Smith’s work mainly in economic terms. The four stages 
theory, although it is certainly not an exclusively economic theory, having emerged 
from considerations of law and governance, includes economic aspects which are 
of crucial importance for Smith’s economic theory. 
We shall now look more closely at the four stages theory as presented by 
Smith, first in its complete version in the lectures, then in partial form in several of 
Smith’s works (these parts being more easily recognisable as elements of the 
theory when the theory as a whole is familiar), with the particular objective of 
outlining the role of population therein. We will examine in Section 6  how the 
same structure and causal system is at work in several other authors’ work, 
illustrating the commonly established causal role of population in conjectural 
history, before looking at the adoption but diversion of the theory by Malthus in 
the last section. 
 
5. Smith’s conjectural history of  
population and development 
The most complete account of the four stages theory given by Smith that we have a 
written trace of is in the set of notes on Smith’s jurisprudence lectures discovered 
in the mid-20th century by John Lothian and first published in the Glasgow edition 
of Smith’s works.68 It will be apposite, therefore, to start with a consideration of 
this account, before looking at elements of the four stages theory throughout the 
rest of (the known part of) Smith’s oeuvre. In the Lothian notes, the passages 
where Smith presents the four stages (as most corresponding passages in that set 
of notes) are indeed much longer and more elaborate than the corresponding 
passage in the Cannan notes, and this is of particular importance for the subject 
under consideration, namely the role of population in the four stages theory. Smith 
starts his exposition of the four stages in the Lothian notes by listing the distinct 
stages that “mankind” passes through:  
There are four distinct states which mankind pass thro :— 1st, the Age of 
Hunters ; 2dly, the Age of Shepherds ; 3dly, the Age of Agriculture ; and 4thly, 
the Age of Commerce. 
If we should suppose 10 or 12 persons of different sexes settled in an 
uninhabited island, the first method they would fall upon for their 
                                                        
68 See p. 60 above for a description of the various documents contained in the Lectures on 
Jurisprudence Glasgow volume and the way they are referred to in the text and in the 
footnotes in the present work. 
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sustenance would be to support themselves by the wild fruits and wild 
animals which the country afforded. Their sole business would be hunting 
the wild beasts or catching the fishes.  . . .  This is the age of hunters. (LJ(A) 
i.27, p. 14) 
Istvan Hont (2010, p. 172) noted that the image of “castaways on an 
uninhabited island” (in the Cannan notes, as we shall see shortly, Smith is reported 
to have specifically spoken of “shipwrecked”) was commonly used as metaphors 
for the fictional “state of nature”, as they were by Samuel Pufendorf. Smith was here 
describing a fictional original state of mankind, used as theoretical device (he 
begins his account with the words “If we should suppose”).69 It is after this 
description of the initial stage that population growth as causal element in the 
progression of stages is introduced:  
In process of time, as their numbers multiplied, they would find the chase 
too precarious for their support. They would be necessitated to contrive 
some other method whereby to support themselves.  . . .  The contrivance 
they would most naturally think of, would be to tame some of those wild 
animalls they caught, and by affording them better food than what they 
could get elsewhere they would enduce them to continue about their land 
themselves and multiply their kind. Hence would arise the age of 
shepherds. (LJ(A) i.28, p. 14) 
The italicised parts in this quotation are of central importance for the way the 
passage of stages was explained, not only in Adam Smith’s account, but also in the 
corresponding descriptions by other authors making use of this theory, whom we 
shall look at in the next section: that “necessity is the mother of invention”; and 
that this necessity is created by a shortage occasioned by the growth of population. 
The growth of population is described as the prime mover, with the necessity or 
want it creates being the element that will set into motion a technological 
revolution. Thus, growth of population creates a shortage. Up to a certain size of 
population a people can hunt wild animals without having too much of an 
incidence on the local ecosystem. But once people become more numerous, 
continuous hunting on the same territory will start to decimate the wild animals, 
which will gradually decline in numbers. And it will thus be harder and harder for 
the society, once its members increase, to subsist by this method.  
                                                        
69 See Hont for an analysis of Pufendorf’s view that the “state of nature” as conceived by 
Hobbes was necessarily fictitious, though still useful as a theoretical device when this 
fictional nature was recognised. This view was echoed by Hume in his Treatise of Human 
Nature (Hume 1888 [1739], p. 493), as we shall examine in more detail in Chapter 3 (p.  
224 below). 
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In the passage from the second to the third stage of society (from the 
shepherd stage to the agricultural stage), the same mechanism is at work:  
They [the shepherds from the end of the previous quote] would more 
probably begin first by multiplying animalls than vegetables, as less skill 
and observation would be required.  . . .  But when a society becomes 
numerous they would find a difficulty in supporting themselves by herds and 
flocks. Then they would naturally turn themselves to the cultivation of land 
and the raising of such plants and trees as produced nourishment fit for 
them.  . . .  And by this means they would gradually advance in to the age of 
agriculture. (LJ(A) i.28-31, p. 15) 
Here again, it is the growth of population that creates a shortage (“difficulty”). 
And the discovery and implementation of the new technology of subsistence is 
introduced. One can see, too, from this quote that, although Smith classified the 
different ages of society into four definite categories, this was only a simplification, 
while his full-blown theory was more complex.70 In fact, society moves “gradually” 
through these stages, which implies that at any time there may be features of 
earlier stages still present (or of future ones already present). It seems clear that 
the four stages are used by Smith as a rough model of the process of societal 
development, not as a precise account of how human societies have developed. 
This gradualism plays an important role, too, in the explanation of the move from 
feudalism to the modern European monarchies (coinciding, from a mode-of-
subsistence perspective, with the move from predominantly agricultural to proper 
commercial societies) described by Smith in Book III of the Wealth of Nations.71 It 
is important to stress this intentionally reductive nature of the theory, for it is 
prone to be taken as a classification into which Smith believed all nations, in all 
ages, to neatly fit or have fitted. But it was above all a model by which to analyse 
and compare different societies at different levels of development, and with the 
help of which to understand that development itself, much like Montesquieu’s 
model of different forms of political regimes was such a tool, while actual political 
regimes could incorporate elements of different types.72 
                                                        
70 The same approach can be observed in the treatment of the division of labour in Wealth 
of Nations: Smith first introduces this subject by the intentionally spectacular example of 
the pin factory, inside a single workhouse, before he widens the subject to the social 
division of labour at the end of the same chapter, and to regional and international trade in 
later considerations and throughout the work. 
71 See on this Section 3 in Chapter 3, below p. 236. 
72 In this sense Richter (2006, p. 169) notes that when “Herder convicted Montesquieu of 
empty abstraction  . . .  He mistook an ideal-type analysis of political regimes for reductive 
crudity.”  
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In Smith’s explanation of the passage to the next stage, namely commercial 
society, we encounter another characteristic element of the four stages theory, and 
one which to this day remains particularly associated with Smith’s name: the 
introduction of different trades, or, in other words, the division of labour. The 
division of labour in time evolves to international trade, bringing about the age of 
commerce: 
As society was farther improved, the severall arts, which at first would be 
exercised by each individual as far as was necessary for his welfare, would 
be seperated; some persons would cultivate one and others others, as they 
severally inclined. They would exchange with one an other what they 
produced more than was necessary for their support, and get in exchange 
for them the commodities they stood in need of and did not produce 
themselves. This exchange of commodities extends in time not only betwixt 
the individualls of the same society but betwixt those of different nations. 
Thus we send to France our cloths, iron work, and other trinkets and get in 
exchange their wines. To Spain and Portugall we send our superfluous corn 
and bring from thence the Spainish and Portuguese wines. Thus at last the 
age of commerce arises. (LJ(A) i.31-2, p. 15-6) 
Population growth is not mentioned here, in the transition to the commercial 
stage, as a causal element. Smith did not believe that population growth would 
cease in the course of the agricultural stage. Indications to the contrary abound.73 
Yet it could point to the fact that Smith does not see the growth of population as 
just as much of a necessary condition for the progress of an advanced society as he 
does see it as the condition for the progress of an as yet primitive one.74 Indeed, as 
other elements come to play an increasing role in the development of society, such 
as division of labour and the accumulation of capital, not present at the outset, 
                                                        
73 Numerous associations between population and progress by Smith were observed in the 
General Introduction (p. 41 and n. 37 above). See also the clear association of these in 
Smith’s famous statement at WN I.viii.23, p.87-8: “But though North America is not yet so 
rich as England, it is much more thriving, and advancing with much greater rapidity to the 
further acquisition of riches. The most decisive mark of the prosperity of any country is 
the increase of the number of its inhabitants. In Great Britain, and most other European 
countries, they are not supposed to double in less than five hundred years. In the British 
colonies in North America, it has been found that they double in twenty or five-and-twenty 
years. Nor in the present times is this increase principally owing to the continual 
importation of new inhabitants, but to the great multiplication of the species.” See further 
about this quotation p. 118 below. 
74 An explanation of the demographic transition from a ‘Smithian’ perspective compatible 
with this interpretation, starting with Smith’s observations about the interrelationship 
between wages, mortality, fertility and wealth, will be attempted in the last chapter. 
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population becomes just one of many causal factors feeding into the complex 
interrelationship of components at work in the development process.75 
The exposition of the four stages theory at the beginning of the Lothian notes 
that we have hitherto examined is only a relatively brief introduction by Smith to 
his considerations of law and government, and more particularly of the theme of 
property, or occupation. After having described all four stages, Smith thus 
concludes that “It is easy to see that in these severall ages of society, the laws and 
regulations with regard to property must be very different” (LJ(A) i.32, p. 16). 
Smith next tells his students that property is introduced in the shepherd state with 
the ownership of flocks, and theft is there consequently severely punished, 
whereas it is hardly a misdemeanour in the hunting stage, where no property of 
any significance exists (i.33)). In the agricultural stage, although theft is no longer 
so acute a problem, as property progressively diversifies and spreads to a larger 
part of society, laws must accordingly complexify (i.34). In general, Smith 
concludes, “The more improved any society is and the greater length the severall 
means of supporting the inhabitants are carried, the greater will be the number of 
their laws and regulations necessary to maintain justice, and prevent 
infringements of the right of property” (i.35). In what follows (i.35-63, p. 16-27), 
Smith notably discusses the moral and psychological foundations of property, in a 
language and with allusions in part reminiscent both of Wealth of Nations and 
Theory of Moral Sentiments (use is repeatedly made of the impartial spectator 
(i.36-8, i.42-4)); Smith discusses the doctrines of ancient roman legal theorists 
(i.39), and cites Tacitus, Homer and Aristotle (i.51-2). And he mentions the 
“tyranny of the feudal government” (i.54) familiar from Book III of Wealth of 
Nations. In both sets of student notes on Smith’s jurisprudence lectures, in fact, 
although the order of subjects treated differs considerably,76 the four stages are 
presented right at the beginning of his lectures and used as frame of reference 
continuously throughout.  
Although the sequence of subjects treated differs in both sets of notes, the 
four stages theory is introduced in each case in the context of the laws of 
occupation. Yet the Cannan notes, which in general treat subjects in a much more 
summary fashion than the Lothian notes, do not mention the mechanism behind 
                                                        
75 This proposition will be developed in the next two chapters and particularly in Chapter 
3. 
76 This was the main reason for the editors of Lectures of Jurisprudence to attribute the two 
sets of notes to Smith’s classes of two different academic years. See on this the 
introduction to LJ, p. 7-8. 
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the passage of the stages. In the Cannan notes, Smith’s account of the four stages is 
reported thus: 
The four stages of society are hunting, pasturage, farming, and commerce. 
If a number of persons were shipwrecked on a desart island their first 
sustenance would be from the fruits which the soil naturaly produced, and 
the wild beasts which they could kill. As these could not at all times be 
sufficient, they come at last to tame some of the wild-beasts that they might 
always have them at hand. In process of time even these would not be 
sufficient, and as they saw the earth naturally produce considerable 
quantities of vegetables of its77 own accord they would think of cultivating 
it so that it might produce more of them. Hence agriculture, which requires 
a good deal of refinement before it could become the prevailing 
employment of a country.  . . .  The age of commerce naturaly succeeds that 
of agriculture. As men could now confine themselves to one species of 
labour, they would naturaly exchange the surplus of their own commodity 
for that of another of which they stood in need. According to these stages 
occupation must vary. (LJ(B)150, p. 459) 
All the elements of the succession of stages are here presented, but no causal 
explanation is provided. It seems unlikely that Smith’s account would have 
substantially differed in the same class he gave in two successive years. It is of 
course possible that he did not mention population in this context in his class of 
the following year (possible reasons are various and familiar to teachers and 
professors: it may be that he was pressed for time in this particular session, or that 
he simply forgot — Smith’s absentmindedness has indeed often been described as 
a characteristic trait of his (Stewart II.54, p. 295; Ross 2010, p. 444-5)). But given 
that a shorter and less detailed account of the various parts of Smith’s lectures 
characterise the Cannan notes as a whole as compared with the Lothian notes, and 
are not a feature of this particular part of the lectures only, it seems more likely 
that this element was omitted by the person who took down the notes or later 
edited them.78 As a comparison with the corresponding passages in the Lothian 
                                                        
77 The editors of Lectures on Jurisprudence left this spelled wrongly as “it’s”. 
78 Meek, Raphael and Stein (the editors of Lectures on Jurisprudence) believed the Lothian 
notes to be a retranscription of shorthand notes from the original lectures (which allows 
for greater accuracy and a more important capture of what was actually said in the 
lectures), while the Cannan notes appear to first have been taken down in longhand and to 
have been quite heavily edited afterwards, as they seem to have been intended for sale, 
maybe as a summary of Smith’s lectures, as was commonly done at the time with lectures 
of prominent professors. The number of subjects treated, on the other hand, is larger in 
the Cannan notes, which seem to give an account of all lectures of the corresponding term, 
while the Lothian notes stop abruptly in the middle of a lecture well before the end of 
term, as is clearly visible in this case, since the lectures in the Lothian notes are listed and 
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notes examined above shows, the passage in the Cannan notes is indeed only a 
short summary of Smith’s four stages theory as presented in the Lothian notes. 
Maybe the student did not deem the element of population growth to be 
sufficiently important for a summary when he was taking down his notes (or the 
choice of what to include in his longhand notes — which by the nature of this type 
of notes cannot be taken down as fast as a professor speaks and hence cannot 
capture his spoken words in their entirety — was entirely random), or this element 
was not retained when the notes were rewritten in clear fashion. Whichever the 
reason, the passage of stages is not explained in the Cannan notes. As a result, 
Smith scholarship has only been able to address this feature of Smith’s theory since 
1978 (or a few years earlier for those who had access to the unpublished notes, 
notably Meek), and comparatively little has been written on the subject yet as a 
result.79  
There is a hint to the causal role of population in an earlier passage of the 
Cannan notes, where Smith had already mentioned nations of hunters, but had not 
talked about the four stages as a whole yet. But it is only a mention in passing 
among a discussion of the differences of governments in the different types (or 
ages) of society. Smith states here that in a nation of hunters, only few people can 
live together:  
We shall now make some observations on nations in the two first periods 
of society. These viz. of hunters and shepherds.  
In a nation of hunters and fishers few people can live together, for in a 
short time any considerable number would destroy all the game in the 
country, and consequently would want a means of subsistance. Twenty or 
thirty families are the most that can live together, and these make up a 
village (LJ(B)27, p. 407) 
This is the clearest indication to a possible causal role of population of the 
four stages type (i.e. of the “necessity is the mother of invention” kind) that one can 
                                                                                                                                                                  
dated (which is not the case in the Cannan notes). The Lothian notes seem to have been 
made by a student for his own private use (as the text contains many spelling errors and 
poor formatting). The notes taken in each lecture are of considerable length and were 
complemented by additional notes (written on the verso pages of the manuscript), which 
probably stem from comparison with another student’s notes, or could be additions made 
in Smith’s complementary class in which specific points were explained at the students’ 
request, and apparently many illustrations provided. See Introduction to LJ, p. 6-7, 11-13, 
23. 
79 Craig Smith (2006b) and Kennedy (2008) stand out for having given the causal role of 
population in Smith’s rendering of the four stages special mention (even though Craig 
Smith calls it a “prompt” rather than a “cause”, on which I shall comment at the close of 
this chapter). 
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find in the Cannan notes — and it is not very clear. There is thus a hint here, but 
only a hint, which is hard to read independently of any knowledge of the passage in 
the Lothian notes where this causal role is clearly laid out. The corresponding 
passage to the one just cited in the Lothian notes is also more informative: 
In the age of hunters it is impossible for a very great number to live 
together. As game is their only support they would soon exhaust all that 
was within their reach. Thirty or forty families would be the most that 
could live together, that is, about 140 or 150 persons. These might live by 
the chase in the country about them. (LJ(A) iv.36, p. 213) 80 
To substantiate the account of the causal role of population in the succession 
of stages presented by Smith in the Lothian notes, we may look at an even earlier 
source in which Smith’s conjectures on population and technology were outlined. 
The “Anderson Notes”, as they are generally referred to today, are a set of 
handwritten notes discovered in 1970 by Professor Archie Brown in a notebook 
having belonged to John Anderson, a colleague of Smith’s at Glasgow. They were 
made accessible to the reading public by Meek in 1976. Meek (1976a, p. 440) 
believed this document to consist in “selective extracts from a student's notes of a 
relatively early version of Smith's Jurisprudence lectures”. Pauchant (2016) 
recently argued, based on his own investigation, that these notes correspond to 
lectures given in 1749. They were not included in the Glasgow edition of Smith’s 
Works and Correspondence, but Meek made a convincing case, by comparison with 
the then not yet published set of lecture notes of Smith’s jurisprudence lectures, for 
                                                        
80 Smith observes in the ‘First Fragment on the Division of Labour’ that “In a savage tribe 
of North Americans, who are generally hunters, the greatest number who can subsist 
easily together seldom exceeds one hundred or onehundred and fifty persons.” (FA.3, LJ p. 
583) These figures of groups of hunters being limited to about hundred-fifty individuals 
are very interesting with regard to recent research on the size of ancient hunter-gatherer 
societies. Dunbar (1992), using findings by primatologists linking mean group size of 
primate species to the average size of their neocortex, established, in concord with the 
anthropological and ethnographic literature on early human group sizes, that early 
humans  probably lived in groups of about a hundred-fifty individuals  (a finding 
popularised in the business and popular science literature of the past two decades — 
inferring lessons for the ideal size of the workforce of firms among other things — under 
the name “Dunbar’s number”). It must be remarked that Dunbar reported to have 
extensively consulted classical sources as well, thus some of his sources may have been 
the same as Smith’s. 
The variation between the number of families Smith is reported to have mentioned in 
the two corresponding quotes of LJ(A) and LJ(B) reproduced above — “Twenty or thirty 
families” in LJ(B), “Thirty or forty families” in LJ(A) — reflects a frequent difference in 
illustrative numbers and figures (and other insignificant details, but no substantial points) 
between the two sets of notes. (In the Fragment on the Division of Labour, Smith, or his 
amanuensis, apparently crossed out the words “one hundred and fifty men two hundred” 
next to the quote at the beginning of this note.)  
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the Anderson notes being in fact notes from Smith’s lectures, and he reproduced 
them in part in the 1976 article cited above.81 As in the Lectures on Jurisprudence, 
Smith here introduces the four stages (as did most of his contemporaries, as we 
shall see in the next section) from a jurisprudential perspective, and in particular 
within a discussion of the origin of the laws of property: 
Hunting and fishing are all the arts that prevail in the first states of society.   
. . .  when a clan or nation hunt and fish long (i.e., have lived long) in one 
tract of country they acquire an exclusive property and it is considered as 
theirs, i.e., they acquire property in common (vide the histories of America 
and Caesar and Tacitus), which is the second state of perfection in society.  . 
. .  When their numbers encrease, when instruments of husbandry are 
invented (vide Hesiod), and when they have built huts and towns, they will 
begin to labour little spots about their houses and the publick fields will be 
neglected, and hence will arise private property in lands  . . .  which is the 
third state of society advancing towards perfection.  . . .  Where there are no 
manufactures and where agriculture is little minded, the country must 
soon be overstocked with inhabitants; hence the Teutones, etc. made their 
invasions (Meek 1976a, p. 467-8)82 
This quotation contains only scattered elements of Smith’s more detailed and 
coherent account of the four stages in the Lectures of Jurisprudence (and especially 
the Lothian notes). But the role of the pressure of population (“When their 
numbers increase”, “soon be overstocked with inhabitants”) in the progression of 
stages is here laid out, although not quite as clearly as in the Lothian notes. A few 
elements are noteworthy as well: first, as already noted, the treatment of this 
theme within a presentation of the laws of nations (as in Smith’s lectures on 
jurisprudence);83 second, the absence of division of labour (“Hunting and fishing 
                                                        
81 The article containing the notes was republished the following year in  a collection of 
essays (Meek 1977) with no apparent modifications. The original of the Anderson notes 
are kept and can be viewed at the library of Glasgow University. For a recent detailed 
examination of the Anderson notes see Pauchant (2016).  
82 It is further remarked, at this point, that “Feu, the German word, signifies pay (as fee in 
English). As the conquests were made by armies and by generals who were not able to 
maintain them, they were put in possession of the lands, instead of receiving pay, and 
were obliged to military service, etc.”, which points to themes developed by Smith in the 
Lectures on Jurisprudence and more famously in Book III of the Wealth of Nations. 
83 Note also, in this connection, that the “second state of perfection in society” is here 
defined by Smith (if indeed these are authentic representations of Smith’s words only, as 
Meek seems to have believed, not altered and/or complemented by Anderson) by the fact 
not that the people have become shepherds (i.e. the mode of subsistence), but by the fact 
that “they acquire property in common”. Meek (1976a, p. 466) believed that “at the time of 
the Anderson notes Smith was still using his stadial theory more or less exclusively in 
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are all the arts that prevail”) and private property (common property implying no 
private property) in the first stage; third, Smith’s reference to ancient sources (not 
made explicitly in the Lectures of Jurisprudence in this context).  
Let us then return to the four stages theory and look at elements of this 
theory in the Theory of Moral Sentiments and Wealth of Nations. In the famous 
passage from the Theory of Moral Sentiments in which Smith mentions the 
“invisible hand”, it is observed that “The produce of the soil maintains at all times 
nearly that number of inhabitants which it is capable of maintaining” (TMS IV.1.10, 
p. 184). If this is so, then growth of population must in time create a shortage. This 
is a critical element of four stages theory. Smith tells us in the Wealth of Nations 
that “Every species of animals naturally multiplies in proportion to the means of 
their subsistence, and no species can ever multiply beyond it” (WN i.viii.39, p. 97) 
and that “Countries are populous not in proportion to the number of people whom 
their produce can clothe and lodge, but in proportion to that of those whom it can 
feed” (WN I.xi.c.6, p. 180). The availability of the means of subsistence, depending 
on such natural characteristics of the area as the fertility of the soil, seems to be the 
main determinant of the size of population on a given territory. But Smith also tells 
us in the Wealth of Nations that “the difference is very great between the number of 
shepherds and that of hunters whom the same extent of equally fertile territory 
can maintain” (IV.vii.c.100, p. 634). This too is a crucial element of four stages 
theory. How much means of subsistence are obtained on a given extent of territory 
depends on the period or stage of society, characterised by a particular mode of 
subsistence and degree of division of labour distinctive of the latter. 
In this sense, in the quotation from the Theory of Moral Sentiments above, it is 
stated, not that it is the soil which maintains a given number of people directly, but 
that that this number depends on the “produce of the soil”. This says itself nothing 
                                                                                                                                                                  
connection with the problem of changes in the state of property, and had not yet fully 
succeeded in separating the mode-of-subsistence 'basis' from the state-of-property 
'superstructure'”. But as has been stated before (see above notes ... and ...) it is doubtful, in 
fact, whether Smith ever felt the need to make such a separation. In the lecture notes of 
Lectures on Jurisprudence the four stages are (quite naturally, as these are notes on 
lectures on jurisprudence) presented in a jurisprudential setting, within a discussion of 
the laws of property, as indeed they were generally by the authors we will consider in the 
next section; and, insofar as Smith used elements of the four stages theory in the Wealth of 
Nations, he did not feel the need to spell out the theory as a whole. This does not preclude 
that the theory may have been an implicit reference at many instances in the Wealth of 
Nations of course, as I have argued in the preceding sections, and that one aspect or 
another may have here been more important depending on the particular context, but this 
does not require a formal separation of the mode-of-subsistence aspects from the laws-of-
property aspect by Smith as Meek seems to have supposed.  
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about the fixity or variability of this produce.84 Further, the produce of the soil is 
said to determine the number of people, precisely, “at all times”. In different times 
(in different “periods of society”), the produce of the soil varies. Of course, for there 
to be a “produce” of the soil properly speaking, a society needs to have entered at 
least the agricultural stage. But in a wider sense, the quantity of means of 
subsistence depends first and foremost on the particular stage (mode of 
subsistence) attained. It also varies, however, within a given stage. The passage 
from the agricultural to the commercial stage is particularly fluid, insofar as no 
change of mode of subsistence properly speaking takes place. Still, the quantity of 
available means of subsistence (on a given territory) increases substantially, more 
substantially, it appears, than ever before. Indeed, “the populousness of every 
country must be in proportion to the degree of its improvement and cultivation” 
(WN IV.vii.b.7, p. 568); and the improvement and cultivation of land (indeed the 
very beginning of agriculture) depends itself on the particular stage on the 
continuum between savagery and civilisation a nation has attained, and 
particularly on the degree of division of labour.  
Smith specifies at the very beginning of the Wealth of Nations that “Whatever 
be the soil, climate, or extent of territory of any particular nation, the abundance or 
scantiness of its annual supply” depends chiefly on the degree of “skill, dexterity, 
and judgment with which its labour is generally applied” (WN 3-4, p. 10), “and the 
greater part of the skill, dexterity, and judgment with which it is anywhere 
directed, or applied, seem to have been the effects of the division of labour” (WN 
I.i.1, p. 13). The degree of division of labour is, as we have seen, one of the main 
characteristics of the different stages of society. It is, in fact, the defining 
characteristic of the fourth stage. It is “When the division of labour has been once 
thoroughly established” and “Every man thus lives by exchanging, or becomes in 
some measure a merchant” that “the society itself grows to be what is properly a 
commercial society” (WN I.iv.1, p. 37). It is thus that 
Among savage and barbarous nations, a hundredth or little more than a 
hundredth part of the labour of the whole year will be sufficient to provide 
them with such clothing and lodging as satisfy the greater part of the 
people. All the other ninety-nine parts are frequently no more than enough 
to provide them with food. But when by the improvement and cultivation 
of land the labour of one family can provide food for two, the labour of half 
the society becomes sufficient to provide food for the whole. The other half, 
therefore, or at least the greater part of them, can be employed in providing 
                                                        
84 For some thoughts on the importance of this distinction, see Rutherford (2007, p. 220-
1). 
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other things, or in satisfying the other wants and fancies of mankind. (WN 
I.xi.c.6-7, p. 180) 
This “satisfying [of] the other wants and fancies of mankind”, in turn, 
contributes substantially to the “improvement and cultivation of land”: 
Without the assistance of some artificers, indeed, the cultivation of land 
cannot be carried on but with great inconveniency and continual 
interruption. Smiths, carpenters, wheelwrights, and ploughwrights, 
masons, and bricklayers, tanners, shoemakers, and tailors are people 
whose service the farmer has frequent occasion for. Such artificers, too, 
stand occasionally in need of the assistance of one another; and as their 
residence is not, like that of the farmer, necessarily tied down to a precise 
spot, they naturally settle in the neighbourhood of one another, and thus 
form a small town or village. The butcher, the brewer, and the baker soon 
join them, together with many other artificers and retailers, necessary or 
useful for supplying their occasional wants, and who contribute still further 
to augment the town. The inhabitants of the town and those of the country 
are mutually the servants of one another. The town is a continual fair or 
market, to which the inhabitants of the country resort in order to exchange 
their rude for manufactured produce. It is this commerce which supplies 
the inhabitants of the town both with the materials of their work, and the 
means of their subsistence. The quantity of the finished work which they 
sell to the inhabitants of the country necessarily regulates the quantity of 
the materials and provisions which they buy. Neither their employment nor 
subsistence, therefore, can augment but in proportion to the augmentation 
of the demand from the country for finished work; and this demand can 
augment only in proportion to the extension of improvement and 
cultivation. (WN III.i.4, p. 378) 
In other words, the improvement of land and the progress of the division of 
labour depend on one another. Insofar that it is in commercial society that the 
division of labour “has been once thoroughly established”, it is in commercial 
society only that land is properly improved. The agricultural stage describes one of 
subsistence agriculture, in which the whole population are farmers. Only the 
commercial stage, in which labour is thoroughly divided (notably between food-
producing and non-food-producing activities), allows for the improvement of land, 
which is but one aspect (but a crucial one) of the famous efficiency gains from the 
division of labour pointed out by Smith in the opening pages of the Wealth of 
Nations.85  
                                                        
85 Within agriculture, Smith tells us in the first chapter of the Wealth of Nations, the 
division of labour is more limited than in manufactures, but the division of labour between 
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We may at this point briefly review the different elements and steps that 
make up Smith’s four stages theory as laid out most clearly in the Lectures of 
Jurisprudence (and in particular the Lothian notes), but to which references are 
made, and of which elements are used, throughout Smith’s entire oeuvre. Society in 
the savage state is composed of few individuals, who live together in groups of 
about a hundred-fifty. Population is in balance with the environment (“The produce 
of the soil maintains at all times nearly that number of inhabitants which it is 
capable of maintaining”). There are thus nearly as many people as the produce of 
the soil can maintain, but these will gradually increase as long as the environment 
they inhabit furnishes them with some surplus food, which is assumed to generally 
be the case (for otherwise no society could ever have progressed).86 This in turn 
exerts a pressure on the means of subsistence that forces the nation to innovate in 
terms of food procurement and production. Hunters become shepherds as animals 
(which they already dealt with) are easier to tend to than the more complicated 
cultivating of plants (which would require more extensive learning).87 This also 
introduces inequality, as some individuals will appropriate more animals, whereas 
before everyone lived directly from nature, considered common property, and 
hence no private property needed to exist. In the shepherd state laws are thus 
introduced (under the authority of chiefs, being the great proprietors of livestock). 
Eventually the shepherd mode of subsistence, in turn, does not provide sustenance 
anymore for a growing population, as grazing lands become scarcer and eventually 
overused, and the nation thus turns to agriculture (the possibility of which would 
have been discovered already by man observing nature, but it is only introduced as 
mode of subsistence when there is need for it). In this state, too, towns develop. 
And as a corollary, the division of labour develops in society, laws, government and 
the various arts and trades complexify and subdivide their activities, with each 
becoming more productive in the process. Eventually, as the members of the 
society in question exchange all their surplus products with each other and “Every 
man thus lives by exchanging, or becomes in some measure a merchant”, which 
                                                                                                                                                                  
agriculture and manufactures itself carries with it enormous productivity gains, including 
in agriculture, as he elaborates on in Book III of the same work. 
86 Note that Smith also explained the non-progression of certain nations by this not being 
the case. Thus he invoked the infertility of the soil (as well as, importantly, the absence of 
natural means of transportation, which ties in with the account of the extent of the market 
in Chapter III of the Wealth of Nations) to explain why the Arabs and Tartars had remained 
stuck (and would continue to be so) in the Shepherd stage; at LJ(A) iv.53, p. 220; iv.56, p. 
221; iv.60-3, p. 223 and LJ(B) 30-1, p. 408. 
87 Smith also lists an exception to this order, the Native Americans cultivating some maize 
plants albeit still being essentially hunters (LJ(A) i.29-30, p. 15). 
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extends in time to foreign trade (the possibility of which is both effect and cause of 
this progress), the stage of commerce is attained, which has some air of finality.88 
All these elements can be found in one way or another in a number of other 
authors who used the theoretical framework of the four stages theory at around 
the same time as Smith. We shall principally, in the following section, concentrate 
on some authors who made the causal role of population in the passage of stages 
very explicit, to see the prevalence of this feature in the four stages theory as it 
stood at that time. 
 
6. Population and development  
in the wider four stages theory  
The central role of population as a causal variable in the four stages theory can be 
ascertained by examining the use made of this theory by several authors writing 
around the same time Smith held his lectures on jurisprudence. By bringing out 
this central causal role of population in the use of the four stages theory, as well as 
the remarkably uniform character of this account of the development of society 
across the works of different authors, the causal role population plays in Smith’s 
own version of the theory will be more easily recognised. In what follows, we shall 
hence consider the four stages theory as exposed by a number of Smith’s 
contemporaries, as well as make some brief references to earlier accounts of the 
development of society which resemble the four stages theory, to uncover the 
central role population played in this theory overall.  
The origin of the precise shape the four stages theory took among the 
scholars referred to by Roy Pascal (1938) as the “Scottish Historical School” is 
disputed. Meek, on the basis notably of the Anderson notes, speculated that Smith 
himself could be the true ‘inventor’ of the theory in his early Glasgow lectures of 
the 1750s (Meek 1976b, p. 107-16). Pauchant (2016) endorses this view. If an 18th 
century originator of the theory needs to be found, Kames is another likely 
candidate. Even though his Sketches on the History of Man were published only in 
1774, he claimed himself they had been thirty years in the making (Lehmann 1971, 
p. 59, 181). Istvan Hont (2010, p. 160), by contrast, held that the “intimate 
continuity” between earlier natural law theories of property and Smith's four-
stages theory “does not need elaborate demonstration.” It should be noted that 
Meek’s position is largely conditioned by his very narrow definition. Only those 
                                                        
88 The question whether the “commercial stage” was thought to be the last will be 
examined in Section 4 of Chapter 3 (p. 244 below). 
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views of the succession of stages firmly based on the mode of subsistence can be 
counted as constitutive of four stages theorising proper according to Meek.89 This 
was related to his personal interest in seeing the Scottish perspective on social 
evolution as a precursor to Marx’s historical materialism, which he had outlined 
twenty years prior to writing his Ignoble Savage (Meek 1954a).  Although, by 
virtue of Meek being the inventor of the term “four stages theory”, retaining his 
restrictive definition may be dictated by the rules of intellectual property, it is 
more apposite for historical accuracy, and with regard to the present examination 
— concerning primarily the role of population in the four stages theory, and the 
role of the four stages in population theory — to use the term in a wider 
acceptation.90 
As acknowledged by Meek himself, a type of four stages theory (although 
without the clear focus on modes of subsistence) was already to be found in 
Lucrecius (and more particularly, and more observant of modes of subsistence, in 
Dicaearchus, Meek 1976b, p. 10-11). As was seen in the quotes from the Anderson 
notes, references to classical writers abound in Smith’s early outline of the four 
stages.91 With regard to the causal role of population in the succession of the 
                                                        
89 “unless the postulated stages are fairly firmly based on the mode of subsistence, such 
contributions should not in my opinion be regarded as anticipations of the eighteenth-
century four stages theory. To take the contrary view would be virtually equivalent to 
claiming not only that there was nothing new in the Enlightenment, but also that there was 
nothing new under the sun.” (Meek 1976b, p. 6-7)  
90 For a clarification of Meek’s perspective on the four stages theory and a friendly critique 
of his former supervisor’s position, see Skinner (1982). The problematic nature of Meek’s 
position becomes apparent, notably, when he considers the contribution to the four stages 
theory of Dalrymple (Meek 1976b, p. 102), noting that: “Only rarely, however, does he 
expressly (or even impliedly) relate these 'stages' to different modes of subsistence. The 
impression one is left with is that Dalrymple regarded the four stages theory as something 
whose use lay mainly, if not exclusively, in illuminating the problem of changes in the state 
of property.” This, however, seems to indeed have been the original use and origin of this 
theory, as outlined by Hont, who traces it to the natural law tradition (as Meek himself 
does, but without giving this association much importance). As we have seen, Smith too 
introduces the four stages theory in both sets of lecture notes on jurisprudence in the 
context of the explanation of the laws of property. And as we shall see shortly, so do 
Kames and Blackstone, the latter, being a jurist, using the four stages theory exclusively for 
this purpose; and Helvétius, too, writes of magistrates and laws in this connection. 
91 As Harris (1968, p. 26) notes, a type of cultural-evolutionary theory is also present in 
the Bible. Reference to this — as to scripture in general, as Campbell and Skinner note in 
the introduction to Wealth of Nations — is conspicuously absent in Smith. This, in addition 
to his association with Hume, as Rothschild (1992) observes, made him be regarded very 
suspiciously by the church. Harris further observes that Lucretius, whom he sees as the 
main influence on Enlightenment thinkers in this connection, was himself inspired by 
Epicurus (1968, p. 26). (The latter, incidentally, is a potent contender for an influence on 
Marx’s historical materialism, insofar as he was the subject of Marx’s doctoral 
dissertation.) Harris also notes how, for Lucretius, language, too, “must  . . .  have been the 
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evolutionary stages of society, Plato, too, is a more important source for 18th 
century conjectural history than Meek (with his focus on a clear distinction of 
modes of subsistence) acknowledged. At various places in Book 3 of the Laws, 
indeed, Plato mentions that his group of shepherds and hunters, to which he refers 
in order to conjecture about the origin of government, just as the theoretical 
historians of the 17th and 18th century would, is increasing in numbers, which leads 
to the adoption of laws, the development of arts, and urbanisation (Plato 1988, p. 
58-88). Hont (1987) traced the 18th century four stages theory more centrally to 
the 17th century writer Samuel Pufendorf. In the latter’s theory, population plays 
the same causal role, as Hont (2010, p. 180) notes.92  
Very little of what Smith wrote was in fact either new or original. Counter 
Rashid (1998), and the many others before who sought to downplay Smith’s 
importance for not having come up himself with most of his ideas, this does not 
diminish his genius or importance. As Dugald Stewart early on remarked, Smith’s 
importance as a scholar came from having woven together different strands of 
thought and presented them in a coherent and comprehensive way (Stewart IV.26-
27, p. 322). He has ever since been called a great synthesiser.93 As will be visible 
from a comparison of the material in this section with the account of Smith’s 
conjectural history in the former, this is true for the four stages theory as well. 
The categories of barbarians and savages, as was noted in section 2 above, 
are as old as their antonym — the polis, the ancient equivalent to the 18th century 
concept of the civil, and eventually of “civilisation” (and the 19th century 
                                                                                                                                                                  
result of a long evolutionary process”, which reinforces the connection with Smith’s 
conjectural history. As Stewart remarked when he coined the term, Smith’s earliest use of 
this methodology was in his dissertation on language. Smith, in the latter, adopted an 
evolutionary position on language. See on this Berry (1974, especially pp. 132-5)). 
92 Pufendorf, in Book IV, Chapter IV, Section IV of Of the Law of Nature and Nations 
(Pufendorf 1729, p. 367) notes how with the growth of population must arise competition 
and conflict over the access to those things that God has handed over to man, and that the 
development of private property is a response to this. This idea indeed can be found 
(usually without reference to God) in many versions of the four stages theory. 
93 Notably by Schumpeter (1986 [1954], p. 180). See also n. 61, p. 97 above, for the 
application of this idea, by Hont, to Smith’s project as a whole, concerning both the Theory 
of Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations. Earlier, Feilbogen (1889, p. 219) had noted 
that “Smith himself is supposed to have said almost nothing that was not to be found in his 
predecessors. There’s no denying that every great man is a 'child of his time.' Accordingly, 
the historians of political economy have employed much diligence and ingenuity, on the 
one hand to gather up all the individual doctrines of Adam Smith among his predecessors, 
on the other hand to explain Adam Smith’s world-historical achievement by everything, 
just not by his almost unprecedented combination of observation skills and deductive 
keenness, of erudition and originality, of caution and boldness in criticism and dogma, in 
short: by his genius” (my translation).  
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“bourgeois” that Marx — or his English translators  — made of it94). The word 
“polis”  (Greek for city, city-state) has given, as Pagden (1988b, p. 33) notes, the 
word “polished” much used by the 18th century Scots. Use of these categories, 
generally coupled with a unified view of human nature, can be found in ancient 
Greek and Roman literature and philosophy (Thucydides, Plato, Lucretius, 
Tacitus), the work of medieval Islamic scholars (Alberuni, Khaldun), Renaissance 
European scholars like Machiavelli and natural law theorists of the 16th and 17th 
centuries like Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, Samuel Pufendorf, and John Locke. 
Stadial theories of development of human society derived from (or used as 
explanation for) these categorisations can be discerned to varying degrees in all 
these thinkers. The 18th century four stages theory can be traced directly and 
indirectly to all these “streams of thought” (as they are reffered to by Meek 1976b, 
p. 14, 23, 26, 127).95 Many of these thinkers had also laid out the causal mechanism 
we are here concerned with, whereby population, by pressing on the means of 
subsistence, induces technological development.  
Smith’s ancient Greek and Latin sources have been noted, and references to 
primary and secondary literature were given, in the preceding sections. For ideas 
about savages and civilised society in Alberuni see Wilczynski (1959, p. 461-2), 
and for the connection with population the somewhat distorted account by 
                                                        
94 The transition from “civil society” to “bourgeois society” in English may actually be an 
instance of something being lost in (re)translation. When speaking of what was translated 
from Das Kapital into English as “bourgeois society”, Marx always used “bürgerliche 
Gesellshaft”, which was his translation of the 18th century “civil society”. Both “bourgeois” 
and “bürgerlich”, as “civil” too, derive from “b(o)urg” (“civis”), i.e. a citadel or town or 
townsmen (German “Burg”, French “bourgh”, English “borough”, latin “civis”, “civitas”, 
“ci(vi)tatem”). The urban connotation is thus present in all three terms. The class 
connotation in general is, however, in fact contained mostly in the words of Germanic 
origin (bourgeois, bürgerlich — whence Marx’s “bourgeois economics”, which in the 
original German also reads “bürgerliche Ökonomie”; the original Germanic root refers 
indeed to fortresses, generally inhabited by the nobility; the latin root “civis” of “civil 
society”, on the other hand, refers simply to town-people, and later, by extension, to 
citizens, i.e. people under the jurisdiction of a state from which they derive certain rights). 
The mistranslation and two connotations of “bourgeois society” were observed by Roy 
Pascal, a professor of German at the University of Birmingham, who translated the German 
Ideology and wrote the (1938) article tying the “Scottish Historical School” to Marx’s 
Historical Materialism, and in this was attacking (in a politically charged time, when the 
Nazis had just remilitarised the Rhineland) the reactionary interpretation of Smith of the 
German Historical School discussed above p. 93-95. For citation of Pascal’s observations 
and an extended discussion of this context and the (mis)translation, see Mizuta (2006, p. 
109-12). (The linguistic observations in this note are mine.) 
95 Whether we want to regard the writings of these thinkers, and especially the earlier 
ones, as forming the “history” or the “prehistory” of the four stages theory (Meek 1976b, p. 
6) seems to me a question more rhetorical than substantial. 
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Spengler (1971).96 Ibn Khaldun deserves particular mention in the present 
context, for not only does he present an evolutionary theory of human society, but 
population growth is, as in the versions of the four stages theory by other 18th 
century authors we are about to consider (and in the one of Smith considered in 
the previous section), and in much the same way, a causal element in the 
development of society.97 
The first contemporary of Smith who deserves attention as a writer on 
stadial theory and population may be Benjamin Franklin. His Observations 
Concerning the Increase of Mankind, Peopling of Countries, etc. is a short essay 
which he wrote in 1751 and which was first published in 1755. It was often 
reprinted and much cited and read. In it, Franklin made the two observations that 
“Marriages in America are more general, and more generally early, than in Europe  
. . .  and if in Europe they have but four Births to a marriage (many of their 
marriages being late) we may here reckon eight, of which if one half grow up, and 
our marriages are made, reckoning one with another at twenty years of age our 
people must at least be doubled every twenty years.” (§7); and (§22) that “there 
are suppos'd to be now upwards of One Million English Souls in North America, 
(tho' 'tis thought scarce 80,000 have been brought over sea)” and “This million 
doubling, suppose but once in twenty-five years, will in another century be more 
than the people of England”. Smith integrated these observations in his theory of 
the adjustment of population to labour demand developed in Chapter VIII of Book I 
of Wealth of Nations, in the form of the statement that “In Great Britain, and most 
other European countries, they are not supposed to double in less than five 
hundred years. In the British colonies in North America, it has been found, that 
                                                        
96 Spengler (1971) considered Alberuni a “Malthusian”. This, however, not only rests on 
the surmised compatibility of Alberuni’s writings with the approbation of birth control, 
which is a position Malthus himself explicitly rejected; but, further, the passage into which 
Spengler reads this position actually states no such thing, as he himself acknowledges, 
noting that: “This passage does not, of course, relate to demographic issues. Yet its spirit is 
compatible with the spirit underlying endorsement of population controls” (ibid. p. 98). In 
other words, Spengler makes the connection between Alberuni and Malthus by attributing 
to the first a position the second actually disapproved; a rather curious way of establishing 
intellectual lineage. And that position itself, in the case of Alberuni, is inferred not from 
actual content but from the surmised “spirit” of a passage. It is hard to see how such a 
“spirit” could be so clearly read, while eight centuries separate us from the time of writing 
and it would take a great amount of contextualising simply to establish what the author 
was writing about precisely (let alone recovering elements likely lost in translation), 
which Spengler did not engage in. 
97 See Spengler (1964), Boulakia (1971); Von Sivers (1980) and Mouhammed (2004). For 
the relationship between the four stages theory and 17th century natural law theory see 
Meek (1976b, p. 12-25) and, particularly in relation to Smith, Hont (1987) and Hont (2010, 
p. 38-51). 
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they double in twenty or five-and-twenty years” (WN I.viii.23, p. 88).98 The same 
figures were later also used, famously, by Malthus, who may have taken them 
either from Smith or Franklin.99  
As regards the four stages theory, the relevant quote from Franklin appears 
at the beginning of the essay (§ 5): 
Europe is generally full settled with husbandmen, manufacturers, &c. and 
therefore cannot now much increase in People: America is chiefly occupied 
by Indians, who subsist mostly by hunting. But as the hunter, of all men, 
requires the greatest quantity of land from whence to draw his subsistence, 
(the husbandman subsisting on much less, the gardener on still less, and 
the manufacturer requiring least of all), the Europeans found America as 
fully settled as it well could be by hunters; yet these having large Tracts, 
were easily prevail'd on to part with portions of territory to the new 
comers, who did not much interfere with the natives in hunting, and 
furnish'd them with many things they wanted. 
Although the outline of the four stages is rather thin in this quote, it is clearly 
stated, at least, that the amount of food a people can produce or retrieve from a 
given amount of land varies with the stage of society, as was discussed with 
reference to Smith at the beginning of the previous section.100  
Alan Houston (2008, p. 125) considers Franklin’s essay a fully fledged 
contribution to the four stages theory. Indeed, the relationship not only between 
the method of subsistence and the stages of development that Meek was so 
                                                        
98 The editors of the Glasgow edition of Wealth of Nations cite in footnote to this passage 
Richard Price’s 1772 Observations on Reversionary Payments which uses the same figures 
for North America, but do not note that Price himself got them from Franklin, his work 
incorporating comments on Franklin’s essay that he had made in letter form first in  1769 
(Houston 2008, p. 140). There is no reason why Smith, who was well acquainted and had 
developed a friendship with Franklin by the time he was writing the Wealth of Nations, 
should not also have gotten the inspiration directly from Franklin (especially considering 
the very low opinion he held of Richard Price; see Smith’s letter to George Chalmers, 22 
Dec. 1785, Corr. 251, p. 290). 
99 Franklin clearly also directly influenced Malthus, especially with the statement, 
appearing immediately before the last cited, that: “There is in short, no bound to the 
prolific nature of plants or animals, but what is made by their crowding and interfering 
with each others' means of subsistence. Was the face of the earth vacant of other plants, it 
might be gradually sowed and overspread with one kind only; as, for instance, with 
Fennel; and were it empty of other inhabitants, it might in a few Ages be replenish'd from 
one nation only; as for Instance, with Englishmen.” (Franklin 1755, §22) 
100 This quote from Franklin’s essay, along with the ones reproduced in the previous 
footnote and earlier in the text, illustrate how closely the four stages theory and the 
“population principle” (generally associated with Malthus, but the phrase was first used by 
Godwin and Arthur Young (see Hollander 1927, p. 190 for references)) were associated in 
18th century writings. We shall consider this connection in detail in the following section. 
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adamant about, but also the relationship between the stages of development and 
the relation of population to the means of subsistence (and thus to land), which we 
are in this chapter more centrally concerned with, clearly come out from the cited 
passage, although it may be too much to claim that the passage lays out the four 
stages theory. Franklin became friends with both Kames and Smith, but only 
several years after writing this essay. His use of the four stages framework thus 
unlikely derives from them, but Houston (2008, p. 125) notes that he used the 
same sources.  
Next in line for a consideration of his use of the four stages theory is 
Helvétius. Smith met Helvétius in France, and this contact, along with the one with 
Holbach, was given much importance in the history of economic thought.101  
Helvétius’ account of the four stages theory appears in his De l’esprit, a 
controversial book (notably for its atheism, for which Helvétius was forced to 
publicly apologise) published in 1758, a few years before Smith’s lectures of 
jurisprudence (to which the recovered notes pertain). The four stages theory is 
invoked in chapter IX of De l’esprit, entitled “De l’origine des passions”. Helvétius 
starts his account of the four stages by positing “several men” brought about by the 
heavens, and, interestingly, starts the passage in which the four stages appears 
with a consideration of the formation of language:  
En effet, supposons que le ciel anime tout-à-coup plusieurs hommes, leur 
première occupation sera de satisfaire leurs besoins; bientôt après ils 
essaieront, par des cris, d’exprimer les impressions de plaisir et de douleur 
qu’ils reçoivent. Ces premiers cris formeront leur première langue, qui, à en 
juger par la pauvreté de quelques langues sauvages, a dû d’abord être très 
courte, et se réduire à ces premiers sons. (Helvétius 2009 [1758], p. 261) 
102 
                                                        
101 Ross (2010, p. 231) considered Smith‘s contact with the French intellectuals as “the 
most exciting passage in Smith’s intellectual development, second in importance only to 
his early contacts with Hume”. But the first to give much importance to Smith’s contact 
with Helvétius (and Holbach) were the instigators of the “Adam Smith Problem” (Knies, 
and above all Skarżiński, see Theory of Moral Sentiments p. 22-5), who believed that Smith 
adopted his “individualism” and insistence on the importance of self-interest from them — 
a position easily proven wrong by a reading of the Lectures of Jurisprudence, reporting 
classes held by Smith before his departure to France and in which these features of his 
‘economic’ theories clearly figure. On Helvétius’ relationship to the four stages theory see 
(Meek 1976b, p. 91-4, 132-6). For Helvétius’s relationship with Smith specifically, see Ross 
(ibid.) and further Plechanov (1896, p. 103-6); and Cumming (1955, p. 129-30, and 164-
66). 
102 Interesting, too, is that Helvétius, for all the atheism he was accused of, did not start his 
story with a few shipwrecked stranded on an island, as Smith (in LJ(B)), but with this tale 
of men who “heaven suddenly animates” much closer to the story of Genesis.  
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One resemblance with Smith’s use of conjectural history thus appears 
immediately. Helvétius, just as Smith in his essay on the formation of language, 
observes how language must have come about in savage society. Smith treated of 
these questions in different works, the connection having been established by 
Steward, while Helvétius’ considers language formation in the very same passage 
in which he introduces the four stages theory. He introduces, immediately 
following, the crucial element of population growth: 
Lorsque les hommes, plus multipliés, commenceront à se répandre sur la 
surface du monde ;  . . .  lorsque les familles seront plus voisines les unes 
des autres ; alors le désir commun de posséder les mêmes choses, telles 
que les fruits d’un certain arbre ou les faveurs d’une certaine femme, 
exciteront en eux des querelles et des combats :  . . .   alors ils feront entre 
eux des  . . .  premières lois. (ibid.) 
Another central element of the four stages theory here appears. As already 
established, the four stages theory was immediately emerging from a tradition of 
natural law theorising, and one of its central aims was to explain the origin of 
government and laws, offering an alternative but related explanation to Hobbes’ 
Leviathan. In Helvétius’ account, laws are a response to the process of competition 
created by scarcity, itself created by population density. Smith constructs this in a 
different yet very similar way. In Smith’s account, the age of shepherds creates 
inequality and this makes laws necessary. Helvétius expressed it more directly: 
increased competition due to higher shortage makes laws necessary to settle 
disputes, as Pufendorf had written. It is laws, in Helvétius’ account, which by 
necessity bring about the order of judges in society (the first division of labour and 
creation of social classes): 
Les lois faites, il faudra charger quelques hommes de leur exécution : et 
voilà les premiers magistrats. (ibid.) 
Helvétius now introduces the critical element of scarcity prompting technological 
development: 
Ces magistrats grossiers de peuples sauvages habiteront d’abord les forêts. 
Après en avoir, en partie, détruit les animaux, lorsque les peuples ne 
vivront plus de leur chasse, la disette des vivres leur enseignera l’art d’élever 
des troupeaux. (ibid.) 
As in Smith’s account, savage people first live directly from nature, but 
eventually animals to hunt become scarce, and it is then “la disette” (shortage of 
subsistence) that “teaches” men the art of tending to animals (“élever les 
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troupeaux”). This is directly brought about by population pressure, which brings 
about new technological stages:  
Ces troupeaux fourniront à leurs besoins, et les peuples chasseurs seront 
changés en peuples pasteurs. Après un certain nombre de siècles, lorsque 
ces derniers se seront extrêmement multipliés, et que la terre ne pourra, dans 
le même espace, subvenir à la nourriture d’un plus grand nombre d’habitants, 
sans être fécondée par le travail humain, alors les peuples pasteurs 
disparaîtront, et feront place aux peuples cultivateurs. (ibid., p. 262) 
The same territory cannot furnish enough subsistence for a multitude of 
people without recourse to improvements (“sans être fécondée par le travail 
humain”) which cannot be conceived of independently of technological innovation. 
And hunger (necessity), just as it has taught them pasturage, also teaches men 
agriculture; and by the same token it teaches them to divide land, which renders 
necessary the introduction of property, which in turn brings about new laws and 
new “sciences”: 
Le besoin de la faim, en leur découvrant l’art de l’agriculture, leur 
enseignera bientôt après l’art de mesurer et de partager les terres. Ce 
partage fait, il faut assurer à chacun ses propriétés : et de-là une foule de 
sciences et de lois. (ibid.) 
Property laws multiply in the age of agriculture, exactly as in Smith’s account. 
And Helvétius also explains, like Smith, the introduction of money by the need 
created by the introduction of exchange. Note, however, that division of labour 
arises for Helvétius from the differences of the produce of land (as for Ricardo), not 
from the productivity advantages that a larger market makes possible, as for Smith: 
Les terres, par la différence de leur nature et de leur culture, portant des 
fruits différents, les hommes feront entre eux des échanges, sentiront 
l’avantage qu’il y aurait à convenir d’un échange général qui représentât 
toutes les denrées ; et ils feront choix, pour cet effet, de quelques 
coquillages ou de quelques métaux. (ibid.) 103 
                                                        
103 This passage cannot fail to remind us of the way money is introduced and explained in 
chapter VI of the Wealth of Nations. This furnishes us with another connection of a part of 
the Wealth of Nations with the four stages theory. The reference to it by Smith in that 
chapter is rather oblique, being made merely through reference to “when the division of 
labour first began to take place” (WN I.iv.2). Once we connect the division of labour itself 
to Smith’s account of the four stages theory, as was done in the previous section, this 
reference becomes clearer. 
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Finally, Helvétius mentions another characteristic element of the four stages 
theory equally central to Smith’s work: that with the progression to higher stages 
inequality and social classes appear: 
Lorsque les sociétés en seront à ce point de perfection, alors toute égalité 
entre les hommes sera rompue : on distinguera des supérieurs et des 
inférieurs. (ibid.) 
Let us then move on to another one of Smith’s contemporaries and 
acquaintances who made use of the four stages theory in much the same vein. The 
earliest written statement of the theory that satisfied Meek to have been a 
manifestation of the latter is contained in John Dalrymple’s Essay Towards a 
General History of Feudal Property in Great Britain (1757), closely followed by 
Kames’ Historical Law-Tracts (Meek 1976b, p. 100, 102). The former, Lehman 
(1971, p. 218) notes, was “a work directly inspired by Kames, both in its substance 
and in its method”.  Dalrymple in fact dedicated his book to Kames, “as to the 
person, who not only led me into the general train of enquiry contained in them, 
but to whom any merit that may be found in the conduct of the particulars of that 
enquiry, justly belongs” (Dalrymple 1758, p. iii).104 At the beginning of his book, 
Dalrymple explains what he sets out to do: 
The following chapters contain an attempt, to trace from the earliest feudal 
times, the great out-lines of the laws which relate to land property, in 
England and in Scotland, so far as they are derived from a feudal origin; to 
mark their variations in different ages, and to assign the causes of those 
variations. (ibid. p. v) 
Dalrymple tells his readers about the four stages of society, as had Pufendorf, 
in the context of the explanation of property rights, and at first concentrates 
strictly on these in his account. The four stages thus appear in Chapter III, entitled 
“History of the Alienation of Landproperty”, at the beginning of Section I on 
“Voluntary alienation”. “This subject”, Dalrymple tells us, “is curious and 
interesting; in order to trace the progress of it, the progress of society must be 
traced”: 
The first state of society is that of hunters and fishers; among such a people 
the idea of property will be confined to a few, and but a very few 
moveables; and subjects which are immoveable, will be esteemed to be 
common.  . . .   
                                                        
104 The title page also contains a citation of Montesquieu, who, as noted in the introduction 
to this chapter, was seen, notably by Stewart and Millar, as having laid out the plan that 
Smith followed with the four stages theory. 
128 
The next state of society begins, when the inconveniences and dangers 
of such a life, lead men to the discovery of pasturage. During this period, as 
soon as a flock have brouzed upon one spot of ground, their proprietors 
will remove them to another; and the place they have quitted will fall to the 
next who pleases to take possession of it: For this reason such shepherds 
will have no notion of property in immoveables, nor of right of possession 
longer than the act of possession lasts. (ibid. p. 90-1) 
It is at this point (after recounting the story of Abraham and Lot) that 
Dalrymple introduces the element of the pressure of population on land and the 
means of subsistence (first mentioning cattle and soon after population): 
The words of Abraham to Lot are : "Is not the whole land before thee? 
separate thyself, I pray thee, from me. If thou wilt take the left hand, then 
will I go to the right; or if thou depart to the right hand, then will I go to the 
left". And we are told that the reason of this separation, was, the quantity of 
flocks, and herds, and tents, which each of them had, and which the land 
was unable to support. 105 
A third state of society is produced, when men become so numerous, 
that the flesh and milk of their cattle is insufficient for their subsistance, 
and when their more extended intercourse with each other, has made them 
strike out new arts of life, and particularly the art of agriculture. This art 
leading men to bestow thought and labour upon land, increases their 
connection with a single portion of it; this connection long continued, 
produces an affection; and this affection long continued, together with the 
other, produces the notion of property in land. (ibid. p. 91-2) 
Meek (1976b, p. 99) held that it “should be noted” that both Dalrymple and 
Kames “were members of Smith’s circle”. But it may be more accurate to consider 
Dalrymple and Smith to have been members of Kames’ circle, who was twenty-
seven years Smith’s senior, and thirty years Dalrymple’s, as well as fifteen years 
Hume’s, to whom, as well as to Smith, he served as patron (Ross 2010, p. 80). Smith 
himself affirmed: “We must every one of us acknowledge Kames for our master” 
(ibid.).106  
                                                        
105 We shall reencounter Abraham and lot in the following section of this chapter. The fact 
that shepherds tend to migrate (and can become formidable armies) was given some 
prominence by Smith in Book V of the Wealth of Nations. 
106 See also Dalrymple’s dedication cited on p. 123 above. Ross (2010, p. 80) writes of a 
version of the four stages theory being contained already in Kames’ Essays on Several 
Subjects concerning British Antiquities (1747) and cites to this effect Meek (1976b) (but 
without page number). Meek, however, clearly wrote that the first version of the theory 
which appeared in writing that he identified was the one of Dalrymple of 1758. 
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Kames’ account of the four stages is contained in Book 1, Sketch 1 – 
significantly entitled “Progress Respecting Food and Population” – of his Sketches 
on the History of Man (1774). As mentioned above, at the moment of its 
publication, he had apparently been working on this opus for the past three 
decades. Kames starts off his account of the four stages with reference to 
population and subsistence: 
Plenty of food procured by hunting and fishing, promotes population 
(Kames 2007 [1778], p. 55) 
Population grows because in the beginning of the hunting stage, there are still 
a lot of animals to be found, and they provide for surpluses of food. Yet the very 
growth of population eventually creates scarcity (the idea so central to Malthus’ 
work, that population progresses faster than the means of subsistence, is clearly 
contained here). But, importantly, it is this very scarcity (through necessity being 
the mother of invention), that prompts technological progress and results in a new 
age characterised by a new mode of subsistence: 
but as consumption of food increases with population, wild animals, sorely 
persecuted, become not only more rare, but more shy. Men, thus pinched 
for food, are excited to try other means for supplying their wants. A fawn, a 
kid, or a lamb, taken alive and tamed for amusement, suggested probably 
flocks and herds, and introduced the shepherd-state.  (ibid.) 
Precisely the same mechanism for the passage to a superior subsistence 
technology as the one outlined by Smith and Helvétius is described here by Kames. 
More or less by coincidence, people discover that they can tame wild animals. And 
it is when necessity arises that it becomes economical to do so. Necessity, in itself, 
presents new opportunity. The same mechanism repeats in the next stage: 
The shepherd state is friendly to population. Men by plenty of food multiply 
apace; and, in process of time, neighbouring tribes, straitened in their 
pasture, go to war for extension of territory, or migrate to land not yet 
occupied. Necessity, the mother of invention, suggested agriculture (ibid., p. 
56) 
It is through necessity being the mother of invention, indeed, that population 
moves society through successively higher stages, because humans are naturally 
inventive:  
When corn growing spontaneously was rendered scarce by consumption, it 
was an obvious thought to propagate it by art.  (ibid.) 
There is a clear resemblance to Smith’s “naturally” in Kames “obvious 
thought” (see the quote from LJ(A)i.28 on page 106 above). Kames then explains 
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how this will again first create a surplus of food which makes population rise, 
through the division of labour (everyone earns his living, now, through “skill and 
labour”):  
A lasting division of the land among the members of the state, securing to 
each man the product of his own skill and labour, was a great spur to 
industry, and multiplied food exceedingly. (ibid.) 
There is a further element of importance involved here: the introduction of 
private property, which, as in Smith’s version, is an effect of the passage to a higher 
stage, and at the same time a cause of the passage to a further one. Through the 
introduction of property, because people have more interest to tend to land that is 
their own, food production is increased. How the causality chain is precisely laid 
out varies ever so slightly, but the result is the same as in Smith’s and Helvétius’s 
version.    
Population made a rapid progress, and government became an art; for 
agriculture and commerce cannot flourish without salutary laws. (ibid., p. 
57) 
Government and laws are also introduced as in Smith, and in Helvétius, 
within the passage through the stages, as a result of population pressure. (Notice 
also the resemblance to Smith’s insistence on just laws for his system of natural 
liberty.) Kames proceeds: 
That the progress above traced must have proceeded from some vigorous 
impulse, will be admitted, considering the prevailing influence of custom: 
once hunters, men will always be hunters, till they be forced out of that 
state by some overpowering cause. (ibid., p. 59) 
Kames makes here the important observation that we cannot simply suppose 
that society will develop. The laying bare of the causal mechanism is of prime 
importance. Of course, there might be a drive by man to better his condition, as 
Smith observed, but the element here emphasised (as in Smith’s account) is 
“necessity”. There has to be a strong impulse, Kames remarks, to change the mode 
of subsistence because, as Smith also noted, people have a tendency to proceed as 
they are accustomed, and laws and institutions can thus stay in place even long 
after they have finished to serve their purpose. This strong impulse to change the 
status quo, according to Kames, is created by necessity:  
Hunger, the cause here assigned, is of all the most overpowering; and the 
same cause, overcoming indolence and idleness, has introduced 
manufactures, commerce, and variety of arts. (ibid.) 
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As we shall see in the next section, this same idea was to play a prominent 
(and too often ignored) role in Malthus’ theory. 
We shall next consider the work of Sir William Blackstone (1723–1780), an 
English judge and Tory politician. More notably, he was the first lecturer of English 
law in Britain. After a couple of works on English law, he published in 1766 his 
magnum opus, Commentaries on the Laws of England. The book was the first 
systematic treatise of English common law, was extensively cited not just in Britain 
but also until much later in the United States, and went through many editions. 
Smith too had read it, and cites from it twice in the Wealth of Nations.107 It is in this 
work that Blackstone makes use of the four stages theory. As in his natural law 
predecessors’, and in Smith’s, Helvétius’ and Kames’ accounts, it is used to explain 
the introduction of laws in society. And in Blackstone’s version too, population is 
the original causal element driving the progress of the succession of stages.  
In Blackstone’s account (as in Pufendorf’s), scripture is invoked in a 
reverential manner, at the difference of Smith and most other authors considered 
in this section (but recall Helvétius’ oblique reference to Genesis and Dalrymple’s 
mention of Abraham and Lot). This does not in any meaningful way alter the 
content of the theory, however. Blackstone’s exposition of the four stages appears 
in Chapter 1 of Book 2, entitled “Of Property, in General”. Blackstone here 
introduces the four stages as had Smith, with regard to the laws of occupation:  
In the beginning of the world, we are informed by holy writ, the all-
bountiful creator gave to man "dominion over all the earth; and over the 
fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that 
moves upon the earth."  . . . 
The earth, therefore, and all things therein, are the general property of 
all mankind, exclusive of other beings, from the immediate gift of the 
Creator. And, while the earth continued bare of inhabitants, it is reasonable 
to suppose, that all was in common among them, and that every one took 
from the public stock to his own use such things as his immediate 
necessities required.  . . . 
                                                        
107 At I.v.13, p. 52 and  III.ii.13, 391, Smith mentions the opinions of “Doctor Blackstone”. 
Campbell and Skinner (ibid.) give references to the corresponding passages in the 
Commentaries on the Laws of England. I have found no indication of Smith and Blackstone 
ever having met, either in biographies of Smith or of Blackstone, but it is quite possible 
that they would have, for both Smith and Blackstone studied in Oxford in the period 1740-
46. For an examination of Blackstone’s position in the jurisprudential tradition of the 18th 
century, with some interesting remarks on its bearing on the development of wider social 
science in that period (with regard to the argument made in section 1, p. 82 and n. 30 
above), see Lieberman (1988). 
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These general notions of property were then sufficient to answer all 
the purposes of human life; and might perhaps still have answered them, 
had it been possible for mankind to have remained in a state of primeval 
simplicity (Blackstone 1859 [1766], p. 393-4) 
In the savage state, Blackstone writes (as Smith explained in his Glasgow 
lectures, as Helvétius put it in De l’esprit and as Kames exposed it in his Sketches), 
society is egalitarian. There are no differences of wealth as there is no private 
property. Exactly as Kames had argued, there is a force of habit and custom which 
makes men like to remain the same, but they are eventually bound to innovate by 
some overwhelming force, and in Blackstone also that causal element is the 
increase of population creating shortage and necessity: 
But when mankind increased in number, craft, and ambition, it became 
necessary to entertain conceptions of more permanent dominion.  . . .  Such, 
as were not contented with the spontaneous product of the earth, sought 
for a more solid refreshment in the flesh of beasts, which they obtained by 
hunting. But the frequent disappointments, incident to that method of 
provision, induced them to gather together such animals as were of a more 
tame and sequacious nature; and to establish a permanent property in 
their flocks and herds, in order to sustain themselves in a less precarious 
manner . . .  
As the world by degrees grew more populous, it daily became more 
difficult to find out new spots to inhabit, without encroaching upon former 
occupants; and, by constantly occupying the same individual spot, the fruits 
of the earth were consumed, and its spontaneous produce destroyed, 
without any provision for a future supply or succession. (ibid. p. 394-6) 
Here also it is population that creates necessity because there are more 
people on the same territory and stress is put on the local eco-system. If people do 
not introduce a superior technology of food production, they cannot subsist:  
It therefore became necessary to pursue some regular method of providing 
a constant subsistence; and this necessity produced, or at least promoted 
and encouraged, the art of agriculture. And the art of agriculture, by a 
regular connection and consequence, introduced and established the idea 
of a more permanent property in the soil, than had hitherto been received 
and adopted.  (ibid., p. 396) 
Naturally, as property is what Blackstone is centrally dealing with, he always 
comes back to the idea of property. As in Smith, property takes on more 
importance with the passage of stages. And laws and government are themselves a 
result of the introduction of private property, which they serve to protect: 
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Necessity begat property; and, in order to insure that property, recourse 
was had to civil society, which brought along with it a long train of 
inseparable concomitants; states, government, laws,  punishments, and the 
public exercise of religious duties.  (ibid.) 
The appearance of government and of legal and political institutions (with 
the particularity that Blackstone also includes religious institutions in these) is 
thus explained by the same familiar mechanism of population creating necessity. 
Finally, another element characteristic of the four stages theory, and more widely 
associated with Smith’s theory in general, division of labour and specialisation, is 
introduced by Blackstone (using almost the same formulation as Smith’s “the 
labour of half the society becomes sufficient to provide food for the whole” and 
“The other half, therefore,  . . .  can be employed  . . .  in satisfying the other wants 
and fancies of mankind”108): 
Thus connected together, it was found that a part only of society was 
sufficient to provide, by their manual labor, for the necessary subsistence 
of all; and leisure was given to others to cultivate the human mind, to 
invent useful arts, and to lay the foundations of science. (ibid.) 
The last work we shall consider in this section is the long “Didactic Poem” of 
1793, entitled The Progress of Civil Society, by Richard Payne Knight. Like Helvétius, 
Knight was watched rather circumspectly by religious authority — though not 
precisely for the same reason.109 His poem is divided in six books, of which the first 
four are significantly titled “Of Hunting”, “Of Pasturage”, “Of Agriculture” and “Of 
Arts, Manufactures, and Commerce” (the two last books deal with “Climate and 
Soil” and “Government and Conquest” respectively). The most interesting part of 
the poem for our purpose is the beginning of Book II: 
In every species of each living kind,  . . . 
Progressive numbers without end increase, 
While nature gives them safety, food, and ease: 
Whence, through the whole the balance to sustain, 
And in porportion'd bounds each race restrain, 
Each stands opposed to some destructive power, 
By nature form'd to slaughter and devour; 
                                                        
108 See p. 111 above for the full quote (which at this point may perhaps be read more 
beneficially with the full four stages theory in mind). 
109 Knight was known foremost for his 1786 book A Discourse on the Worship of Priapus, 
and its Connection with the Mystic Theology of the Ancients, a book about ancient phallic 
cults, vividly illustrated, regarded as somewhat subversive by the established Church. He 
further wrote about the aesthetics of art and collected ancient coins. 
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And still, as each in greater numbers breeds, 
More foes it finds, and more devourers feeds.  . . . 
Promiscuous death, through all the finny brood, 
Destroys the less to give the greater food: 
Their countless hosts no social right protects; 
No mutual instinct in fond pairs connects;— 
Unfelt the sweet delights of love, they breed; 
And, undisgusted, on their offspring feed. 
As growing numbers claim'd increase of food, 
In smaller herds the cattle browsed the wood: 
The hunter's labours less productive grew, 
And pale-faced famine slowly rose to view; 
Hence want inventive, and prospective thought, 
More certain sources of nutrition sought; 
Directed man his genius to employ 
To guard and save, as well as to destroy;  . . .  
As more the bounds of social rights expand,  
And peaceful herds submit to man's command; 
Still as a faithful minister, he shares 
The shepherd's labours, and divides his cares; 
(Knight 1796, p. 28-30) 
The mechanism from population growth via the creation of want to 
technological development is here concisely laid out. Meek (1976b, p. 209-13) 
considered Knight’s poem as part of the “revisionist” literature on the four stages 
theory, and remarked, pointedly, that revisionist tendencies “presuppose the 
existence of something 'orthodox' to revise”, seeing Knight’s poem in this 
connection as “Striking evidence of the rise of the four stages theory to the status 
of orthodoxy”. What Meek does not note is that Knight himself saw his poem 
mainly as a commentary on Lucretius.110  
As the elements of the four stages theory as used by the various authors 
considered in this section were sensibly the same as in Smith’s version, it will not 
be necessary to sum up anew the various steps of this theory (see the last 
                                                        
110 Knight thus wrote in his preface: “The learned reader will perceive, that the general 
design of the following work is taken from the latter part of the fifth book of Lucretius, 
beginning with verse 923; and that I have also borrowed many particular passages, which 
I should have given at the bottom of the page, did I not rather wish that the whole should 
be read in its proper order, as a text, upon which I have written a commentary, as nearly in 
the same style and manner, as my poor abilities, and the inferior language which I employ, 
will allow; for that style and manner I consider as perfect. Lucretius is, in my opinion, the 
great poet of the Latin language”. See n. 19 on p. 79 above for a view of the importance of 
Lucretius for 18th century theories of socio-cultural evolution. 
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paragraph of the previous section on p. 117 above). This section was mainly 
intended, indeed, to show the great resemblance in almost every detail of the four 
stages theory as used by various authors at the time, and, by highlighting the 
centrality of the population mechanism therein, to throw additional light on 
Smith’s use of this feature of the theory.  
The ‘Malthusian’ flavour of the beginning of the quote from Knight above will 
have escaped few, which brings us to our next subject. Only two years after the 
work considered last (Knight’s poem of 1796), the first edition of Malthus’ Essay on 
the Principle of Population was published (anonymously). Malthus was naturally 
deeply influenced by the categories of analysis of the four stages theory. He 
adopted from this theory the three critical elements of: population being at any 
one time nearly proportional to what food can be obtained from nature with the 
given state of subsistence technology; population having the tendency to increase, 
and to do so faster than the means of subsistence, so as to produce scarcity;111 and 
this very scarcity spurring people on to industry and invention. As we shall see, 
however, Malthus also introduced elements of his own which made his use of the 
four stages theory only partial, and may have had the effect, deplored by Meek 
(1976b, p. 223), of contributing to the coming into disuse of the original four stages 
theory rather than to its wider circulation. The four stages theory in its original 
outline was made use of, in turn, by some authors to criticise Malthus’ population 
theory (sometimes not recognising, however, to what extent what they were 
advancing to counter Malthus was in fact close to what he had written himself — 
as is so often the case in scholarly controversies112). 
 
7. Malthus and his critics 
As Rutherford (2007, p. 222) remarks, too little attention has been paid by 
commentators on Malthus’ work to his use of 18th century conjectural history. It 
may be added that those who have recently paid some attention to this feature of 
Malthus’ work (including Rutherford himself)113 have in turn paid insufficient 
attention to the intimate connection between the four stages theory (and not 
                                                        
111 In the savage state, indeed, the means of subsistence do not increase at all once the 
balance between society and the food to obtain from nature is broken by ongoing 
population growth, but rather decrease by the progressive decimation of the wild animals. 
112 For an example of this from 20th century development theory, see Alacevich (2011). 
113 Others include Dzelzainis (2006) and Bashford and Chaplin (2016). 
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merely the stadial model as categorisation of human societies) and Malthus’ own 
theory of population and the theoretical content of his Essay more widely. 
Meek (1976b, p. 223) accused Malthus of having used the four stages theory 
merely to show the eternal and overarching validity of his own propositions about 
population. On the one hand, the charge is justified and largely true: Malthus not 
only used the four stages theory in an instrumental manner, but, for this purpose, 
he also deviated from it in important respects. On the other hand, Meek’s quick 
dismissal of Malthus in his detailed investigation into conjectural history does not 
do justice to the considerable use Malthus in fact made of the four stages theory. 
Meek was interested mainly in Malthus’ role (or absence thereof) in the 
continuation of this theoretical tradition in the same form. The more interesting 
questions for the history of thought may be, conversely, what role the four stages 
theory played in shaping Malthus’ hugely influential propositions about population 
and society; and to what degree this theory thus lived on in Malthus’ work while 
taking on a different shape and a somewhat new purpose.  
The four stage theory had been used from the start (that is in ancient Greek 
thought, and in the natural law tradition that took it up) to justify the existence of 
private property. Thereby, the theory also served, indirectly, to justify economic 
inequality (for the defence of private property is of most use to those who own 
more than their own labour). Yet the four stages theory could also be used to argue 
for an improvement in economic equality in a “fifth stage” to come (as it was by 
Godwin and Condorcet, Malthus’ primary targets, and later by Marx). Malthus’ 
argument for the inevitability of inequality based on the population principle was 
partially derived from four stages theory. But it also diverged from this theory in 
important respects, as we shall see. 
The popular historical simplification consisting in the view that, up to 
Malthus’ Essay, everyone believed population was a great force for good, and 
suddenly, Malthus having enlightened the whole world to the real effect of 
population, everyone realised that it was the actual cause of impending doom, is of 
course as implausible as it is wrong. The development of ideas about population at 
the end of the 18th century was, as always, one of many contradictory positions 
being held, and the same, sometimes widely accepted argument being used for 
various purposes. It is true that the major controversy on population in the 18th 
century concerned not the beneficial or harmful character of population growth for 
society, but rather the relative population of the ancient and modern world (i.e. the 
question whether Europe had been populated or depopulated since Roman times), 
which was itself taken but as a means to discuss the superior or inferior character 
of institutions of classical versus modern European states (a continuation of the 
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‘querelle des anciens et des modernes’). On the question of the beneficial or 
harmful character of population for society (surely an ambiguous question to begin 
with), which would frame the major controversies about population of the 19th and 
20th centuries, there was a relative consensus in the 18th century: population was 
seen as an integral part of progress, thus usually as a sign of progress, and by many 
thinkers (including Smith) jointly as a cause of it.114 Yet the idea that population 
curtailed the means of subsistence and laid stress on society was equally 
widespread, as we have seen. Indeed, these two ideas were in general neither 
presented as, nor seen as contradictory, and, in the four stages theory, they in fact 
complement each other, the stress brought about by population pressure being 
itself seen as the cause of progress. The caricature of the state of population theory 
before and after Malthus presented above (reinforced by such adjectives as “pre-
Malthusian” to qualify theories of population before Malthus) totally obscures the 
direct continuation of many theoretical elements and themes of former works in 
the one of Malthus. Nor was Malthus in fact predicting impending doom. Instead, 
his theory included a view of the progress of society, which, importantly, 
incorporated population growth, very much along four stages theory lines. 
Malthus himself recognised that he was not a pioneer of the principle of 
population — and with more detail and emphasis so in the second edition of his 
Essay. In the first edition he declared that “It is an obvious truth, which has been 
taken notice of by many writers, that population must always be kept down to the 
level of the means of subsistence” (1998 [1798], p. vii). And in the second and 
subsequent editions, he affirmed to have “deduced the principle, which formed the 
main argument of the Essay, [from] Hume, Wallace, Adam Smith, and Dr. Price” 
(1826a, p. v). Wallace had famously laid out the Malthusian population theory in 
full detail in 1761 already (Wallace 1809 [1753]), almost forty years before the 
publication of Malthus’ first Essay.115 And part of Malthus’ theory was derived 
                                                        
114 For useful summaries and analyses of debates and positions on population in the 18th 
century, see notably Whelan (1991), Tomaselli (1988) and Kreager (1991). See Black 
(1985) for a somewhat narrower focus on economic questions in this regard. 
115 On Wallace’s ideas on population, see Luehrs (1987). (There is a curious parallelism in 
the history of ideas between two famous Wallaces. Robert Wallace (1697–1771), here 
considered, was minister of the Church of Scotland, and a precursor to the cleric Malthus 
on population; Alfred Russel Wallace (1823 –1913), British naturalist and geographer, 
preceded — or coincided with — the  naturalist and geologist Charles Darwin in the 
formulation of the theory of evolution by natural selection; and Darwin, of course, was 
famously inspired by Malthus in his elaboration of the theory of natural selection, the 
“struggle for existence” (title of chapter three of Origin of Species) being, in Darwin’s 
words, “the doctrine of Malthus applied with manifold force to the whole animal and 
vegetable kingdoms” (Darwin 1859 p. 63, 1872 p. 50).) 
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directly from the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations, notably the 
chapter on wages in the latter (WN I.viii). Malthus only gave these ideas more 
polemic focus by tying them more clearly to contemporary political concerns.116 
To uncover the lesser known connection between the four stages theory and 
Malthus’ population theory, one needs to be prepared to further look for 
population theories in works that do not expressly deal with population issues. 
Thus it is at least possible that the connection between Malthus’ work and 
conjectural history was obscured for later scholars by the fact that this theoretical 
tradition was not dealing principally with population questions. The word 
“population” was indeed only beginning to find widespread use at the end of the 
18th century.117  Kames, as we have seen, presented the four stages theory in a 
section of his Sketches on the History of Man entitled “Progress Respecting Food 
and Population”; and Franklin had earlier written a four-stages-theory-like 
segment in his essay entitled Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind, 
Peopling of Countries, &c (both of which Malthus had likely read — Franklin was 
indeed specifically named by him as one of his sources). The connection between 
the four stages and population theory thus appears very clearly in these two 
sources at least. But neither Smith in his lectures, nor Helvétius in De l’esprit, nor 
Dalrymple in History of Feudal Property in Great Britain or Blackstone in 
Commentaries on the Laws of England presented the four stages theory in any way 
as connected to population theory, nor were they likely by this means to have 
wanted to contribute to population theory or debates about population. Malthus 
himself, indeed, did not mainly intend to do so. His Essay, in any case the first 
edition, notwithstanding the population theory presented therein, was primarily 
intended to refute the theories of Godwin and Condorcet about the “perfectibility 
of society”. Both of them had themselves considered what would be Malthus’ 
objection (the disturbing force of population), but ultimately dismissed it, for 
reasons which Malthus attacked. The connection between Malthus’ work and the 
four stages theory as used in jurisprudential theories and theories of societies of 
the 18th century is thus not likely to appear when too much focus is put on the 
population aspect alone. It is from a more comprehensive consideration and 
comparison of these theories with the one of Malthus that the connection will 
become visible. Notwithstanding, it is precisely in the population aspect of their 
theories, and the connection to hardship and the development of society, that the 
resemblance can be found.  
                                                        
116 For the evolution of the intellectual context between Smith’s and Malthus’ time, see 
Winch (1998, p. 5-10). 
117 See General Introduction, p. 19. 
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Just as Smith, with the Wealth of Nations, presented a great synthesis of 
economic theories that had been formulated hitherto, so Malthus did something 
similar with regard to population theories in his Essay. But while they are 
commonly hailed today, respectively, as the founding father of economics and of 
demography — justly or wrongly —, it is quite obvious that neither of them had 
the intention of founding such a science; not only because they did not ever profess 
such an intention, but also because their work was in direct keeping with 
contemporary debates and quite clearly intended as a contribution to the fields of 
knowledge existing at the time: theology, moral philosophy, political economy; and 
jurisprudence in Smith’s case at least. (Smith taught all four of these subjects, as we 
have seen, although not in classes exclusively dedicated to them; Malthus, as a 
scholar, a cleric, and later as the first professor of political economy, was clearly 
concerned with the three first at least). Their sources were, in their majority, not 
explicitly “economic” and “demographic”, respectively. Just as Smith found much of 
his inspiration (“economic” and other) in the legal (or jurisprudential) tradition 
(Pufendorf’s Law of Nature and Nations, Montesquieu’s Esprit des Lois and the 
works by Smith’s contemporaries and acquaintances considered in the previous 
section), so Malthus, too, found therein (whether directly or indirectly) some of the 
sources of his population theory (or rather of his theory as a whole, of which his 
population theory was a part).118  
If the four stages theory was in fact as widely known and used at the end of 
the 18th century as Meek (1976b) established, it would have been surprising, to be 
sure, had Malthus entirely ignored it. And indeed, he did not. Both the idea that the 
growth of population exerts a pressure on subsistence and thus creates hardship 
(itself related to the idea — if not deriving from it — that population always 
naturally conforms to what the environment, with the given state of technology, is 
capable of producing) and the idea that the hardship the pressure of population 
produces is both good and necessary for the progress of society were contained in 
the four stages theory. Malthus adopted both these ideas and they both played a 
crucial role in his theory. But he also utilised them in a new context and for 
different motives. Indeed, the idea of the constant pressure of population on 
subsistence and the social, political and economic changes this brought about, 
having been used by the natural law theorists (including Smith) as a means to 
explain the introduction of property, laws and government, became in Malthus’ 
theory an argument against the prospect of an egalitarian society. Malthus thus 
held — which was a deviation from the four stages theory as formulated hitherto 
                                                        
118 See n. 30 on p. 82 above for the centrality of jurisprudence in 18th century social 
science. 
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— that the pressure of population always exerted itself exclusively on the lower 
ranks of society, and would recreate these lower ranks if they ever were made to 
disappear.  
The idea that the pressure of population, despite the hardship it creates, is 
ultimately a good thing, as it spurs society on to higher stages of development, also 
took on a new purpose in Malthus’ Essay. While the four stages theory had before 
been presented by reference to God or scripture (notably in Pufendorf’s early 
version, or later in Blackstone’s), these were invoked merely as a way to introduce 
the idea of early humanity from whence the development of society could then be 
traced. Other authors had used different devices for the same purpose, such as 
Smith’s island metaphor. Under Malthus’ pen, however, the idea became 
theodicy.119 
It is ironic, as I signified in the introduction to this chapter, that the idea of 
population pressing on the means of subsistence and thereby bringing about 
technological change as a response to the want it creates is today known as the 
“Boserupian” position, while Ester Boserup formulated her theory two centuries 
after Helvétius, Smith and Kames, and the idea in fact can already be found, as we 
have seen, in classical authors, as well as natural law theorists of the 17th century 
(who indeed all inspired the former). On the other hand, the connection of this set 
of ideas with Boserup’s name in contemporary social science is not all that 
surprising in face of the fact that the conjectural historians did not have a 
‘Malthusian’ theory of population to confront, and their integration of the positive 
role of population growth was thus not polemical, and has not been remembered 
in that connection. It was, however, as we shall see shortly, used by some authors 
in the first decades of the 19th century already specifically to attack Malthus.  
Ironic too is that Boserup is often depicted as ‘standing Malthus on his head’ 
(Elliott 1965, p. 655; Clark 1984, p. 177; Robinson & Schutjer 1984, p. 356; Schultz 
1990, p. 2) even though this very theme of population pressing on the means of 
subsistence, and thereby inducing positive change in society was in fact recognised 
by Malthus himself and played a crucial role in his theory. Boserup can thus hardly 
be said to have ‘stood him on his head’ with her use of this theory. 120 
                                                        
119 For a consideration of Malthus’ theodicy see notably Pullen (1981), Santurri (1982) and 
Harvey-Phillips (1984). For a more recent take see Denis (2006). 
120 Boserup herself reportedly had this to say about this allegation: “In my first book on 
agricultural growth, there was a flap noting that I turned Malthus on his head. I did not say 
that; it was the publisher. A great advertisement, of course. In reality, I wrote very, very 
little about Malthus. Malthus said many things on many issues, and you always find a 
counter-example. I am not interested in old economists but in how things relate to each 
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As we are concerned here with the use of conjectural history, it will be 
apposite to start our textual examination of the link between Malthus’ work and 
the four stages theory by looking at Malthus’ position on the use of conjecture. This 
he disclosed in the opening pages of the first edition of his Essay on the Principle of 
Population:  
In entering upon the argument I must premise that I put out of the 
question, at present, all mere conjectures, that is, all suppositions, the 
probable realization of which cannot be inferred upon any just 
philosophical grounds.  (Malthus 1998 [1798], p. 3) 
Malthus, observes, a few paragraphs later:  
I have thus sketched the general outline of the argument, but I will examine 
it more particularly, and I think it will be found that experience, the true 
source and foundation of all knowledge, invariably confirms its truth. (ibid., 
p. 5) 
And a few pages later he declared, resonating with four stages theory: 
That population does invariably increase where there are the means of 
subsistence, the history of every people that have ever existed will 
abundantly prove.   
And that the superior power of population cannot be checked without 
producing misery or vice, the ample portion of these too bitter ingredients 
in the cup of human life and the continuance of the physical causes that 
seem to have produced them bear too convincing a testimony. (ibid., p. 11) 
Malthus had thus turned the “conjectural history” of Adam Smith and his 
peers into an ‘historical truth’. It is upon having been amply criticised for this 
(stipulating a population theory without showing that it was relevant in the real 
world, while professing to base himself on experience) that he undertook a serious 
scholarly effort in comparative analysis of population mechanisms in various 
countries and epochs that form the bulk of the second edition of his Essay, which, 
as has often been noted, was in many respects a new book. It must be remarked, of 
course, that the term “conjectural history” was Stewart’s, not Smith’s, and in 
stressing the importance of experience over conjecture Malthus was in fact 
following in the empiricist (and anti-rationalist) tradition of Smith and Hume.  
It should be remarked too, however, that Malthus’ declaration of avoidance of 
conjecture and espousal of proof from experience, which he repeats numerous 
                                                                                                                                                                  
other today.  . . .  It is incorrect to say that I turned Malthus on his head.” (Mathieu 2014, p. 
14-15; the quoted conversation was held, according to the author, in 1981.) 
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times throughout the book,121 is mostly rhetorical. A few paragraphs before the 
first of the two passages quoted above, indeed, Malthus first exposes what is still 
one of the most famous conjectures in the history of economic thought, political 
theory and the human sciences as a whole, i.e. the particular formulation he gave 
the principle of population, with its arithmetical progression of food pitted against 
a geometrical progression of population: 
Population, when unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio. Subsistence 
increases only in an arithmetical ratio. A slight acquaintance with numbers 
will shew the immensity of the first power in comparison of the second.  
By that law of our nature which makes food necessary to the life of 
man, the effects of these two unequal powers must be kept equal. 
This implies a strong and constantly operating check on population 
from the difficulty of subsistence. This difficulty must fall somewhere and 
must necessarily be severely felt by a large portion of mankind. (ibid., p. 4-
5) 122 
All the elements listed by Malthus in the preceding two quotes (save for the 
“arithmetical” and “geometrical” nature of the relative increase of food and 
population) are fully congruent with the population mechanism we have hitherto 
observed to be the main ingredients of some of the typical versions of the four 
stages theory. While declaring to eschew conjecture, Malthus thus still endorses 
the framework of “conjectural history” (the phrase having been coined by Stewart 
five years before the publication of Malthus’ first Essay), “the history of every 
people that have ever existed” resounding with Smith’s “ages and nations”. 
Friedrich Engels notably remarked 40 years later how Malthus’ computation was 
purely conjectural: 
Malthus established a calculation, on which his whole system is based. 
Population increases in geometrical progression: 1 +2 +4 + 8 +16 + 32 etc., 
the productive power of the soil in an arithmetical one: 1+ 2 + 3 +4 + 5 + 6.  
The difference is manifest, is terrifying, but is it correct? Where has it been 
                                                        
121 Malthus’ assurance that what he is stating is derived from experience is repeated no 
less than thirty-six times in the short work (125 pages in the edition used) that the Essay 
still was in its first edition (Malthus 1998 [1798], p. 5, 7, 10, 13, 17, 40, 41, 46, 52: five 
times, 65, 66, 70, 72, 73: three times, 75, 80: twice, 82: twice, 85, 88, 105, 112: twice, 113, 
115, 116, 120, 121, 122). 
122 Although he was much less blunt and more elaborate when exposing the principle of 
population in subsequent editions, Malthus always maintained the contrast between the 
“geometrical” and “arithmetical” progressions. Malthus also explained, in later editions, 
that the progression of population in geometrical proportion was a tendency, not an actual 
rate (he insisted on the difference  between the two in his correspondence with Senior; see 
Senior (1829, p. 60-6)). In the first edition this was not yet clearly spelled out. 
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proven that the productivity of the soil increases in arithmetical 
progression? (Engels 1844, p. 110 my translation) 
Engels’ counter-argument is worth considering: 
The extension of soil is limited, all right. The labour power to apply to this 
surface increases with population; let us even suppose that the increase of 
returns is not always in proportion to the increase of labour; there still 
remains a third element, which the economist admittedly never deems 
important, science, and its progress is as infinite and at least as rapid as the 
one of population. What progress does agriculture in this century owe to 
chemistry alone, indeed to two men alone — Sir Humphrey Davy and Justus 
Liebig? But science increases at least like the population; the latter increases 
in proportion to the numbers of the last generation; science progresses in 
proportion to the sum of knowledge, which it has inherited from the 
previous generation, hence in the most normal of situations in geometrical 
progression too, and what is impossible for science? (ibid.)  
The accumulation of knowledge, which Engels here invokes, was also a 
feature of the four stages theory, as we have seen (consider the many instances of 
necessity ‘teaching’ society various ‘arts’ in the quotes of the previous sections).123 
With the division of labour that is introduced especially in the agricultural and 
commercial stages, arts and sciences multiply, and, as Smith so poignantly pointed 
out in the opening passages of Wealth of Nations, with the division of labour the 
skill of the workmen increased, and hence the level of skill in society overall.124 
                                                        
123 For an examination of the theme of the accumulation of knowledge in four stages 
theory, see especially Craig Smith (2006b). (But see my comment in the penultimate 
paragraph of this chapter.) 
124 The idea of the acceleration of science forms an integral part of Smith’s theory of the 
division of labour. It is the division of labour which creates a special class of 
“philosophers” in society that can dedicate themselves entirely to scientific research, and 
with the progress of the division of labour this class of philosophers further subdivides 
and scientific research consequently becomes, like all other branches of activity, more 
productive (WN I.i.9, p. 21-2), whence the idea of an acceleration of science with 
increasing population and (thus) division of labour in Smith’s theory. The link between 
population and division of labour in Smith’s thought shall be more centrally examined in 
the following chapter. 
A related theory (which Engels also alludes to with his mention of the “two men 
alone” that 19th century agriculture was so deeply indebted to) is sometimes called the 
“geniuses” theory. It was used by Turgot to explain that with increasing population, there 
would be an increasing amount of geniuses, and hence progress in knowledge would 
accelerate (Whelan 1991, p. 63-5). William Petty exposed the same theory a century 
before, and Julian Simon used it a century after Turgot  (Simon 1998 [1981]).  In the four 
stages theory, however, as it was examined in the prior two sections, such a theory was 
not spelled out. The progress of society was explained in purely materialistic terms, 
necessity inducing people, not so much to be inventive, as to make use of the discoveries 
144 
Other authors who criticised Malthus in the first decades of the 19th century 
made more specific use of the four stages theory. John Weyland did so in 1816; 
Michael Sadler in 1830 and George Poullet Scrope in 1833.125 Interestingly, in 
reaction to Malthus’ work — which the writings of these three authors explicitly 
constituted — the role of population now took centre stage in considerations of the 
evolution of society. In Malthus’ work, indeed, population got charged with such a 
prominent negative role that it naturally was the most obvious feature of his theory 
to attack, and the one that consequently became the most attacked.  
The role of population in the four stages theory had been an unambiguously 
positive one for the progress of society (in the long run at least, while in the short 
run it created some hardship, which, however, was the very cause of the long-run 
progress). But this role was not emphatically stated or made the central aspect of 
the theory. Indeed, as has been remarked already, the four stages theory was never 
principally formulated as a contribution to population controversies, nor did it 
need to be, the positive role of population for progress being largely taken for 
granted by the majority of scholars at the time the theory emerged. In Malthus’ 
work, population continued, in fact, to carry this positive role for progress 
(alongside its more prominent negative role) in the form of the “goad of 
necessity”.126 But as this was overshadowed by the more dazzling “geometrical” 
progression of population contrasted with the “arithmetical” progression of the 
productive power of the soil, it was often overlooked by friends and foes alike — 
the neo-Malthusians, indeed, wanting to do away with population growth 
altogether, entirely ignored it. The use Weyland, Sadler and Scrope made of the four 
stages theory was thus to bring the positive causal role of population for the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
and observations they were, in fact, most naturally inclined to have made anyway (without 
having as yet a use for them), by virtue of humans being by nature observant and creative. 
Genius, it may be recalled, in Smith’s theory, is not seen as the cause of progress in 
technology, but rather both the progress of genius and the progress of technology are the 
effect of a common cause, namely the division of labour. Smith’s egalitarian stance indeed 
made him shun theoretical elements based on the natural inequality of individuals. In 
Smith’s theory, it is the division of labour which creates the essential part of the inequality 
of talents in society. At birth and in early childhood, the future porter and the future 
philosopher are essentially identical in genius (WN I.ii.4, p. 28-9 and references given in n. 
14 on p. 76 above). 
125 Weyland is noted in this connection by Meek (1976b, p. 224), who sees in him (and 
List) one of the few “exceptions of the type that proves the rule” to the decline of the use of 
four stages theory in the 19th century. Sadler’s and Scrope’s anti-Malthusianism are 
considered in Coontz (1957, p. 22-45) and Kern (2009) respectively. 
126 The “goad of necessity” is mentioned by Malthus in the first and later editions of the 
Essay (1826b, p. 5; 1826a, p. 50, 92; 1998 [1798], p. 47). Alternative expressions, such as 
“goadings of want”, “goaded by constant distress”, “want was the goad” also appear in both 
(1826b, p. 29, 302; 1998 [1798], p. 13, 61). 
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progress of society to the fore. The latter of these three might be used here for 
illustration.  
In Scrope we find, again, the same familiar elements of the four stages theory, 
and the same mechanism of population creating necessity and thereby opportunity 
for a superior subsistence technology:  
Many savage tribes still existing offer an example of the mode in which our 
ancestors must have subsisted  . . .  Their sustenance must have been 
confined to the fruits and berries of the plain or forest, the flesh of wild 
animals and fish, and the water of the spring.  . . .  and as the numbers of a 
society increased, there must have been felt a very inconvenient scarcity of 
food  . . .  When, however, a people had attained a knowledge of the art of 
domesticating animals, whose milk or flesh supplies a wholesome and 
pleasant diet, a great addition was made to their power of providing 
themselves with food from a limited territory. A tract of land employed as 
pasturage for herds of cattle and flocks of sheep might be made to support, 
probably, not less than a hundred times the population which could subsist 
on its spontaneous supply of wild fruits and animals.  . . .  But as the 
numbers of such a society increased, they might not impossibly find 
themselves pinched for want of a sufficient range of pasture land. We have 
an example of this recorded in the sacred history of the Jews.  
Under these circumstances two resources, as before, are open to such 
a people, — viz. either to spread themselves over other distant lands yet 
unoccupied, (which was the proposal of Abraham to Lot  . . .  ) or by the 
exercise of their ingenuity to contrive means for making the district they 
inhabit afford them more copious supplies of food (Scrope 1833, p. 263). 
127 
“To these”, Scrope remarks at this point, in barely covert reference to Malthus: 
modern political economists have added a third, namely, the keeping their 
numbers sedulously within the limits of their existing means of subsistence 
by ‘a prudential abstinence from marriage’. Fortunately our ancestors in 
the earlier ages of the world did not adopt this sage plan; or the probability 
is, that we, and the other civilized nations of the globe, would never have 
existed at all; and mankind would have been confined, in local occupation, 
to some one or two snug corners, — a rich island, or a fertile valley, — and 
in numbers, to the few thousands whom the pasture of this limited 
territory could supply with milk, cheese, and cattle! (ibid.)  
                                                        
127 Recall that Dalrymple also referred to Abraham and Lot in this connection (see above p. 
124). 
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Scrope’s criticism potently illustrates the absurdity of the view that 
population always and everywhere constitutes an obstacle to the progress of 
society. But this was not in fact Malthus’ view. The idea of the necessity of 
population for the progress of society in Scrope’s remark was in fact one with 
which Malthus wholeheartedly agreed. Thus he stated: 
That an increase of population, when it follows in its natural order, is both 
a positive good in itself, and absolutely necessary to a further increase in 
the annual produce of the land and labour of any country, I should be the 
last to deny. (Malthus 1826b, p. 241) 
The “natural order” bit of this quote is of course in direct lineage of Smith: what 
“nature” (Smith) or “God” (Malthus) produced was good. What man contrived — 
whether to force capital into channels it would not have gone into “of its own 
accord” (Smith) or bring about more (or less!) population growth than would 
naturally occur, by the artificial stimulus of the poor laws, or the artificial restraint 
of birth control (Malthus) — was pernicious.  
Malthus was thus less worried about the effect of a growing population (as 
long as it had grown by “natural” means) in the long run (which he recognised 
would, much like in the four stages theory, contribute to society’s progress) and 
more with how to bring that growing population about — or rather how to allow it 
to naturally occur. Indeed, his view that population everywhere and always 
pressed immediately on the means of subsistence made the actual growth of 
population (other than its tendency to great growth) not an obvious and 
straightforward affair. He believed, indeed, much like Smith,128 that some nations 
did not attain higher stages precisely because their population had not increased: 
There is a principle in human society, by which population is perpetually 
kept down to the level of the means of subsistence. Thus among the 
wandering tribes of America and Asia, we never find through the lapse of 
ages that population has so increased as to render necessary the cultivation 
of the earth. (Malthus 1998 [1798], p. 56) 
It was not population growth alone, however, which would move society to 
higher stages of development, in Malthus’ view. Indeed:  
Had population and food increased in the same ratio, it is probable that 
man might never have emerged from the savage state. (ibid. p. 115) 
Instead, what was needed was precisely the fact that population produced 
privation, and this privation motivated people to work harder and become more 
                                                        
128 See n. 86 on p. 113 above. 
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productive. It was only by this means that society could both grow in population 
and move to higher stages of development: 
if we return to the principle of population and consider man as he really is, 
inert, sluggish, and averse from labour, unless compelled by necessity  . . .  
we may pronounce with certainty that the world would not have been 
peopled, but for the superiority of the power of population to the means of 
subsistence. Strong and constantly operative as this stimulus is on man to 
urge him to the cultivation of the earth, if we still see that cultivation 
proceeds very slowly, we may fairly conclude that a less stimulus would 
have been insufficient. Even under the operation of this constant 
excitement, savages will inhabit countries of the greatest natural fertility 
for a long period before they betake themselves to pasturage or agriculture.  
. . .  The principle, according to which population increases  . . .  keeps the 
inhabitants of the earth always fully up to the level of the means of 
subsistence; and is constantly acting upon man as a powerful stimulus, 
urging him to the further cultivation of the earth, and to enable it, 
consequently, to support a more extended population. (ibid. 114-5) 129 
In later editions, Malthus similarly stated: 
A history of the early migrations and settlements of mankind, with the 
motives which prompted them, would illustrate in a striking manner the 
constant tendency in the human race to increase beyond the means of 
subsistence. Without some general law of this nature, it would seem as if 
the world could never have been peopled. A state of sloth, and not of 
restlessness and activity, seems evidently to be the natural state of man; 
and this latter disposition could not have been generated but by the strong 
goad of necessity (Malthus 1826a, p. 92) 130 
The context in which Malthus defends the importance of the “goad of 
necessity” is the process by which “mind” arises from “matter”: 
                                                        
129 Note that Malthus’ contention that the inhabitants of the earth are always kept “fully up 
to the level of the means of subsistence” contrasts with Smith’s view according to which 
“The produce of the soil maintains at all times nearly that number of inhabitants which it is 
capable of maintaining” (see above p. 71). Smith’s view makes more room, indeed, for a 
natural and comfortable growth of population before any obstacle is encountered. 
130 Even the increase of population and the necessity it brought about was not, according 
to Malthus, a sufficient cause of the increase of wealth, as he stated in his Principles  
(Malthus 1836, p. 311). Yet, as clearly emanates from the previous quotes, the pressure of 
population was seen by Malthus as a necessary cause of society’s progress. (The passage in 
the Principles just referred to appears in Chapter I of Book II, entitled “On the Progress of 
Wealth”, in which Malthus notably exposes his theory of “universal glut”.) 
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The first great awakeners of the mind seem to be the wants of the body.  . . .  
They are the first stimulants that rouse the brain of infant man into 
sentient activity  . . .  The savage would slumber for ever under his tree 
unless he were roused from his torpor by the cravings of hunger or the 
pinchings of cold  . . .  if those stimulants to exertion which arise from the 
wants of the body were removed from the mass of mankind, we have much 
more reason to think that they would be sunk to the level of brutes, from a 
deficiency of excitements, than that they would be raised to the rank of 
philosophers by the possession of leisure. In those countries where nature 
is the most redundant in spontaneous produce the inhabitants will not be 
found the most remarkable for acuteness of intellect. Necessity has been 
with great truth called the mother of invention. Some of the noblest 
exertions of the human mind have been set in motion by the necessity of 
satisfying the wants of the body.  . . . Locke, if I recollect, says that the 
endeavour to avoid pain rather than the pursuit of pleasure is the great 
stimulus to action in life  . . .  it is by this exertion, by these stimulants, that 
mind is formed. (Malthus 1998 [1798], p. 112-3)  131 
Malthus’ explanation of the importance of necessity to rouse man to action 
very much resembles Kames’ explanation of the same examined in the previous 
section (see especially the quotes on p. 129-130 above). Both authors spell out 
Plato’s maxim that necessity is the mother of invention; and although Kames’ first 
speaks of custom as the force that needs to be overcome by “some vigorous 
impulse” and “some overpowering cause”, he next states, like Malthus, that 
“Hunger, the cause here assigned, is of all the most overpowering; and the same 
cause, overcoming indolence and idleness, has introduced manufactures, commerce, 
and variety of arts”. 
Malthus takes this idea, and derives from it a theory of mind (which he links 
to Locke’s). More importantly, it becomes for Malthus an argument to tackle the 
problem of evil, and vindicate the ways of God. Indeed, the growth of population, by 
the shortage it creates, induces hardship, but God allowing this evil to prevail is 
justified by the powers of the mind it stimulates and the higher stages mankind is 
thus moved to: 
                                                        
131 David Hume had written in ‘Of Commerce’ (first published 1752): “What is the reason, 
why no people, living between the tropics, could ever yet attain to any art or civility, or 
reach even any police in their government, and any military discipline; while few nations 
in the temperate climates have been altogether deprived of these advantages? It is 
probable that one cause of this phaenomenon is the warmth and equality of weather in the 
torrid zone, which render clothes and houses less requisite for the inhabitants, and 
thereby remove, in part, that necessity, which is the great spur to industry and invention.” 
(Hume 1987 [1777], p. 267) 
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As we shall all be disposed to agree that God is the creator of mind as well 
as of body, and as they both seem to be forming and unfolding themselves 
at the same time, it cannot appear inconsistent either with reason or 
revelation, if it appear to be consistent with phenomena of nature, to 
suppose that God is constantly occupied in forming mind out of matter and 
that the various impressions that man receives through life is the process 
for that purpose. The employment is surely worthy of the highest attributes 
of the Deity.  . . .  If Locke’s idea be just, and there is great reason to think 
that it is, evil seems to be necessary to create exertion, and exertion seems 
evidently necessary to create mind.  . . .  The necessity of food for the 
support of life gives rise, probably, to a greater quantity of exertion than 
any other want, bodily or mental.  . . .  To furnish the most unremitted 
excitements of this kind, and to urge man to further the gracious designs of 
Providence by the full cultivation of the earth, it has been ordained that 
population should increase much faster than food.  . . .  But it is impossible 
that this law can operate, and produce the effects apparently intended by 
the Supreme Being, without occasioning partial evil. (ibid. 112-5)  
Let alone his use of the “necessity is the mother of invention” argument as 
theodicy, it may be remarked that Malthus, by giving such prominence to the 
development of the mind as an intermediary step between hardship and 
(technological) development, was, despite his insistence on the passions in 
stimulating mind to exertion, closer to those theories who described the progress 
to civilisation as a constant development of reason (like the very two authors he 
primarily attacked in his first Essay, namely Godwin and Condorcet) than to those, 
like Smith, who saw the progress of society merely as a response of natural human 
propensities to changing material circumstances. In Smith’s theory, as we have 
seen, no development of the mind is necessary. Civilised man is different from 
savage man merely because of the difference in their circumstances, just as the 
philosopher is different from the porter by that virtue alone. Although Malthus also 
gave some importance to the difference of circumstance in the development of 
mind,132 his theory implies that civilised man has, as a result of differing 
circumstances over time, altered his mental faculties, and is by that virtue 
intellectually superior to the savage. By that intermediary step between 
circumstances and results which the formation of mind represents, then, Malthus’ 
                                                        
132 “It has been not infrequently remarked that talents are more common among younger 
brothers than among elder brothers, but it can scarcely be imagined that younger brothers 
are, upon an average, born with a greater original susceptibility of parts. The difference, if 
there really is any observable difference, can only arise from their different situations. 
Exertion and activity are in general absolutely necessary in one case and are only optional 
in the other.” (Malthus 1998 [1798], p. 116) 
150 
theory is a less universalist theory than Smith’s (in the sense of the term adopted in 
section 1). 
Malthus’ theory, too, was primarily an attack on the very idea of 
egalitarianism. It is this aspect of Condorcet’s and Godwin’s theories, the prospect 
of the elimination of the class society, which was the main target of his criticism. In 
this context as well, the “pressure of want” imported from the four stages theory 
played an essential role. Yet, in order for him to use it to that end, Malthus needed 
to adapt the idea to his specific purpose.  
Malthus’ reasoning is as follows: The principle of population is always acting 
specifically on the lower orders of society. The principle of population is a 
necessary ingredient in the progress of society, as considered above. Therefore, the 
progress of society itself relies on the existence of social classes. For that reason, 
the progress of society cannot entail the elimination of social classes.  
But in order to show that the principle of population is always acting 
specifically in this way — i.e. exerting itself exclusively on the lower classes of 
society — Malthus had to show that it was acting this way even in the first stage of 
society, that is among hunter-gatherers. For that he had to introduce into hunter-
gatherer society a lower social class; which he did, in the form of women, children 
and the aged: 
The North American Indians, considered as a people, cannot justly be called 
free and equal. In all the accounts we have of them, and, indeed, of most 
other savage nations, the women are represented as much more 
completely in a state of slavery to the men than the poor are to the rich in 
civilized countries. One half the nation appears to act as Helots to the other 
half, and the misery that checks population falls chiefly, as it always must 
do, upon that part whose condition is lowest in the scale of society.  . . .  In 
estimating the happiness of a savage nation, we must not fix our eyes only 
on the warrior in the prime of life: he is one of a hundred: he is the 
gentleman, the man of fortune  . . .  The true points of comparison between 
two nations seem to be the ranks in each which appear nearest to answer 
to each other. And in this view, I should compare the warriors in the prime 
of life with the gentlemen, and the women, children, and aged, with the 
lower classes of the community in civilized states. (Malthus 1998 [1798], p. 
21) 
Thus, according to Malthus, male middle-aged hunters may be compared to the 
nobility in civilised societies; and women, children and the elderly respectively to 
the poor. In the shepherd state, Malthus tells us: 
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Where there is any inequality of conditions, and among nations of 
shepherds this soon takes place, the distress arising from a scarcity of 
provisions must fall hardest upon the least fortunate members of the 
society. This distress also must frequently have been felt by the women, 
exposed to casual plunder in the absence of their husbands, and subject to 
continual disappointments in their expected return. (ibid., p. 15) 
Even here, by singling out women in such a way, Malthus was in fact 
following an important theme of four stages theory. John Millar, notably, made the 
treatment of women a defining mark of a nation’s degree of civilisation.133 Smith 
too had remarked that women were to their husbands as slaves in some situations. 
None of those, however, occurred in the savage state.134 In the savage state, indeed, 
there was no marriage at all (or no oath of fidelity at least), as there was no 
jealousy, according to Smith; even child-rearing is in this state of society (as among 
Plato’s guardians) viewed as a communal affair (LJ(B) 104, p. 439). “When 
manners became more refined,” Smith further told his students (ibid.): 
jealousy began and rose at length to such a height that wives were shut up, 
as they are among the Turks at this day. As mankind became more refined, 
the same fondness which made them shut up woemen made them allow 
them liberties. In the latter ages of Greece woemen were allowed to go any 
where. This same fondness carried to a high degree gives as great a licence 
as when infidelity was disregarded. In no barbarous country is there more 
licentiousness than in France. (LJ(B) 104, p. 439) 
In other words, while there is great inequality between women and man in some 
barbarous nations and in feudal countries, according to Smith, in the most 
                                                        
133 On Millar’s treatment of this subject specifically, see Bowles (1984) and Olson (1998). 
For the role of women in theories of progress of the Scottish Enlightenment more 
generally see Sebastiani (2013, p. 133-50). Meek (1976b, p. 161) thought that “In Millar's 
books and lectures, it is hardly too much to say, the new social science of the 
Enlightenment comes of age. For one thing, the range of topics with which it deals is 
appreciably increased: although Millar's main emphasis is still on the development of 
systems of law and government, he is also concerned to explain the changes which occur 
(for example) in the condition of women, in father-child and master-servant relationships, 
in manners and morals, and in literature, art, and science, as society develops.” Smith had 
considered all these subjects too of course, and was likely the main inspiration for Millar. 
Meek (ibid.) believed, however, that “No one before Millar had ever used a materialist 
conception of history — for, in his hands, that is what it in effect became — so ably and 
consistently to illuminate the development of such a wide range of social phenomena.” 
134 Smith noted that women are as slaves to their husband especially in polygamy (LJ(A) 
iii.51, p. 160; iii.54, p. 161; LJ(B) 118, p. 445), as well as “amongst the Romans  . . .  By the 
ancient marriages, which were performed either by confarreatio or coemptio” (LJ(A) i.155, 
p. 65-6). 
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primitive state, there is a great deal of equality between the sexes, which becomes 
to a degree reinstated in the most civilised countries.135  
Not only are women treated in the hunting stage with the most respect, but, 
according to Smith — and we find this identical in the accounts of the other 
conjectural historians —, hunter-gatherer society is in every respect a very 
egalitarian one: 
there can be very little government of any sort, but what there is will be of 
the democraticall kind.  . . .  The power of making peace and war in such 
nations belongs to the whole people.  . . .  There may indeed be some 
persons in this state who have a superior weight and influence with the 
rest of the members; but this does not derogate from the democraticall 
form, as such persons will only have this influence by their superior 
wisdom, valour, or such like qualifications, and over those only who incline 
of themselves to be directed by him. In the same manner as in every club or 
assembly where the whole members are on an equall footing there is 
generally some person whose counsil is more followed than any others 
(LJ(A) iv.4-7, p. 201-2) 
Thus, in such society, “each individuall had the same power as an other” 
(LJ(A) iv.19, p. 207). Malthus’ contention that women in the shepherd state were 
constantly left alone by their combating husbands also is in contradiction with the 
view of this state of society held by Smith, who wrote in the Wealth of Nations that: 
When such a nation goes to war, the warriors will not trust their herds and 
flocks to the feeble defence of their old men, their women and children; and 
their old men, their women and children, will not be left behind without 
defence and without subsistence. The whole nation, besides, being 
accustomed to a wandering life, even in time of peace, easily takes the field 
in time of war.  . . .  Among the Tartars, even the women have been 
frequently known to engage in battle. (WN V.i.a.3, p. 690-1) 
Hence Malthus, when introducing a lower class of people in hunter-gatherer 
society in order to prove the eternal validity of the population principle as he 
conceived it (i.e. as exerting itself always exclusively on the inferior ranks of 
people) in order to prove the impossibility of a classless society as conceived by 
                                                        
135 But to a degree only, as Smith tells us: “Tho' there was little or no regard paid to 
woemen in the first state of society as objects of pleasure, yet there never was more regard 
paid them as rational creatures. In North America, the woemen are consulted concerning 
the carrying on of war, and in every important undertaking. The respect paid to woemen 
in modern times is very small. They are only put to no trouble for spoiling of their beauty.” 
(LJ(B) 105, p. 439) 
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Godwin and Condorcet, was introducing into the four stages framework a 
contrivance that went entirely against the grain of the theory as hitherto laid out. 
When Smith wrote that “in civilised society it is only among the inferior ranks of 
people that the scantiness of subsistence can set limits to the further multiplication 
of the human species” (WN I.viii.39, p. 97-8), indeed, he had clearly stated that this 
was the case, in particular, “in civilised society”. And although the authors 
previously considered in this chapter (including Smith) did not envision a fifth 
stage of society where perfect equality reigned, as would Godwin and Condorcet, 
nothing within four stages theory as laid out before explicitly precluded the advent 
of such a state. Indeed, the very first state had been, according to this theory, one of 
perfect equality, and even Smith’s (and Millar’s) musings, according to which the 
condition of women, after gravely worsening in the stages of society following the 
very first, gradually improved thereafter, points into the direction of improving 
equality (in any case between the sexes, precisely the criterion singled out by 
Malthus) in civilised society. Thus Malthus’ population principle was contained 
fully-fledged (only without the arithmetical and geometrical ratios) in the four 
stages theory; but Malthus’ argument that since the ‘necessity is the mother of 
invention’-type population and development mechanism contained in the theory 
relies on particular stress being put on the lower classes, these must always have 
existed and must always continue to exist, was not. In fact this idea went against 
the theory in many respects, which is likely why Malthus felt the need to begin his 
account by contradicting the supposed equality among savage societies: he was 
arguing here against the familiar and established account of savage society to be 
found in the four stages theory. 136 
In the context of the four stages theory as before considered, moreover, 
Malthus’ idea that the principle of population was exerting its pressure always 
exclusively on the lower classes was putting the carriage before the horse. Indeed, 
for lower classes to be concerned by the want created by the principle of 
population more than the rest of society, there first need to be different social 
classes, which Malthus simply postulated to have always existed, by contriving 
some artifice to introduce them even in the savage state. Malthus then uses the 
population principle to explain why social classes could never disappear. The four 
stages theory, by contrast, first explained the very emergence of social classes, 
starting from a state where there were none. Malthus hence breaks with a central 
                                                        
136 In James Mill’s later version of the four stages theory, inspired by Smith and Millar but 
also deviating from them in important respects, there is squarely a superior class of people 
present from the very first state. See for an analysis Bianchini (2015). Mill may have been 
influenced by Malthus in this regard. 
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tenet of the four stages theory: that the different stages are different and contain 
different elements entirely one from the other, in terms of social institutions, rules 
of conduct and make-up of society in general.137 In any case in the exposition of the 
effects of his population principle, Malthus did not take this into account. In this 
sense, Marx’ criticism of Malthus — to the effect that Malthus applied the law of 
population as he conceived it, i.e. as specifically acting on the lower classes only, to 
all times and places, while in fact, according to Marx, this was a particular feature 
of the capitalist mode of production — is more in keeping with four stages theory 
than Malthus’ approach.138 With regard to the laws of population, then, the 
continuity Pascal (1938) and Meek (1954a) saw between the four stages theory 
and Marx’s historical materialism can be noted as well, notwithstanding the 
considerable imports Malthus (whom Marx so violently attacked) also made from 
this theoretical tradition. 
Having noted in which way Malthus deviated from the four stages theory, 
then, stress should again be put on how much he adhered to it when it comes to the 
general effect of population on society. Thus, while Malthus strongly argued against 
the “perfectibility” of society, he was often misread to mean that population was an 
obstacle to the “progress of society” in general. Yet he portrayed population as an 
obstacle to the prospect of a perfectly egalitarian society only, and used it as an 
explanation of why such a society could never be realised. But it was also precisely 
through population pushing on the means of subsistence and bringing about 
hardship — and this is the important aspect Malthus took over from the four stages 
theory — that there was any progress in society at all according to him. 
Much has been made of Malthus’ expression of his opposition to birth control 
with the sentence that “Mr Condorcet  . . .  proceeds to remove the difficulty in a 
manner which I profess not to understand” (Malthus 1998 [1798], p. 48). This 
misunderstanding surely must have been a rhetorical one, for Malthus ends the 
same paragraph by observing that “To remove the difficulty in this way will, surely, 
in the opinion of most men, be to destroy that virtue and purity of manners, which 
the advocates of equality, and of the perfectibility of man, profess to be the end and 
                                                        
137 Notably, in Smith’s theory, while sympathy and the ties of family-relationships and 
personal acquaintance suffice to direct affairs in savage society, self-interest comes to take 
on more and more importance as the principle by which economic life functions in society 
with increasing division of labour and population and the concurrent increasing 
anonymity that this necessarily brings about, as Smith explains in probably the most read 
and known part of his oeuvre (i.e. the first chapters of the Wealth of Nations). 
138 We shall consider Marx’ criticism of Malthus in more detail in the last chapter. Meek 
(1976b, p. 224) noted that John Weyland, cited above, also used the four stages theory 
specifically to argue, against Malthus, that in different stages of society different laws of 
population prevailed. 
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object of their views” (Malthus 1998 [1798]). This moral stance, however, still 
does not fully enlighten us to the motives of Malthus’ opposition to birth control. 
For the entirety of these, the last two chapters of the first edition of the Essay, from 
the first of which was amply quoted in this section, must be taken into account. As 
clearly emerges from these, Malthus’ real motive for being opposed to birth control 
was that to refuse the children God had sent on the way to be born was to 
contravene the deity’s great design, in which the pressure of population was a 
necessary ingredient in spurring humanity on to those higher stages of mind and of 
existence which God can only have intended to be the purpose of humanity. It is for 
this reason that Malthus opposed birth control. If the pressure of population on the 
means of subsistence, and thereby the hardship it causes (in the lower orders of 
society), was entirely removed, this would take away the necessary spur to 
industry. As Malthus put it very clearly in the Additions to the fourth and former 
editions of An Essay on the Principle of Population published in 1817:  
I should always particularly reprobate any artificial and unnatural modes 
of checking population, both on account of their immorality and their 
tendency to remove a necessary stimulus to industry. If it were possible for 
each married couple to limit by a wish the number of their children, there 
is certainly reason to fear that the indolence of the human race would be 
very greatly increased; and that neither the population of individual 
countries, nor of the whole earth, would ever reach its natural and proper 
extent. (Malthus 1817, p. 292) 
In this sense, there was a more radical break between Malthus and the neo-
Malthusians (who wanted to halt population growth completely) than between the 
four stages theory and Malthus. 
It may be remarked that Malthus’ mention of the possibility of preventive 
checks to population in the form of delay of marriage is in contradiction with the 
necessity of the pressure of population. This is a potent objection. The preventive 
check was given far greater prominence in subsequent editions of the Essay, in 
which the additional vocabulary of “moral restraint” and “prudential 
checks/habits/restraint” was introduced and much used in this connection. The 
infamous passage of the banquet, where people coming into the world when the 
means of subsistence were not available for them were depicted as unwelcome 
guests, which was introduced in the second edition but removed from later ones, 
also seems to be in contradiction with the idea of the necessity of the pressure of 
population for the progress of society. Indeed, the last two chapters of the first 
edition, in which Malthus made the “goading of want” theodicy, were omitted 
entirely from all subsequent editions. Several possible reasons for this omission 
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have been evoked.139 It may be — but the passage from 1817 just quoted seems to 
suggest the opposite — that Malthus came closer to believing, as time went by, that 
at least in civilised society, the pressure of population was no longer a much 
needed force for progress (while in the last two chapters of the first edition the 
stress of want was described as being constantly necessary to keep mind aroused), 
and delay of marriage may do society more good — a position later elaborated on 
by the neo-Malthusian John Stuart Mill, who wrote that “The density of population 
necessary to enable mankind to obtain, in the greatest degree, all the advantages 
both of co-operation and of social intercourse, has, in all the most populous 
countries, been attained” and exulted the advantages of a “stationary state” in 
which the “trampling, crushing, elbowing, and treading on each other's heels, 
which form the existing type of social life” could finally cease (Mill 1965 [1848], p. 
754-6). But while the theological chapters were removed from later editions, the 
“goad of necessity” was still mentioned and presented in much the same way as 
before.140 Himmelfarb (1984, p. 114) observes that the prudential checks may 
have been suggested to Malthus by Godwin, who criticised him after the 
publication of his first Essay for having neglected that restraint from childbearing 
could prevent the misery-inducing effects of the principle of population. Malthus, 
significantly, replied that this would remove a necessary spur to industry and thus 
reduce the means of subsistence (ibid.). Probably, Malthus’ seeming contradiction 
as to the necessity of population growth and its misery-inducing effect on the one 
hand but the possibility to reduce misery by moral restraint on the other can only 
be properly understood by bearing in mind the importance of balance and middle-
positions in his thought.141 
Why was Malthus misread to have believed that population was an obstacle 
to the progress of society in the absolute? It may be because of a shift in meaning of 
the concept of progress, at around the time he wrote. As both increasing equality 
and increasing wealth came to be seen, at the end of the 18th century, more so than 
when Smith wrote, as marks of the progress of society (notably through the credo 
of “égalité” during the French revolution142), Malthus’ attack on the “perfectibility 
                                                        
139 See the references in n. 119 on p. 136 above, as well as Rashid (1984). 
140 See n. 126 on p. 140 above for mentions of the concept in the first and sixth edition. 
141 On the importance of the idea of balance in Malthus’ thought see notably Winch (1992b, 
1993).  
142 The famous hendiatris which now forms the national motto of France, although first 
uttered in an official context by Robespierre in a speech of 1790, only acquired the 
prominence it has today much later. The association of “égalité” with “liberté” (i.e. without 
the “fraternité”), however, was already common during the period running up and 
immediately following the French revolution, and the concept of “égalité” can well be 
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of society” came to be charged with a great weight of ambiguity and confusion 
(especially for later readers). Malthus’ ambiguity as to this positive role of 
population notably lead Senior, in correspondence (published as appendix to 
Senior (1829)), to politely confront Malthus with his own thoughts about 
population, thinking first that they were more in agreement than could appear 
from the formulations they both used (p. 55-9), discovering from Malthus’ 
response that their disagreement was in fact more substantial (p. 60-72), before 
settling on the position that they were essentially in agreement  (p. 87). 
For Malthus did believe in progress. But this progress, for him, did not — 
indeed, within the terms of his theory could not — include the realisation of a 
perfectly egalitarian society. It is crucial, in order to understand this distinction, to 
realise that when Malthus, in the preface to the first edition of the Essay, described 
the means by which “population must always be kept down to the level of the 
means of subsistence” as “to his143 mind, the strongest obstacle in the way to any 
very great future improvement of society”, it is not the “improvement” that Adam 
Smith wrote of that he had in mind, but the one envisioned by Condorcet and 
Godwin. Thus, in Smith’s work, the “improvement of society” described such things 
as increase in the general level of wealth, higher agricultural yields, urbanisation, 
etc., all subsumed under the general movement of society, examined in the present 
chapter, from the state of savagery and barbarism to the ones of agriculture and 
civilisation. The “improvement of society” which Malthus described in his preface 
was designating, by contrast, the view of Godwin and Condorcet of the possibility 
of a total elimination of inequality in society; the realisation of a society, not only 
classless, but infinitely wealthy and healthy, to the degree of the future near-
immortality of human beings (in Godwin’s work). It was this “improvement of 
society” that Malthus viewed as implausible, and to which the principle of 
population was described by him as the greatest obstacle. This distinction is made 
quite clearly in a famous passage of the sixth edition of the Essay, when Malthus 
affirms that: 
On the whole, therefore, though our future prospects respecting the 
mitigation of the evils arising from the principle of population, may not be 
so bright as we could wish, yet they are far from being entirely 
disheartening, and by no means preclude that gradual and progressive 
improvement in human society, which, before the late wild speculations on 
                                                                                                                                                                  
taken as representative of the claims of the revolutionaries in France and their influence 
on British debate at the time. On the history of the tripartite motto see Borgetto (1997). 
143 Malthus was here referring to himself (as “the author”) in the third person. 
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the subject, was the object of rational expectation.  (Malthus 1826b, p. 440-
1) 
Moreover — and this is the crucial part — this very principle of population, 
while being an obstacle to the  kind of “improvement” described by Godwin and 
Condorcet, not only did not preclude the kind of “improvement” Smith had 
envisioned, but was viewed by Malthus, in line with the four stages theory, as the 
very engine of this type of improvement. Indeed, it was the very fact that the 
principle of population was necessary for Smithian-type improvement that, 
according to Malthus, made it an obstacle to improvement of the Godwinian type. 
Bearing in mind that according to him the principle of population acted always 
specifically on the lower orders, it is essentially this that Malthus was expressing 
when he wrote, in the same passage from which was just quoted: 
A strict inquiry into the principle of population obliges us to conclude that 
we shall never be able to throw down the ladder, by which we have risen to 
this eminence; but it by no means proves, that we may not rise higher by the 
same means.  
Quite to the contrary of the principle of population being an impediment to 
progress, Malthus thus saw the population principle itself, and the misery it 
brought about, as an engine of progress. In this, then, he did nothing more and 
nothing less than following the orthodoxy of the four stages theory. He deviated 
from this theory merely in two particular, and related, aspects: First, Malthus 
deviated from four stages theory in the use he made of the theory, taking one of its 
components (the pressure of population on the means of subsistence) to argue 
against the possibility to completely remove social classes in the future progress of 
society, which Condorcet and Godwin had speculated about. Earlier writers, as we 
have seen, had used the four stages theory principally to explain the development 
of laws and government. As has often been remarked, Malthus’ use of the 
population principle in this way was not an innovation, for the same argument (i.e. 
the impossibility of a perfectly egalitarian society due to the pressure of population 
on subsistence) had been invoked by Robert Wallace already four decades prior 
(see Luehrs 1987, p. 329-35). Even Condorcet and Godwin, against whom Malthus 
argued, had evoked it, but had dismissed it on the ground that in an egalitarian 
society, men would also, if need be, be able to regulate population growth, notably 
by birth control (which Marx and Engels would reiterate to be the case in 
communism). Second, and more fundamentally, Malthus deviated from the four 
stages theory in seeing social classes (in some form or other) as a timeless feature 
of society, while in four stages theory, a class society was the outcome, and not the 
starting point, of the development that the theory described. In line with four 
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stages theory, the population principle could not, then, have always exerted its 
pressure exclusively on the inferior classes of society as Malthus held. 
 
8. Conclusion 
This chapter was concerned with the four stages theory of socio-cultural evolution: 
its origin and nature, its presence in Adam Smith’s work, and its relation with 
population theories in the 18th century, notably Malthus’. Five major points were 
formulated in the six preceding sections. It was argued, in sections 2 and 3 above, 
respectively, that the four stages theory is both a very ancient one and constitutes 
a universalist theory of human progress and human differences; and that this 
theory, and the four ideal-type categories it uses (savage/hunting, 
barbarian/shepherd, feudal/agricultural and civilised/commercial) are ubiquitous 
in Adam Smith’s work, and play a central role therein, including in the Wealth of 
Nations. Possible reasons for the neglect of this dimension of Smith’s work in 
intellectual histories of the past two centuries were examined in Section 4, 
including the link between the Adam Smith Problem, German nationalism and the 
universalist nature of the four stages theory. The remaining sections were 
concerned with the role of population in the four stages theory and the role of the 
four stages theory for 18th century population theory, including the one formulated 
at the close of the century by Robert Malthus. Sections 5 and 6 analysed the precise 
sequence of steps by which population growth induces technological and societal 
progress in the four stages theory, in Adam Smith’s work, and in the work of a 
number of his predecessors and contemporaries who used the same theory with 
remarkably little variation. Section 7, finally, examined the influence of the four 
stages theory on Malthus’ population theory, considering both the import and the 
deviation Malthus made from this theory. We shall at present briefly reconsider 
some of these points, and further attempt to situate the population theory to be 
found in the four stages theory in its wider theoretical context, in Smith’s work and 
beyond, which will offer a bridge to the following chapter. 
The essential shape and logic of the four stages theory can be found already 
in Plato: both the idea that population growth induces a shortage, and that this 
very shortage is — because necessity is the mother of invention — the origin of 
technological progress are present in Plato’s work. Through a number of classical 
and modern writers of various origins this theory was transported into the 18th 
century. The connections between these authors are manifold, and it is difficult to 
know who — in the same period — exactly influenced whom. The theory that 
these writers have in common is characterised by the fact that it explains human 
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differences by the stage of societal development alone, itself explained by external 
circumstances (mostly geographic), rather than by the intrinsic characteristics of 
the culture, language, religion or ‘genetic make-up’ of human groups. (Rather, 
these latter elements were explained themselves by the material historical 
circumstances of the society in question.) In this sense, the theory relies on, and 
itself constitutes, a universalist representation of humanity and human societies. 
In an effort to link the four stages theory to Marx’ historical materialism, 
Pascal (1938) and Meek (1954a) have insisted on the materialist nature of the four 
stages theory. As such, the theory could be read primarily as an ‘economic’ one, in 
the sense that economics is the branch of the human sciences most centrally 
concerned with the material conditions of individuals and societies. But let alone 
the anachronism of this perspective — insofar as economics did not exist as an 
independent branch of philosophy or speculation in the 17th and 18th centuries —, 
the theory was not used primarily, at the time, to describe ‘economic’ phenomena  . 
Rather, it became associated, in the 17th century, with the natural law tradition and 
the effort by such writers as Grotius, Hobbes, Locke and Pufendorf to explain (or 
justify) the existence of property, government, social classes and inequality in 
modern societies, with the starting point being the Aristotelian (and Christian) 
view of the earth having been inherited equally by all its inhabitants (which makes 
the existence of property and inequality something to be justified). Tying Smith to 
this tradition (as Hont and Ignatieff (1983) have notably done), rather than to early 
19th century political economy (i.e. classical economics, an intellectual movement 
Smith did not live to see, but in the category of which he is more frequently 
included) considerably mitigates his purported role as founder of an ‘independent’ 
discipline of economics, and the supposed “epistemic break” that the Wealth of 
Nations constitutes in 18th century social science, as argued by Foucault (1966).144 
Use of the categories of the four stages theory is ubiquitous in Smith’s work, 
whether in the language of the savage-civilised spectrum (savages, barbarians and 
civilised people) or the corresponding subsistence-technology vocabulary of 
hunters, shepherds and commercial society, with the third stage (the age of 
agriculture) being defined either in socio-political terms (villains, serfs, barons) or 
again in subsistence-technology ones (peasants, husbandmen), and the last stage 
being further associated with cities and urban life. As a professor of moral 
philosophy and jurisprudence, Smith was naturally concerned with the major 
debates of 17th and 18th century social science, which itself was heavily influenced 
by classical Greek and Roman thought: natural law theorising seeking to explain 
                                                        
144 See on this also Winch (1983,1997) 
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the existence of the state and legal, social and administrative institutions of 
modern society as compared to the “state of nature” on the one hand, and the 
debate over the superiority of the moderns over the ancients, and more generally 
of civilisation over savagery, on the other, with obvious links between these two 
strands of thought. Yet, in the course of the 19th and 20th century, Smith’s work 
came to be, through the reading of economists, increasingly disconnected from 
these concerns, Smith himself having come to be regarded as a founding father of 
19th century economics, itself increasingly conceived as being concerned primarily 
with such matters as value, prices and monetary and financial affairs, with the 
comparison of modern to ancient or savage societies moving increasingly to the 
background or being absorbed by the new fields of sociology and anthropology. 
What Smith did write about money, value, prices and finance thus came 
increasingly to be read independently from the 18th century debates mentioned 
above, which these things were clearly intended by Smith to contribute to (as a 
comparative reading of his work with a multitude of other contemporary works — 
most of which are not considered today to be ‘economic’ in nature — cannot fail to 
reveal). 
Two major intellectual movements were identified as being instrumental in 
this severance of Smith’s ‘economics’ from his moral philosophy and 
jurisprudence. The first is the 19th century criticism of Smith’s work by German-
speaking scholars, who saw in him both a “cosmopolitan” thinker, and a 
representative of British interests, both of which was seen as being a challenge to 
the efforts of German intellectuals of the period to conceptualise and bring about 
the German nation-state. Whether or not the attack on Smith as a cosmopolitan 
thinker was justified, the connected charge of him paying insufficient attention to 
particular local conditions was clearly misguided (the four stages theory is 
precisely built on the differing circumstances of different societies), but remained 
influential well into the 20th century and indeed to this day. In the 20th century, 
furthermore, economists came to take pride in the independence of the field from 
other social sciences (seeking to orient the discipline along the lines of the ‘hard’ 
physical sciences instead). The ‘dichotomy-view’ of Smith’s work, seeing his moral 
philosophy (and along with it the entirety of his earlier work) as disconnected 
from his ‘economic’ work that the Wealth of Nations purportedly represented, thus 
got revived and/or kept alive. Smith’s moral philosophy and jurisprudence was 
seen, by now, by economists as of little interest to their work, at best as interesting 
but non-substantial quirk. It is only in recent decades, and especially since the 
bicentenary edition of the Wealth of Nations together with the entirety of Smith’s 
work and correspondence, that a more interdisciplinary interest in his work, 
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especially from intellectual historians and other social scientists, has revealed 
anew the central position of the jurisprudential tradition in Smith’s work as a 
whole.   
The four stages theory, in Smith’s work as in the one of the other authors 
considered in this chapter, has multiple dimensions. One dimension is primarily 
concerned with legal and political matters, consisting in an explanation of laws and 
public institutions: universal democracy and loose laws among hunters, strict 
hierarchy and severe punishment for theft among shepherds, continuing 
hierarchisation of property and political power in agricultural society, and a 
further complexification of laws and institutions, but coupled with a possible 
return to more democratic political forms, in commercial society. Another 
dimension of the four stages theory is more ‘economic’ in nature, namely the 
explanation of the mode of subsistence: savages hunt, barbarians are pastors, 
feudal society is generally associated with agriculture, and in commercial society, 
while agriculture remains the dominant mode of subsistence, an increasing 
number of people become invested in non-food-procuring activities through the 
division of labour, notably between towns and rural areas, while agriculture, in 
conjunction, becomes more and more productive as the soil is “improved”. There is 
another much less known and studied dimension of the four stages theory, which 
was the focus of this chapter: the population theory contained therein. According 
to this theory, hunting communities are very limited in numbers (Smith speaks of 
circa hundred-fifty individuals), as hunters need a large territory to procure 
enough food by this method even for a small number. Shepherds can sustain larger 
numbers, especially when they migrate with their livestock, allowing it to 
periodically graze on new land. Together with these larger numbers also comes 
military might, especially as in this stage of society there is very little division of 
labour, and hence everyone (including women) is a warrior, as much as a 
shepherd. This permits barbarian societies further to absorb other nations in their 
wars of competition that arise from the limited availability of grazing lands. 
Eventually, however, this state must give way, if the territory and climate permits 
it (and otherwise further development will cease) to an agricultural mode of 
subsistence, implying sedentarisation. Agriculture, by the much larger food surplus 
it produces, permits population to increase much further, and this is amplified by 
the building of towns, division of labour and trade (first regional then 
international), progressively ushering in commercial society. 
The decisive element moving human society through the successive stages, 
with legal and political systems, new socio-economic arrangements, and a larger 
population attached to each, is the growth of population itself. With a given state of 
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subsistence technology, the growth of population induces shortages, and thus 
forces societies to adopt more productive means of food procurement as well as 
new legal arrangement (the shepherd state introducing property and inequality) 
and therefore particular forms of government and judicial systems. While there 
has been some debate about whom, among Malthus and his contemporaries, 
‘invented’ what later became known as the “law of diminishing returns”, it has to 
my knowledge never been remarked that, in the form of the idea of shortages being 
created by the growth of population, the four stages theory in fact contains a clear 
anticipation of this ‘law’ — which constitutes another significant import Malthus 
made from the theory (if we choose to side with those who connect the law to his 
name). Thus, in the four stages theory, with increasing population, the same 
subsistence technology — whether hunting, pasturage or agriculture — yields ever 
decreasing returns per person, and hence needs eventually to be replaced by a 
superior technology. Or, said differently, on a given amount of land, food 
‘production’ yields decreasing returns with increasing population. The surface of 
land is not entirely fixed, as hunters and especially shepherds may still periodically 
migrate, and the term “food production” squarely applies only in later stages, as 
food is initially not produced but directly consumed in its natural state, but the 
essential idea that the law of diminishing returns was still principally connected 
with in the 19th century, namely that the food to be obtained from land increases 
less than proportionally with population, is quite clearly contained in the four 
stages theory.145 
 In a way, Malthus, with his idea that population growth always presses on the 
means of subsistence and induces shortages directly and immediately, is more 
removed from the law of diminishing returns than the original four stages theory, 
in which this shortage only gradually comes about, and intensifies at the brink of 
each stage. Thus hunters, in Adam Smith’s work, although often described as 
‘miserable’ compared with the inhabitants of civilised society, are not suffering 
from hunger at every instance. Within the limits of the hunting stage, although they 
have to invest most of their labour in hunting, and this activity yields little surplus 
                                                        
145 Reid (1989) offers an interesting conceptualisation of Smith’s stadial theory in terms of 
“Societal Growth Trajectories”, which culminate in stationary states when the institutional 
arrangement of particular stages are no longer adequate for a changed economic reality, 
and thus need to be replaced, opening a new growth cycle. (Although not noted by Reid, 
there is here too, then, a clear parallel between the four stages theory and Marx’ Historical 
Materialism with its inherent contradictions of capitalism — or any other stage — being 
exacerbated and ushering in new institutional arrangements.) Reid does not connect this 
theme to population and diminishing returns, but these are implicit in the concept of 
“stationary state” when this concept is read in the context of its theoretical emergence 
discussed in the General Introduction (p. 36 above).     
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(both of which, as well as the too small population, makes an intensive division of 
labour impossible at this stage), hunters can live relatively comfortably from this 
activity as long as they remain a small group.  
It has often been noted that Smith was a direct influence on Malthus’ and 
Ricardo’s (and later Marshall’s) ideas of diminishing returns in agriculture and 
increasing returns in manufactures by his singling out of the former as being much 
less amenable to division of labour (and thus increasing returns) than the latter. 
Revealing the presence of the idea of diminishing returns in the four stages theory, 
and the influence of this theory on Malthus, not only offers a more direct line of 
influence on Malthus’ adoption of this idea, but also throws additional light on 
Smith’s insistence on a more limited applicability of division of labour for the 
obtainment of food from land. Indeed, would food procurement be directly and 
immediately subject to the same increasing returns that can be obtained from 
employing additional people in manufactures, the explanatory mechanism of the 
four stages theory, which relies on shortage and necessity being created, so that 
people can be pushed by this necessity to be more productive, would no longer 
hold.  
It has to be remarked, then, after having noted the presence of the idea of 
diminishing returns in the four stages theory, that these diminishing returns are 
themselves only the means by which increasing returns can be secured in the long 
run. Thus, after having been pushed to its limits by diminishing returns, a 
technology of food procurement is replaced by a superior one, which yields higher 
returns. In this way, it is because of these diminishing returns that increasing 
returns finally set in. It is because there are diminishing returns in the short run 
that there are increasing ones in the long run (to put the proposition in Marshallian 
terms). It is the shortage brought about by population growth that steers society to 
develop a new subsistence technology, more productive than the former. Hence 
there will be higher yields per person than before, once the new technology has 
been adopted, although this new technology may itself be subject to diminishing 
returns in the long run. In this way, the four stages comes closer, in fact, in its view 
of food-procurement technology, to the view of technology as production process 
or ‘factor mix’, subject to diminishing returns, prevalent in neoclassical micro-
economics, than to the ‘classical’ idea of diminishing returns from land — although 
the two are certainly linked theoretically and genealogically. 
What is of crucial importance furthermore — and this brings us to the subject 
of the next chapter — is that the new technology of subsistence, which 
characterises the new age of society, could not have been adopted before. Indeed, 
not only is necessity the mother of invention through the constraint it occasions, it 
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is also the mother of invention through the opportunity it offers. Thus, as long as 
people can live comfortably by hunting, the important investment in time and 
energy necessary to pass from the less (but at this point still sufficiently) efficient 
hunting habits to the more (but at this point excessively) efficient shepherding 
habits remains itself inefficient. What Smith expressed with the idea that “the 
division of labour is limited by the extent of the market”, which we shall examine in 
the following chapter, is that the efficiency gains the division of labour permits 
remain uneconomical as long as there is not sufficient need for them. As Allyn 
Young (1928, p. 530) put it in his justly famous exploration of the meaning and 
importance of this idea, “It would be wasteful to make a hammer to drive a single 
nail; it would be better to use whatever awkward implement lies conveniently at 
hand”. 
This crucial feature of Smith’s view of economic organisation and economic 
progress — put emphatically in the short third chapter of the Wealth of Nations, 
and used as frame of reference throughout the work — is already expressed in the 
four stages theory: there will not be adoption of superior technology as long as 
there is no need for it. People are using technology in accordance with the task at 
hand. When the problem to be solved changes in proportion (more mouths to feed) 
solutions will tend to change in nature (use of a superior technique of food 
procurement). The need for this becomes pressing when population increases, as 
the current technology of food procurement outruns the natural reproduction of 
resources that this technology relies on: wild animals for hunters, which are 
decimated by too intensive hunting, grasslands for shepherds that becomes too 
scarce with intensive pasturage, and the “productive power of the soil” once 
agriculture has become the main mode of subsistence, which cannot keep pace 
with increasing population, as was more emphatically stated by Malthus. 
There are thus two dimensions to the process of population and development 
outlined in the four stages theory, which in fact are the two faces of the same coin: 
the growth of population creates the necessity to adopt a superior technology of 
subsistence, but at the same time offers the possibility of doing so. Because the 
division of labour is limited by the extent of the market, this superior technology 
could not have been introduced at an earlier stage. The need is created by a larger 
population. But it is only through the larger population in turn that the opportunity 
for it is also created. One may observe the semantic affinity between the concepts 
of “need” and of the “demand” that expresses itself, and can be met, on a market 
(more on the link between “demand” and “the market” in the next chapter).. 
This feature of the role of population in the four stages theory, that it is at 
once responsible for hardship and, through this initial hardship it brings about, 
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eventually makes for a higher level of development and thus opulence, is mirrored 
in Smith’s theory of population formulated in the Wealth of Nations, even though it 
is expressed there in different terms. Although Robert Heilbronner, I believe, read 
Smith’s population theory wrongly, through the prism of Ricardo’s and not Smith’s 
own wage theory, he pointedly observed (speaking of the Wealth of Nations) that 
“There is something fascinating in this automatic process of aggravation and cure, 
stimulus and response, in which the very factor that seems to be leading the 
system to its doom is also slyly bringing about the conditions necessary for its 
further health” (Heilbroner 1999, p. 66).146 
A last point may be made at the close of this long chapter, directly related to 
the subject we shall next consider. Craig Smith (2006b) has put the principal focus, 
in his study of the four stages theory, on the role of knowledge in the succession of 
stages of society. This runs the risk, in my opinion, of giving undue weight to a 
feature of the theory that is in fact a mere by-product of the dynamic described 
therein. It is because the fundamental nature of the theory is a materialist, rather 
than an idealistic one, that it has been described (by Pascal and Meek) as a 
precursor to Marx’ historical materialism. Even though it is difficult to maintain 
that the theory, with its many dimensions, is purely a materialist one, as Shearmur 
(2007) has more recently argued,  this materialist dimension cannot be denied, 
and representing the role of ideas therein as the driving force is clearly a 
misrepresentation. 147   
                                                        
146 Heilbronner sees the stimulus and response he describes here in the growth of 
population first reducing wages — and in this way, according to him, population growth 
brings about its own halt — but this very reduction in wages then allows capitalists to 
invest more, as reduced wages raise profits, and hence wages rise again and population 
can grow once more. But in Smith’s theory, wages and profits do not directly compete with 
one another, as they do in Ricardo’s. (In both Smith’s and Ricardo’s theories, profits tend 
to fall when wages rise, but for Smith it is not the rise in wages itself which occasions the 
fall in profits, but rather both have the same cause, namely the accumulation of capital.) 
Thus, while the precise sequence described by Heilbroner, to which the remark quoted 
pertains, may not be an adequate representation of Smith, the remark itself perfectly 
describes the stimulus-and-response-mechanism contained in Smith’s population theory 
as a whole as it shall emerge from the analysis in the present and the next chapter: 
population growth may have a tendency to reduce wages by raising the supply of labour, 
but since at the same time the growth of population enlarges the market, it also allows for 
more division of labour and hence a rise in productivity and thus profits and capital 
accumulation, which will eventually lead to a rise in wages permitting a new cycle of 
growth. 
147 Craig Smith (2006a, p. 49-50) holds  that “population growth itself cannot be the reason 
behind a change in the stage of the mode of subsistence. It certainly may act as a prompt to 
that change, but the means depend on the acquisition of the knowledge requisite to pursue 
the new mode.” I cannot see any substantial difference in meaning between “the reason 
behind a change” and “a prompt to that change”. There may be a distinction to be made 
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One aspect of this materialist dimension of the four stages theory is that what 
conditions the progress of society, especially in the early stages (questions of 
policy, to a larger degree volitional, take on more importance in later stages, 
especially in Smith’s use of the theory) are material conditions, principally the 
geographical characteristics of the territory a people inhabit: its position in 
relation to navigable rivers and coastlines, the fertility of its soil, the clemency or 
harshness of its climate. These will allow a people to either obtain enough surplus 
of food from the environment for population to increase or conversely be 
condemned to stagnate in the early stages, as well as to entertain (or not) trade 
relationships with other people, which can help to overcome the limits of the 
immediate environment and thus act as motor to the progress of society. In line 
with what was advanced above concerning the two faces of the population-creates-
necessity element, as being both a push and a pull factor, both a constraint and an 
opportunity, it has to be recognised that knowledge, as much as technology, can 
only be used in accordance with the task at hand, and the knowledge of how to 
build castles, ships and manufactures will be of no use in a society of hunters. 
Population pressing on the means of subsistence is itself a material factor, not an 
ideational one. Together with more mouths to feed, an increased population also 
represents more arms and legs to work, and more brains to invent, which can serve 
for the division of labour. Increased population also represents a larger market, 
allowing for this division of labour to be usefully deployed. It is with these crucial 
elements of Smith’s thought — the relation of population to the extent of the 
market defining the scope for the division of labour and thus economic progress — 
to which Malthus (and Ricardo) paid insufficient attention, that we shall at present 
be concerned. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                  
between a necessary and a sufficient cause, but that is another matter. Also, “the 
acquisition of the knowledge requisite to pursue the new mode” which Craig Smith 
stresses is not given great stress by Adam Smith himself. As was customary in four stages 
theory (see notably Kames’ description cited above p. 125), development of the knowledge 
of pasturage and agriculture are described by Smith in his lectures as casual chance 
discoveries (LJ(A) i.28-31, p. 14-5; (LJ(B)150, p. 459); and the development of division of 
labour and exchange that underlie the emergence of commercial society are for Smith, as 
is well known, “not originally the effect of any human wisdom” but “the necessary, though 
very slow and gradual consequence of a certain propensity in human nature  . . .  to truck, 
barter, and exchange one thing for another” (WN I.ii.1, p. 25).  
168 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We have laboriously to rediscover and force through the obscuring 
envelopes of our misguided education what should never have ceased to be 
obvious. (Keynes 1963 [1951], p. 120-1) 
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Chapter 2 
 
Population and the Market 
 
1. Introduction 
The proportion between a nation’s “produce, or what is purchased with it” and 
“the number of those who are to consume it”, meaning the degree to which a 
nation “will be better or worse supplied with all the necessaries and conveniences 
for which it has occasion”, depends chiefly on “the skill, dexterity, and judgment 
with which its labour is generally applied”. This Smith tells us in the first four 
paragraphs of the Wealth of Nations, in the ‘Introduction and Plan of the Work’ 
(WN 1-4, p. 10). And he adds a few paragraphs later, at the beginning of the first 
chapter, that “the greater part of the skill, dexterity, and judgment with which it [a 
nation’s labour] is any where directed, or applied, seem to have been the effects of 
the division of labour” (WN I.i.1, p. 13). A nation’s per capita wealth thus depends 
principally, according to Smith, on its degree of division of labour. Yet “the Division 
of Labour is limited by the Extent of the Market”, title and subject of Chapter III of 
Book I. Capital accumulation too is vital for the wealth of a nation, as Smith 
develops in Book II, but capital accumulation itself is also limited by the extent of 
the market as noted by him earlier.1 For Smith, the wealth of nations was thus 
largely conditioned by the size of their market. The concept of the market, indeed, 
may well be the single most important concept of the Wealth of Nations.2 But what 
does Smith exactly mean by “the market”, and what then defines its extent? 
Modern-day economics is a poor guide to address the question of the 
meaning of “the market” for Smith. Surely, it seems safe to assume that the 
concept’s meaning has changed since Smith’s time; and economists today are not 
concerned primarily with ‘what Adam Smith meant’. But the greater obstacle yet to 
                                                        
1 “the narrowness of the market may not admit the employment of a larger capital in the 
business” (WN I.x.b.36, p. 129). “The extent of the market, by giving employment to 
greater stocks” (WN I.x.b.37-8, p. 130). See also WN I.x.c.44, p. 152. The relationship 
between capital accumulation and division of labour will be more thoroughly examined in 
the next chapter. 
2 The word “market” appears more than six hundred times in the Wealth of Nations. It 
appears eighty-five times in Lectures of Jurisprudence, and only a single time in the whole 
Theory of Moral Sentiments. 
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using modern economics to interpret Smith’s use of the concept is a more general 
deficiency of definition of “the market” in present-day economics. As Geoffrey 
Hodgson (2008) remarks in his entry ‘markets’ in the second edition of the New 
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, citing three Nobel laureates in economics for 
support, the concept of the market, while central to most economists’ concerns to 
this day, is itself insufficiently studied and largely left undefined by the discipline 
at present. Most standard economics textbooks lack a definition of the market (see 
also Hodgson 2008 ; Satz 2015, p. 538). And “neither the massive 1968 edition of 
the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences nor the otherwise comprehensive 1987 
edition of The New Palgrave” comprise an entry on markets (Hodgson 2008). As 
Barrett (2008) notes in the New Palgrave’s entry on ‘spatial market integration’: 
“Although contemporary economics rests fundamentally upon the concept of 
markets, the discipline struggles with the important and practical challenges of 
clearly defining a market”. It may be no coincidence that the latter observation is 
made specifically in an entry on the connection between markets and space. After 
tracing the evolution of the definition of the market in French economics 
dictionaries from the late 19th to the late 20th century, Diemer (2003, p. 5), for 
example, concludes first that spatial considerations were progressively left out of 
the definition of the market; and further that economists have progressively 
abandoned the definition of the market altogether to concentrate on its 
functioning.3  
As Douglas North remarked in his Nobel address: “Neoclassical theory  . . .  is 
concerned with the operation of markets, not with how markets develop”. For that 
reason, he thought, it “is simply an inappropriate tool to analyze and prescribe 
policies that will induce development. How can one prescribe policies when one 
doesn’t understand how economies develop?” (1994, p. 359).4 ‘Neoclassical 
                                                        
3 Hodgson’s and Barrett’s are the only entries in the New Palgrave drawing attention to 
this definitional problem. Remarkably, besides Hodgson’s, not a single one of the seventy-
nine different entries in total in the 1987 and 2008 (and later online-only) editions of the 
New Palgrave whose titles contain the word “market” offers a definition of the concept. 
(Only Scherer (1987, p. 6287), White and Eccles (1987, p. 8015) and Barrett (2008) 
include a succinct observation on what markets do; and Pelkmans’ (2011) entry on 
“European Union Single Market: design and development” offers some observation about 
“What precisely is a Single Market”.) 
4 Kaldor (1972, p. 1240) saw the quintessential problem with modern (“equilibrium”) 
economics in the habit of “focusing attention on the allocative functions of markets to the 
exclusion of their creative functions” (italics in original); but he unfairly blamed Smith for 
this, referring to Smith’s theory of “natural” and “market” prices. It is not very clear where 
Kaldor saw in this theory one of “allocative functions”, but in any case Smith used the 
concept of the “extent of the market” throughout his work, at least as frequently as the one 
of “market price”, and there cannot be the slightest doubt that Smith was far more 
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economics’ is for the same reason an inappropriate lens through which to read 
Smith’s theory of development, insofar as for Smith the development of society 
depended so critically on the development of the market.5 Yet, the incurious 
attitude of 20th century economists about the definition of the central concept of 
their discipline seems to have translated also to Smith scholarship. In the Essays on 
Adam Smith, published as part of the Glasgow edition on the occasion of the two-
hundredth anniversary of the Wealth of Nations (Skinner & Wilson 1975), there is, 
for example, no chapter dealing squarely with the market. And even the follow-up 
volume carrying the word “market” in its very title (Wilson & Skinner 1976), while 
it contains chapters on “The Market and the State”, “The Product Markets” and 
“The Labour Market”, does not at any place investigate the meaning of the concept 
of the market itself for Smith, a concept yet so central to the Wealth of Nations.6  
One finds the term “market” in the titles of many papers about Smith of the last 
quarter-century (Nielsen 1986 ; Johnson 1990 ; Rashid 1992 ; Goldsmith 1995 ; 
Elliott 2000 ; Kalyvas & Katznelson 2001 ; Young 2001 ; Vincent-Lancrin 2003 ; 
Kurz 2016). The question of the definition of this concept is, however, never 
explicitly addressed. Implicitly, the meaning of “the market” that is retained in all 
these contributions is the one of an institution, a set of rules, an organisational 
mode of society, often opposed to the institution of the state. But this is only one 
                                                                                                                                                                  
interested in the “creative functions” of markets than in their “allocative functions” (he 
was interested in their allocative functions, in fact, mainly insofar as these were conducive 
to their creative functions). 
5 That “the market”, as used by Smith, and “the economy” as understood today are, 
however, not identical concepts shall be established in Section 3 of this chapter. (North 
seems to equate the two in the preceding remarks, which, as will be argued, is a common 
mistake in perspectives on “the market” in modern economics.) 
6 The absence of an investigation into the meaning of this concept in both these volumes 
may indeed be linked to the lack of definitions and studies of the meaning of the market in 
economics, insofar as most contributors were practicing economists. (Just as the absence 
of an interest in population questions in Smith by modern readers of Smith, most of them 
economists, was linked to the absence of this interest in economics in the General 
Introduction.) The 1976 volume contains essays by prominent economists and economic 
historians presented at the bi-centenary conference. The 1975 volume (an accompanying 
volume to the Glasgow edition of Smith’s works on the occasion of the Wealth of Nations’ 
bicentenary) was meant as “a series of essays by contemporary students of Smith which 
would cover the main areas of his work, as distinct from simply concentrating on the 
economics” (Skinner & Wilson 1975, p. 1). The volume was therefore divided into two 
parts, the first “mainly concerned with the broadly 'philosophical' and political aspects of 
Smith’s contribution” and the second “with the subject matter (by no means entirely 
economic) of The Wealth of Nations itself” (Skinner & Wilson 1975, p. 1). However, the 
large majority of contributors to the volume — all contributors to the second part (on the 
Wealth of Nations), and more than a third even of those contributing to the shorter first 
part (on “the broadly 'philosophical' and political aspects of Smith's contribution”) — 
were in fact economists. 
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dimension of the multifaceted conception of “the market” one can find in Adam 
Smith’s work. And, importantly, it does not permit to meaningfully explore the 
significance of the concept of the “extent of the market” in Smith’s theory. 
In part, at least, the conception of “the market” as an organisational mode of 
economy and society opposed to the one of the state seems to be inherited from 
the 20th century opposition between “market” and “planned” economies, 
particularly prevalent during the cold war period, and as such represents an 
anachronistic reading of Smith. Smith opposed ‘planned’ mercantilist trade 
policies. But he surely did not pronounce himself on the “planned economy” of 
socialist regimes that only began to be imagined after his death (even though it 
emerges quite clearly from his work that he would have been more than sceptical 
of such “unnatural” and rigorist direction of economic affairs from the part of 
“m[e]n of system”). The term “the market” is not employed by Smith, as it 
frequently is today, to signify the opposite of a “planned economy” (as synecdoche 
for the “capitalist system”) nor does he use it as synonym for the societal stage he 
called “commercial society”. 
Probably the most eminent treatment of Smith’s idea that the division of 
labour is limited by the extent of the market is the one by Allyn Young (1928). 
Young (1928, p. 529) thought that “Adam Smith's famous theorem that the division 
of labour depends upon the extent of the market” was “one of the most 
illuminating and fruitful generalisations which can be found anywhere in the 
whole literature of economics”. He took Smith’s “theorem” as the basis of a theory 
of increasing returns and continuous, cumulative, and self-generating economic 
growth. Young’s article was very influential, notably in writings in the emerging 
field of development economics in the 1930s to 1960s, and remains frequently 
cited to this day, as much in the history of economic thought as in recent growth 
theory, although what he was advancing in his article was, as many observers 
agree, largely misunderstood (Kaldor 1972, p. 1243; Currie 1981, passim; 
Buchanan & Yoon 2000, p. 44; Perälä 2006, passim).7 Furthermore, Young’s article, 
in which he interprets the relationship Smith draws between the extent of the 
market and the division of labour through Say’s observations on the relationship 
between supply and demand, seems to have led many Smith scholars to equate the 
                                                        
7 On the important differences between Young’s theory and the modern “endogenous 
growth” literature, in which he is often cited approvingly, see notably Grangeas, Lecaillon, 
Le Page, and Ottavj (1994); Sandilands (2000); Lavezzi (2003b,2003a); Chandra and 
Sandilands (2005) and Sandilands (2009). De Bandt, Ravix, and Romani (1990) and Ravix 
(1997) analyse Young’s contribution from the perspective of industrial organisation 
theory, but taking a sensibly different approach from Stigler (1951). For an excellent 
reconstruction of Young’s position as a whole see Colacchio (2009).  
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concepts of “market” and “demand”. Keynesian aggregate demand theory, through 
which Young was (after his death) often interpreted (Sandilands 2000, p. 310-13), 
probably contributed to this trend. But Smith clearly differentiated between the 
concepts of “market” and “demand” (although they surely are closely related), and 
equating the two does not accurately and completely capture what Smith 
described by “the market” — especially when “demand” is disincarnated from its 
demographic and geographic vectors and bounds, as is generally the case in 
modern treatments of Smith’s ideas on the extent of the market, often visibly 
influenced by Young’s paper. 
Joseph Spengler, author of numerous writings on the history of thought on 
population, among which two of the rare articles that deal squarely with Smith’s 
treatment of population (Spengler 1970, 1976), observed that “Because Smith 
placed so much stress upon division of labour and its dependence upon the extent 
of the market, he could treat increase in population and/or its concentration as a 
source of increasing return, at least in the absence of emerging limitations” (1970, 
p. 379). Spengler here drew attention to the important fact that one of the main 
determinants of the extent of the market for Smith — indeed, as we shall see in this 
chapter, its most fundamental determinant — are the individuals to be found on a 
given territory and the spatial proximity between them. Growth and concentration 
of population, therefore, augment the extent of the market as Smith conceived it. 
Since the division of labour is limited by the extent of the market, growth and 
concentration of population thus augment the possible degree of division of labour 
in the society in question, and thereby the level of wealth a nation (insofar as we 
are concerned with the market of a nation) can attain.  
After his statement on population and increasing returns, Spengler went on 
to remark that “Later on, some critics of Malthus pointed to this effect, and it was 
made use of some 150 years later by Allyn Young and Colin Clark, economists of 
great distinction” (Spengler 1970, p. 379). Clark’s pro-populationist stance is well-
known, but Young was in his most famous article in fact rather evasive on the 
connection between increasing returns and population. He was more explicit about 
this connection elsewhere8 — and also, apparently, in his teaching, as reported, 
precisely, by Colin Clark.9 In his widely cited 1928 article, however, Young 
                                                        
8 See notably this statement by Young made in an entry on ‘capital’ in the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica: “Improvements in industry and in transport made the world capable of 
sustaining a larger population, while the growth of population, in turn, by creating larger 
markets, made it profitable for industry to use methods of a higher degree of 
roundaboutness”. (Young 1990 [1929], p. 145). 
9 Clark was Young’s research assistant at the LSE from October 1928 to his death in 
February 1929. He remarked (in Clark 1968 [1967], p. 256) that “Though Young wrote 
174 
abstracted altogether from geographic and demographic factors in his conception 
of the market. This is problematic when Young’s article is treated as an authority 
on Smith’s conception of the market; for geographic and demographic factors were 
for Smith precisely the most fundamental elements constitutive of markets.  
Both sets of notes on Smith’s jurisprudence lectures contain a strong and 
very explicit statement on the causal role of population for productivity and thus 
economic growth, via the division of labour: 
For 20 millions in a society, in the same manner as a company of 
manufacturers, will produce 100 times more goods to be exchanged than a 
poorer and less numerous one of 2 mill. (LJ(A) vi.166, p. 392) 
Twenty millions of people perhaps in а great society, working as it were to 
one another's hands, from the nature of the division of labour before 
explained, would produce a thousand times more goods than another 
society consisting only of 2 or 3 millions. (LJ(B) 265, p. 512) 10 
While not with the same strength of emphasis, this same idea — that the size 
of population determines the scope for the division of labour in a society or nation 
as a whole, and therefore its overall level of productivity, just as the size of the 
workforce in a particular manufacture determines the scope for this manufacture’s 
degree of division of labour and productivity — is, in fact, mirrored in the Wealth of 
Nations. Smith thus concluded his chapter on wages (I.viii) with the observation 
that: 
What takes place among the labourers in a particular workhouse takes 
place, for the same reason, among those of a great society. The greater their 
number, the more they naturally divide themselves into different classes 
and subdivisions of employment. More heads are occupied in inventing the 
most proper machinery for executing the work of each, and it is, therefore, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
little, and left many of his ideas to be disseminated by oral tradition, he followed his 
matter up to its logical conclusion, and contended that an industrial country would 
directly benefit economically from an enlargement of population. What British industry 
needed, he said, coming from Harvard to teach in London, was an internal market of 100 
million population.” 
10 Eltis (1975, p. 430) speculates that the student who took the Cannan notes (LJ(B)) may 
have added one zero. For all we know, it might be the other way round. (This is more 
probable in fact, insofar as the word “thousand” is written out, while “100” is written 
numerically.) In any case, Smith was not always exceedingly precise in his numerical 
illustrations. In the pin-factory parable, the productivity-enhancing effects of the division 
of labour are thus estimated at between 24.000 and 480.000%. These numbers were 
probably meant above all to render more visual (and not precisely measurable) the gains 
in productivity to be had from the division of labour; Smith’s main idea being that the 
gains from the division of labour — and, in the quotes from the Lectures of Jurisprudence 
above, from a larger population, by means of the division of labour — were enormous. 
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more likely to be invented. There are many commodities, therefore, which, 
in consequence of these improvements, come to be produced by so much 
less labour than before that the increase of its price is more than 
compensated by the diminution of its quantity. (WN viii.57, p. 104)  
This idea goes beyond the important and straightforward enough recognition by 
Smith that a larger supply of labour — whether in a workhouse or society as a 
whole — allows for more subdivision (which, through the gain in productivity, 
overcompensates for the rise in price of certain foodstuffs that the growth of 
population also occasions11). It involves the additional theoretical step that a 
larger population constitutes a wider market, and wider markets allow for more 
division of labour. Indeed, without this vaster market, as Smith explained five 
chapters earlier, the greater production that a more intensive division of labour 
makes possible could not be advantageously disposed of, thus precluding the 
division of labour from being gainfully augmented. 
Since the market as institution only takes the central position in the economic 
life of society in the commercial stage, and population is a causal element in the 
progression of the four socio-economic stages, the fact that the institution of the 
market comes to take the central role in the economic organisation of society is 
itself, for Smith, an outcome of the growth of population. But, as noted, the 
institutional dimension is not the only dimension of the market for Smith. Indeed, 
before being an institution, the market for Smith relies on a physical reality. For a 
market to be in place, the physical environment needs to be such as to render 
exchange (physically!) possible, and to potentially act as its vehicle. 
Fundamentally, for this potential for exchange and possible vehicle of trade that 
defines the market in its material dimension, population and space — and the 
physical characteristics of the terrain that make space be easier or more difficult to 
overcome — are the determining variables. 
The fact that transport costs are an important part of Smith’s conception of 
the market is widely acknowledged (Groenewegen 1977, p. 163; Myint 1977, p. 
237; West 1978, p. 345-6). But how geographical factors more widely enter the 
Smithian definition of markets is rarely enunciated clearly in the secondary 
literature.12 The relationship with population, moreover, is almost universally 
disregarded. Even Eltis (1975) and particularly Lowe (1975), who note the crucial 
                                                        
11 We shall examine this last point in section 5 of this chapter. 
12 See, however, the account of this — unusually detailed, for a non-history-of-thought text 
— in the World Bank’s World Development Report of 2009 (World Bank 2009, p. 14-5, 93-
4, 126-8, 194). 
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role population plays for the Smithian conception of the market, do not point out 
how this link between population and the market is precisely articulated.  
Spengler himself, two pages before his remark that “Because Smith placed so 
much stress upon division of labour and its dependence upon the extent of the 
market, he could treat increase in population and/or its concentration as a source 
of increasing return”, had stated that for Smith “discussion of population was 
essentially corollary to his treatment of economic development which, his analysis 
suggests, dominated demographic development” (1970, p. 377). This is 
inconsistent. If population growth is a source of increasing returns, indeed, then it 
is by that virtue a source of economic growth, and it is then imprecise to state that 
economic development dominates demographic development, which suggests a 
one-way relationship, with economic growth being exclusively the cause and not 
also the effect of population growth. That Smith conceived of the causal 
relationship between population growth and economic growth as unidirectional 
(or neglected the influence of population on economic variables altogether), 
though often repeated in the secondary literature (most notably in the 
introduction to the Glasgow edition of Wealth of Nations, p. 48; see for a recent 
example Sunna (forthcoming)), is inexact. Economic and demographic 
development in fact are both each other’s cause and effect in Smith’s analysis, as 
Alvin Hansen remarked long ago (1939, p. 2-3). Although not quite as explicitly as 
in his lectures, Smith clearly recognised this two-way relationship (and hence the 
role and importance of population growth and size for economic development) in 
the Wealth of Nations. 
Scholars who espoused the unidirectional view (that economic development 
for Smith exclusively occasions population growth, not the reverse) did not 
recognise the way population played into the succession of Smith’s socio-political 
and economic stages, as examined in the previous chapter. As we have seen, before 
1978 at least, or in any case before 1958, this can be explained by the explicit 
reference to population in this regard only being found in the second set of lecture 
notes, not yet available before these dates. However, as shall be examined in the 
present chapter, scholars adopting this position of population being exclusively an 
effect and not also a cause of economic development in Smith’s system of thought 
also miss another important element. This element, although maybe not entirely 
plain to see, — especially when Smith is read through the neo-Malthusian lens that 
he so frequently is these days — is, and has been for a long time, open for anyone 
to discover in the Wealth of Nations: the way in which population growth and 
market development are bound up in Smith’s view of the progress of society. This, 
too, becomes much more apparent when what is contained in the Wealth of Nations 
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is complemented by the material in Smith’s other works. But there is enough 
material even in the Wealth of Nations alone to establish it.13 
To deal with the question of the role of population for the Smithian market, it 
will be useful to examine, first, what Smith precisely understood by “the market” 
when writing about its “extent”. Smith saw the extent of the market as embodying 
the possible extent of trade (section 2). This is related to, but distinct from, both 
aggregate demand and “the economy” as a whole (section 3). The possible extent 
of trade, in turn, is determined primarily by population and space, while wealth 
and technology enter only later, and indirectly, into the definition of the extent of 
the market (section 4). The extension of the market by the growth of population is 
related to Smith’s description of how a society evolves through the different stages 
of economic progress, examined in the previous chapter, on which the relation 
between size of population and extent of the market sheds further light (section 5). 
The growth of population thereby acts on the size of the market through two 
compounding effects: the multiplication of possible trade relations (by the 
multiplication of potential trade partners) and the facilitation of trade relations by 
the diminution of the mean distance between trading partners (an effect of the 
population concentration accompanying population growth). In this, too, we can 
find Smith’s theory of urbanisation fuelled by the social (and geographical) 
division of labour. These will be examined in the penultimate section (6). Section 7 
concludes. 
 
 
2. The extent of the market as power of 
exchanging, and some sociological implications 
                                                        
13 All of Spengler’ references to Smith in his two 1970s articles on Smith and population 
(Spengler 1970, 1976) are to the Wealth of Nations. Spengler justified this confinement to 
the sole Wealth of Nations by stating that “Smith's final expression of his views appeared 
in the Wealth of Nations” (Spengler 1970, p. 377). But insofar as Smith’s different works 
deal with different themes and have different content (despite also much overlap), rather 
than being successive treatments of the same subject, this is an unsatisfactory approach 
when writing about Smith’s views on such a broad theme as population. All of Smith’s 
works contain elements of his perspective on this topic. All of Smith’s works are thus 
relevant to an analysis of his position on this subject. Moreover, as was largely elaborated 
on in the previous chapter, there is little ground on which to conclude that Smith had in 
any way changed his mind with regard to the themes developed in the Lectures of 
Jurisprudence and the Theory of Moral Sentiments by the time he wrote the Wealth of 
Nations; insofar as there is overlap between themes in Smith’s different works, then, these 
different works are certainly useful for a more in-depth analysis of affected themes.  
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Smith opens his chapter on the extent of the market (WN I.iii) with the following 
definition:  
As it is the power of exchanging that gives occasion to the division of 
labour, so the extent of this division must always be limited by the extent of 
that power, or, in other words, by the extent of the market. When the 
market is very small, no person can have any encouragement to dedicate 
himself entirely to one employment, for want of the power to exchange all 
that surplus part of the produce of his own labour, which is over and above 
his own consumption, for such parts of the produce of other men's labour 
as he has occasion for. (WN I.iii.1, p. 31) 
A corresponding passage in the first of the rediscovered “fragments on the division 
of labour” (FA) reads: 
As it is the power of exchanging which gives occasion to the division of 
labour, so the extent of this division will always be in proportion to the 
extent of that power. Every species of industry will be carried on in a more 
or less perfect manner, that is, will be more or less accurately subdivided 
into the different branches according to which it is capable of being split, in 
proportion to the extent of the market, which is evidently the same thing 
with the power of exchanging. When the market is very small it is 
altogether impossible that there can be that separation of one employment 
from another which naturally takes place when it is more extensive. (FA 1-
2, in LJ p. 582) 
Thus, the extent of the market in Smith’s theory is synonymous with “the power of 
exchanging”. It describes, in other words, the possible extent of trade.  
If the division of labour is limited by the extent of the market, and hence by 
“the power of exchanging”, this is because the essence of division of labour, or 
specialisation (Smith himself never uses this last term), is that people formerly 
supposed to be self-sufficient (as we shall see in the next chapter, this is largely a 
“philosophical fiction”) narrow down the scope of their own production, and hence 
become dependent on exchange. In other words, the first effect of the division of 
labour is that people quit producing everything they are in need of, but produce 
more than what they need of a particular good, and therefore need to exchange 
what they are producing against other goods in order to provide for themselves all 
the “necessaries and conveniences of life”.14 Division of labour (specialisation) is 
                                                        
14 In this sense, Witztum (2010, p. 170) notes that, while in modern economics 
specialisation is depicted as the solution to the problem of scarcity, in Smith’s analysis, on 
the contrary, the risk of scarcity emanates from specialisation, since when individuals 
specialise, they cannot remain self-sufficient. 
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only viable, therefore, if the individuals in question have the assurance that they 
will be able to exchange the fruits of their new (or narrower) activity with others 
who are producing what they were producing before (and which is critical for their 
survival). As Smith himself expresses it, it is “the certainty of being able to 
exchange all that surplus part of the produce of his own labour, which is over and 
above his own consumption, for such parts of the produce of other men’s labour as 
he may have occasion for” that “encourages every man to apply himself to a 
particular occupation, and to cultivate and bring to perfection whatever talent or 
genius he may possess for that particular species of business” (WN I.ii.3, p. 28). 
And the more people specialise, the less of what they need they produce 
themselves, so the more of what they need they now have to obtain through 
exchange. The market (the power of exchanging) therefore needs to expand in 
order to make room for a wider division of labour in society.15 
That the division of labour, in order to progress, requires an extension of 
exchange naturally follows from Smith’s discussion “Of the Principle which gives 
occasion to the Division of Labour” in Chapter 2 of Book I of Wealth of Nations. The 
division of labour is therein described by Smith as being “the necessary, though 
very slow and gradual consequence” of the human “propensity to truck, barter, and 
exchange one thing for another” (WN I.ii.1, p. 25). But the propensity to exchange, 
in order to bring about exchange, needs the power to exchange (the being of a 
market). Thus, strictly speaking, the division of labour is dependent on both the 
propensity and the power to exchange (a market), both being a necessary and 
none a sufficient condition (Jackson 2005, p. 208). Significantly, before describing 
the extent of the market as the power of exchanging in the first paragraph of the 
third chapter of Wealth of Nations, Smith explained in the last paragraph of 
Chapter II the impossibility for dogs to make use of their differences in talents by 
the “want of the power or disposition to barter and exchange” (WN I.ii.5, p. 30). In 
turn, as the division of labour progresses, it requires a further development of 
exchange. Smith is thus reported to have affirmed in his lectures that “The being of 
a market first occasioned the division of labour, and the greatness of it is what puts 
it in one’s power to divide it much” LJ(A)vi.64.16  
                                                        
15 This seems to have been the position of the physiocrats as well (Van den Berg & Salvat 
2001, p. 17-20). Interestingly, André Morellet seemed to not have recognised this point in 
Smith, for he criticises him precisely for not taking it into account (Van den Berg & Salvat 
2001, p. 18-9). 
16 Note that in this particular sentence from LJ(A), it is the power of exchanging (“the being 
of a market”) that Smith describes as the original trigger of the division of labour, while in 
WN.I.ii it is the propensity to exchange that is first described as such. As noted, Smith sees 
both these elements as preconditions. 
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Without claiming that these may be easily separable, one could see the 
disposition to exchange as a more sociological and the power of exchanging as a 
more economic, or materialistic, dimension of the phenomenon of market 
development as Smith explains it. Another component of the sociological (or socio-
psychological) dimension of Smith’s explanation of the development of the division 
of labour is the evolution of the motive for exchange. With the deepening of the 
division of labour, the obtainment of the necessaries of life for the individual 
becomes increasingly dependent on the procurement of those necessaries by 
others, but these others may not have any particular regard for the individual in 
question, and this becomes in fact increasingly so with the development of the 
division of labour. The deepening of the division of labour indeed augments the 
average social distance between individuals, more and more isolated from one 
another in their principal daily activities and engaged in increasingly indirect 
exchange with one another. This is when self-interest comes to take precedence as 
a leading motive of exchange (and further possibly people’s actions more 
generally), while in savage society exchange happens mostly within the circle of 
personal acquaintances and is thus more deeply linked with regard to others.  
It should be noted that this does not imply that in savage society individuals 
do not work together in the fulfilment of the necessary tasks of society. But labour 
is not divided insofar (and only insofar) as there is no strict division of 
employments — for which, indeed, the fact that everyone labours together at 
communal tasks is itself an illustration. As already noted in the previous chapter, 
Smith remarked for example that childcare was a communal affair in hunting 
nations (LJ(B) 104, p. 439). He also noted in the ‘Plan and Introduction’ of the 
Wealth of Nations that “Among the savage nations of hunters and fishers, every 
individual  . . .  endeavours to provide, as well as he can, the necessaries and 
conveniences of life, for himself, or such of his family or tribe as are either too old, or 
too young, or too infirm to go a hunting and fishing” (WN 4, p. 10). When Smith 
mentions in Chapter II that “In civilized society [man] stands at all times in need of 
the cooperation and assistance of great multitudes, while his whole life is scarce 
sufficient to gain the friendship of a few persons” (WN I.ii.2, p. 26), this does not 
mean, therefore, that in savage society, man does not also have “almost constant 
occasion for the help of his brethren” (ibid.). It means, only, that in savage society, 
as compared with civilised society, there are not “great multitudes” whose 
“cooperation and assistance” he requires; he requires only the help of the members 
of his “family or tribe”, which actually constitute his whole society; and as the 
individual is usually well acquainted with the latter, it is, other than in civilised 
society, not entirely “vain for him to expect it [cooperation and assistance] from 
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their benevolence only” (ibid.). Indeed, in savage society, exchange, such as the 
offering of arrows by a hunter who makes them particularly well to another (for 
which he receives eventually, though not always directly, some of the other’s 
catch), is described in Lectures of Jurisprudence as “a present to some of his 
companions” (LJ(A) vi.46, p. 348; LJ(B) 220, p. 493). Thus Marx’s accusation of 
Smith’s misrepresentation of the human past by his invoking the “isolated hunter” 
was, as already noted (p. 96 above), unjustified. Smith’s hunters were neither 
purely self-interested in their exchanges nor were they isolated. Smith’s position is 
not all that distant, in fact, from Marcel Mauss’ (1923-24) famous study of gift-
giving and reciprocity in hunter-gatherer society (where gift-giving, according to 
Mauss, serves both self-interested and other-regarding motives, and is a 
fundamentally social phenomenon).17 
The evolution of the motive for exchange (becoming more self-interested as 
civilisation progresses) is bound up, too, with the peopling process. Hence, in the 
savage state, where man lives in bands of 100-150 individuals (LJ(A) iv.36, p. 213; 
FA.3, p. 583), an individual may easily personally know every single member of the 
clan. This becomes increasingly difficult as population grows, so that ties of 
personal acquaintance become increasingly insufficient as a basis for the 
cooperation of the members of society in the production of the total sum of 
products and services. It is thus also in relation to a larger population that Smith 
remarks about man “In civilised society” that “he stands at all times in need of the 
cooperation and assistance of great multitudes, while his whole life is scarce 
sufficient to gain the friendship of a few persons” (WN I.ii.2, p. 26). A growing 
population renders it increasingly difficult for the individual to be personally 
acquainted with all the members of society, while, at the same time, growing 
populations imply an increasing division of labour (notably under the impulse of 
the necessity-is-the-mother-of-invention mechanism analysed in the previous 
chapter) that increasingly isolates individuals in particular productive activities 
(which previously may have been carried out collectively). In the “progress of 
improvement and population”, therefore, the two effects of more people being 
present in the society, whom it is increasingly difficult for the individual to know 
all, and the increasing isolation in particular production processes that are an 
effect of the division of labour compound, both making for increased anonymity in 
                                                        
17 Marx did not have the benefit of reading the Wealth of Nations with notes from Smith’s 
lectures as guide, of course, but was confined to the sole Wealth of Nations, in which Smith 
indeed makes it appear as if he considered the hunters as fully self-sufficient (hence 
“isolated”). We shall examine this point in more detail in the next chapter (p. 224 et seq. 
below).  
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society. At the same time the number of people whose services individuals are in 
need of increases as an effect of the smaller and smaller part of their daily needs 
being covered by themselves because of the division of labour and the larger 
number of individuals being involved, directly and indirectly, in the production of 
all goods and services. As sympathy is conditioned by social distance, as Smith 
develops at great length in the Theory of Moral Sentiments,18 it is therefore 
increasingly necessary to replace it with another motive for the also increasingly 
necessary (though increasingly roundabout) cooperation of society’s members in 
the production of the goods and services necessary for their daily lives. Self-
interest, then, through the “invisible hand” mechanism, assures that people 
involuntarily — or rather, without this being their prime motive — fulfil each 
other’s needs. Thus, what can be taken to be the main sociological characteristic of 
the ‘market economy’ (or, in Smithian terms, “commercial society”), i.e. the self-
interested motive for individuals’ contribution to the provision of goods and 
services in society, is, too, a consequence of the growth of population.  
This sociological dimension of the extension of commercial exchange in 
society, leading to the establishment of the societal state of “commercial society”, 
in which “Every man  . . .  becomes in some measure a merchant” (WN I.iv.1, p. 37), 
while being related to an extension of the market (necessary for an extension of 
division of labour), is not the same thing with the extension of the market, 
however. The extent of the market does not describe, for Smith, the extent to which 
exchange of a commercial nature only occurs. As was already remarked (p. 172 
above), the meaning of “the market” to signify “the market economy” (capitalism) 
is a contemporary one, which cannot properly be employed to interpret Smith’s 
use of the term “the market”, and Smith does not use the terms “the market” and 
“commercial society” interchangeably. Even the self-interested motive, which is 
inseparably linked with the modern conception of market exchange (and often so 
with reference to Smith’s “invisible hand”), is not essential for Smith to consider 
exchange to be made via a market. Insofar as for Smith the market means the 
power to exchange, even savages exchanging arrows and meat as presents to each 
other (out of sympathy and not self-interest) make, by definition, necessarily use of 
a market. The extent of the market does not describe to what extent exchange 
occurs in actual facts at all, indeed, but to what extent it is possible for exchange to 
occur. Similarly to demand and supply curves in modern economics, it traces a 
map of potentialities only, it does not describe an actuality. 
                                                        
18 For commentary, see notably Forman-Barzilai (2005,2010). 
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The power of exchanging (the extent of the market) depends on a number of 
material elements, which Smith all treats in the short Chapter III of Book I of 
Wealth of Nations, without however always making the separation between them 
very clear. This separation shall be more explicitly established in what follows, in 
order to make the respective role of the different elements constitutive of the 
market for Smith more apparent. It shall be made clear, thereby, that demographic 
and geographic factors are fundamental for Smith, while the other factors directly 
and indirectly referred to by him, namely wealth and technology, are only 
relatively important, in that they are a result, over time, of the way a population 
relates to a particular geography.  
We shall examine the intimate connection between population and the 
market for Smith (in its material dimension, essentially defining the extent of the 
market) in Section 4 and the subsequent two sections of this chapter. Before 
applying ourselves to this task, however, it is necessary to clear up some confusion 
that besieges the conception of the extent of the market in the secondary literature 
on Smith of the past hundred years (and possibly further back). Instead of 
exploring the different determinants of the power of exchanging for Smith so as to 
assess what determines the extent of a market, indeed, modern economists and 
historians of thought usually rely on a shortcut, substituting for “extent of the 
market” the term “demand” (sometimes preceded by “effective”, or “aggregate”) or 
the concept of the whole economy, or the whole economic system. Why this is not 
an accurate depiction of Smith’s position we shall at present inspect. 
 
3. Demand, the economy, and the power of 
exchanging: the inaccuracy of Young’s Sayian 
reading of Smith 
West (1997, p. 434) casually asks and responds to the question “What is a 
market?” by stating that “Surely it is the ability and willingness of individuals to 
purchase, a function of produce offered in exchange.” This characterisation of the 
Smithian market visibly derives from Young (1928) (cited by West in another 
connection shortly after). “But just what constitutes a large market?”, Young asked, 
and answered that it was:  
Not area or population alone, but buying power, the capacity to absorb a 
large annual output of goods. This trite observation, however, at once 
suggests another equally trite, namely, that capacity to buy depends upon 
capacity to produce. In an inclusive view, considering the market not as an 
outlet for the products of a particular industry, and therefore external to 
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that industry, but as the outlet for goods in general, the size of the market is 
determined and defined by the volume of production. If this statement 
needs any qualification, it is that the conception of a market in this 
inclusive sense — an aggregate of productive activities, tied together by 
trade — carries with it the notion that there must be some sort of balance, 
that different productive activities must be proportioned one to another. 
(Young 1928, p. 532-33) 
Although Young mentions population and space first, everything that follows 
in his exposition actually draws attention away from these elements (and they are 
hardly mentioned by Young — and if so, as in this passage, mostly to de-emphasise 
their importance — in the remainder of his paper). Young here, in fact, presented 
the market more or less as synonymous with the economy as a whole — or what 
Spengler (1959b, p. 6) refers to as “the economic system itself” — and this has 
often been adopted uncritically as accurate depiction of Smith’s position.19 Further, 
Smith’s concept of the extent of the market is often equated in the secondary 
literature today with the one of demand.20 Young, in the quote above, conceived of 
the market as an “outlet” for goods. This is significant because, by being considered 
as “outlet”, the market is in fact looked at from one side only, i.e. from the 
perspective of the producer who seeks to dispose of his production. This 
conception by Young of the market as “outlet” can further be linked to Jean-
Baptiste Say’s term “débouchés”. In this sense, it essentially describes the total 
demand of a product (and by extension of all products). By looking at the market 
from the other perspective, the one of the consumer, one will, conversely, conceive 
of the market principally as (total or particular) supply. 
But this Youngian depiction of the market as “outlet”, and the frequent and 
related equivalence assumed between “market” and “demand” in modern readings 
of Smith, is in fact largely foreign to Smith himself. Demand, the market, and 
exchange (or trade, commerce) are all closely related in Smith’s account. Yet they 
differ, subtly maybe, but importantly. Significantly, in the whole of Chapter 3, Book 
1 of the Wealth of Nations on the extent of the market, the word “demand” does not 
                                                        
19 In addition to West and Spengler just cited, see for example Brewer (1991, p. 3). Lowe 
(1954, p. 139) writes less definitely of the “growth of the system”. 
20 This is the case of Thweatt (1957, p. 227); Streeten (1959, p. 167); West (1964, p. 24); 
Eagly (1970, p. 62); Sylos-Labini (1976, p. 205); Rostow (1980, p. 159); Currie (1981, p. 
53); Caton (1985, p. 850); Stull (1986, p. 295); Ahmad (1996, p. 444); Evensky (2003, p. 
9); Lavezzi (2003b, p. 84); Negishi (2004, p. 35); Rima (2004, p. 181) and Aspromourgos 
(2010, p. 1171). 
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appear a single time.21 The sense of “market” in Smith’s work for the most part still 
bears the mark of the medieval (and still contemporary) meaning of the term as 
signifying the physical location in which goods and services are exchanged.22 This 
is especially apparent when Smith writes of goods being brought “to market”, an 
expression employed close to a hundred times in the Wealth of Nations 
(particularly often in chapters VII and XI of Book I); or when he writes of values or 
quantities of goods in or at particular markets such as at Windsor market (I.xi.b.20, 
p. 168; I.xi.f.4-g.8, p. 211-14; I.xi.n.5, p. 257), in the European (l.xi.e.7, p. 195; 
I.xi.g.16-35, p. 216-28) or in the Spanish market (I.xi.h.6, p. 231). More generally, 
the market for Smith describes the structure — be it physical or immaterial — that 
renders trade possible (whence the equivalence of the “extent of the market” and 
the “power of exchanging”). In Young’s article, by contrast, the market is regarded 
as the total sum of what is exchanged, rather than that which permits it to be 
exchanged.  
Young’s assessment of what determines the extent of the market is clearly 
reminiscent of Say’s law; or rather, it is Say’s law that it is expressed by Young in 
the passage cited above.23 “Say’s law” is evidently related to Smith’s considerations 
about division of labour and the extent of the market, and quite probably derived 
from them too, at least indirectly. The division of labour, by increasing 
                                                        
21 Negishi (2004, p. 35) observes about a statement by Smith on the long-run effects of an 
increase in demand (WN V.i.e.26, p. 748), which he takes as representative for Smith’s 
thoughts about the relationship between division of labour and extent of the market: “It is 
somewhat curious that this passage is not from Book I, chapter 3, of the WN, entitled 'That 
the division of labour is limited by the extent of the market'”. But this is only curious if we 
take demand and the extent of the market to be, in fact, equivalents (apart from the known 
fact that Smith did not have the habit of neatly compartmentalising his subjects, as they 
were in later economic treatises and textbooks, but rather used some leitmotivs 
throughout his work; something particularly true for the division of labour and its 
relationship to the extent of the market). 
22 In the middle ages, the term “market” was describing the time and place of transactions 
(Harper 2001-2013). The older latin mercatus is largely a synonym for “trade”, and this 
meaning was carried over into old French, alongside the newer meaning of “marketplace”. 
(The medieval Old North French sense of “trade, commerce” has been carried over to a 
certain degree into modern French. It is thus spoken, colloquially, of “faire son marché”, 
literally “make one’s market”, meaning “to buy groceries”, and in more formal language of 
“passer un marché”, meaning, “to conclude a trade agreement”.) This sense of mercatus as 
synonym for trade has survived in the adjective “mercantile”. It was made use of by Smith 
himself in his term “mercantile system” (the term “mercantilism”, a variation of Smith’s 
term, having come into use later). But “the market” for Smith was not a synonym for trade 
(they are clearly treated as distinct, notably at WN I.x.b.38, p. 130). 
23 Young’s remark on balance (likewise made by Say in his chapter that gave rise to “Say’s 
law”) is also the starting point of the doctrine of “balanced growth”, which we shall further 
examine in the following chapter. 
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productivity, increases production (or supply), and consumption (or demand) thus 
has to increase proportionally for it to be viable. But there is an important 
difference between the two ideas that supply is intimately linked to (if not 
synonymous with) demand and that the division of labour is limited by the extent 
of the market. What Say wanted to bring out most centrally in his chapter on 
“débouchés” is that supply and demand, in the aggregate at least (barring certain 
possible imbalances between the production of different products and abstracting 
from the influence of money), should in fact be considered synonymous. The 
division of labour and the extent of the market, by contrast, are definitely not 
synonymous, neither literally nor figuratively (i.e. neither in the sense that the 
division of labour is literally the same thing as the extent of the market, nor in the 
sense that the volume of production made possible by a given degree of division of 
labour is always strictly equal to what can be exchanged in that market or by 
means of it).  
In Say’s law, by virtue of that which is produced also being that which is 
exchanged, and thus the volume of production actually defining what is demanded, 
the two are necessarily equal and in fact synonymous, and the increase in 
production implies quite immediately an increase of demand exactly 
proportionate. In other words, aggregate demand and aggregate supply (as 
conceived of by Say) are the same thing, looked at from different sides of the 
exchange relationship.24 Smith, in his considerations about division of labour and 
the extent of the market, had quite a different concern: that in the absence of the 
possibility to exchange an increased production, there was no economic sense in 
pushing further any given degree of division of labour in any particular place (and 
hence people would not usually further divide labour in that place, at least not for 
long, if they cannot exchange the surplus they thus produce). This does not 
preclude, however, that there may be an imbalance between what is produced and 
what can be exchanged economically (i.e. without exceeding in cost the very 
benefit that could be made from the transaction) at any one time. The degree of 
division of labour may fall short of the possibilities of exchange, notably by the lack 
of accumulation of capital (which also conditions the division of labour). It may be 
pushed beyond the limits of the extent of the market momentarily, for reasons of 
miscalculation or unforeseen events. Inversely, a transport route may break down 
for climatic or political reasons, for example, or a large part of the population be 
killed in war on an epidemic, suddenly restricting the size of the market, while the 
degree of division of labour is still adjusted to a larger one. In other words, 
                                                        
24 Becker and Baumol (1952), following Oscar Lange (1942), called this “Say’s identity”. 
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production need not be exactly proportional to the possibilities to exchange it at 
any one time. Nor do the volume of production and the possibilities of exchange 
always necessarily increase (or diminish) simultaneously or on a par. Other than 
supply and demand in Say’s Law, the extent of the market limits the extent of the 
division of labour, but does not strictly define it (and this has nothing to do with 
the influence of money or saving; it is true even for a barter economy).25 As 
Groenewegen (1977, p. 163) rightly puts it, “The greater the market”, the greater is 
“the potential demand for final output”.26  Extent of demand and extent of the 
market are thus not equivalent, but the extent of the market is what permits a 
certain extent of demand. Young confused the two, and seems to have been 
followed in this by a great many historians of economic thought. 
Jean-Baptiste Say sojourned in England from 1785 to 1786, and, on his 
return, became famous first and foremost as a populariser of Smith’s thought in 
France. Say’s “law” is derived from Chapter XV of Book I of the Traité (6th edition), 
with the original title “Des débouchés”. It is significant in this respect that what 
was called in French “la loi des débouchés” has been rendered in English as “the 
law of market(s)”. Chapter XV of Book I of the Traité was translated in English 
(translator C. R. Prinsep, editor Clement C. Biddle, published 1855) as “Of the 
Demand or Market for Products”, while the proper English translation for the word 
“débouchés” is in fact ‘opening, prospect, outlet’. The English translation is not only 
making it sound as if the concepts of “demand” and “market” were in fact 
equivalent; it is also odd insofar as the word “market” (marché) does not appear in 
Say’s chapter at all. In this way, the English translation of Say’s book, by equating 
“débouchés”, “market” and “demand”, may well have contributed to the confusion 
between “demand” and “market”.27 
                                                        
25 Imbalances between demand and supply play a very explicit role in Smith’s theory of 
market price. But what he considers therein are imbalances between demand and supply 
of particular goods only, not demand and supply in the aggregate, as Malthus and later 
Keynes would. Although Smith did not himself lay out Say’s law before Say, he does not 
contradict it either. Say’s reflections on the relation between supply and demand were 
almost certainly inspired at least in part by his reading of Smith, but it is uncertain what 
Smith would have thought of Say’s developments.  
26 Franklin (1976, p. 380) also clearly distinguishes between demand and the market 
(although rather incidentally) when he writes that: “As the market expands and exchanges 
multiply, money as a medium of exchange becomes necessary and is generalized, a process 
which facilitates demand and establishes the distinction between use and exchange value”. 
27 Say himself did not mention Smith in his chapter “Des débouches”, but he did mention 
him in Chapter VIII of his Traité (i.e. seven chapters earlier) entitled “Des avantages, des 
inconveniens et des bornes qui se rencontrent dans la séparation des travaux”, which is, as 
the title suggests, essentially a detailed summary of Smith’s views on the division of 
labour. (Say does not offer anything that is not contained in the Wealth of Nations in this 
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Smith himself sometimes presented the market as an outlet, giving the 
impression that what is really expressed by the term “market” is the demand for 
particular products or for the total production of a particular nation. This is the 
case, for example, in such expressions as “by means of water-carriage a more 
extensive market is opened to every sort of industry” (WN I.iii.3, p. 32); or “The 
wool of England  . . .  found a market in the then wealthier and more industrious 
country of Flanders” (I.xi.c.4, p. 179); and especially when Smith wrote of some 
place or condition ‘affording a market’ to any sort of produce.28 At one place in the 
Wealth of Nations, Smith makes it appear, even, as if the words “market” and 
“demand” were interchangeable in his sentence: “The price of silver in the 
European market might perhaps have fallen still lower  . . .  The gradual increase of 
the demand for silver, or the gradual enlargement of the market for the produce of 
the silver mines of America, is probably the cause which has prevented this from 
happening” (WN I.xi.g.23, p. 220).  
But at other places throughout the Wealth of Nations, Smith makes it very 
clear that “market” and “demand” are distinct; that demand can (or rather has to) 
express itself in or through a particular market; that the market is the structure, 
support, or vehicle containing a particular demand; but that this demand is not 
identical with that market. This is the case, for example, when Smith used such 
expressions as “If by the general progress of improvement the demand of this 
market should increase” (WN I.xi.d.4, p. 194) or “America, therefore, is a new 
market for the produce of its own silver mines, of which the demand must increase 
much more rapidly than that of the most thriving country in Europe” (WN I.xi.g.26, 
p. 222); or when he writes of the “demand of the home-market” (II.v.33-4, p. 372; 
IV.ix.23, p. 671) or “the demand of the markets nearer home” (IV.vii.c.48, 608). And 
as there is the demand, so there is also the “supply of the home market” (WN 
IV.v.a.34, p. 521; IV.v.b.25-32, p. 534-5; IV.v.b.36-41, 537-9; IV.viii.39, p. 657). 
                                                                                                                                                                  
chapter, but he ably renders Smith’s thoughts on the matter therein). Say does not confuse 
the extent of the market (a phrase he does not use at all in fact) with demand in that 
chapter, although he comes close to it when writing that one can enjoy the benefits of the 
division of labour only when consumption extends beyond a certain point (Say 1841 
[1803], p. 94). This is not, of course, in contradiction with Smith (and neither would it have 
been had Say used the word “demand” at this point). But it is committing the same 
imprecision as Young later would, by confusing exchange and the means of exchange 
(insofar as speaking of consumption supposes that there has been exchange, rather than 
there being a potential for it). 
28 Smith writes of a market being ‘afforded’ to some kind of produce or industry (or the 
produce or industry of a particular country) at WN I.iii.3, p. 34; I.xi.b.27, p. 171; I.xi.c.35, p. 
192; III.i.1, p. 376; III.iv.2, p. 411; IV.iii.c.4, p. 489; IV.iii.c.11, p. 494; IV.v.b.19, p. 531; 
IV.vii.c.100, p. 635; and V.iii.72, p. 935. 
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The constraint that the extent of the market poses to the division of labour 
for Smith is not merely one of demand (nor of supply). Rather, this constraint 
consists in the fact, first, that a demand for, say, a haircut in London, is largely 
irrelevant, under normal circumstances, to a barber in Glasgow; and second (but 
actually first in order of precedence), and relatedly, that such a specialised craft as 
that of a hairdresser can only come about in a community of a certain size, i.e. once 
there is a certain critical number of people, located sufficiently close together so 
that easy communication is assured among them all, by virtue of which they form a 
community of people, and the different communities so connected a nation. The 
size of the community, the population of the nation (when we are considering the 
nation as a whole) and the degree and quality of interconnectedness of the 
individuals (and of the communities that compose the nation) are thus of critical 
importance.29  
A further difference between Say’s law and Smith’s idea of division of labour 
being limited by the extent of the market is that in Say’s law (and Allyn Young 
followed Say and more importantly Mill and Ricardo in this regard), the economy 
as a whole — and, by convention, this is usually, implicitly, the national economy 
— is looked at as one single unit, inside which the exchange of goods is taken for 
granted. In Smith’s concern with the extent of the market, conversely, it is most 
centrally the exchange of goods (both inside a particular place and from that place 
with the outside) which is at issue. The extent of the market, in the Smithian sense, 
indeed defines the degree to which it is possible to economically exchange goods 
from a particular place. Smith’s concern, thereby, is not generally the national 
economy, but the economy of every particular place (generally a village, town, city, 
or particular area or region, and only sometimes a particular country, continent or 
even the world as a whole), and, furthermore, Smith is usually concerned, at any 
one time, with the economic opportunities of particular individuals and particular 
trades. It is only by aggregating these, insofar as this makes sense, that we arrive at 
the picture of the regional, the national, or the world economy. But this 
aggregation is itself conditioned by what we are considering, i.e. the extent of the 
power of exchanging, or the extent of the market. Otherwise, there could be no 
                                                        
29 Say perfectly understood this when he wrote in his chapter on the division of labour 
mentioned above: “Par cette raison, elle [la division du travail] ne peut être poussée à son 
dernier terme que lorsque les produits sont susceptibles d'être transportés au loin, pour 
étendre le nombre de leurs consommateurs, ou lorsqu’elle s’exerce dans une grande ville 
qui offre par elle-même une grande consommation. C’est par la même raison que plusieurs 
sortes de travaux, qui doivent être consommés en même temps que produits, sont 
exécutés par une même main dans les lieux où la population est bornée.” (Say 1841 [1803], 
p. 94) 
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different markets of different places, and for different trades, independently from 
the whole world market. And the limits of particular markets, even though Smith is 
concerned with the wealth of nations, are not for Smith always and automatically 
the ones of a national economy.30 When equating “the market” with the economy 
as a whole, considering it as an “aggregate of productive activities, tied together by 
trade” as Young expressed it, i.e. as all the supply and demand that is being brought 
forth by all participants in the economic nexus (implicitly understood to pertain to 
an individual country), we are thus in fact taking for granted that the fruits of these 
various economic activities that are aggregated in this way to constitute “the 
market” will somehow be exchanged within this (usually national) economy we are 
considering. But this is taking for granted the very thing that Smith singled out as 
the meaning of the extent of the market: the power of exchanging! 
For Smith, the market is what underlies and supports exchange. Total 
production or supply, or total consumption or demand, which are two ways of 
looking at the total exchanged product, or GDP in modern terms, of a nation, 
society or other economic entity, are not identical with the market, which is the 
vehicle, and the frontier, that renders this total exchange possible, and defines its 
limit (which may be surpassed momentarily but not for long). The relationship 
between the market and demand (or supply), in other words, is the one between a 
container and that which it contains. The market is not synonymous with 
exchange. It is the container, exchange is that which is (or can be) contained. By 
extension, the extent of the market is not synonymous with the volume of 
production, but it is what, by allowing for a certain volume of exchange, renders 
possible a given volume of production (insofar as what is produced, in an economy 
governed by the division of labour, is produced in order to be exchanged).   The 
market, then, is a structure, a fundament, or a vehicle for economic exchange. And 
this structure or fundament, for Smith, is essentially of a geographic and 
demographic nature. We shall in the following section look at how this geographic 
and demographic nature of the market is precisely expressed by Smith. 
 
4. The critical geographic and demographic 
dimension of the power of exchanging 
Directly following the first paragraph of WN I.iii (cited on page 178 above), in 
which Smith defines the extent of the market as the possible extent of trade, Smith 
                                                        
30 Diatkine (2016) argues that the concept of the nation, economically speaking, is in fact 
absent from the Wealth of Nations. 
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goes on to illustrate this by contrasting the larger possibilities for specialisation in 
a town to the restrained opportunities of similar specialisation in the Highlands of 
Scotland, using the examples, respectively, of a porter, and of a nail-maker:  
There are some sorts of industry, even of the lowest kind, which can be 
carried on no where but in a great town. A porter, for example, can find 
employment and subsistence in no other place. A village is by much too 
narrow a sphere for him; even an ordinary market town is scarce large 
enough to afford him constant occupation. In the lone houses and very 
small villages which are scattered about in so desert a country as the 
Highlands of Scotland, every farmer must be butcher, baker and brewer for 
his own family.  . . .  It is impossible there should be such a trade as even 
that of a nailer in the remote and inland parts of the Highlands of Scotland. 
Such a workman at the rate of a thousand nails a day, and three hundred 
working days in the year, will make three hundred thousand nails in the 
year. But in such a situation it would be impossible to dispose of one 
thousand, that is, of one day's work in the year. (WN I.iii.2, p. 31-2) 
What this passage reveals is that the two most basic defining elements of the 
extent of the market for Smith are population and space.  Demand, or “débouchés”, 
are clearly important — Smith speaks of the possibility to “dispose” one’s produce 
— but the way this demand can exert itself is tied to population and space. These 
are, in a way, the connecting elements between “demand” and “supply”, and insofar 
make up the market (the possibility of exchange). The passage further reveals how 
very closely these two elements of population and space are interconnected.  
Thus, the market is larger in a town because there are more people for the 
porter to cater to. The porter needs to have at his disposition a large pool of 
potential customers (who each only occasionally have need for his services) in 
order to be able to exert his trade on a permanent basis. Yet, this element of 
population is inseparable from the element of space. What makes the town a larger 
market is not that it has a larger population in the absolute, but that this numerous 
population is present in one same place of limited size (which is of course the very 
definition of a town or urban area: a comparatively large population occupying a 
comparatively small territory). The large pool of customers, in order to actually be 
at the disposition of the porter, needs to be within reach. This is obvious but needs 
stressing. In the Scottish Highlands taken as a whole, indeed, population may be 
more numerous than in Smith’s unnamed town. But the Highlands having a much 
larger territory than any town, people are too scattered throughout, and they are 
thus not easily accessible. Potential buyers in a close enough range are so few that 
it hardly pays off to specialise in any one particular trade. A market, then, is 
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constituted by people, but these need to be located in space in such a manner as to 
facilitate their connexion. We may take this, for now, to be an expression of the 
relevance of population density. But this needs to be qualified and elaborated on, 
which will be done in the last section of this chapter. 
Next, Smith stresses the importance of waterways to carry out trade over 
distance: 
As by means of water-carriage a more extensive market is opened to every 
sort of industry than what land-carriage alone can afford it, so it is upon the 
sea-coast, and along the banks of navigable rivers, that industry of every 
kind naturally begins to subdivide and improve itself. (WN I.iii.3, p. 32) 
In the remainder of the chapter, Smith more specifically points out the 
advantages of water-carriage and the importance for the extent of the market that 
the presence of navigable rivers or the proximity of the sea-coast thus implies. He 
substantiates this with the observation that all ancient civilisations developed 
along sea-coasts or large rivers which stretch and ramify into their territory. Still 
economically backward regions (such as Africa), conversely, were hindered in 
their development precisely by the absence of such waterways. Not only need 
there be large rivers to serve as inlets into the mainland, indeed, but these also 
need to be close enough to each other to permit inland trade between them (which 
is not the case in Africa and Tartary, where large rivers are few and far between).31 
Smith points out that wherever agriculture has a long history (such as Egypt, 
Bengal and the eastern provinces of China), large waterways that ramify out into 
the country can be found (WN I.iii.6-7, p. 34-5). Smith hence considers a 
sufficiently dense network of navigable rivers a necessary condition for the 
passage to the third stage of society (agriculture).32
                                                        
31 Smith nowhere suggests that Africa’s underdevelopment has anything to do with culture 
or race, but bases his explanation of it purely on geography. Along with Smith’s statement 
that the division of labour is more the cause than the outcome of differences between 
individuals, illustrated by the parable of the porter and the philosopher (WN I.ii.4, LJ.A 
vi.47-8), this non-ethnicisation of the explanation of the economic inferiority of Africa, half 
a century before the abolition of slavery in Britain, is an illustration of Smith’s 
universalism, or of his basic belief (possibly in line with Stoic philosophy, which is 
generally believed to have significantly influenced him) in the basic equality of human 
beings. This distinguishes him from his friend Hume who (although also opposed to 
slavery) explicitly considered “negroes” to be inferior to “whites” (see n. 13 on p. 75 
above). (For Smith’s condemnations of slavery, see — on economic grounds — WN 
I.viii.41, III.ii.9, IV.ix.47; LJ.A iii.112; LJ.B 138, 290, 299; ED 44 and — on moral grounds — 
TMS V.2.9; and for commentary Pack (1996), Griswold (1999, p. 198-202), Lapidus 
(2002), Wells (2010) and Elmslie (2010).) 
32 See also LJ(A) iv.53, p. 220: “As the Tartars have been always a nation of shepherds, 
which they will always be from the nature of their country, which is dry and high raised 
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By greatly facilitating exchange, natural waterways substantially augment the 
volume of trade that it is possible to conduct, and thus increase the size of the 
market. It may appear that this presence of rivers and coasts in a territory is a 
geographic element that has nothing to do with demography, but this is not so. 
Natural waterways (or any other characteristics of geography that potentially 
represent natural facilities for trade) can be actual means or facilities of exchange 
only if there are people to use them. Since the extent of the market in Smith’s 
theory describes the possible extent of trade, rivers are of interest only insofar as 
they connect potential trading partners. Only this will enlarge the market. Rivers 
that run through uninhabited land will be of no influence on the size of the market. 
When Smith writes that rivers are critical for the extent of the market, therefore, 
he is actually taking for granted (without pointing this out) that we are considering 
rivers that are connecting together loci of productive activity, i.e. human 
agglomerations. Smith may have deemed this fact too obvious to warrant 
mentioning. It is important to take into account, however, to uncover the primary 
importance of population for the Smithian market. It is precisely for this reason, 
indeed, that Smith advocated that such works as a “highway, a bridge, a navigable 
canal  . . .  be both made and maintained by a small toll upon the carriages which 
make use of them” (V.i.d.3, p. 724) in order that they be primarily built where they 
are needed (so as to enlarge the market) and that “A magnificent high road cannot 
be made through a desert country where there is little or no commerce, or merely 
because it happens to lead to the country villa of the intendant of the province” 
(V.i.d.6, p. 725).33 
Smith thus identifies three interdependent and mutually reinforcing factors 
that determine the total size of the market. The first is the number of people (on a 
                                                                                                                                                                  
above the sea, with few rivers tho some very large ones, and the weather and the air is too 
cold for the produce of any grain”. 
33 Of course, if rivers run through hospitable/fertile land, the fact that they do will likely 
favour human settlement there. The history of human settlement and the presence of 
navigable rivers and sea-coasts are closely connected in Smith’s account, as illustrated by 
his examples of Egypt and Bengal having developed along and by means of these 
waterways (and conversely Africa and Tartary not having developed because of their 
absence) (I.iii.4-8, p. 34-6). This, indeed, is congruent with Smith “circular cumulative” 
way of conceiving economic development, which we shall examine in the following 
chapter. (It may be remarked that, as would natural rivers, so “magnificent high roads” 
could, in principle, promote settlement and development in a hitherto “desert country” — 
but, as with restrictions to or promotions of trade, Smith was not in favour of such 
‘artificial’ means to direct development, which, other than natural rivers already present 
on a territory, needed an initial investment by the state, for no statesman or group thereof 
could, according to Smith, possess sufficient understanding of the natural process of 
societal development to outdo in quality the spontaneous, i.e. natural, ordering of this 
process). 
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given territory). The second is the extent to which they are in reach of each other, 
i.e. how close they are situated to each other in space. The third element is how 
well people are connected through the particular distance that separates them, i.e. 
how easy or difficult it is to overcome this distance with the given means. In the 
chapter on the extent of the market in the Wealth of Nations, Smith lays primary 
stress on navigable rivers or other natural waterways. In Lectures of Jurisprudence 
he also mentions the importance of the presence and quality of roads in this 
context (LJ(A) vi.65, p. 356; LJ(B) 222-3, p. 494).34 Other geographical elements 
(mountains, deserts, parasite- and disease-infested swamps and jungles, etc.) 
represent obvious obstacles to trade.35  
Why population and space are the primal constituents of the extent of the 
market becomes clearer when we further consider what the other factors that 
Smith directly names in WN.I.iii (natural waterways and “riches”), as well as the 
one he indirectly alludes to (technology), precisely amount to. What is significant 
in this context is Smith’s insistence on the importance of time. 
When speaking of the inland market, Smith points out that in earlier periods 
of development (i.e. before the “commercial stage”, when trade is conducted with 
the exterior) these inland parts of the country have a size of market (a power of 
exchanging) that is limited to the one that exist within themselves only. This power 
of exchanging within the inland parts of a country is determined, Smith holds, by 
their “populousness”. But Smith also mentions at this point that it is determined by 
the country’s “riches”: 
The inland parts of the country can for a long time have no other market for 
the greater part of their goods, but the country which lies round about 
them, and separates them from the sea-coast, and the great navigable 
rivers. The extent of their market, therefore, must for a long time be in 
proportion to the riches and populousness of that country, and 
consequently their improvement must always be posterior to the 
improvement of that country. (WN I.iii.4, p. 34) 36 
                                                        
34 That Smith continued, in the Wealth of Nations, to consider the quality of roads and 
other man-made facilities of trade of crucial importance for the extent of the market is not 
in doubt, as manifest notably by Smith’s long considerations on the financing ‘Of the 
publick Works and Institutions for facilitating the Commerce of the Society’ in Book V 
(V.i.c-d, p. 724-58), which was already referred to. See also WN p. 32, editor’s note 8. 
35 Smith does not mention these negative elements, which somewhat suggests themselves, 
in WN I.iii. At LJ(A) iv.56, p. 221, and iv.62, p. 223, however, several negative and positive 
elements of the terrain are considered as conditions for a society’s progress.  
36 Note how in this instance it becomes clear that the extent of the market is always tied to 
a particular location. Smith speaks of the “extent of their market”, i.e. the extent of the 
market of the inland parts of the country, meaning the power of exchanging from these 
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A hundred rich people will represent a larger market than a thousand poor 
people, if they permit, by their larger buying power, a larger power of exchanging. 
Wealth is therefore clearly important for the extent of the market.  
Smith also repeats this in his critique of mercantilism. He states at IV.iii.c.11 
(p. 494), for example: “As a rich man is likely to be a better customer to the 
industrious people in his neighbourhood, than a poor, so is likewise a rich nation. A 
rich man, indeed, who is himself a manufacturer, is a very dangerous neighbour to 
all those who deal in the same way. All the rest of the neighbourhood, however, by 
far the greatest number, profit by the good market which his expence affords 
them.” The two quotes from Lectures of Jurisprudence linking population and 
division of labour, cited in the introduction of this chapter (p. 174 above), also 
appear in that context, and are preceded and/or followed by the observation that 
free trade with France would be more advantageous than with Spain or Portugal, 
as France is not only more populous but also much richer.  
But no more than natural waterways can wealth be considered an 
independent factor — independent, that is, of the elements that were already 
established as the fundamental constituents of the extent of the market: the size of 
population and the quality of its connection through space. First, wealth, of course, 
is of no influence on the extent of the market without people to use it. (From a 
more ontological standpoint, indeed, without people to use it, there can be no 
wealth at all.) And while for certain goods, few people will suffice to circulate a lot 
of wealth, whether in the form of stock or income (luxuries, for which wants are 
unlimited), for other goods, there is necessarily a certain proportionality between 
consumption and size of population (especially foodstuff, because of the limited 
capacity of the human stomach, WN I.ix.c.7). Second, and more significantly, wealth 
is itself not independent of the level of the division of labour and capital 
accumulation attained by a society, by which it is created and accumulated.37 
Division of labour is limited by the extent of the market, the determination of 
which must thus rely, at the outset, on other factors but division of labour, as 
otherwise Smith’s depiction of the relation between the market and the division of 
labour would be a mere tautology. Wealth can therefore not be counted as a primal 
element constitutive of markets. Originally, it is the result, and not the cause, of the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
inland parts. See also the same proposition at WN III.i.1: “The greater the number and 
revenue of the inhabitants of the town, the more extensive is the market which it affords 
to those of the country”. 
37 Recall that Smith is concerned with “real wealth, the annual produce of the land and 
labour of the society” (WN 9, p. 12). 
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division of labour. Wealth is a result of the development of society in the Smithian 
system, which itself depends on the extension of the market. 
Young (1928, p. 533) famously expanded Smith’s analysis to imply that the 
division of labour is limited by the division of labour: “Modified, then, in the light of 
this broader conception of the market, Adam Smith's dictum amounts to the 
theorem that the division of labour depends in large part upon the division of 
labour.” And Young added that “This is more than mere tautology”. It is more than 
mere tautology, however, only by virtue of the element of time. What is significant 
is not that the “division of labour depends on the division of labour”, which is a 
mere tautology, but that the current division of labour depends on previous 
division of labour. What Young seeks to describe with this pseudo-tautology is a 
continuous, path-dependent, cumulative and self-enforcing process of change.  
It is significant, therefore, that the extent of the market is considered by 
Smith in conjunction with time. (References to time are italicised in the following 
quotes.) Smith’s opening sentence on the advantages of water-carriage at the 
beginning of the third paragraph of Chapter III Book I (WN p. 32), explaining that 
since water-carriage augments the power of exchanging, development 
(improvement), spurred by the division of labour, must naturally proceed faster 
near the coast and navigable rivers, continues and ends with this clause: 
and it is frequently not till a long time after that those improvements 
extend themselves to the inland parts of the country. 
After illustrating the advantages of water carriage over land-carriage by 
some numerical examples in the remainder of this paragraph, Smith begins the 
next paragraph by repeating in only slightly different wording the first sentence of 
the previous one just considered:  
Since such, therefore, are the advantages of water-carriage, it is natural that 
the first improvements of art and industry should be made where this 
conveniency opens the whole world for a market to the produce of every 
sort of labour, and that they should always be much later in extending 
themselves into the inland parts of the country. (WN.I.iii.4, p. 34) 38 
                                                        
38 It should be noted that in Smith’s own terms, this is somewhat of an exaggeration. In 
fact, even water carriage does not “[open] the whole world for a market to the produce of 
every sort of labour”, since the cost-effectiveness of carrying products over long distance 
for sale is itself relative to the value of these products where these can be exchanged. It is 
important to note, therefore, that when Smith writes of “the market”, it is generally tied 
not only to a particular place, but also to a particular product. Insofar as the market is 
related to geographical considerations, it is crucial to attach it to a particular place. How 
far the market reaches from that place depends, however, on the particular product to be 
exchanged. For some products, their high value, coupled with their relative ease of 
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While wealth cannot be counted as a primal element of the extent of the 
market, it thus later gets incorporated and forms a defining element of the latter. 
The same is true for technology, in the sense that for Smith it is largely integrated 
into the division of labour (Lowe 1954, p. 135; Elmslie 1994a). Eventually, 
technological development will obviously make people more accessible to each 
other by using better means of transportation, etc. But this technology is an 
outcome of the very process we are considering. Hence, at the elemental level, 
technology is also not included by Smith into the definition of the extent of the 
market.  
Technology is not directly mentioned by Smith in his chapter on the extent of 
the market, although it is indirectly alluded to. Arguably, a basic technological 
component is thus included into the extent of the market with the element of 
natural waterways. Indeed, to make use of waterways for transportation, a society 
needs to have at least developed a rudimentary form of shipping technology. For 
two reasons, however, this is not fundamental. First, this technological component 
could be very rudimentary indeed. Rafts and canoes can be made quite simply 
from (fallen) tree trunks and branches found along river shores. Beyond this 
reason that very rudimentary technology suffices here, however, is a more 
fundamental point, which can only be understood by keeping in mind the circular 
nature of causality in the Smithian system, which shall be analysed in more detail 
in the following chapter. This is that while we need some form of technology to 
make use of rivers, the opposite is also true, and essential for Smith’s argument. 
Thus, it is because there are rivers (augmenting the extent of the market) that the 
technology to make use of them (through ever-increasing division of labour and 
hence scientific and technological progress) will be developed. Incrementally, from 
                                                                                                                                                                  
transportation (“such whose price was very considerable in proportion to their weight” 
WN I.iii.3), warrants exchange over long distance, while for others, where this relation is 
less favourable, the market is confined to the immediate vicinity. Smith illustrates this 
with the example of coal and metal mines. The market of the metal mine is potentially the 
whole world, since the value of metal renders economical the cost to transport it virtually 
everywhere. The coal mine, on the other hand, has a smaller potential market, since, 
relatively to the metal mine, it is not economical, given its lower value, to transport the 
coal very far for sale (WN I.xi.c.21). (These markets are potential only because in early 
stages of society they rely on foreigners to take charge of the carrying trade, see WN III.i.7, 
p. 380). Smith also contrasts clothes with materials of lodging (WN I.xi.c.5), wool and raw 
hides with butcher’s-meat (I.xi.m.4-5), manufactures with corn or cattle, and finer 
manufactures with coarser ones (IV.ii.16, VI.i.29-30, IV.ix.41), the former and latter of 
these being respectively more economical and less economical to transport. He often 
refers to the ease of transport of precious metals relative to their high value (WN I.xi.m.18, 
IV.i.5, 12-13; IV.iv.15). If, hence, the whole world was opened for a market “to the produce 
of every sort of labour”, Smith’s theory of the relative market for products — relative, that 
is, to distance, cost and value — would be pointless. 
198 
rafts to canoes to bigger ships, by the progressive division of labour and capital 
accumulation made possible by the extension of the market that these waterways 
constitute and further permit, shipping technology will be developed in order to 
make use of them for transportation. What is fundamental here is the presence, in 
the first place, of these waterways and people to use them. This brings us back 
squarely to the theme of the connection between the expansion of the market and 
the development of society over the very long run, which, as we know, is organised 
by Smith in four stages of progress. It is the connection between the development 
of the market and the progression of Smith’s stages which we shall at present 
consider.  
 
5. Population growth and the market in the early 
stages of society 
In Smith’s “primitive stage”, there is hardly any technology, no capital and only 
very few people — as well as no private property, but this does not need to 
concern us here.39 Smith considered that groups of early humans, due to the nature 
                                                        
39 It may be argued that the very idea of a market (or of exchange more generally) depends 
on the existence of private property. Some critics of Smith, notably Karl Polanyi (2001 
[1944], p. 45-6), have in fact argued that Smith’s idea of exchange among hunter-gatherers 
is in contradiction to anthropological evidence that commercial exchange was (is) not 
present in such societies. (For a similar treatment of the historical record see Heilbroner 
1999 , Chapter 2.) But Smith in fact conceived of the ‘beginning’ of exchange precisely in a 
setting where there is no private property (i.e. in the primitive, hunter stage). Exchange as 
such, indeed, does not need to be of a commercial nature, and Smith actually made it very 
clear — at least in his lectures — that, at first (i.e. in the “primitive state”), exchange 
happened as a form of gift-giving (above p. 177). Private property, therefore, is no more 
necessary for the existence of markets than the motive of self-interest (see above p. 176-
178). This suggests that the “propensity to truck, barter and exchange”, which Smith 
attributes to man, either as an original part of human nature or as a consequence of the 
faculty of speech and reason (WN.I.ii.2, p. 25) is indeed present according to him even 
among people who have not (yet) instituted the right to or practice of private property. 
Polanyi’s critique of Smith rests on the 20th century meaning of market as institution 
(discussed above p. 168 and 178). In Smith’s theory of the dependence of the division of 
labour on the existence of a market, however, the market describes the “power of 
exchanging”, without which exchange, whether of a commercial nature or not, is thus by 
definition impossible. Polanyi’s charge against Smith, of having elevated commercial 
motives over all other human motivations — in particular in “primitive man”, as opposed 
to “modern man” where such a view would, it is held, be more justified — is a common 
misreading of Smith, related to the Adam Smith Problem, which can only be sustained by 
declaring the rest of Smith’s oeuvre either irrelevant to or in contradiction with the 
particular passages in the Wealth of Nations from which such a view is inferred. In order to 
establish that division of labour does not depend on markets (which he misreads to imply 
commercial exchange), Polanyi is further driven, contra Smith’s egalitarian view of the 
relationship between division of labour and people’s talents (n. 31 above), to revert to a 
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of their mode of subsistence as hunters, were limited in numbers to about a 
hundred fifty people (LJ(A) iv.36, p. 213; FA.3, p. 583). In this small human group, if 
all individuals were fully self-sufficient, there would be zero connections of 
exchange between the members of the group. It is important to stress that this is a 
totally fictitious situation. Humans (like the other great apes) are by nature social 
animals (and pack hunters), which are engaged in mutual aid and assistance 
(including provision of food and thus material goods) from the very start of and 
throughout their lives.40 Indeed, the inherently social nature of human beings 
irrespective of time and place was one that was opposed by Smith and Hume to the 
17th and 18th century theories of the state of nature and original contract.41 Smith 
clearly expressed this idea in his discussion of the division of labour in the second 
chapter of Wealth of Nations: 
In almost every other race of animals each individual, when it is grown up 
to maturity, is intirely independent, and in its natural state has occasion for 
the assistance of no other living creature. But man has almost constant 
occasion for the help of his brethren (WN.I.ii.2, p. 26)  
A total absence of division of labour in human society was therefore quite 
unthinkable (just as it is unthinkable in a beehive, Mandeville’s famous metaphor 
                                                                                                                                                                  
view of the origins of division of labour that harks back to Plato (but was also again 
adopted, after Smith, by Ricardo in his theory of ‘comparative advantage’ and through the 
latter endures in economic theory to this day): “Division of labor, a phenomenon as old as 
society, springs from differences inherent in the facts of sex, geography, and individual 
endowment; and the alleged propensity of man to barter, truck, and exchange is almost 
entirely apocryphal” (Polanyi 2001 [1944], p. 46). 
40 That Smith had no issue in seeing man as belonging generally to the animal kingdom is 
clear from such statements as “It is common to all men, and to be found in no other race of 
animals” (I.ii.2) or “As men, like all other animals, naturally multiply in proportion to the 
means of their subsistence” (I.xi.b.1). Linnaeus — whose work Smith was familiar with — 
had, in 1758, placed man in the order of primates. (In 1776, the year of the publication of 
the Wealth of Nations, humans were given their own separate taxon by Johann 
Blumenbach, to be reintroduced into the order of primates again only a century later.) 
41 Thus, in addition to what was remarked in n. 39 above, Polanyi’s (2001 [1944], p. 48) 
observation that “if one conclusion stands out more clearly than another from the recent 
study of early societies, it is the changelessness of man as a social being”, which he 
opposes to Smith’s view of “primeval man as bent on barter and truck” (Polanyi 2001 
[1944], p. 47) is in fact entirely in line with what Smith himself advanced. Man’s social 
nature and his propensity to truck and barter were inherently linked for Smith. It is the 
impartial spectator (an inherently social mechanism) that is invoked by Smith in his 
lectures on jurisprudence to explain that a thing is considered as belonging to someone 
when he has invested his labour in it (such as an apple plucked from a wild apple tree), 
and it is the same explanation that is used in the Wealth of Nations for formulating the 
(labour) theory of value valid in the primitive state (see LJ(A) i.36-7, p. 17; i.41-44, p. 19-
20; and i.59-60, p. 25; and WN I.v.2, p. 47). 
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of human society). Smith’s use of a situation preceding the division of labour must 
in fact be considered to be a “philosophical fiction” in the sense that Hume laid out 
in 1739 (we shall consider this further in the next chapter, p. 229 below). Further, 
it can be considered that when Smith spoke of the division of labour, he was 
referring to an already fairly advanced kind of specialisation, as is the view 
defended by Meek and Skinner (1973, p. 1109), and that the basic form of division 
of labour existing among “savages” would thus not be referred to by Smith as such. 
In the Wealth of Nations as well as the Lectures of Jurisprudence, Smith 
mentions the activity of arrow making as a possible first coming into existence of 
the division of labour. Starting from a (hypothetical) situation of no exchange of 
goods and services in society (a clan of hundred-fifty hunters), the introduction of 
this single activity would, by necessity, influence relations of exchange in society. A 
highly specialised activity like making weapons, as opposed to hunting and 
gathering, needs a comparatively large market to be viable. Other than food, which 
can be used every day by everyone, the hunters will only be in need of new 
weapons occasionally, so that the only way for the maker of weapons to viably 
exercise his or her specialisation on a continuous basis within the group is to be 
able to exchange with all the hunters occasionally, whenever they are in need of a 
new weapon, so that he may constantly exchange new weapons with one or the 
other of them. The human group in question, i.e. hundred fifty savages, is in fact a 
market. And it needs a market of such a modest size at least for the activity of 
arrow- and bow-making to arise. Eventually, with additional specialisations 
arising, this will lead to the introduction of some type of currency for the new 
types of more and more indirect exchanges to be feasible (as developed in WN I.iv).  
 What, then, is our human group to do when the division of labour has 
progressed to its absolute limit with that size of market, in order to extend the 
division of labour? How can the market be enlarged? Since the market is defined by 
the power of exchanging, to increase the size of the market, possibilities of 
exchange need to be multiplied. As developed in the previous section, 
technological advance or capital accumulation are not an option, as these are 
themselves bound up with the development process, which is itself constrained by 
the extent of the market.42 This being the primitive stage, “original accumulation” 
has not yet occurred. 
                                                        
42 It may be noted that capital accumulation is determined by profits and savings. For 
these to occur, however, wealth needs to expand, and this, as Smith announces in the 
preface of the Wealth of Nations, is the result primarily of labour becoming more 
productive, which itself is the result of the division of labour, which again is limited by the 
extent of the market. 
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Two solutions seem to offer themselves to this human group: either the 
population grows, which augments the possibilities of exchange internal to the 
society in question, or  the group engages in foreign trade.  
With the growth of population the market will in effect be enlarged, since 
with more people there will be further opportunities of exchange. The growth of 
population could take place either internally, or the group could converge with 
another, creating a more drastic increase. 
The possibilities to engage in external trade, on the other hand, are limited 
precisely by what we are considering: the extent of the market. Or, more precisely, 
the possibilities to engage in trade (external and internal) are what determines the 
extent of the market; they in fact are the extent of the market. Even if silver lies in 
the soil, right in the vicinity of our group of hunter-gatherers, for example, they 
neither have the technology nor the capital to carry it to where they may exchange 
it against something of use to them, let alone to get it out of the ground in the first 
place. We can see here the problem with external trade as a means to enlarge the 
market. Considering that the market can be enlarged by trade is putting the 
carriage before the horse. Once a society has evolved to a certain level of technical 
sophistication and capital accumulation, it becomes economical for the society to 
engage in all kinds of trade. In order for the society to amass — and, more 
importantly, to implement — this technology, however, the market first needs to 
expand. The only way the market can be enlarged through foreign trade is by 
enlarging the possibility to engage in foreign trade, which for an isolated group of 
hunter-gatherers is a feat largely outside of their control. Since they do not possess 
the capital and technology (the two being closely linked) to facilitate long-distance 
trade themselves (by building roads or ships for example), the only way this could 
happen is if another human group reaches out to them by building such 
connections, or through human migrations which will put them in contact with 
other groups (or, in a longer term perspective, by climatic or geographical change, 
increasing the flow of rivers for example, making them more navigable, or 
transforming deserts into more fertile grassland or indeed connecting formerly 
disjointed land-masses, making them more easily crossable). This makes it very 
clear that in a situation where the whole world was composed of small groups of 
hunter-gatherers, the only way (other than geological change) by which the overall 
market of humanity (the power of exchanging of all humans in the world with all 
others, of all goods in general) could be expanded was through the growth of 
population. 
It is important in this respect that the geographical features that may 
facilitate trade, in particular navigable rivers, which Smith singles out as making 
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for a larger market, are natural (not man-made) ones. Indeed, Smith held that “The 
being of a market first occasioned the division of labour” (LJ(A)vi.64). Society 
needs the being of a market (the possibility of exchange) in order to progress from 
the savage state, in which division of labour is minimal. The means to create 
artificial waterways (or other large infrastructure or ‘overhead capital’ that 
facilitates transportation) are only available to a society having advanced to a 
considerable degree of division of labour and accumulation of stock already; and 
for society to advance to this late stage a comparatively large market needs to exist 
in the first place. The waterways that Smith mentions hence are (and can only be) 
natural ones. In the first two stages (the hunting and the pastoral ones), however, 
waterways are of little incidence to the extent of the market, as there is as yet little 
produced that would warrant transportation over water, and the technology and 
capital necessary to engage in such carriage by navigation are not available in any 
case. At these initial stages of society, therefore, only the growth of population can 
possibly enlarge the market. 
The growth of population also augments the relative scarcity, and therefore 
the price (in labour), of some foodstuff. The increased possibilities of division of 
labour that an enlarged population create, however, more than compensate for 
this. A larger population, on balance and in the long run, is a positive force (indeed 
a necessary condition) for society’s progress, in fact, as we have seen in the 
previous chapter, not only despite, but at least partly because population growth 
first creates hardship, through greater difficulty in food procurement as long as the 
mode of subsistence remains unchanged. The same idea of increasing difficulty 
(diminishing returns) in food procurement with a rising population is developed 
by Smith especially in the long Chapter XI of Book I of Wealth of Nations.43 Indeed, 
in each stage of society, the prevailing source of nourishment (wild animals in the 
hunter stage, raised animals in the shepherd stage, raised crops and animals in the 
agricultural and commercial stages) becomes more expensive as population 
progresses, as the necessary input or source of this foodstuff becomes relatively 
scarcer in relation to population. Thus, wild animals rely on the wilds (forests, 
savannas, steppes), which mechanically diminish in per capita terms as population 
expands, and the same is true for grazing land in the shepherd state and 
agricultural ground thereafter. The latter was given greater emphasis in Ricardo’s 
                                                        
43 In particular, one may find this idea developed in the part “Different Effects of the 
Progress of Improvement upon the real price of three different Sorts of rude Produce” 
(l.xi.j-m, p. 234-55). I.xi.m.15, p. 253, contains a statement of the law of diminishing 
returns, expressed by the procurement of fish, very much resembling the Ricardian rent 
theory.  
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and Malthus’ theory of rent. Ricardo and Malthus, however, thereby neglected the 
other (and dominant) effect that Smith saw deriving from a larger population. 
While Malthus, as we have seen in the previous chapter, incorporated Smith’s 
view (possibly unbeknownst to him, as it does not appear in the Wealth of Nations) 
that the hardship that the greater relative scarcity of land occasions with rising 
population prompted technological development (“industry” or “exertion” in 
Malthus’ words), Malthus did not adopt Smith’s idea that the rise of productivity 
was produced, also, directly by a larger population, through the division of 
labour.44 For Smith, the division of labour needs a growing market to progress, but 
this growing market, as we have seen, is in fact provided directly and immediately 
by an increasing population. Thus, the growth of population does not only create 
the need for improved technology (notably of food-procurement), but also — and 
at the same time — provides the opportunity of improved technology (via 
increased division of labour) through the enlargement of the market it occasions. 
And this improved technology and deepened division of labour does not simply 
compensate for the larger relative scarcity of certain natural resources, but it more 
than compensates for it, so as to make the average real price of goods (i.e. their 
average price in labour) sink.  
The growth of population is thus the most important driver of market growth 
(indeed the only possible one for an isolated group) in the original setting of 
Smith’s primitive state. The importance of the growth of population for the growth 
of the market, more generally, is proportionate to the stage of development and 
the isolation of the society in question. The less developed and the more isolated a 
society, the more important is the growth of population for the extension of its 
market. The following section will examine by which two conjoining forces the 
growth of population extends the market, related to the peopling progress and the 
stadial evolution of societies (and humanity as whole). 
 
6. Population, distance and the stages of society 
The growth of population augments the number of potential trading partners. This 
increases the power of exchanging. The growth of population thus quite 
mechanically enlarges the market. The process, moreover, is an exponential one. 
The number of possible trade relations augments much more than proportionally 
                                                        
44 See the quote on p. 142 above in which Malthus holds that it was not a larger population 
itself that occasioned progress, but only the greater hardship it occasions, which Malthus 
used to back up his anti-egalitarian stance. 
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to the growth of population. Thus, increasing, for example, a group from ten 
individuals to a thousand individuals (i.e. multiplying them by a hundred) 
multiplies the possible relations between any two individuals by a hundred 
thousand.45  
The preceding considerations, however, abstract from space. Considering 
only the amount of potential trading partners neglects the difficulty that they have 
to trade with one another (the power of exchanging, precisely), which is 
determined in large part by the distance that separates individuals.46 The 
importance of distance for the extension of the division of labour is directly 
apparent in Smith’s comparison of the highlands of Scotland with more populated 
towns. The difference between the two is not the overall population size, but the 
distance at which the individuals are placed from one another. In other words, 
other than the number of potential trading partners, what is relevant for the power 
of exchanging is the accessibility of these potential trading partners — if they are 
not accessible, they are not potential trading partners in the first place, indeed. 
Most of the goods that are produced are not so valuable as to warrant 
transportation over great distances for the benefit that can be obtained through 
their exchange. For many of the goods and services produced by a society — and 
this is all the more the case as the society is relatively little developed — the only 
individuals that come within the range of being possible trading partners are the 
ones in the immediate vicinity of the producers.47  
As was already remarked, the extent of the market is conceived by Smith 
usually in relation to a particular place, from which the power of exchanging is thus 
designated. Smith also speaks of the extent of the market of particular countries or 
                                                        
45 As Christakis (2012, p. 81-2) puts it: “The whole is greater than the sum of its parts.  . . .  
Perhaps the most impressive [example] is that carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen, sulfur, 
phosphorus, iron, and a few other elements, mixed in just the right way, yield life   . . .  not 
present in or predictable from these constituent parts.  . . .  It is also the case that the whole 
has a complexity that rises faster than the number of its parts.  . . .  If we have 10 people in 
a group, there are a maximum of 10 x 9/2 = 45 possible connections between them. If we 
increase the number of people to 1,000, the number of possible ties increases to 1,000 x 
999/2 = 499,500. So, while the number of people has increased by a hundredfold (from 10 
to 1,000), the number of possible ties (and hence this one measure of the system’s 
complexity) has increased more than ten thousandfold.” 
46 The same shortcut is hence taken by considering population separately from space as 
the one that was described to be made if considering demand as separately from space; 
see above p. 179. 
47 Even today, although transport costs have drastically fallen since the 18th century, 
distance between population centres and their accessibility from everywhere else remain 
absolutely decisive for patterns of trade (and the market, understood as the possibility of 
trade). See on this for example Brakman and van Marrewijk (2008). 
205 
regions as a whole, however. In this case (as when considering the extent of the 
market of the whole world), this must be understood to be an implicit computation 
of all the powers of exchanging of the individuals or economic entities within the 
territory considered. As mentioned above, Smith is not concerned always with 
national boundaries only in this regard. He considers the extent of the market of 
towns and regions, as well as continents. All these, however, cover a certain 
territory, and the power of exchanging of these towns, regions, countries or 
continents must be understood as a computation of the whole (or average) power 
of exchanging of all economic entities within the territory with each other and with 
the rest of the world. Other considerations aside (notably how difficult it is to 
overcome a given distance, which varies with the type of territory and the 
technology and capital available — but these, as we have seen, are themselves 
dependent of the process we are examining), the power of exchanging within a 
given territory is directly dependent on the average distance separating 
individuals from one another within that territory. 
How, then, is this average distance of individuals one from another related to 
the growth of population? The answer might appear straightforward: ‘An increase 
of population on a given territory mechanically augments population density 
within that territory. The denser the population, the shorter the distance between 
individuals on average, the easier is exchange between individuals or, in other 
words, the greater is the power of exchanging. Higher density of population makes 
for a larger market.’  
The question hence becomes what influence the growth of population has on 
population density. This, of course, depends in large part on the territory that can 
be occupied. As long as there is vast unoccupied land round and about a human 
group, the initial population could grow for a long time without any necessary 
increase in population density: a group of hunters finding their population 
increasing because of ready availability of food, inhabiting a (part of the) world 
still largely unoccupied by human beings, would simply spread out over the land, 
forming numerous new groups, continuing the same nomadic lifestyle of hunting 
and gathering at different locations, without any marked increase in population 
density. It is clear, however, that once we consider a population confined to a 
certain territory, or even the world as a whole, growth of population will 
necessarily augment population density. 
The increase of population density, as we have seen, is both cause and 
consequence of the change of the mode of subsistence: it is when population starts 
increasing on a given amount of land that food starts becoming scarce, and this will 
enjoin the human group to adopt a new mode of subsistence (recall that Smith uses 
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an island metaphor to illustrate the development of society through the four stages 
of subsistence, thus building in the constraint of a fixed territory). This new mode 
of subsistence, in turn, can accommodate a larger population on a given surface of 
land. As we have seen, Smith (see above p. 105), and before him Franklin (above p. 
123), had remarked that the more primitive a society, the larger is the territory 
that the same number of humans need for their subsistence. “the difference is very 
great between the number of shepherds and that of hunters whom the same extent 
of equally fertile territory can maintain” (WN IV.vii.c.100, p. 634). Thus a territory 
of equal size will be able to nourish a much larger number of people in the 
shepherd state than in the hunter stage, in the agricultural state than in the 
shepherd state, and in commercial society than in the agricultural state. Put 
differently, the same society occupying the same territory will have a comparably 
larger population the further evolved it is on the stadial scale. More evolved 
societies have both larger and denser populations therefore, so that their market is 
larger both for their larger amount of potential trading partners and their greater 
accessibility. 
So far, however, we have considered population density and accessibility of 
individuals one to another within a territory to be equivalents. This is not strictly 
accurate. Overall population density does not entirely capture what we are 
interested in, in fact, i.e. the (average or absolute) physical proximity of individuals 
to one another on a given territory. A large city with a large area of relatively 
empty space around it, for example, could have both the same overall size of 
territory and the same size of population (and therefore the same average 
population density) as a large rural area (such as the highlands of Scotland). Yet 
the average distance between individuals is lower in a territory of equal size and 
population comprising a city than in one where population is more spread out (see 
Figure 1).48 
                                                        
48 Which part of a territory we are considering is relevant then, and all the more relevant 
as the population is unevenly distributed. Thus, moving from the left to the right square in 
Figure 1, while overall density remains the same, the density of only the central area of the 
square is increased. Moreover, the portion regrouping the four individuals in the centre of 
the square on the right has a much larger population density than any other equal size 
portion of that same square, but also than any portion of equal size of the two other 
squares. When calculating simple average population density on a territory, the 
concentration of population is however not taken into account. 
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The value of population density is obtained by dividing the whole number of 
people by the whole size of the area considered. Therefore a territory of the same 
size with the same size of population will always have the same population density. 
But this does not tell us where people are situated on the area in question. As 
noted, if population is concentrated in one or a few central places, the average 
distance between individuals will be much smaller than if it is scattered 
throughout the territory, while the value of overall population density on the 
territory remains the same. It is even conceivable, in a large enough territory, that 
increase of population (and thus increase of average population density over the 
whole territory) goes hand in hand with an increase of the average distance 
between individuals, if population growth results in the spread out to yet 
unoccupied parts of the territory, instead of the concentration of population (see 
Figure 2). Thus average population density on a territory does not give us a very 
precise account of the average distance between individuals on that territory. 
What, then, other than the number of people on a territory (i.e. population 
density) alone, determines the distance between people, which allows or 
constrains their ability to trade, and hence further conditions the power of 
exchanging? And how is this related to the growth and size of population? Why is it 
that people are found more or less far away from each other in any given region? 
This is a feature of the settlement process, the process by which a population 
grows, and, as a result, both spreads out over the land, in an early stage of the 
process, and, at a later stage, concentrates in a limited number of places (i.e. 
urbanises). In other words, it is intimately linked to Smith’s conception of the 
stadial progress of society through different modes of subsistence.  
Figure 1: Population density and average distance  
Average population density is the same in all three boxes, but the 
average distance of individuals from each other decreases from 
left to right 
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In population ecology, the ways populations are distributed over a territory 
are referred to as patterns of dispersion. Populations can be evenly distributed, 
randomly distributed, or lumped together in a number of places.49 In terms of 
average distance between individuals, there is no great difference between the 
uniform and the random pattern. The clumped pattern, however, makes for a much 
larger average proximity between individuals (see Figure 3). The clumped pattern 
is thus much more conducive, when human population is considered, to an 
extension of the market. 
 
                                                        
49 These patterns of dispersion, however, also depend on the area considered. While over a 
larger territory population may be “clumped”, when we look at only the area of one of the 
lumps, it may appear to be evenly or randomly distributed (or again lumped, forming a 
fractal pattern). 
Figure 3. Patterns of dispersal. A clumped pattern of dispersal of 
an equally sized population makes for a much smaller average 
distance of individuals from one another than a uniform or 
random pattern of dispersal.
Figure 2. Population size and average distance. Population size 
(and with it population density) increases from left to right. 
Average distance between individuals increases too. 
209 
When the whole world, or any large territory, is beheld, human populations are of 
course never entirely uniformly or randomly distributed. Although our species has 
come to occupy almost every sort of habitat, some regions (deserts, the polar 
regions, high mountain ranges) are less attractive than others (with easy access to 
points of freshwater and abundant sources of food), so that the former are less 
occupied, and the general pattern of distribution — over the whole world, or the 
larger regions that compose it — of human population, even in its savage 
condition, is thus more or less clumped. When only the more hospitable parts of 
the world are considered, human populations can however be much more evenly 
distributed. The degree to which population will be clumped together, in fact, 
varies greatly with the mode of subsistence. 
In primitive society, bands of humans roam through a territory, and, since 
they need a large stretch of land in order to hunt, will need to keep a relative 
distance from other such human bands. Hunters thus live in small groups with a 
relatively large distance between them. Shepherds can sustain larger groups 
(which makes them notably a much larger threat to civilised nations). As Smith is 
reported to have observed in his lectures: 
In a nation of hunters and fishers few people can live together, for in a short time 
any considerable number would destroy all the game in the country, and 
consequently would want a means of subsistance. Twenty or thirty families are the 
most that can live together, and these make up a village, but as they live together 
for their mutual defence and to assist one another, their villages are not far distant 
from each other.  . . .  On the other hand a much greater number of shepherds can 
live together. There may be a thousand families in the same village. The Arabs and 
Tartars who have always been shepherds have on many occasions made the most 
dreadfull havoc. (LJ(B) 27-9, p. 407-8) 
The more significant change in the mode of occupation of territory, however, 
comes in the third and fourth stage. Thus, while a population of hunters may have 
a tendency to spread out over the land to find new grounds to hunt, and a 
population of shepherds to find new lands to let their animals graze on, once a
population is fully settled (i.e. from the third stage of society onwards), the 
tendency is toward population concentration. This is a direct corollary of the 
development of the division of labour. Thus, from the onset of agriculture, human 
populations show a much more markedly clumped pattern of dispersion. Indeed, 
when such a human population expands, it will regroup around places offering 
greater opportunities for trade — along the shores of navigable rivers and seas, as 
Smith points out in the third chapter of Wealth of Nations, and along roads on 
which trade is conducted, at a more advanced stage of society. As humans stand by 
nature in need of one another, and increasingly so with the deepening of the 
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division of labour, a growing population will naturally be drawn closer together, 
i.e. become more concentrated geographically. Population growth thus naturally 
leads (via the division of labour) to human concentration. 
Thus urbanisation is, for Smith, the outcome of the process of the social 
division of labour, which starts first as specialisation outside of agriculture and 
thereby leads naturally to the formation of towns, as people not exercising 
agriculture are no more tied to the land, and find it more convenient to congregate 
in central places to be better able to exchange their respective services: 
Without the assistance of some artificers, indeed, the cultivation of land cannot be 
carried on, but with great inconveniency and continual interruption. Smiths, 
carpenters, wheel-writes, and plough-writes, masons, and bricklayers, tanners, 
shoemakers, and taylors, are people, whose services the farmer has frequent 
occasion for. Such artificers too stand, occasionally, in need of the assistance of one 
another; and as their residence is not, like that of the farmer, necessarily tied down 
to a precise spot, they naturally settle in the neighbourhood of one another, and 
thus form a small town or village. The butcher, the brewer, and the baker, soon join 
them, together with many other artificers and retailers, necessary or useful for 
supplying their occasional wants, and who contribute still further to augment the 
town. (WN III.i.4 p. 378) 
The same argument can be found in Lectures on Jurisprudence: 
Trades men naturally choose to live in towns, as they have there a market for their 
goods and an opportunity of bying those which they stand in need of; whereas if 
they stay in the country, there must be a great loss of time in providing their tools, 
d etc. and going to sell their commodities. (LJ(A) iv.142-3, p. 256) 
The very raison d’être of towns is thus to create markets, at the same time as they 
are also an outgrowth of the market process, in Smith’s characteristic circular and 
cumulative way, which we shall look at more closely in the next chapter. 
As we have seen in Section 2 above, the social distance between individuals 
increases with the progress of society, under the effect both of an increasing 
population and an increasing division of labour. An increasing population makes it 
necessary for the individual to know an ever larger number of people to be 
acquainted with the same proportion of the total population, while his capacity to 
form friendships is however absolutely limited, and in fact restrained by the other 
component of the progress of society, the division of labour, which increasingly 
isolates him in his professional life. Average physical distance between individuals, 
on the other hand, is constantly diminishing with the progress of society, as 
increasing division of labour requires an increasing number of exchanges with an 
increasing number of people, making the population gather in central places in 
order to be able to better exchange their produce. 
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The growth of population, then, has a double-incidence on the extent of the 
market. First, the multiplication of individuals within a territory increases the 
amount of possible trade relations within that territory. Second, the growth of 
population on a territory reduces the mean distance between individuals on that 
territory, facilitating trade relations — not in itself, but through the particular 
mode of the occupation of space and of settlement that is characteristic of growing 
human populations on a limited territory, under the influence of the successive 
changes in mode of subsistence that this growth of population on a limited 
territory brings about (as analysed in Chapter 1). The effectiveness of the first 
effect is largely conditional on the second one being operative. (A growing 
population of hunters surrounded by vast uninhabited land may simply spread out, 
not greatly augmenting the number of potential trade partners, as the number of 
people accessible to each individual or group remains sensibly the same). But once 
a growing population starts settling on the land, and congregating in central places, 
after the onset of agriculture, the growth of population both augments potential 
trading partners and shortens the average distance between them. In this way, 
population growth has an escalating or exponential effect on the power of 
exchanging, which is further compounded by the accumulation of capital, wealth, 
and technology, as the market expands. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we considered the importance of population for Smith’s conception 
of the market. It was shown that population is the primal constituting element of 
the extent of the market in Smith’s theory. This implies that division of labour, and 
thereby economic development, is spurred by the growth of population, since “the 
division of labour is limited by the extent of the market”. The importance of the 
size of population for the extent of the market, and the productivity-enhancing 
effect of the growth of population that this implies, are in line with the role 
population growth plays for the advancement of society in the four stages theory, 
analysed in Chapter 1, and shows how closely the two ideas of the four stages 
theory and the division of labour being limited by the extent of the market are 
related.  
Going deeper into the analysis of the relation between population growth and 
market growth, we have to consider not only overall growth but also location of 
population, which are inseparable to begin with, as population is necessarily 
located in space in a certain manner. By looking at the particular mode of the 
occupation of space of (growing) human populations, it becomes clear that a 
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growing human population will enlarge the market by two conjoining forces: the 
growth of the possible number of trade connections implied by the growth of the 
number of people; and the facilitation of these connections by the shortening of the 
mean distance between individuals through densification of population, itself a 
joint effect of population growth and the increased division of labour that ensues 
from it, of which urbanisation is the spatial manifestation. Thus population growth 
has an escalating or exponential effect on the increase of the market, which is 
further compounded by the accumulation of capital, wealth and technology as the 
market expands. 
Allyn Young’s 1928 paper has the great merit of having highlighted the 
ongoing importance of Smith’s theorem that the division of labour is limited by the 
extent of the market for modern economics and of having motivated many Smith 
scholars (and economists) to study this particular aspect of Smith’s theory. The 
pitfall of this is that, by the very reputation of that paper and its engaging language, 
many scholars have taken it as the main authority on Smith’s ideas on division of 
labour and the extent of the market. While Young himself wrote that he was merely 
“borrow[ing] a theme from one of the masters and add[ing] certain developments 
or variations of his own” (p. 529), not that he was engaging in an analysis of 
Smith’s theory per se, later scholars have often taken his paper as an accurate 
description of what Smith centrally expressed in Chapter III of Book I of Wealth of 
Nations (and which he reiterates or alludes to throughout the entire work, it 
forming the basis of his theory both of development and of trade).50  
My intention, in this chapter, was not to belittle Young’s article in any way. 
Indeed, the general thrust of the argument developed in this work, with regard 
notably to circular cumulative causation, as will become clearer still in the next 
chapter than it may have been in the present one, owes much to Young’s important 
paper (and the other, largely unknown pieces in which he developed his argument, 
available to the present generation of economists and historians of thought mainly 
through the work of Roger Sandilands51). I merely wished to highlight in this 
chapter that there is another component to Smith’s conception of the extent of the 
market, largely disregarded by Young in his famous paper (which is, in the 
                                                        
50 As Tony Aspromourgos expressed it to me in conversation, he was often wondering if 
what he was reading on Smith on the theme of  division of labour and extent of the market 
did not have more to do with Young than it did with Smith.  
51 See notably the volume edited by Sandilands and Mehrling (1999), which unites many 
largely unknown pieces by Young (chiefly encyclopaedia entries and contributions to 
popular science books, many of them unsigned) and the lecture notes of Young’s LSE class 
by Nicholas Kaldor edited and published in full by Sandilands (1990) and in part by Blitch 
(1990). 
213 
overwhelming majority of publications citing Young, the only piece by him cited); 
and that this other aspect of the extent of the market was arguably more important 
to Smith himself, for it is a condition for the other component, highlighted by 
Young, to hold. Although this aspect (the geographical and demographic nature of 
the Smithian market) is in itself readily recognised at least by some commentators 
on Smith, the importance of this feature of the extent of the market for the aspect 
Young stressed (the size of demand, or of the whole economy), the inseparable link 
between the two in fact, is insufficiently taken into account throughout.  
It has been noted in the previous chapter that the progressive separation of 
economics from the other social sciences in the 20th century correlated with the 
treatment of Smith’s oeuvre, the interpretation of Smith inherited from the 19th 
century German scholars who accused him of having abandoned moral philosophy 
(and other earlier concerns) in his work of political economy remaining influential 
(see p 101 above). The lack of interest in the definition of markets in contemporary 
economics, mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, and the implicit 
treatment of “the market” exclusively in its institutional dimension and as 
shorthand for the ‘capitalist system’, seem to have affected Smith scholarship in 
like fashion. But the transfer to the interpretation of Smith’s work of this reduced 
conception of markets (stripped of their material — including geographic and 
demographic — dimension) seems to have happened, as it were, more 
surreptitiously, and hence uncritically, than the adoption of the dichotomy-view of 
his work inherited from the “Adam Smith Problem”. The dichotomy-view, indeed, 
was vigorously rejected, notably by those scholars associated with the Glasgow 
edition of Smith’s works, and the coherence-view today largely prevails among 
historians of thought (although it does so to varying degrees and the dichotomy-
view still prevails in popular opinions about Smith, including among economists). 
The little noticed and discussed change in the acceptation of the concept of the 
market in economics has been adopted, I surmise, mostly unconsciously by 
historians of economic thought — for the most part themselves economists and 
necessarily influenced in their views by the current practice of the field — who, 
until the most recent past, represented the majority of scholars still studying 
Smith. Young’s 1928 reconsideration of Smith’s “theorem” that the division of 
labour is limited by the extent of the market, by offering an operational definition 
of this concept, filled the definitional void and was consequentially adopted by 
economists, including by historians of economic thought, as a useful analytic tool. 
But the verification of its applicability to Smith’s work was neglected.  
But while, thus, many historians of thought seem to have inadvertently taken 
Young’s conception of the market as representative of Smith, some commentators 
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have, on the other hand, given too much weight to Young’s originality vis-à-vis 
Smith. These scholars interpret Young’s own indication that he was using Smith’s 
theorem “in much the way that some minor composer borrows a theme from one 
of the masters and adds certain developments or variations of his own” (1928, p. 
529) as excessive modesty on his part. In this view, it is Young, not Smith, who is 
credited with developing a theory of industrial differentiation and of economic 
growth as a self-perpetuating, circular and cumulative process, starting from what 
is taken to be Smith’s rudimentary and confined vision of the division of labour, 
limited to division of crafts in the pin factory.52 In fact, both these elements 
(industrial differentiation and cumulative endogenous growth) are fully present in 
Smith’s work, and developed in much greater detail than in Young’s article — 
unsurprisingly, given that Young’s 1928 paper is only sixteen pages long, while the 
Wealth of Nations, in its different non-shortened editions, abuts a thousand pages. 
Regarding the pin factory as sole representative of Smith’s views on the division of 
labour is a frequent interpretation but one that stems from a very incomplete 
reading of Smith. Smith himself expressly stated that the pin factory, appearing at 
the very beginning of the Wealth of Nations, was only taken as example, because 
the phenomenon can there be observed under one roof, to better understand “the 
division of labour, in the general business of society” (or what Marx was to call the 
“social division of labour”) (WN I.i.2, p. 14). Industrial differentiation is described 
from the very start of Smith’s treatment of the subject in the Wealth of Nations, 
notably in the example of the woollen coat, to be found in the same first chapter as 
the one of the pin factory, which it concludes (WN I.i.11, p. 22-3). The cumulative 
circular nature of growth, moreover, or the view of economic development as a 
process of positive feedback, as we shall see in the next chapter, clearly emerges as 
the central feature of Smith’s own theory of economic development from a reading 
of the Wealth of Nations, especially when complemented by a reading of the 
Lectures of Jurisprudence, even though Smith did not, of course, use the modern 
vocabulary employed by Young to describe the phenomenon. It is thus with the 
circular and cumulative nature of Smith’s theory of development that we shall be 
concerned in the next chapter. 
  
                                                        
52 For this view see notably Chandra (2004); (2006), for which he is rightly confronted by 
Grieve (Grieve 2006a, 2006b). Earlier, Currie (1981, p. 52-3) stated that “Young’s major 
contribution was in recognising that what Smith viewed chiefly as a limitation on the 
division of labour — the size of the market — is at the same time the clue to self-
perpetuating growth.  . . .  Although Young modestly dubbed these findings mere variations 
on a theme of a master composer, they actually went far beyond not only what Smith 
envisaged but what Young’s contemporaries were thinking.” 
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Nineteenth-century science went wrong mostly because of the hard and 
narrow concept of causation which dominated it.  . . .  the two sharp ideas 
or rather situations of cause and effect were made to confront each other in 
every case of causation like two opposing forces. This logical precision 
immediately had the effect of making it impossible to understand how the 
one passed into the other in actual causation.  . . .  there is no way out of the 
impasse but by retracing our steps and recognising that these concepts are 
partial and misleading abstractions.  . . .  cause and effect are not at arm’s 
length but interlocked, and embrace and influence each other through the 
interpenetration of their two fields. (Smuts 1927 [1926], p. 1, 17-18) 
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Chapter 3 
 
Positive Feedback in Adam Smith’s 
theory of demo-economic development 
 
1. Introduction 
Carl Linnæus — a contemporary of Smith who was not only the creator of the 
modern nomenclatura of life and a renowned botanist, but also ventured himself 
into the territory of political economy — held that “it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to discern beginning and end in divine works. In a circle, namely, runs everything” 
(Linnaeus [1760] 1764, p. 18, cited and translated byMüller-Wille 2003, p. 166). 
Giambattista Vico, who had died in 1744, also held a view of the world of running 
in circles, and this being an expression of divine will.1 When in such a causal circle, 
there is not just “reproduction” of the cycle, but “enlarged reproduction” (in 
Marxian terms), i.e., when in successive points in time throughout the (repeating) 
cycle, an amplification of the phenomena thus causally linked has occurred, we are 
in the presence of a positive feedback mechanism, as it was called in the 20th 
century. It is in this manner that Smith, in general, conceived of causation. This 
concerns population as it does other elements of Smith’s theory of the 
development of society. It is characteristic, indeed, of Smith’s theory of progress as 
a whole, with the different elements composing it causally linked in such a manner. 
James Welling (1888, p. 9) believed that this mechanism “in which cause 
perpetually becomes effect and again turns effect into cause” was the “primary 
principle of causation in social progress”.2  
                                                        
1 Linnaeus also wrote, one year after Vico (in 1744 and 1745 respectively) about the 
rather peculiar subject of word impairment in what is today called aphasia (Östberg 
2003), which seems to indicate that one read the other, although I have not been able to 
find evidence of this in biographies of either. About Vico and his possible influence on 
Smith, see further above page 246, n. 38. On the relation between Linnaeus and Smith, see 
the annex to this chapter. 
2 Welling (ibid.) thought that “We should not wonder that the opponents of Malthus have 
often failed to credit him with a due allowance for this primary principle of causation  . . .  
because Malthus himself has often failed to take this principle into account in checking the 
too absolute logic with which he pits the law of population against the law of food supply, 
as if these two great and opposing protagonists filled alone the lists of the world-struggle.” 
In the rather careful way Welling expresses his criticism, it may be justified. See however 
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It is the opposite mechanism, however, that is a central feature of modern 
economics. Negative feedback is, indeed, the mechanism necessary for establishing 
and maintaining ‘equilibrium’, a concept around which the discipline, at least since 
the name “economics” has come into general use, has been built. The 19th century 
saw wide application of the principle of negative feedback in mechanics and 
chemistry. The transfer to the social sciences suggested itself.3 The mechanism of 
negative feedback is also present in Adam Smith’s work, notably contained in his 
theory of natural and market prices elaborated in Chapter VII of Book I of the 
Wealth of Nations.4 Considered as the basis for the development of equilibrium 
economic theory, this feature of Smith’s work has been elevated by some to his 
most valuable contribution to economics (Hollander 1973, p. 306; Schumpeter 
1986 [1954], p. 183).5 For the same reason, Nicholas Kaldor (1972, p. 1240), by 
contrast, in a paper that acknowledged its debt to Allyn Young, identified Smith’s 
concern with the price mechanism (in the context in which the principle of 
negative feedback is used) precisely as the moment when “economic theory went 
astray”.6 While some have gone so far as to depict Smith entirely (and approvingly) 
as an equilibrium theorist (Samuelson 1977),  it is, however, very much the 
opposite mechanism, the one of positive feedback, that underlies Smith’s view of 
the social, economic and political development of societies; and this, the 
development of societies, much more than the theory of natural and market prices, 
is the central theme running through the whole of the Wealth of Nations ―  not just 
the three opening chapters, as Kaldor seemed to imply ―  and a major theme 
underlying Smith’s entire work (see Chapter 1).7  
                                                                                                                                                                  
Pullen (2016) for a large number of examples in which Malthus, too, employed a circular 
logic of causation. 
3 On the influence of mechanics on both the natural sciences and economics (and vice 
versa) see especially Mirowski (1989) (the phenomenon of negative feedback is not 
treated specifically by Mirowski however). On the role of negative feedback in economic 
theory see Hodgson (2009) and in the same volume Holt and Pressman (2009, p. 78) and 
the rest of the volume edited by Berger (2009). See further Tassier (2010, p. 886-7) and 
Hornung (2015). 
4 For a look at the use of negative feedback by Smith, see Mayr (1971). 
5 Schumpeter writes: “The rudimentary equilibrium theory of Chapter 7, by far the best 
piece of economic theory turned out by A. Smith, in fact points toward Say and, through 
the latter’s work, to Walras.” Hollander, more approving of Smith throughout, also praises 
him most for the development of equilibrium theory. 
6 As was noted in the previous chapter (n. 4 on p. 166 above), this was an unfair criticism 
of Smith, as the argument made in the present chapter shall further establish. 
7 On the question of what the concept of general equilibrium implies for how the economic 
system is viewed, there is of course wide-ranging debate. ‘General equilibrium’ is often 
conceived as a means to encapsulate the interconnectedness of economic phenomena, and 
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Smith thus generally conceived of the relationship between different 
variables not exclusively as a change in one variable causing a change in the other, 
but rather as a complex relationship of cause and effect, whereby the behaviour of 
one element causes the other to behave in such a way as to bring about in the first 
precisely what provoked that behaviour in the second. As Viner (1927, p. 198) put 
it, Smith was applying “to the wilderness of economic phenomena  . . .  the unifying 
concept of a co-ordinated and mutually interdependent system of cause and effect 
relationships which philosophers and theologians had already applied to the world 
in general”. David Hume and his attack on the Aristotelian view of causation surely 
influenced Smith’s ideas on this subject.8  
This makes it difficult to clearly ascribe the respective roles of cause and 
effect to the different variables invoked by Smith. Moreover, the relationship of 
mutual cause and effect thereby frequently results in an amplification of the 
phenomenon under consideration, that is, a positive feedback loop, or what 
Gunnar Myrdal (1944, p. 75) referred to as “the principle of cumulation”. This 
underlies also to a large extent what has been considered as Smith’s notion of 
‘emergent’ or ‘spontaneous order’ (for which the “invisible hand” metaphor is 
epitomic). While the terms “positive feedback” and “cumulative causation” are 
                                                                                                                                                                  
as such Smith can clearly be linked to it. Critics of the ‘equilibrium approach’ in economics, 
on the other hand, highlight its static implication. Seen in this light, the concept of 
equilibrium (of the whole economy) clearly was not central to Smith’s concerns. On the 
theme both of equilibrium in economics in general and of Smith’s conception of 
equilibrium and the role of equilibrium in his theory, see notably Robbins (1930); Kaldor 
(1972); Myers (1976); Colander (1995); Fiori (1996); Hart (2003); Montes (2003b); 
Lawson (2005); Arthur (2010); Metcalfe (2010); and Witztum (2010). 
8 Schweber (1980, p. 198, fn. 11) holds that: “Scottish philosophy from Hume to Dugald 
Stewart and Thomas Browne rejected the notion that one could explain anything by 
referring to ultimate principles or processes whose existence and operation could not be 
ascertained from the observation of particular instances. And Hume's notion of causality 
played a central role in the development of the "social" sciences and in ascertaining 
mechanisms of evolution.” The influence of Hume’s ideas about causation on Smith is 
clearly visible, notably, in section II of ‘History of Astronomy’ (see in particular II.7-8, p. 
40-42). On this see further Raphael and Skinner (1980). At one point in the Theory of 
Moral Sentiments (II.ii.3- 5, p. 87), Smith affirmed that it is important to distinguish final 
from efficient causes, which Hill (2001, p. 6) takes as sufficient ground to affirm that 
“Smith’s entire vision is underpinned by the design principle and by a belief in Final 
Causes; indeed he rejects as untenable any explanation that refers solely to efficient 
causation”. But Smith’s concern here is with the distinction of outward appearance and 
internal functioning of the social fabric, not with the theory of causation per se, and the 
Aristotelian language Smith here used is in all appearance merely a pragmatic choice to 
make his particular point. The terminology of final and efficient causes is used neither in 
the Wealth of Nations nor in the student notes to Smith’s lectures. The cited paragraph 
(TMS II.ii.3- 5, p. 87) and the title — but not the text — of the last chapter of Part II of the 
same work (TMS II.iii. 3, p. 104) are, in fact, the only instances in Smith entire oeuvre 
where the terms are used. 
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fairly recent, indeed, what they describe is in keeping with the central concern of 
the Scottish Enlightenment in which Smith evolved, being the study of complex 
chains of causation in the working of human society, or, as Smith put it in his 
“juvenile” essay on ‘The Principles which Lead and Direct Philosophical Enquiries’ 
(see above p. 89), “those hidden chains of events which bind together the 
seemingly disjointed appearances of nature” (Astronomy III.i.1, p. 48). 
Allyn Young (1928) famously interpreted Smith’s thoughts on the 
interrelationship between division of labour and market growth as one of 
cumulative self-generating growth where “change becomes progressive and 
propagates itself in a cumulative way” (1928, p. 533). The surplus generated from 
within the economic system (not by particular firms or industries but through the 
synergy arising from the interconnectedness of the whole) Young designated with 
the term “increasing returns”. He took care to distinguish the way he used this 
concept — that is, to analyse the phenomenon of economic progress — from the 
narrow technical conception it had come to acquire in economic theory after 
Marshall, who still used it in a broad sense (Marshall 1920 [1890], p. 318). The 
narrow technical sense the concept had acquired in the meantime (as used for 
example by Chapman (1908)), Young believed, had misled economists into the 
fruitless “cost controversy” of the 1920s that Clapham’s (1922) and Robertson’s 
(1924) “empty economic boxes” critique of Pigou (1912) had spurned, away from 
the broader question of economic progress, undoubtedly the central theme of the 
Wealth of Nations. Contra those who would, later, interpret Smith as an equilibrium 
theorist, Young (1928, p. 533) held that the “The apparatus which economists have 
built up for the analysis of supply and demand in their relations to prices does not 
seem to be particularly helpful for the purposes of an inquiry into these broader 
aspects”. In Young’s sense, Kerr (1993) and Elmslie (1994a ; 1994b) have more 
recently interpreted Smith’s theory of development as one of positive feedback.9 
And Negishi (2004, p. 31) held that Smith’s theory both of trade and of increasing 
returns by division of labour can “be fully demonstrated only as a disequilibrium 
theory”. 
Allowing for the occurrence of “positive feedback” and “cumulative 
causation” in Smith’s system makes it possible to resolve some apparent 
contradictions in his thought, having arisen precisely form his interpretation 
through the lens of the modern equilibrium theory of economics. Of course, some 
                                                        
9 “Positive feedback” and “circular cumulative causation” (as well as “synergy” and 
“increasing returns”), while not strictly identical concepts, can for the broader purposes of 
the argument made in this chapter (to the effect that a conception of causation akin to the 
one at work in these phenomena is present in Smith’s theory) be treated as synonyms. 
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amount of conflict or contradiction may always remain in his work, which it will 
not be possible to interpret away. However, certain interpretations allow one to 
resolve apparent contradictions between different ideas of past thinkers, while 
others do not. Whether the former should necessarily be preferred is a matter of 
debate. Certainly, it should not be preferred at any cost. Quentin Skinner (1969) 
famously urged historians of thought to accept that past thinkers, whatever their 
fame and reputation in their lifetime and/or thereafter, could very well have 
contradicted themselves, especially when different works of theirs are considered 
that have been composed at very different moments in their lives. Yet, for the same 
reason for which Skinner argued against the forced establishment of coherence 
between different utterances of past thinkers, however contrived, as the 
paramount objective of the history of ideas — i.e. the need to consider ideas in 
their historical, linguistic and intellectual context and to pay heed to an author’s 
intention with regard to his main audience — we should also reject such 
interpretations of past thinkers that find conflict between their ideas only and 
precisely because these ideas are interpreted in modern terms, i.e. out of context. 
The debate about Smith’s purported “vent-for-surplus” argument for trade is a 
classic example of such apparent contradiction brought about only because a past 
author has been interpreted in light of latter ones’ work.10 The meaning of the 
terms employed by the earlier author is thereby necessarily deeply distorted, and, 
by mistaking the question this author is attempting to answer for the one that his 
or her commentators (or the dominant school of the day) are concerned with, a 
misinterpretation of the answer of the author to the question he was himself 
addressing is almost inevitable.11 
We shall analyse the use Smith makes of cumulative causation by looking at 
three particular instances of his considerations of social development, which will 
allow us, at the same time, to address three vexing questions in the history of 
economic thought and Smith scholarship regarding precedence, order and cause-
and-effect relationship of the involved elements of analysis.  
Smith’s treatment of the question of “primitive accumulation” in the Wealth 
of Nations was famously Marx's starting point for his chapter on this topic in 
Capital. But it can be shown, especially through an examination of Smith’s lectures 
                                                        
10 This point shall be developed in a forthcoming work. 
11 A useful example of this was related to me by Daniel Diatkine in conversation: while 
Smith was attempting to answer the question “why are we so rich”, Ricardo instead was 
interested in the question “why are we so poor”, and this would necessarily have distorted 
Ricardo’s interpretation of Smith’s work when read through his own opposite question, 
which he may well have done. 
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and the ‘Early Draft’, that the two authors fundamentally differed with regard to 
the understanding of this concept. While for Marx it was inseparably tied to the 
emergence of an advanced capitalist economy, Smith conceived this notion within 
the context of the “early and rude stages” of society that formed the starting point 
of his theory of socio-cultural evolution examined in Chapter 1. As we shall see, 
this distinction throws important light on the contentious question of which of 
these two elements — division of labour or capital accumulation — principally 
causes economic development for Smith. The following section (2) will thus 
examine the role of capital accumulation and division of labour in Smith’s theory of 
economic development, and the relation between these two elements. 
In Book III of the Wealth of Nations, Smith laid out the famous theory of the 
“natural progress of opulence”, and its opposite, the “unnatural and retrograde 
order”, the first proceeding from the development of agriculture (the “industry of 
the country”) to the development of manufactures (the “industry of the town”), the 
latter proceeding in opposite fashion. Here, Smith then clearly seems to lay out a 
blueprint for a policy of favouring agricultural development over the development 
of manufactures, at least at an early stage of the process of urbanisation. His 
account of how Europe in fact progressed, in an “unnatural” and “retrograde” 
fashion, therefore has appeared to many commentators as either in contradiction 
with Smith’s seeming advice, or as even proving the contrary of what he set out to 
prove. But reading an advocacy of the favouring of any kind of industry or sector 
over another into Smith’s position is in fact to interpret him to advocate for what 
precisely he criticised. The overarching principle is the one of natural liberty, 
which however should not be enforced, but must itself come about through free 
(natural) means. Here lies part of the resolution of the apparent conflict, as shall be 
laid out in Section 3. The relationship between town and country is one of mutual 
promotion, i.e. of positive feedback. This cycle can work any way around, but the 
order will depend on conditions in place. 
Another scholarly dispute in the interpretation of Smith’s work concerns the 
long-term prospect for economic growth, and the question whether it is bounded 
or without limit. Section 4 does not offer a definite answer to this question. When 
the process of economic development described by Smith is analysed in its full 
complexity, as a process of positive feedback with multiple elements variously 
linked in a circular and cumulative fashion, however, many of the passages in 
Smith’s work read as laying out a view of stagnation can be seen as containing 
themselves the seeds for a movement out of this stagnation. This must also be 
linked to the theme of the “slow progress of opulence”, treated in Section 1, which 
outlines a far greater difficulty of development in the early stages as in the later 
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ones, a characteristic feature of positive feedback. This theme is itself, in 
conclusion (Section 5) related to 20th century development literature, in which, by 
a reading of Smith (via Young) via modern equilibrium economics, a situation of 
positive feedback (with characteristic slow growth at the origin) was mistaken for 
one of negative feedback, describing a “low level equilibrium trap”.  
Although, as we shall see, the question of urban and regional growth for 
Smith, in particular, has to be considered within the context of the peopling 
process (which is the approach that has been adopted in the present work), the 
present chapter is thus not primarily concerned with the question of population. 
Rather, what will be attempted herein is an interpretation of the functioning of the 
overall system of Adam Smith’s theory of economic development, through a look at 
the particular way that Smith conceived of causal relationships between the 
different elements of his system of thought in treating of economic development. 
This, in turn, shall make it apparent in which way population — itself a crucial 
causal element in Smith’s conception of progress, as we have seen in the previous 
two chapters — is connected with the other elements of the system and integrates 
into the overall theory.  
 
2. The division of labour and “primitive” 
accumulation 
From the second part of Book I and throughout Book II of the Wealth of Nations, 
Smith exposes his view that capital accumulation is the basis for the economic and 
demographic development of societies. This can appear to be in conflict with the 
“Introduction and Plan of the Work” and the first three chapters of Book I. Here 
Smith had told us, first, that the principal circumstance which determines a 
nation’s ‘per capita GDP’12  is “the skill, dexterity, and judgment with which its 
labour is generally applied” (WN 1-4, p. 10); second, that “the greater part of the 
skill, dexterity, and judgment with which it is anywhere directed, or applied, seem 
to have been the effects of the division of labour” (WN I.i.1, p. 13). Different 
scholars have defended the position either that division of labour is the major 
element explaining economic growth in the Wealth of Nations (Lowe 1954 ; Loasby 
1996);13 or that this role is taken up by capital accumulation (Clark 1990 ; Brewer 
                                                        
12 i.e.: the proportion between “all the necessaries and conveniences of life which [every 
nation] annually consumes” and “the number of those who are to consume it”. 
13 “economic growth  . . .  can be stimulated only by a rise in productivity  . . .  In this factor 
we now encounter the strategic variable of the whole system.  . . .  The decisive variable is 
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1991).14 When looking for a prime mover (“decisive variable” or “independent 
cause”) in the constitution of economic growth in Smith’s writings, it is indeed not 
eminently clear which factor should be interpreted as taking this role. The 
difficulty can be removed by recognising that no one single variable in Smith’s 
system of concurrent emergent phenomena plays this role. Thus both division of 
labour and capital accumulation (and other elements, notably population) are, in 
Smith’s view, part of a complex virtuous cycle of development, in which the 
different elements reinforce each other in a positive feedback loop.  
Book II of the Wealth of Nations “treats of the nature of capital stock, of the 
manner in which it is gradually accumulated, and of the different quantities of 
labour which it puts into motion” (WN 6, p. 11). Smith opens the short introduction 
to Book II with the observation that, where the division of labour is absent and 
exchange not developed enough (i.e., in the primitive stages of society), there can 
(or rather needs) be no accumulation of stock. He then affirms a few sentences 
later that this accumulation must always precede the division of labour (WN II.1-2, 
p. 276-7). A few paragraphs later, at the beginning of the first chapter of Book II, 
Smith draws a distinction between mere stock, and that part of stock he calls 
“capital”: 
When the stock which a man possesses is no more than sufficient to 
maintain him for a few days or a few weeks, he seldom thinks of deriving 
any revenue from it. He consumes it as sparingly as he can, and endeavours 
by his labour to acquire something which may supply its place before it be 
consumed altogether. His revenue is, in this case, derived from his labour 
only. This is the state of the greater part of the labouring poor in all 
countries. 
But when he possesses stock sufficient to maintain him for months or 
years, he naturally endeavours to derive a revenue from the greater part of 
it; reserving only so much for his immediate consumption as may maintain 
him till this revenue begins to come in. His whole stock, therefore, is 
distinguished into two parts. That part which, he expects, is to afford him 
this revenue, is called his capital. (WN II.i.1-2, p. 279)   
                                                                                                                                                                  
a particular form of technology, namely, "division of labor." It has always been recognized 
that for Smith division of labor is the true dynamic force.” (Lowe 1954, p. 135) 
14 “Without doubt, capital accumulation is the driving force of Smith’s economics” (Clark 
1990)“In Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations economic growth is caused by capital 
accumulation, which is in turn the result of saving. Increases in productivity through 
increased division of labor are a more or less automatic result of accumulation, not an 
independent cause of growth.” (Brewer 1991, p. 1) Brewer repeated this position in 
several works thereafter (1995a, p. 633; 1995b, p. 185; 1998, p. 79; 1999, p. 249) 
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Smith thus established, at the beginning of Book II of Wealth of Nations, that 
division of labour depends on accumulation of stock, and that once people start 
accumulating more stock than is necessary for their consumption, they will start 
using the remainder (which is the part of stock Smith designates specifically with 
the term “capital”) as input in production, and more precisely to put other people 
to work who have no stock of their own. What Smith does not do is to point out 
precisely how this division, between those who accumulate capital and those who 
do not, precisely comes about. Marx took offence with this. 
For Marx, famously, Smith’s opening of Book II on the accumulation of stock 
was the starting point for his theory of primitive accumulation.15 Marx ridiculed 
Smith for describing the process by which capital originally gets accumulated as an 
“idyllic” one, chastising him for having obscured the social implications of this 
“primitive accumulation”. Marx himself equated this concept with the historical 
emergence of a salaried class replacing the serfs of feudal society, through the 
overthrow of feudal lords by the bourgeoisie; a process which, according to Marx, 
involved in reality a lot of violence: 
This original accumulation plays in Political Economy about the same part 
as original sin in theology. Adam bit the apple, and thereupon sin fell on the 
human race.16  . . .  In actual history it is notorious that conquest, 
enslavement, robbery, murder, briefly force, play the great part. In the 
tender annals of Political Economy, the idyllic reigns from time 
immemorial.  . . .  As a matter of fact, the methods of original accumulation 
are anything but idyllic.  . . .  The capitalist system pre-supposes the 
complete separation of the labourers from all property in the means by 
which they can realize their labour.  . . .  The process, therefore, that clears 
the way for the capitalist system, can be none other than the process which 
takes away from the labourer the possession of his means of production.  . . 
.  And the history of this, their expropriation, is written in the annals of 
mankind in letters of blood and fire.  (Marx 1996 [1887], p. 704-6)   
Marx had quite a precise idea of when this separation of the labourer from 
the means of production occurred in world history:  
                                                        
15 That Marx was inspired by Book II of the Wealth of Nations is visible notably in such 
sentences of Smith’s as “The goods of the merchant yield him no revenue or profit till he 
sells them for money, and the money yields him as little till it is again exchanged for goods. 
His capital is continually going from him in one shape, and returning to him in another, 
and it is only by means of such circulation, or successive exchanges, that it can yield him 
any profit.” (WN II.i.4, p. 279), describing in a nutshell Marx’s ‘General Formula for Capital’ 
laid out in Chapter IV of Capital, Vol. 1.  
16 Note the equivocality — so typical of the use of allusions and citations by Marx — of the 
use of “Adam” in this phrase. 
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The starting point of the development that gave rise to the wage-labourer 
as well as to the capitalist, was the servitude of the labourer. The advance 
consisted in a change of form of this servitude, in the transformation of 
feudal exploitation into capitalist exploitation. To understand its march, we 
need not go back very far. Although we come across the first beginnings of 
capitalist production as early as the 14th or 15th century, sporadically, in 
certain towns of the Mediterranean, the capitalistic era dates from the 16th 
century.  . . .  In the history of original accumulation, all revolutions are 
epoch-making that act as levers for the capital class in course of formation; 
but, above all, those moments when great masses of men are suddenly and 
forcibly torn from their means of subsistence, and hurled as free and 
"unattached" proletarians on the labour market. The expropriation of the 
agricultural producer, of the peasant, from the soil, is the basis of the whole 
process. (Marx 1996 [1887], p. 706-7) 
It is Marx’s explanation of primitive accumulation that has become the prime 
reference for this phenomenon in economic thought, largely overshadowing 
Smith’s. Certainly Marx’s exposition sheds more light on the emergence of the 
capitalist class, as distinct from wage earners, than Smith’s indefinite remarks 
about those who accumulate more than what they need for their consumption and 
those who do not. But Marx and Smith were not, in fact, dealing with the same 
issue in their considerations of “primitive accumulation”. There is a fundamental 
difference, indeed, between both the temporal scale and the conceptual context 
within which Smith and Marx, respectively, conceived of this phenomenon. Both 
Smith and Marx were deeply concerned with the causes and effects of the 
emergence and evolution of different social classes. However, while Marx evoked 
“primitive” (or “original”) accumulation in the context of the emergence of the 
capitalist and salaried classes, which he situated in the 16th century (with tentative 
beginnings in the two centuries prior, see quote p. 226 above), Smith considered 
this phenomenon with reference to the “rude and early stages” of society, prior to 
the advent of agriculture (of which the dating depended on which people one was 
referring to; in the Wealth of Nations at least, Smith considered this in the abstract, 
without reference to a particular people or civilisation).17  
                                                        
17 I do not wish to suggest that Smith did not himself see the accumulation of stock as the 
origin for the emergence of the ‘capitalist class’. Indeed, Smith examines the relationship 
between the division of labour and the accumulation of stock, in the context of which he 
introduces the idea of ‘previous accumulation’, in Book II, which, as he announces in the 
Plan and Introduction of Wealth of Nations “treats of the nature of capital stock, of the 
manner in which it is gradually accumulated, and of the different quantities of labour which 
it puts into motion” (WN 6, p.11). A few chapters before the beginning of Book II already, 
in his chapter on wages (WN I.viii), Smith had stated that it is the accumulation of stock 
and the appropriation of land that made the labourer no more earn the totality of the 
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The very first paragraph of Book II thus reads:  
In that rude state of society in which there is no division of labour, in which 
exchanges are seldom made, and in which every man provides every thing 
for himself, it is not necessary that any stock should be accumulated or 
stored up beforehand in order to carry on the business of the society. Every 
man endeavours to supply by his own industry his own occasional wants as 
they occur. When he is hungry, he goes to the forest to hunt; when his coat 
is worn out, he cloaths himself with the skin of the first large animal he 
kills: and when his hut begins to go to ruin, he repairs it, as well as he can, 
with the trees and the turf that are nearest it. (WN II.1, p. 276) 
Smith then proceeds with affirming:  
But when the division of labour has once been thoroughly introduced, the 
produce of a man’s own labour can supply but a very small part of his 
occasional wants. The far greater part of them are supplied by the produce 
of other men’s labour, which he purchases with the produce, or, what is the 
same thing, with the price of the produce of his own. But this purchase 
cannot be made till such time as the produce of his own labour has not only 
been compleated, but sold. A stock of goods of different kinds, therefore, 
must be stored up somewhere sufficient to maintain him, and to supply him 
with the materials and tools of his work till such time, at least, as both these 
events can be brought about. A weaver cannot apply himself entirely to his 
peculiar business, unless there is beforehand stored up somewhere, either 
in his own possession or in that of some other person, a stock sufficient to 
maintain him, and to supply him with the materials and tools of his work, 
till he has not only compleated, but sold his web. This accumulation must, 
evidently, be previous to his applying his industry for so long a time to such 
a peculiar business. (WN.II.2, p. 276-7) 
The rationale for the prior accumulation of stock being necessary to carry 
out the division of labour is thus in essence what Böhm-Bawerk would later 
                                                                                                                                                                  
product of his labour (since, as he explained in the previous chapters, land and stock are 
now also remunerated, by rent and profit). Marx may well have been inspired by Smith in 
this regard. What he failed to recognise (or chose to ignore for his own purposes) was that 
in the introduction to Book II, where Smith expounds the idea of previous accumulation, 
the latter was dealing with a distinct issue altogether. Indeed, the origin of private 
property Smith sees already in the primitive stage, the accumulation of stock (in the form 
of animals) in the shepherd stage and the appropriation of land in the agricultural stage. 
The accumulation of stock on a grander scale, bringing about the capitalist class, only 
occurs for Smith, however, in the commercial stage (with its manufactures and 
commerce), which is also what Marx had in mind. 
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elaborate on in great length: the time-lag involved in “roundabout” production.18 
Smith is also reported to have insisted on this element of time in the lecture notes 
first published by Cannan: 
Again, after the ages of hunting and fishing, in which provisions were the 
immediate produce of their labour, when manufactures were introduced, 
nothing could be produced without a great deal of time. It was a long time 
before the weaver could carry to the market the cloth which he bought in 
flax. Every trade therefore requires a stock of food, cloaths, and lodging to 
carry it on. (LJ(B) 233, p. 498) 
It is evident from this quote, as from the very beginning of Book II of Wealth 
of Nations quoted above, that Smith considers the phenomenon of “primitive 
accumulation” in the context of the four stages theory examined in Chapter 1, and 
that it was an event he situated in the early stages of society (and more specifically 
the second stage, the age of shepherds, in which accumulation of stock first occurs 
in the form of the domestication — and appropriation — of animals, i.e. livestock). 
For Smith, then, “primitive accumulation” was an event neither large in scale nor 
in time. It was a minor (in size, though maybe not in importance), and likely 
incremental event in the remote past (as far as Britain and Europe were 
concerned). Marx saw this purely as a cunning stylistic device, akin to “original 
sin” in the Bible (see quote page 225 above). Yet, for Smith, what he referred to as 
the “rude state of society”, was an integral part of his four stages theory of the 
socio-cultural, political, economic and demographic development of society.19  
The exact dating of this original accumulation, if we admit it is situated in the 
“rude state” of society, was indeed of no consequence for Smith, and this for two 
distinct but related reasons.  
First, in the case of Europe, or even, if we want to take humanity as a whole 
and consider the advent of a new age of subsistence as the time when that mode is 
introduced by some people somewhere, then the third age, agriculture, is an event 
in the far distant past. The advent of agriculture (Neolithic revolution) is dated by
archaeologists today at about 12.000 BC. This is very far removed, indeed, from 
Marx’s musings about the 14th to 16th centuries. Even though 18th century thinkers 
                                                        
18 Allyn Young also employed this term in his famous 1928 article with reference to Smith 
and the division of labour. 
19 See also on this Perelman (1983, p. 451): “Smith’s concept of primitive accumulation 
was initially introduced to explain the origins of the capital which had come into existence 
during the mythical time prior to the beginnings of capitalism. The exact dating was of no 
consequence. For Marx, in contrast, primitive accumulation coexisted in time with 
capitalist accumulation.” 
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were incapable of such precise dating, it was believed, by Enlightenment writers in 
both France and Scotland, who jointly developed the four stages theory (as 
recounted in Chapter 1) that there was a “primitive time” of mankind prior to 
civilisation, which preceded agriculture and even pasturage, and which was to be 
situated somewhere in the ‘remote past’.  
The second reason why the dating of the first or second stage in the four 
stages theory is necessarily somewhat indefinite is that the development of this 
theory in the middle of the 18th century was itself influenced by the study of 
American natives and other “primitive” peoples still practising their primitive life-
style at that very time. And while the study of the way of life of these American 
natives and other indigenous peoples was thought to shed light on the history of 
humanity as a whole,20 it was also evident, by the same token, that if the four 
stages theory that was inspired by this study was in fact a universal theory of 
human historical development, then not all human groups everywhere were at the 
same stage of this development.  
An important remark must be made at this point concerning the opening 
paragraph of Book II (quoted above p. 227). Smith here writes of a “rude state of 
society in which there is no division of labour, in which exchanges are seldom 
made, and in which every man provides every thing for himself”. As was noted in 
the previous chapter (p. 199 above), it is quite improbable that Smith in fact 
believed there ever was a state of mankind where “there is no division of labour” 
and “every man provides every thing for himself”. This image of men who provide 
for themselves, and at some point ‘enter into’ relationships of exchange (as 
opposed to this being a part of human nature and there not being a ‘prior’) 
actually closely resembles the view of a “social contract” into which previously 
independent individuals enter, which both Hume and Smith criticised precisely for 
its lack of realism.21 This absolute stance on the division of labour was not in fact 
used by Smith in his earlier drafts and lectures. Note also that while Smith 
mentions “no” division of labour, and men who provide “every thing” for 
themselves, he writes of exchanges not never-, but only “seldom” being made. This 
already hints at the fact that this view of man is an exaggeration by Smith even by 
his own standards, as division of labour and exchange are closely linked in his 
account (WN I.iii; LJ(A) vi.63-66; LJ(B) 222-23). Indeed, he continues his narrative 
by the sentence “when the division of labour has once been thoroughly 
                                                        
20 Sebastiani (2013) gives a good account of this. (The theme is treated throughout the 
book, but see especially chapter 3.) 
21 Smith covered this at LJ(A) v.114-119 (p. 315-18), v.127-129 (p. 321) and LJ(B) 15-18 
(p. 402-4). 
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introduced”, which again shows that his depiction of an absolute absence of 
division of labour prior to that is more stylistic device than firm belief. In that 
sense Marx’ remark that primitive accumulation plays in political economy (read 
“for Smith”) about the same role as original sin in the Bible — i.e. a narrative 
device akin to deus ex machina — is partly correct.22 This depiction of an absence 
of division of labour is in fact a “philosophical fiction”, such as Hume singled out, in 
his criticism of state of nature- and social contract theory, as permissible uses of 
such: 
'Tis utterly impossible for men to remain any considerable time in that 
savage condition, which precedes society; but that his very first state and 
situation may justly be esteem'd social. This, however, hinders not, but that 
philosophers may, if they please, extend their reasoning to the suppos'd 
state of nature; provided they allow it to be a mere philosophical fiction, 
which never had, and never cou'd have any reality.” (Hume 1888 [1739], p. 
493) 
It was noted in Chapter 1 (p. 106 above) that the island narrative used in the 
exposition of the four stages theory is such a philosophical fiction as well. So is the 
narrative of hunters exchanging arrows to illustrate the emergence of the division 
of labour in society, as we saw in Chapter 2 (p. 199 above). The pin factory account 
at the beginning of the Wealth of Nations, although not a philosophical fiction as are 
original accumulation or the island metaphor in the four stages theory, plays a very 
similar role. It is a synecdoche, used to illustrate a complex and extensive process 
by use of an example limited to a few individuals. Smith tells his readers this 
himself when introducing the pin factory story, at the very beginning of the first 
chapter of Wealth of Nations, by noting that: 
The effects of the division of labour, in the general business of society, will 
be more easily understood by considering in what manner it operates in 
some particular manufactures.   . . .  To take an example, therefore, from a 
very trifling manufacture; but one in which the division of labour has been 
very often taken notice of  . . .  (WN I.i.2-3, p. 14)  
And just as the pin factory parable is not chosen by Smith as an opening for 
his magnum opus to reveal anything new about the division of labour in pin 
                                                        
22 See also Ahmad (1996, p. 447): “Both Smith and Rae were so enthusiastic about the 
importance of their chosen factors (accumulation for Smith and invention for Rae) that in 
spite of their full awareness of the roles of other factors, they sometimes appear to claim 
that the major factor is the only factor. A more complete reading of the respective texts, 
however, makes clear the weakness of these apparent claims; they are essentially 
rhetorical rather than substantive.” 
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making to the world — rather this subject “has been very often taken notice of” 
already, as he clearly states23  —, but instead the example is chosen, as he also 
clearly states, because with help of it “The effects of the division of labour, in the 
general business of society, will be more easily understood”, so, in like manner, the 
introduction of a “philosophical fiction” in the form of a pre-social kind of ‘state of 
nature’ in his broach of the subject of capital accumulation is in fact used by Smith, 
not so much to say anything about the early state of society (or ‘non-society’, in 
this case) itself, but to get at the underlying functioning of the process of economic 
growth.  
When bringing up the idea of “primitive accumulation”, Smith was thus not 
concerned, as Marx, with the emergence of social classes, which would occur in any 
meaningful way only at a much later point in his stage-theory of development. The 
topic of capital accumulation in general was considered by Smith, not with regard 
to the development of wealth differentials, but to deal with the theme of economic 
growth, i.e. wealth creation.24 
Let us then proceed to a more detailed analysis of the interplay between the 
division of labour and the accumulation of capital as depicted in Smith’s work, and 
of the precise nature of the problem he was examining when writing about what 
Marx dubbed “ursprüngliche Akkumulation”. As we shall see, although the 
consequences of this “original accumulation”, i.e. the onset of the process of the 
division of labour, may be seen as formidable (given Smith’s sensationalist 
description of this feature in the opening chapters of the Wealth of Nations), what 
is of much greater relevance for the ongoing process of economic development is 
the fact that not only does further division of labour also need further prior 
accumulation, but the opposite is also true. In order to more properly establish this, 
we cannot rely on the sole Wealth of Nations, but need to consult also the two sets 
of lecture notes on jurisprudence and the ‘Early Draft’ of the Wealth of Nations. 
                                                        
23 Therefore the many efforts to prove that Smith ‘stole’ the idea from the Encyclopédistes 
that followed a footnote by Edwin Cannan to this passage in his 1937 edition of the Wealth 
of Nations (Smith 1937 [1776], p. 7, n. 12), are quite pointless — especially with regard to 
the fact that the French Encyclopédistes could have equally ‘stolen’ the ‘idea’ from 
Ephraim Chambers’ Cyclopaedia published fourteen years earlier, or from other English 
writers of the 1730s, ‘40s and ‘50s, whom Smith surely had in mind when he wrote that it 
“has been very often taken notice of”. On the latter writers see Groenewegen (2008). For a 
serious treatment of Smith's engagement with the Encyclopédie, see Kafker and Loveland 
(2013). 
24 In Smith’s four stages theory, as we have seen in Chapter 1, the emergence of social 
classes and wealth differentials is more meaningfully approached, although — certainly by 
Marxian standards — it is not satisfactorily elucidated therein either. 
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In the “primitive” time previous to the accumulation of capital and a 
widespread division of labour in society, the accumulation of some stock of 
provisions is necessary in order for any individual to specialise. This, as we have 
seen, is because there is a time-lag involved in any kind of activity between the 
moment one engages in it and the moment one reaps the fruits from it. As long as 
this lag is not very long (as with hunting and gathering), and everyone engages in 
all activities (as Smith supposes, or at least postulates, to be or have been the case 
during the “rude states”), this is of no consequence to the functioning of society. 
However, as was touched upon in the previous chapter, what is inherent in the 
very act of specialisation, which can be defined as the concentration of productive 
activities in the procurement of a more limited set of goods and/or services, is that 
part of the previous activities are therefore abandoned (by those who specialise in 
the new or more narrow activity). If we start, then, from a situation when human 
beings were each and everyone preoccupied mainly with the procurement of 
foodstuff (hunting and gathering), and all of the foodstuff thus procured by the 
group on a daily basis was essential for the group’s survival, then the act of 
specialisation of some member of the community in the procurement of non-
foodstuff would, in the first instance, create a shortage. It therefore becomes 
necessary, prior to specialisation, for there to have been some accumulation of a 
stock of necessaries to secure the survival of the group: 
A rude and barbarous people are ignorant of the effects of the division of 
labour, and it is long before one person, by continualy working at different 
things, can produce any more than is necessary for his daily subsistence. 
Before labour can be divided some accumulation of stock is necessary. A 
poor man with no stock can never begin a manufacture.25 Before a man can 
commence farmer he must at least have laid in a years provision, because 
he does not receive the fruits of his labour till the end of the season. 
Agreably to this, in a nation of hunters or shepherds no person can quit the 
common trade in which he is employed, and which affords him daily 
subsistence, till he have some stock to maintain him and begin the new trade. 
(LJ(B)286, p. 521) 26 
                                                        
25 As becomes clear from the example of a farmer in the next sentence, Smith’s use of the 
word manufacture here was intended to mean any trade or occupation in general (an 18th 
century acceptation of the word), not industrial production, which had become its 
acquired meaning in the 19th century, that Marx employed. (Indeed manufacture, literally 
and originally, means to make by hand). See also on this point Stark (1944, p. 25-7) and 
Singh (1959, p. 116). 
26 It is apparent in this passage that Smith did not have to wait for meeting the Physiocrats 
in order to develop the idea of capital as advance, as one frequently reads in Smith 
commentary to this day. Eltis (2004, p. 153)  for example writes that “There is nothing in 
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 This “prior accumulation” need in fact consist in nothing more than a surplus 
beyond what is necessary for survival. It is very conceivable that, in favourable 
enough conditions, the realisation of such a surplus is/was possible even in 
hunter-gatherer societies (many species of animals are able to conserve food over 
time by some means, indeed). Hence, mere surplus, in and of itself, does not, in fact, 
presuppose capitalist production, as Marx enunciated (see quote page 239 
below).27 And from then on, the specialisation of individuals or sub-groups in the 
group becomes very conceivable, without any ‘grand scheme’ of “primitive 
accumulation”.  
In time, indeed, the availability of a surplus of (different kinds of) food, 
making possible the less-than-total dedication of some members of the group to its 
(their) procurement, will further increase the surplus of food available, by 
different kinds of positive feedback mechanisms. First, the increasing 
specialisation of different members of the group in different productive activities 
will increase the overall production of goods and services by the famous three 
productivity-enhancing mechanisms tied to the division of labour, outlined by 
Smith at the beginning of the Wealth of Nations. Second, there will be synergistic 
effects between the different activities, as between newly specialised tool-making 
and the use of these tools, made better by means of increased dexterity in- and 
dedication to tool-production. Thus, for example, hunters using better bows and 
arrows will hunt better. And there is a synergistic effect created by the separation 
of the activities of hunting and bow- and arrow-making: not only is the production 
of both meat and bows-and-arrows directly increased as an effect of the newly 
emerged specialisations in hunting and bow-and-arrow-making (by means of the 
three advantages of the division of labour), but also this increase in quality and 
quantity of bows and arrows produced will indirectly raise the production of meat, 
because hunters can now hunt better by means of these tools; and, conceivably, 
better-fed arrow makers (by means of more and/or better meat) will in turn 
produce more and/or better arrows, and so on ad infinitum.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
the Early Draft and the Glasgow Lectures on the interconnection between capital 
accumulation and economic growth. He only introduced this into his analysis after his 
acquaintance with the economics of Quesnay, Turgot and the physiocrats.” In addition to 
the passage the present note is attached to, see the very many references to accumulation 
of stock (and frequently its relation to economic growth, notably because of its 
interdependence with the division of labour) that were given in n. 46 on p. 90 in Chapter 1 
above.  
27 Marx, of course, speaks here of “surplus value”, not merely of “surplus”, and the former 
has a very particular meaning and function in his theory. To the extent that he links his 
remark to Smith’s theory, however, the observation to which this note is attached is 
justified. 
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The important part, for the argument being made here, is that Smith writes 
that the dependency of the division of labour on the accumulation of stock is not 
only an initial condition, but will be maintained dynamically through time; further, 
that thereby a balance needs to be maintained between the accumulation of stock 
and the division of labour:  
As the accumulation of stock must, in the nature of things, be previous to 
the division of labour, so labour can be more and more subdivided in 
proportion only as stock is previously more and more accumulated. (WN 
II.3, p. 277) 
It lies in the nature of this dynamic balance that the accumulation of stock is 
not only necessary for the division of labour, but that further accumulation of stock 
also necessitates further division of labour. In other words, the two are mutually 
dependent. That Smith indeed recognised this circular and cumulative nature of 
the development process becomes clear from a sentence in Lectures on 
Jurisprudence (appearing shortly after the quote on page 232 above): 
till some stock be produced there can be no division of labour, and before a 
division of labour take place there can be very little accumulation of stock. 
(LJ(B) 287, p. 522)  
It is clear from this sentence by Smith that further accumulation of stock — 
i.e. beyond that initial accumulation, that ‘mystical’ unmoved mover, however 
small it may have been — is in its turn conditional on a prior advance of the 
division of labour. Division of labour and accumulation of stock in fact build on 
each other in a cumulative fashion. So the division of labour switches from being 
only an effect of the accumulation of stock to become the very cause of any further 
accumulation. It is only through the increased productivity of the economy that the 
division of labour permits, indeed, that accumulation on a grander scale becomes 
possible.   
Dellemotte and Walraevens (2015, p. 717) interpret the two passages cited 
above as “Smith simultaneously affirm[ing] in his works that a prior accumulation 
of stocks is a prerequisite for any division of labour (WN, II.3, 277) and that any 
constitution or accumulation of stocks is impossible to conceive, before the 
division of labour was first introduced (LJ(B), 286–7, 521)”, which they describe as 
an inconsistency. For Marouby (2004, p. 158), whom they cite, this is so much as a 
contradiction in terms, and would preclude, logically, the division of labour from 
ever arising. These readings are a perfect illustration of the difficulty involved in 
interpreting Smith without paying heed to his conception of dynamic 
interdependence.  
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First, the account given of Smith’s (written and reported) words by 
Dellemotte and Walraevens should be reconsidered. Smith wrote in the Wealth of 
Nations, not that “a prior accumulation of stocks is a prerequisite for any division 
of labour” but that “the accumulation of stock must, in the nature of things, be 
previous to the division of labour” (WN, II.3, 277). As observed in the previous 
chapter (p. 200 above), Smith meant by the division of labour an advanced degree 
of separation of different professions, not simply any separation of tasks. 
Admittedly, this may be seen as hair-splitting on my part. More importantly, then, 
Smith’s sentence continues, with him observing “so labour can be more and more 
subdivided in proportion only as stock is previously more and more accumulated” 
(ibid.). As noted above, Smith’s stress is thus on the proportionality between 
division of labour and capital accumulation more than on the necessary 
precedence of one over the other. In the Lectures on Jurisprudence, furthermore, 
Smith is reported to have said, not that “any constitution or accumulation of stocks 
is impossible to conceive, before the division of labour was first introduced”, as 
Dellemotte and Walraevens (2015, p. 717) put it, but that “before a division of 
labour take place there can be very little accumulation of stock” (LJ(B), 287, 522).28 
This is not the same thing. And, more significantly, the full sentence of the lecture 
notes is ““till some stock be produced there can be no division of labour, and before a 
division of labour take place there can be very little accumulation of stock”. Smith 
is thus reported even in his lectures to have affirmed the necessary precedence of 
some accumulation of stock over the division of labour, and not only the inverse 
dependence of the accumulation of stock (beyond a “very little” amount) on the 
division of labour. And, here too, he is reported to have stressed, most of all, the 
necessary proportionality, in time, between the accumulation of stock and the 
deepening of the division of labour. There is thus no inconsistency between the 
Wealth of Nations and the lecture notes on this point whatsoever.29  
                                                        
28 The sentence occurs at p. 522, not p. 521 cited by Dellemotte and Walraevens, but since 
on p. 521 Smith only speaks of the dependency of the division of labour on accumulation 
of stock, and not the inverse, this must be a simple slip. 
29 When writing of the dependency of the division of labour on the extent of the market, 
however, Smith does not always mention that the division of labour is also conditional on 
the accumulation of stock. He thus affirms in the first sentence of Chapter III, Book I, of the 
Wealth of Nations that “it is the power of exchanging that gives occasion to the division of 
labour”, with no mention of the necessity of capital accumulation for the division of labour 
at this point, which is only brought in several chapters later. In the first ‘Fragment on the 
division of labour’ Smith similarly affirms: “As among such nations, therefore, tho’ they 
have scarce any foreign commerce, the home market is somewhat more extensive, we may 
expect to find something like the beginning of the division of labour” (FA.3, p. 583). No 
need for capital accumulation for the division of labour to arise is mentioned here. 
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The problem of interpretation arises, in fact, not from any contradiction or 
inconsistency on Smith’s part, but from attempting to understand Smith with a 
strictly linear conception of causation in mind. The recognition of the chicken-and-
egg relationship between the division of labour and capital accumulation by Smith 
make such a reading inappropriate. Whether the chicken or the egg preceded one 
another is a meaningless question. Insofar as the very existence of chickens and 
the one of chicken-eggs absolutely depend on one another, they can be considered 
only as an inseparable whole. The only pertinent question is (and even here only a 
very approximate answer can be given, which depends on the definition retained) 
at what point in time the chicken as a separate or new species came about, which 
includes the embryonic (egg), infant (chick) and adult (chicken) form. So it is with 
the division of labour and capital accumulation. Insofar as both depend on one 
another, it is vain to want to establish precisely which one preceded the other 
(even if Smith may seem to do just that). The pertinent question is when the 
integrated whole arose, which the mutually interdependent relationship between 
divided labour and capital constitutes.30 Smith’s answer, in the different 
documents contained in Lectures on Jurisprudence, is that it basically began in the 
primitive state. There are rudimentary forms of division of labour in barbarous 
nations (FA.3, p. 583). And people even in savage societies of hunters use tools, 
which, as Ricardo recognised (in an effort to amend Smith’s value-theory), can be 
considered a rudimentary from of capital. The challenge for economic growth in 
the primitive stage, according to Smith, is not that either capital or divided labour 
are absolutely lacking. It is that both are present in infinitesimal quantities only, 
and, precisely since they depend on each other, they can thus augment only at a 
very slow rate. It is for this reason that the “knowledge of agriculture and of other 
useful arts”, which “the colonists carr[ied] out with them” to America, were 
“superior to what can grow up of its own accord in the course of many centuries 
among savage and barbarous nations” (WN IV.vii.b.2, p. 564). 
Thus, if “till some stock be produced there can be no division of labour, and 
before a division of labour take place there can be very little accumulation of 
stock”, then the process must, at the outset, be very slow. The issue of “primitive 
accumulation” was considered by Smith, indeed, in connection with the “slow 
progress of opulence”. And the necessity of a primitive accumulation was his 
answer to the question of why economic growth is harder to set off than to sustain. 
The above-quoted sentence from the lecture notes describing the mutual 
                                                        
30“In this circumstance lies the possibility of economic progress”, as Allyn Young (1928, p. 
539) remarked about the equally interdependent nature of the relationship between 
division of labour and extent of the market. 
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dependency, dynamically speaking, between the division of labour and the 
accumulation of stock thus appears precisely in the context of Smith’s examination 
of the reasons for the slow progress of opulence (of which it is the reason). The 
whole section starts thus: 
We come now to the next thing proposed, to examine the causes of the slow 
progress of opulence. 
When one considers the effects of the division of labour, what an 
immediate tendencey it has to improve the arts, it appears somewhat 
surprising that every nation should continue so long in a poor and indigent 
state as we find it does. The causes of this may be considered under these 
two heads, first, natural impediments, and secondly, the oppression of civil 
government. (LJ(B) 285, p. 521)
If the division of labour was indeed so formidable in its productivity-
enhancing abilities as Smith made it out to be in the opening chapter of the Wealth 
of Nations, he was faced with the question of why it then took so long to take hold 
in society. Why, in other words, is the process of development so hard to initiate? 
Why did societies remain for so long in a state of low division of labour before 
reaching the commercial stage, where division of labour and with it economic 
progress came to proceed at an unprecedented pace? As could be expected from a 
philosopher so acutely concerned with the topic of the “progress of society”, this 
was an important question for Smith. It features in all of Smith’s unpublished (until 
recently or much later) work on political philosophy or statesmanship (legal and 
economic matters), i.e. both sets of the (re)discovered lecture-notes of Smith’s 
teachings on jurisprudence (or “police and arms”) and the ‘Early Draft’ of the 
Wealth of Nations, before being restated (rather scantily for that matter) in the 
final version of what is today his most famous work.  
After the passage in the Cannan notes just quoted follows the passage 
already quoted on page 232 above (“A rude and barbarous people  . . .  begin the 
new trade.”). Then Smith goes on to write: 
Every one knows how difficult it is, even in a refined society, to raise one's 
self to moderate circumstances. It is still more difficult to raise one's self by 
these trades which require no art nor ingenuity. A porter or day labourer 
must continue poor for ever. In the beginings of society this is still more 
difficult. Bare subsistence is almost all that a savage can procure, and 
having no stock to begin upon, nothing to maintain him but what is 
produced by the exertion of his own strength, it is no wonder that he 
continues long in an indigent state. The meanest labourer in a polished 
society has in many respects an advantage over a savage. He has more 
assistance in his labour; he has only one particular thing to do, which by 
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assiduity he attains a facility in performing; he has also machines and 
instruments which greatly assist him. An Indian has not so much as a pick-
ax, a spade, or a shovel, nor any thing else but his own labour. This is one 
great cause of the slow progress of opulence in every country; till some 
stock be produced there can be no division of labour, and before a division 
of labour take place there can be very little accumulation of stock. (LJ(B) 
286-7, p. 521-2) 
This section is directly mirrored in the ‘Early Draft’ of the Wealth of Nations:  
Chap. 5th Concerning the causes of the slow progress of opulence. 
Those causes of two kinds. First, natural impediments; and, secondly, 
oppressive or injudicious government.  
The original poverty and ignorance of mankind the natural impediments to 
the progress of opulence. That it is easier for a nation, in the same manner 
as for an individual, to raise itself from a moderate degree of wealth to the 
highest opulence, than to acquire this moderate degree of wealth; money, 
according to the proverb, begetting money, among nations as among 
individuals. The extreme difficulty of beginning accumulation and the many 
accidents to which it is exposed. The slowness and difficulty with which 
those things, which now appear the most simple inventions, were originally 
found out. That a nation is not always in a condition to imitate and copy the 
inventions and improvements of its more wealthy neighbours; the 
application of these frequently requiring a stock with which it is not 
furnished. (ED 42, p. 579) 
This is what Smith considers the “natural impediments” which make for the 
difficulty and the slowness of the progress of development in its beginning. This 
process becomes easier (more fluid) and faster as it gathers momentum: a 
characteristic feature of positive feedback. Indeed, the mechanism of positive 
feedback, which underlies Smith’s considerations of economic development, 
explains why progress is an initially slow, and increasingly accelerating process. 
Note that Smith considers this, too, an explanation for the impossibility or at least 
great difficulty of technology transfer between nations at different stages of 
advancement (in the last sentence of the quote above): as capital, technology, and 
specialised labour and skills are dependent on one another, they can only be 
introduced gradually and develop in a cumulative fashion. Another, more 
picturesque, passage to the same effect can be found in the Wealth of Nations. Here 
Smith compares the accumulation of capital in a nation with that of an individual 
(the context is the discussion of the falling rate of profit, but this is irrelevant to the 
issue at hand): 
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It is with industrious nations who are advancing in the acquisition of 
riches, as with industrious individuals. A great stock, though with small 
profits, generally increases faster than a small stock with great profits. 
Money, says the proverb, makes money. When you have got a little, it is 
often easy to get more. The great difficulty is to get that little. (WN I.ix.9, p. 
109-10) 
Smith’s treatment of primitive accumulation, and of the question of the 
relationship between division of labour and capital accumulation more generally, 
thus relies on a circular, cumulative and incremental conception of the growth 
process. Hence Smith’s theory — even though he might not have been as explicit 
about it as later were Alfred Marshall and Allyn Young, who built on and made 
more explicit the cumulative nature of Smith’s ideas on the division of labour and 
the extent of the market31  — can best be understood when viewed as an unfolding 
process of organic growth, where each incremental step not only adds to the 
previous one, but in conjunction with this previous one makes a sum that is greater 
than its parts, and thus makes possible further incremental change, which can 
become the more and more vigorous the more and more previous steps have 
already been accomplished, just as from a seed a tree grows to maturity, and the 
more branches grow out of the initial stem, the more further branches can possibly 
grow.  
Marx in fact also had such a view of history. Indeed, his historical materialism 
can be seen as following an evolutionary logic, with unintended consequences and 
emergent order playing a major role. It is also probable that he was influenced in 
this by Smith, although he did not acknowledge this particular debt.32 Yet, in the 
particular instance of the relationship between capital accumulation and division 
of labour, Marx, as many later commentators, does not seem to have discerned the 
evolutionary reasoning involved in Smith’s conception. This can be seen, notably, 
in Marx’s enunciation of the paradoxical question of the onset of capital 
accumulation: 
But the accumulation of capital presupposes surplus value; surplus value 
presupposes capitalistic production; capitalistic production presupposes 
                                                        
31 On the relationship between Marshall, Young and Smith on this point see Lavezzi 
(2003b). 
32 Marx did praise Smith for his recognition of the ‘alienating’ effects of the division of 
labour. But he did not, to my knowledge, draw a link between his own historical 
materialism and Smith. This attitude toward an author who influenced him would not be 
untypical for Marx. Some have even postulated an inverse relationship between the 
hostility he expressed for certain writers and the degree of influence they had on him 
(Schumpeter 2003 [1943], p. 22).          
240 
the pre-existence of considerable masses of capital and of labour power in 
the hands of producers of commodities. The whole movement, therefore, 
seems to turn in a defective circuit,33 out of which we can only get by 
supposing a primitive accumulation (previous accumulation of Adam 
Smith) preceding capitalistic accumulation; an accumulation not the result 
of the capitalist mode of production, but its starting point. (Marx 1996 
[1887], p. 704) 
This depiction by Marx of a “defective circuit” which it seems impossible to 
break out of actually resembles in many respects the purported vicious circle of 
underdevelopment — with which a number of mid-20th century authors were 
concerned, as depicted notably by Nurkse (Nurkse 1952, p. 571):  
The inducement to invest is limited by the size of the market. That is 
essentially what Allyn Young brought out in his reinterpretation of Adam 
Smith's famous thesis. What determines the size of the market? Not simply 
money demand, nor mere numbers of people, nor physical area. Transport 
facilities, which Adam Smith singled out for special emphasis, are 
important; reductions in transport costs (artificial as well as natural) do 
enlarge the market in the economic as well as the geographical sense. But 
reductions in any cost of production tend to have that effect. So the size of 
the market is determined by the general level of productivity. Capacity to 
buy means capacity to produce. In its turn, the level of productivity 
depends-not entirely by any means, but largely-on the use of capital in 
production. But the use of capital is inhibited, to start with, by the small 
size of the market. Where is the way out of this circle? How can the market 
be enlarged? 34 
                                                        
33 The first translators of Capital into English (Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, version 
published in 1887, edited by Friedrich Engels, adopted for the Collected Works here cited) 
have translated this as “vicious circle”. In the much more recent translation by Ben Fowkes  
, the latter translated it as “never-ending circle” (Marx 1976 [1890], p. 873). Marx, in the 
original German, did not use the German word for “vicious circle” (“Teufelskreis”) — nor 
did he write of a never-ending circle —, but used the words “fehlerhaften Kreislauf”, i.e. 
literally a “defective circuit”. Although in the French version (which Marx himself 
oversaw), the word used is also “cercle vicieux”, I have used a formulation closer to the 
original here. The rest of the paragraph is true to the source cited. 
34 Nurkse, although alluding in this regard to Young’s 1928 paper, indeed may have had a 
situation described by Marx in mind. In some unfinished notes he was preparing as an 
answer to criticism of his doctrine of balanced growth by Streeten just before his death 
(edited by Tobin and published posthumously), Nurkse thus wrote, in an only slightly 
different connection: “What I had in mind there was the 'basic contradiction of capitalism' 
as Marx put it and as Malthus dimly saw it before him, namely, the fact that when the 
means to invest are there the will may be lacking, and vice versa.” (Nurkse 1959, p. 297) 
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This question of origin, of ‘result’ and ‘starting point’ (or cause and effect), 
with regard to the accumulation of capital and the division of labour (as with other 
circular relationships drawn out by Smith), is really a chicken-and-egg question. In 
other words, the only satisfactory view of the relationship between capital 
accumulation and division of labour (and the surplus generated through the 
productivity gains from the division of labour) is a circular one, one of mutual 
relation, of mutual causation, or in modern terms of co-evolution.  
 
3. Sequence and Circularity in Smith’s  
“Natural progress of opulence” 
When Dugald Stewart described the particular sort of historical inquiry he 
baptised “Theoretical or Conjectural History” (Stewart II.48, p. 293), and remarked 
that “Something very similar to it may be traced in all [of Smith’s] different works” 
(II.44, p. 292), he had in mind both Smith’s general theory of socio-cultural 
evolution laid out in his Glasgow lectures — which it has become customary today, 
following Meek (1976b, p. 2), to refer to as the “four stages theory” — and the 
theory of the “natural progress of opulence”, developed in Book III of the Wealth of 
Nations. Steward thus singled out, as an instance of conjectural history in the 
Wealth of Nations, “particularly the theoretical delineation [Smith] has given of the 
natural progress of opulence in a country; and his investigation of the causes which 
have inverted this order in the different countries of modern Europe”, before 
remarking that “His lectures on jurisprudence seem, from the account of them 
formerly given, to have abounded in such inquiries” (II.52, 295). Yet, as the four 
stages theory moved more and more to the background as an approach to explain 
development, and in the absence of a clear textual layout of its content and nature 
in Smith’s work until the rediscovery of the second lecture notes on jurisprudence 
in the later 20th century, Smith’s theory of the “natural progress of opulence”, 
describing the demise of feudalism in Europe through the merchant activities of 
towns, came to represent the main embodiment of what Steward had called 
conjectural history. It is today possible, and certainly crucial for modern Smith 
scholarship, to reconstruct Smith’s theoretical history as a whole, and to restore 
the missing link between the “natural progress of opulence” and the four stages 
theory.35 
                                                        
35 The work of Istvan Hont, alone and in collaboration with Michael Ignatief, and the one of 
Donald Winch in particular require mention here (see notably Hont and Ignatieff (1983), 
Hont (1989). 
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As we saw in Chapter 1, the latter theory is certainly present in the Wealth of 
Nations, and can be taken to form the backbone of the work, but references to it are 
unclear without detailed knowledge of the theory. Smith opens nearly every book 
of the Wealth of Nations, indeed, and many chapters within books, with the phrase 
“among nations of hunters” or some variation thereof (then to be contrasted with 
the advanced stages of society). Like formulas appear in the ‘Introduction and Plan 
of the Work’ (“Among the savage nations of hunters and fishers”, I.4) and in Book I, 
at the beginning, respectively, of Chapter 2 (“In a tribe of hunters or shepherds”, 
I.ii.3), of Chapter 6 (“among a nation of hunters”, I.vi.1), of Chapter 10 (“in the rude 
state of society”, in which “Hunting and fishing [are] the most important 
employments of mankind”, I.x.b.3) and of Part II of Chapter 11 (“Among nations of 
hunters and shepherds” and, in the same paragraph, “among the hunting nations of 
North America”, I.xi.c.4). A similar phrase appears at the very beginning, 
respectively, of Book II (“In that rude state of society”, the rest of the paragraph 
making it very clear Smith is here talking about the hunting stage, II.1) and of Book 
V (“Among nations of hunters, the lowest and rudest state of society, such as we 
find it among the native tribes of North America”, V.i.a.2). The formula “savages 
and barbarians” is preferred in Book IV, where it is employed in some form in 
Chapters 1, 3 and 7.36 In Book III, by contrast, no such parallel is drawn. This Book, 
indeed, deals wholly with the development of Europe from the stage of agriculture 
to commercial society, corresponding to the last two stages of development in the 
four stages theory (the first two being the “savage” and the “barbarous” stages, or, 
synonymously for Smith, those, respectively, of hunting and shepherding).  
Urbanisation, indeed, is and can only properly be, for Smith, a feature of 
commercial society, insofar as cities are a concentration of population engaged in 
non-food producing activities. As such, they need, in order to exist, the prior 
development of agriculture, which alone can allow the production of a surplus of 
foodstuff sufficiently large to feed the important number of non-food producers 
that cities contain. In other words, the stage of agriculture must at least have 
commenced for cities to emerge, and they can properly flourish, in natural 
symbiosis with their own regional economy, in commercial society only. Though 
not employing, at this point, the vocabulary of stages of society, Smith expresses 
this, in temporal terms, at the very beginning of Book III: 
As subsistence is, in the nature of things, prior to conveniency and luxury, 
so the industry which procures the former, must necessarily be prior to 
that which ministers to the latter. The cultivation and improvement of the 
                                                        
36 IV.i.33, p. 448; IV.iii.c.11, p. 495; IV.vii.a.8, p. 559; IV.vii.b.2, p. 564-5; IV.vii.b.4, p. 567. 
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country, therefore, which affords subsistence, must, necessarily, be prior to 
the increase of the town, which furnishes only the means of conveniency 
and luxury. (WN III.i.2, p. 377) 
If town and country development are mutually beneficial and mutually 
dependant on one another, however, then in fact the interaction of city and 
country-side poses a chicken-and-egg question, analogous to the ones between 
division of labour and capital accumulation, analysed in the previous section. What 
came first, the city or the country-side? Or, more meaningfully, is it the 
development of the town that brings about the development of the country-side, or 
the other way round? Is the development of agriculture a necessary precedent to 
the development of towns, or are towns in fact the initiators of agriculture? Smith 
has a clear stand on this. In the natural order of things, the development of 
agriculture must necessarily precede the development of manufactures (and hence 
the development of the country-side must precede the one of towns) as 
subsistence is a pre-requisite to convenience and luxury, and so it must be for their 
respective production.  
Smith seems to build his entire theory of the “natural progress of opulence” 
for the sole purpose of denouncing the past and remaining feudal institutions of 
Europe, which led to a development that runs counter to this model. But in 
acknowledging that the “unnatural and retrograde order” (from the development 
of commerce, to manufacture to agriculture, instead of the other way around) 
characterised Europe’s actual development, Smith concedes of course that the 
development of commerce and manufacture may well, and indeed has, positive 
feedback effects on the development of agriculture.  
Smith’s emphasis on the different order(s) of things has even been read as 
contradicting his own position, by proving the contrary of what he claims (Bowles 
1986 ; Blecker 1997 ; and more recently Paganelli 2013). But Smith is in fact very 
aware that his “natural” sequence is an ideal, and that the usual course of things is 
another. “If a nation could not prosper without the enjoyment of perfect liberty 
and perfect justice” he remarks indeed, “there is not in the world a nation which 
could ever have prospered.” (IV.ix.28, p. 674). 
As it is commonly understood today, the word “natural” describes anything 
that has not been tempered with by human hands. This was also its general 
meaning in the 18th century. “Nature” is the world as it exists independently from 
human beings. It is synonymous, in many respects, to ‘the wild’. By analogy, we 
describe as nature that which has been minimally influenced by humans (most 
forests in the world today were actually planted by humans, but are still largely 
considered as “nature”). Smith and his Scottish contemporaries pushed the analogy 
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in another direction. For him, indeed, the term “natural” is applied in the context of 
human society itself. What he considers as natural, then, is the way human society 
evolves, “as it were, of its own accord, and independent of any plan or project” 
(WN I.xi.p.8). As Adam Ferguson put it: 
If we admit that man is susceptible of improvement, and has in himself a 
principle of progression, and a desire of perfection, it appears improper to 
say that he has quitted the state of his nature, when he has begun to 
proceed; or that he finds a station for which he was not intended, while, 
like other animals, he only follows the disposition, and employs the powers 
that nature has given.  (Ferguson 1995 [1767], p. 14) 
What Locke and Hobbes had called the state of nature, i.e. the state of 
humanity before the advent of civilisation, was thus no longer considered by 
thinkers like Ferguson and Smith to be the only natural state of mankind. 
Following the natural state, now called savage state, societies follow a path of 
development that is itself natural, insofar as it derives entirely from man’s innate, 
and hence natural, “principle of progression”. This propensity, the “natural effort of 
every individual to better his own condition” (WN IV.v.b.43, p. 540), “the principle 
from which publick and national, as well as private opulence is originally derived” 
is, for Smith, indeed, “frequently powerful enough to maintain the natural progress 
of things toward improvement, in spite both of the extravagance of government, 
and of the greatest errors of administration” (II.iii.31, p. 343).  
The words “unnatural” and “retrograde” which Smith uses to qualify the 
development of Europe should thus not be interpreted as meaning that the 
development of Europe was in any way unusual. What happens “naturally”, for 
Smith, is what happens “of its own accord” (a phrase he uses interchangeably with 
“natural”), unaided or undirected. The natural process of opulence, in Smithian 
language, is the one that arises out of the self-interested action of individuals, of 
whom each “neither intends to promote the publick interest, nor knows how much 
he is promoting it” (IV.ii.9, p. 456). It is the one which is in accord with “the 
obvious and simple system of natural liberty”, in which “Every man, as long as he 
does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest 
his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with those 
of any other man, or order of men” (IV.xi.51, p. 687). Indeed, Smith tells us, just 
before he describes the latter: 
every system which endeavours, either, by extraordinary encouragements, 
to draw towards a particular species of industry a greater share of the 
capital of the society than what would naturally go to it; or, by 
extraordinary restraints, to force from a particular species of industry 
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some share of the capital which would otherwise be employed in it; is in 
reality subversive of the great purpose which it means to promote. It 
retards, instead of accelerating, the progress of the society towards real 
wealth and greatness; and diminishes, instead of increasing, the real value 
of the annual produce of its land and labour.  (IV.xi.50, p. 687) 
The “natural order of opulence” is the one that is in accord with the “system 
of natural liberty”. In this sense, Smith’s thesis of the unnatural vs. the natural 
order in Book III of the Wealth of Nations was motivated principally by an attack 
on the physiocratic plan of favouring the agricultural sector over manufactures 
(Hont 1989). Human society progresses in a ‘natural way’ for Smith, then, when it 
is not directed ‘consciously’.  
For Smith, the city is by its very essence a herald of commercial society. What
Smith calls the “unnatural and retrograde order” is a feature of feudalism. And the 
way that feudalism was to evolve to “capitalism” (commercial society) was through 
towns. This is because a town, in a sense, is the very expression of the institutional 
system and societal stage of commercial society. Smith considered the towns that 
continued to exist during feudalism as residuals of a merchant class that existed 
prior to feudalism, was driven out of power by the Germanic invasions, but 
survived throughout the dark-ages or middle-ages, and finally brought feudalism 
to an end. The Germanic invasions, according to Smith, interrupted the “natural 
progress of opulence” that would otherwise have continued. Some Marxist scholars 
see this as an ideological way of claiming the superiority of capitalism (see notably 
Mumy 1978/1979). But accusing Smith of naturalising the market-system (Mumy 
1978/1979, p. 460-1), and thereby claiming the superiority of capitalism, is 
reading into Smith support of a system that succeeded him by at least a century, 
and that he could hence not have been concerned with (Winch 1997). Such view 
also neglects the severely critical attitude of Smith towards masters and 
tradesmen, which got significantly watered down with Dugald Stewart’s and 
subsequent interpretations of Smith’s work (Rothschild 1992). 
It ought to be remarked, then, that Smith’s criticism concerns not so much the 
order of development per se, as the repressive institutional settings that led to it. 
What Smith is not saying is that the development of cities is in itself unnatural; that 
it is harmful to the overall development of societies or that investing in towns 
somehow curtails investment in the country-side. In fact he emphatically states 
that town and country (and the development of towns and of the country-side) are 
complementary, cumulative and mutually beneficial (WN III.i.1-4, p. 376-8). The 
problem lies not in city development, but in artificially trying to bring it about, and 
bring it about at the detriment of the country-side, by favouring international trade 
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over the one between cities and their hinterland, “The great commerce of every 
civilised society”(WN III.i.1, p. 376). The opposite is equally true, however, and in 
this sense Smith condemns favouring the development of the country over the one 
of the town: 
Phillip IVth went to the plow himself in order to sett the fashion. He did 
every thing for the farmers except bringing them a good market. He 
conferred the tittles of nobility upon several farmers. He very absurdly 
endeavoured to oppress manufacturers with heavy taxes in order to force 
them to the country. He thought that in proportion as the inhabitants of 
towns became more numerous, these in the country decreased. This notion 
was highly ridiculous, for the populousness of a town is the very cause of 
the populousness of the country, because it gives greater encouragement to
industry. Every man in a town must be fed by another in the country, and it 
is always a sign that the country is improving when men go to town. There 
are no parts of the country so well inhabited nor so well cultivated as those 
which lye in the neighbourhood of populous cities. (LJ(B) 297-98) 
By not wishing for any particular impetus to be given to foreign trade beyond 
that which would “naturally” occur, Smith expresses a priority for the development 
of the interior market. This makes sense in the light of the fact that what are today 
called urban-rural linkages are at the core of Smith’s conception of the market, the 
widening of which it was essential to further to favour the unfolding of the division 
of labour and thus economic progress. In his digression on silver, in chapter 11 of 
Book 1 of the Wealth of Nations, Smith explains how this precious metal warrants 
far distant trade, and how the market of a silver mine most anywhere is thus likely 
the whole world, as the high value of this metal relative to its cost of transportation 
makes exchange over great distance remain profitable. This is the same reason, 
however, why the direct vicinity of a silver mine does not seem to benefit very 
much from its presence in terms of economic development. Thus the goods that it 
is profitable to trade even in backward nations do not seem to be the ones that 
have the most forward and backward linkages, to employ Hirschman’s (1958) 
vocabulary. While there is no reason to discourage the trade in silver, then, it is 
also not particularly useful, for the development of the country, to artificially boost 
this particular trade, at the expense of agriculture notably, as Smith denounced. 
Smith applies the same logic to mercantile cities, which may “derive their 
subsistence from the most remote corners of the world”, and thus, although they 
must necessarily be in commercial interaction with some rural area somewhere, do 
not necessarily contribute greatly to the regional economy. Smith cites the 
Hanseatic towns as examples for mercantile cities which have not greatly 
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contributed to the development of the regional economy (WN III.iv.24, p. 426-7). 
The particular dynamic of economic progress that Smith described, and that he 
called the “natural progress of opulence”, was a phenomenon being mostly 
beneficial to, and essentially taking place within, the interior market of a nation or 
territory, in any case before a nation had fully evolved to an advanced state of 
commercial society.  
Moreover, in the context of the four stages theory, towns, being a feature of 
commercial society, can only arise after the development of agriculture (and surely 
neither in nations of hunters, far too small numerically for cities to form, nor in 
nations of shepherds, characterised by a nomadic lifestyle necessitated by the need 
to periodically find new grazing ground for livestock). On the other hand, cities do 
form prior to commercial society proper in Smith’s account, or rather, in the case 
of Europe, they had formed long before, in a prior commercial age which had 
gotten lost by the barbarian invasions, the barbarians being nations of shepherds. 
Europe had thus already known a commercial age, indeed, prior to these. In the 
time between this partial retrogression into the shepherd state — partial because 
part of commercial society survived in the form of cities — cities not only 
continued to exist, but actually played an active role in the demise of feudal 
institutions tied to the agricultural age, into which Europe had progressed in the 
meantime. These cities, being surrounded by a country-side dominated by these 
feudal institutions, was bound to trade with more far-away lands, rather than with 
the surrounding country-side. And while this failed to immediately benefit the 
surrounding country-side, it did eventually bring about the demise of the 
antiquated feudal institution, by a subtle play of unintended consequences: the 
cities, engaging in long distance trade, eventually began a process of import 
substitution; the feudal lords, seduced by the “trinkets and baubles” (WN III.iv.15, 
p. 421) thus produced, starting accumulating wealth instead of offering occupation 
and livelihood to the surrounding population, and thus progressively lost the 
power they had over them and introduced commercial institutions into the 
country-side. We are here in the presence of a subtle mix of economic (materialist) 
and political and moral factors. The four stages theory, while used as a backbone, is 
shown to be insufficient to explain the history of Europe, not only because 
different nations finding themselves at different stages, when conquering and 
dominating each other, can bring about intermediate forms of society which do not 
belong strictly to only one stage, but also because specific political events can alter 
the course of the natural materialistic progress of society. As Donald Winch (1995) 
remarked, while this part of Wealth of Nations was already present in the Lectures 
of Jurisprudence (Scott held it to be the oldest part of Wealth of Nations), Smith 
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engages here in actual history, not of the conjectural type, recounting specific 
events in the history of Britain and Europe which have altered the natural progress 
of opulence. And while Smith seems to be saying that this “unnatural and 
retrograde order” was inferior to the natural one, this is not necessarily implied (as 
Spencer Pack (1995) observes, “natural” does not necessarily mean “good”). 
In the state of Europe described by Smith in Book III of the Wealth of Nations, 
features of the agricultural age are present (there are towns and agricultural areas, 
which exchange their produce with each other), but there are still features of the 
previous shepherd stage as well (the very great authority of chiefs and the total 
dependence on them of the rest of society) which constitute a hindrance to the 
seamless progress to ulterior stages of development (the authority of the feudal 
barons notably disturbs the free trade between town and country). It is the fact 
that Europe was stuck in these antiquated institutional arrangement that Smith 
used to explain why Europe, instead of by the “natural progress of opulence”, had 
to develop through an “unnatural and retrograde order”, whereby it were elements 
of the next stage (commercial society), that finally liberated the current state (if we 
can agree on situating the Europe described in Book III in the agricultural stage) 
from its elements of the former (shepherd) stage. It is the commerce of the towns 
with other far-away towns (a feature — international trade — that would 
“naturally” be one of commercial society only) which weakens the authority of the 
feudal lords (the remnant from the shepherd stage) and finally lets the agricultural 
stage progress to the commercial one, by extending this commerce between towns 
‘backwards’ (or ‘unnaturally’) to the rural areas. 
Hence Smith’s description of the “unnatural and retrograde order” may in 
fact serve the purpose of showing that this “unnatural” order is nevertheless 
(despite being unnatural) a functional one. Society develops either way, but it does 
so in unpredictable and unintended ways. This does not prove the contrary of what 
Smith tried to prove, however, but is indeed his main point throughout: that there 
are forces within the socio-economic system which move society toward progress, 
out of the confrontation of natural (i.e. in this case: innate) human propensities 
confronted to the natural (non-human, material) world; these forces are acting in 
an intricate interplay of various inter-connected cause and effect relationships, all 
connected in a large positive feedback loop, which, because of their complexity, it 
is impossible for any central authority to fully comprehend and hence imitate and 
direct, let alone enforce. It is here that Smith’s ‘bottom-up’ liberalism clashed with 
the more ‘top-down’ centralising spirit of a directed and even enforced liberalism 
of the physiocrats. 
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Jane Jacobs (1969, p.?) famously contradicted Smith as to the precedence of 
agriculture over cities, claiming that cities arose as trading posts before the 
adoption of agriculture, and that agriculture was actually created by cities as a 
form of import-substitution for foodstuff and other products gathered (and 
hunted) that had to be purchased from without. A recent article by three 
archaeologists holds that “Jacobs’ idea was out of line with extant archaeological 
findings when first advanced decades ago, and it remains firmly contradicted by a 
much fuller corpus of data today.” (Smith, Ur, & Feinman 2014, p. 1525). However 
that may be, what Jacobs (as many others who have and do criticise Smith) failed 
to see, is that her ideas were much more similar to Smith than they were 
contradictory to them.37  
For Smith, as it turns out, it is more the mutual dependency of these variables 
on each other that is of interest, than the precedence of one over the other, even if 
he does sometimes establish such precedence. While Smith does describe a 
“natural” sequence in regional development, in which cities naturally emerge as a 
result of the development of the country-side, he not only acknowledges that the 
sequence also works in reverse, he even describes how this “unnatural” order has 
in fact been the way Europe (i.e. the major part of the developed world, certainly in 
the 18th century) has developed. Much as with the order that Smith described 
between the first occurrences of capital accumulation and the division of labour, 
there are positive feedback effects that largely blur the importance of this order. 
What is crucial is the mutual dependency of these processes (capital accumulation 
and division of labour, population and development, in general, and urbanisation 
and the development of the country-side, in particular) on each other. The 
important fact is that “the gains of both are mutual and reciprocal, and the division 
of labour is in this, as in all other cases, advantageous to all” (WN III.i.1, p. 376).  
 
4. Limits to growth? 
Did Smith believe in continual progress, or did he see definite limits to it? Some 
authors have taken the position that he did in fact see such a limit in the stationary 
state, which is a definite and material boundary, determined by the limited 
availability of land (Hollander 1973 ; Heilbroner 1975 ; Wrigley 1988). The 
passage often cited in support of this view is the following: 
                                                        
37 Jacobs also criticised Smith’s ideas on the division of labour (Jacobs 1969, p. 83), 
claiming it was a static theory, which is a patent misreading of Smith. She offered her own 
theory of spontaneous order in return, which again was actually strikingly similar to 
Smith’s. 
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In a country which had acquired that full complement of riches which the 
nature of its soil and climate, and its situation with respect to other 
countries allowed it to acquire; which could, therefore, advance no further, 
and which was not going backwards, both the wages of labour and the 
profits of stock would probably be very low. In a country fully peopled in 
proportion to what either its territory could maintain or its stock employ, 
the competition for employment would necessarily be so great as to reduce 
the wages of labour to what was barely sufficient to keep up the number of 
labourers, and, the country being already fully peopled, that number could 
never be augmented. In a country fully stocked in proportion to all the 
business it had to transact, as great a quantity of stock would be employed 
in every particular branch as the nature and extent of the trade would 
admit. The competition, therefore, would everywhere be as great, and 
consequently the ordinary profit as low as possible. (WN.I.ix.14, p. 111) 
Others, criticising the former authors for “Malthusianising Smith” have noted 
that in fact it is laws and institutions (which can evolve and be changed) that 
determine the prospect of a country’s advancement, not the availability of land 
alone, citing the very following paragraph of Wealth of Nations for support (Winch 
1995): 
But perhaps no country has ever yet arrived at this degree of opulence. 
China seems to have been long stationary, and had probably long ago 
acquired that full complement of riches which is consistent with the nature 
of its laws and institutions. But this complement may be much inferior to 
what, with other laws and institutions, the nature of its soil, climate, and 
situation might admit of. (I.ix.15, p. 111-2) 
Smith here points out that a country may well be stationary even if it has not 
as yet attained all the limits pointed out in the preceding paragraph (amount of 
“riches” in relation to “soil and climate” and “situation with respect to other 
countries”; size of population with regard to territory and stock; and amount of 
stock in proportion to “business  . . .  to transact”). And another limit or condition to 
the progress of opulence is added, which, however, appears more flexible than the 
others, namely “institutions”. The question is a delicate one, as (like much of what 
Smith wrote) these passages are not devoid of ambiguity. In fact, the second 
paragraph (WN.I.ix.15) does no more invalidate the view of Smith as seeing 
progress as being absolutely limited by the availability of land than the first 
paragraph (WN.I.ix.14) supports it. Strictly speaking, indeed, Smith nowhere refers 
precisely to the availability of land as such in either of these two paragraphs. But 
the first sentence of the second paragraph (“perhaps no country has ever yet 
arrived at this degree of opulence”), at least strongly suggest that Smith believed 
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that eventually, countries would attain a “degree of opulence” at which the various 
limits Smith enumerates were reached, which would lend support to the 
“Malthusianised” view of Smith. And at the end of this paragraph, Smith also refers 
again to countries’ “soil, climate, and situation”, suggesting that these are indeed 
somehow more decisive than a country’s “laws and institutions”, which he had just 
singled out for playing a special role.  
Another noted passage of Smith concerning history and progress is one in 
which he considers the usual duration of periods of prosperity as being generally 
limited to two-hundred years: 
It is now more than two hundred years since the beginning of the reign of 
Elizabeth, a period as long as the course of human prosperity usually 
endures. (WN.III.iv.20, p. 425). 
So is history cyclical for Smith; an ever repeating cycle of progress and decline? 
This was clearly the case in Vico’s New Science, as it had been in Khaldun’s much 
earlier work, both of which share many similarities with Smith’s approach.38 As 
(Nohara 2010) shows, Smith in fact rejects this view in the absolute. But this does 
not mean, necessarily, that “there is no resolution possible [between progress and 
stagnation] within the terms of Smith's premises” (Heilbroner 1975), nor that “the 
commentator is forced to choose between passages in Smith’s work in order to 
support a particular interpretation of the former’s view of history” between either 
“commercial society is the end of history because 1) it supplies the ends of nature 
that he identifies; 2) it is inevitable; and 3) it is permanent” or “commercial society 
does not supply the ends of nature, nor is it inevitable, nor is it permanent” (Alvey 
2003, p. 1). Rather, I would suggest, most passages by Smith on this question in 
and of themselves allow for alternative interpretations.  
Maybe, to attempt to resolve the apparent contradictions in Smith’s premises 
which Heilbroner and Alvey point out, we must stop to see them as contradictions. 
A refutation of the ‘absolute limit to progress’ view of Smith can perhaps best be 
carried out by recognising the actual multitude of ‘limits’ to the progress of 
opulence that Smith enumerates, and their multiple dependencies on each other. In 
the sense of the argument developed in this chapter (the presence of circular 
                                                        
38 There is no evidence that Smith was aware of the work of either. On Fisch and Bergin’s 
(1944) claim that Vico may have influenced the Scottish Enlightenment (and in particular 
Adam Ferguson) Forbes (1954) writes: “It is an interesting suggestion, but  . . .  the 
eighteenth century was full of Vichian thoughts that do not necessarily stem from Vico, 
and in the writings of Kames, Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith and Gilbert Stuart much that is 
'Vichian' is clearly and confessedly derived from Montesquieu.” In the remainder of the 
same paragraph and the next, Forbes however cites many references to Vico by the 
Scottish Enlightenment historian John Gillies. See also Skinner (1965)  
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causation and positive feedback in Smith’s work), it is possible, in fact, looking at 
WN.I.ix.14 quoted above, to not see the seemingly absolutist formulation of Smith 
as quite so absolute, if we recognise the complexity of the different relationships 
referred to here by Smith between “riches”, “soil and climate”, “situation with 
respect to other countries”, “wages”, “profits”, population, “territory”, “stock”, 
“employment”, “business”, “nature and extent of the trade” and “competition”. All 
these elements are actually linked to each other in various and intricate ways by 
Smith at different points in the Wealth of Nations (and Lectures on Jurisprudence), 
and hence the whole complex interrelationship here drawn by Smith, the “system” 
as a whole, is indeterminate. Thus, in this very paragraph, Smith tells us that 
“riches” are limited not only by “soil and climate” but also by the “situation with 
respect to other countries”; that the number of people is limited not only by the 
carrying capacity of the territory, but also by what its stock can employ, and that 
the “quantity of stock” itself is limited by the “nature and extent of the trade”, 
which, as we know from earlier expositions of Smith,39 is limited, in turn by the 
“situation with respect to other countries” mentioned at the beginning of the 
paragraph, as well as by the development and availability of technology (through 
the progress of the division of labour), which itself depends on such things as 
geography (“territory”), the amount of capital (“stock”) and the size of population. 
Seen thus, it is hard to single out any one element as the ‘absolute limit’ to 
progress.  
All of these variables in fact exert some influence on the whole. And, 
significantly, for the most part they are precisely that: variables. While “soil and 
climate”, which Smith mentions first (and to which Hollander, Heilbroner and 
Wrigley devote the greatest attention), is an absolute and not a variable quantity, 
most other ‘limits’ enumerated by Smith thereafter are variables. The “situation 
with respect to other countries” depends notably on the extent and nature of 
settlement, both of the country in question and of the other countries. Thus, if 
population grows in one country and comes to settle in greater proportion nearer 
the border with another country, the situation of both these countries with respect 
to each other (and hence “to other countries”) changes. With respect to population, 
Smith points out in the contentious passage we are considering here that a country 
can be “fully peopled in proportion to what either its territory could maintain or its 
stock employ”. The fact that Smith here uses “either” and “or” rather than “and”, 
however, is significant. If population was limited by the extent of the territory and 
the amount of stock, this would be an absolute limit. But what the either implies is 
                                                        
39 Chiefly WN.I.iii, but also, importantly the Early Draft, and the Fragments on the Division 
of Labour. See Meek and Skinner (1973). 
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that population is limited by the extent of the territory only insofar as we are 
considering only this necessary relation to territory (which, in the absence of 
conquest for a single nation, and, in any case, for the world as a whole, is fixed). 
Independently from this first condition, population is also dependent on the 
amount of stock, and the latter can be increased. Stock itself depends on “amount 
of business to be transacted”, and is thus variable too. So is commerce. The snake 
bites its tail at this point. Circular cumulative causation is at work throughout. 
 Over the long run, with enough velocity gathered, a movement may have 
gained enough momentum to begin a new cycle. Although there are certain laws of 
motion, therefore, in the development of society, we can never fully determine 
outcomes, which depend on too many variables, which are themselves linked 
together in too many ways. Maybe what Ricardo so much criticised in Smith, his 
ambiguity and indefiniteness with regard to the determination of different 
variables of his system, was actually an important and valuable feature of Smith’s 
edifice. In line with writers having linked Smith with Darwin, and what has been 
said in this chapter about Smith’s growth theory resembling one of organic growth, 
the laws of the development of society depicted by Smith resemble the laws of 
biology, with its inherent indeterminacy, more than the social physics that Ricardo 
seems to have wished to construct.40 In that sense, it may be with historical 
development, for Smith, as it would be with biological development for Darwin: 
successive generations are born, but they are never fully identical. Over many 
cycles of biological reproduction, species evolve, just as over many cycles of social 
and economic reproduction (depicted by the circular flow of the Physiocrats), 
societies evolve.41 As Nohara (2010, p. 89) puts it: “what Smith denied was the 
repetition of the same process of the rise and fall of civilization”. Thus, history may 
repeat itself, but never quite identically. Though civilisations may rise and fall, 
overall progress is still conceivable when looked at on a larger scale, just as the 
oscillations of a wave may appear as cycles from close-up, while from a distance 
the wave shows to have an overall direction independent of its oscillations, and 
may even look linear. 
  
                                                        
40 Coats (1979, p. 605) calls this “the gap between the Smithian Scottish tradition of 
economic thought and the Bentham-Ricardo tradition of rationalistic analysis which has 
been so dominant in twentieth century professional economics”. 
41 In this line of argumentation, see Houthakker (1956) for an analogy between the 
concepts of specialisation and speciation. 
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5. Conclusion 
The question of why the development process is so hart to set in (or to set off), in 
fact, is precisely the question mid-20th century development economists grappled 
with, leading them to try to identify the conditions necessary for a “take-off into 
self-sustained growth” (Rostow 1956), for which they advocated a “big push” 
(Rosenstein-Rodan 1943 ; Nurkse 1952) or “critical minimum effort” (Leibenstein 
1957).42 And this is no coincidence, as they were inspired in this, precisely, by 
Allyn Young’s (1928) reconsideration of Smith’s theory of development, as visible 
in the quote from Nurkse above. In many respects, however, these authors of the 
mid-20th century development literature missed maybe the most important insight 
in Smith’s (and Young’s) approach: That it is a process of positive feedback in 
which a multitude of elements are involved which are linked to each other in 
multiple ways, making the process necessarily a slow and gradual one (with the 
additional implication that this process, by its sheer complexity, is one that can be 
favoured or hampered, if we arrive at a better understanding of its working, but 
which can hardly be absolutely controlled, as it depends on the simultaneous 
working of too many variables).43  
In an industrialised economy, an entrepreneur might decide to start 
producing a given good on an industrial scale, knowing there will be a demand for 
it, as people already consume industrial (“mass-consumption”) goods; but in a 
largely agricultural subsistence economy, where people do not earn wages, or have 
little income more generally, they cannot purchase these goods on a large enough 
scale for their industrial production to be economically undertaken. Investment 
can work in augmenting production. But it can solve the problem of demand only 
insofar as the different activities and goods in the economy/society remain 
balanced, in the precise way that the increase of supply is actually a response to an 
increase of demand (or vice-versa), i.e. that the two do not pertain each to different 
activities and/or goods, which would render them out of sync. The problem is 
highly circular, which on the one hand adds to its difficulty, but on the other hand, 
                                                        
42 Paul Krugman (who, incidentally, heavily relied on the Smithian perspective of positive 
feedback — or increasing returns — for his own “New Economic Geography” and “New 
Trade Theory”; see on this Kibritcioglu (2002)) referred to this group of authors 
collectively as “High Development Theory” (Krugman 1993).   
43 Which is why Smith thought that for a “stateman” to “fancy himself fit” to “attempt to 
direct private people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals” was “folly and 
presumption” (WN V.ii.10); because “the duty of superintending the industry of private 
people, and of directing it towards the employments most suitable to the interest of the 
society” is one for “which no human wisdom or knowledge could ever be sufficient” (WN 
IV.ix.51).  
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is also the solution to the problem. In an economy where only few goods are 
exchanged, this balance will be more difficult to obtain. The more goods are 
exchanged in an economy, the easier it becomes to introduce new goods into it, as 
there are more goods against which the new goods can be exchanged. 
Yet authors of the 1940s-1960s, just like growth theorists today in general, 
did and do not approach the problem of development with Smith’s theory of 
development in mind (as a cumulative process that unfolds over the very long run, 
and proceeds in stages), but from the perspective of modern equilibrium theory; 
and this theory, as North (1994) observed, is concerned with the functioning 
instead of the growth of markets. In other words, conditioned by the obsession of 
the discipline with negative feedback, economists of the 1940-1960 failed to see 
that economic development was subject to the opposite logic, namely positive 
feedback, and got enthralled by “paradoxes” (the purported “poverty traps” or 
“low level equiliria”) that really were none.44 In a Smithian perspective of positive 
feedback, there is no “low level equilibrium trap” in poor countries, but a situation 
of development not having gathered enough momentum to proceed at a fast pace; 
so much so that many 20th century economists failed to see the slow but very real 
progress that was happening and took the situation for one of stagnation.45 
 
  
                                                        
44 The irony of this is that in fact both Rosenstein-Rodan and Nurkse were inspired in their 
reflections by a reading of Young’s 1928 article, which is precisely about positive feedback 
in the process of economic growth, but of which apparently they failed to see the deeper 
implications. See also on this Perälä (2006) 
45 “Much of that thought pattern seems based on taking snapshots before and after some 
large change, and then not being able to readily imagine a step-by-step process to go from 
one to the other.” (Ellerman 2004) 
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Annex:  Links from Linnaeus via Smith to 
modern biology 
 
We know that Smith read Linnæus (through the books that were found in his 
library and his essay ‘Of the External Senses’) and that he was studying botany 
while writing Wealth of Nations.  Smith’s library contained four books by Linnaeus 
(Philosophia Botanica, 1751, Genera Plantarum, 9th ed., 1767, Systema Naturae, 13th 
ed., 1768, and Species Plantarum, 2nd ed., 1762-63) (Bonar 1894, p. 59), as well as 
An Introduction to Botany (2nd ed., 1765) by James Lee (ibid., p. 58), “containing an 
explanation of the theory of this science, and an interpretation of its technical 
terms, extracted from the works of Dr Linnaeus” (Ross 2010, p. 227)). In a letter to 
Andreas Holt, dated October 1780, Smith reported that while he was writing 
Wealth of Nations he was also “studying Botany (in which however [he] made no 
great progress)” (Corr. 208, p. 249). But it is almost certain that Smith was 
acquainted with the works of Linnaeus well before this time, as there are four 
references to that author in ‘External Senses’ (§ 70, 71, 77 and 83, p. 162-6), which 
the Glasgow editor of this essay, based on the references it does and does not 
contain, considered to be one of Smith’s earliest known works, having probably 
been written in the 1740s (Wightman 1980, p. 133-4). As Schabas (2003, p. 273) 
notes, Smith also used Linnaeus’ classifications of living beings into “Genera and 
Species” in ‘Astronomy’ (II.1-2, p. 38).46 The portion of that essay in which Smith 
makes these observations is estimated by Raphael and Skinner (1980, p. 6-8), 
based on various evidence, to also have been composed in the late 1740s.47 
On the possible cross-influence of Linnaeus and the political economists, 
Müller-Wille (2003, p. 167) holds that: 
it is not necessary to assume that Linnaeus was 'influenced' by Quesnay or 
any other economist of his time. To my knowledge, there is no evidence 
that he ever read any of the economic works of his day (cf. Koerner 1999, 
2). Rather the converse seems probable, that Quesnay knew the work of 
Linnaeus and other naturalists of his time .... John Locke had a medical 
background as well and kept a herbarium (Coleman  2000); Jean-Jacques 
                                                        
46 There does not appear to me in this passage, however, to be any notion of the 
“adaptiveness of species”, which Schabas (2003, p. 273) also perceives Smith to have 
observed therein. 
47 Schabas (2003, p. 273) further remarks that Smith also had in his library Benjamin 
Stillingfleet’s 1759 translation of Linnaeus’ Oeconomy of Nature. Linnaeus’ Politia naturae, 
the essay which contains the passage quoted at the beginning of the chapter this note is 
annexed to, does not figure in Smith’s library, so he may or may not have been acquainted 
with this particular passage. 
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Rousseau practiced botany late in his life and was a devoted admirer of 
Linnaeus (Cook 1994); and Adam Smith was "studying Botany" as a 
pastime while writing his Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth 
of Nations  . . .  Yet it is equally unnecessary to postulate any 'influence' in 
this converse direction, as both Linnaeus and the 'economists' just 
mentioned had a sufficiently common background in belonging to a 
scientific community that shared certain methodological vantage points, 
both in theory and practice. 
Müller-Wille (ibid.) is much less reserved in attributing to the Linnaean 
“œconomy of nature” (later renamed “œcologie” by Ernst Haeckel) a significant 
role in the work of Charles Lyell and Charles Darwin.48 If we accept the possibility 
of an actual influence of Linnæus on Smith — As Müller-Willle suggests but then 
dismisses as an unnecessary supposition —this would thus also be an important 
link to take into account in the much-discussed Smith-Darwin connection 
(Schweber 1977, 1980 ; Gordon 1989 ; Marciano & Pelissier 2000). Rausing (then 
Koerner 1999, p. 102), more resolute on the actual influence of Linnaeus, with 
particular reference to Smith, writes in this sense: 
Adam Smith, upon reading the great botanist, imports the cybernetic 
concepts governing Linnaeus' natural theology into his human economics 
of the "invisible hand," and Charles Darwin in turn re-imports Linnaeo-
Smithian conceptions of the economy and its self-regulatory features into 
the realm of nature. 
Rausing further remarks that “Linnaeus himself stands outside that more 
general reception of his thought” as he did not, himself, import those “cybernetic 
concepts” from his “natural theology” into his “national economics”. Linnaeus 
indeed favoured autarky over free trade and did not believe the “human economy”, 
as opposed to the “divine economy” (of nature) to be self-governing (Koerner 
1999, p. 96-102; see also Rausing 2003). 
Smith quite evidently believed there was something to infer from the natural 
world for the understanding of human society, as attested by his many statements 
classifying humans as a particular species of animals, sometimes to liken man to 
other animals, sometimes to distinguish him from them. In the first category, we 
must put his statement that “men, like all other animals, naturally multiply in 
proportion to the means of their subsistence” (WN I.xi.b.1, p. 162); in the second 
category, his depiction of the “propensity to truck, barter, and exchange” — which 
                                                        
48 Darwin of course read Linnaeus. He was also a member of the Linnaean society, in front 
of which he presented his work for the first time. 
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he singles out as the origin of the division of labour — as being “common to all 
men, and to be found in no other race of animals” (WN I.ii.1-2, p. ).49    
This distinction by Smith, between humans practising exchange by their very 
nature, and (other) animals being incapable of doing so, and, in so far as the 
division of labour is based on exchange, division of labour hence being a 
distinctively human trait, is rather odd (and one is tempted to believe that had 
Smith studied zoology instead of botany, he would probably not have drawn this 
particular distinction), given how widespread the phenomenon of the division of 
labour in fact is in the animal world (notably the extremely intricate division of 
labour among social insects such as ants, bees, wasps and termites).50 Possibly, the 
denial of division of labour among animals by Smith is justified by the rather 
restrictive conception of the division of labour that he held, meaning a substantial 
amount of specialisation of occupations (Meek & Skinner 1973, p. 1109). Yet, even 
this strict conception of the division of labour would still apply to the above-named 
species of insects. The beehive had indeed already been chosen as metaphor for 
the division of labour in society in Bernard Mandeville Fable. Another possibility is 
that Smith here implicitly draws a distinction between the division of labour 
between humans and between other social animals based on his own conception of 
the cause and effect of the division of labour among humans, developed in the 
same chapter. Inequality between humans, according to Smith, develops out of the 
division of labour rather than being at its origin. In social insects, he may have 
believed, the different social functions are largely biologically determined (such as 
in canines, which he singles out for contrast; he did not recognise, however, that 
the stark difference between different races of dogs was mainly the effect of age-
long human breeding). Yet, even here, the animal world gives examples of 
                                                        
49 Smith also sometimes referred to men as animals to convey, it seems, irony or derision, 
or add dramatic effect; as when writing about politicians at: “that insidious and crafty 
animal, vulgarly called a statesman or politician” (WN IV.ii.39, p. 468); or when speaking 
of the usefulness of alcohol in Lectures on Jurisprudence: “Strong liquors are allmost a 
necessity in every nation.  . . .  Man is an anxious animal and must have his care swept off 
by something that can exhilerate the spirits” (LJ(A) vi.85, p. 363; LJ(B) 231, p. 497). See 
also in the Anderson Notes: “the most tender of all animals, viz infants” (Meek 1976a, p. 
476). 
50 Ahmad (1996, p. 443, fn. 3) holds that “Marx (1844) places the division of labor even 
prior to exchange, since it is practiced within the family where no explicit exchange takes 
place, and even among other creatures, whom Smith explicitly excludes from the possible 
practitioners of exchange. Bees are an obvious example.” I have, however, found nothing to 
this effect in Marx (1844). Marx mentions bees, but not in connection with the division of 
labour, but rather to — like Smith — distinguish animals from men, who, at the difference 
of animals, produce not only for mere necessity. (Neither is the family mentioned by Marx 
in connection with the division of labour in the work Ahmad cites.) 
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precisely the mechanism of the creation of inequality by the division of labour 
described by Smith, such as, again, in bees. That queen bees are genetically 
identical to worker bees could not have been known by Smith of course, but the 
history of beekeeping commences at least three millennia before Smith’s time 
(Kritsky 2017), documented notably by Aristotle, ant that queen bees were bred 
out of regular bee larvae was likely known among beekeepers in the 18th century 
Scotland. 
In so far as Smith was arguably the most important proponent of the concept 
of the division of labour in political economy, which influenced Darwin’s 
conception of evolution (Schweber 1977, 1980 ; Marciano & Pelissier 2000), Smith 
was, inter alia, himself instrumental in favouring the import of the concept into 
biology, where it is today routinely used (maybe more so than in economics, where 
it has long been abandoned as a meaningful theoretical tool51) — ironically, given 
Smith depiction of the division of labour as a distinctively human trait. 
 
 
 
  
                                                        
51 See General Introduction (p. 27 above). 
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Chapter 4 
 
Smith and Marx  
versus Malthus and the Beckerians  
on the Demographic Transition and the 
Industrial Revolution 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The title of the present chapter will provoke some by the crass anachronism it 
appears to espouse. Neither Smith, nor Malthus, nor Marx, had a precise notion of 
the demographic transition, of course, and neither Smith nor Malthus had a 
concrete grasp of the Industrial Revolution. Nor could they have had any kind of 
precise knowledge of these historical phenomena, which only started to unfold 
during the latter part of their lives (with the exception of the Industrial Revolution 
for Marx, which was already well underway in Britain when he wrote). Nor is this 
what is claimed in this chapter.  
In recent years, there has been a resurgence of the theme of the demographic 
transition in the economics literature, this theme being related to the question of 
the industrial revolution and economic development in developing countries in the 
20th and 21st centuries. The demographic transition was often mentioned in 
economic texts of the 1950s and 1960s, when the broader theme of economic 
development was also more central to economists’ writings, but had seen a relative 
disinterest from the part of economists during most of the rest of the 20th century. 
The way this phenomenon is approached in recent years, however, is a direct 
development of the “New Home Economics” which had arisen in the 1970s as an 
expansion of Gary Becker’s “Economic Analysis of Fertility” (Becker 1960), 
culminating in his Treatise on the Family (Becker 1991 (1981)). This literature did 
not consider the question of the number of children per family (and related ones of 
choices in mating, marriage and reproductive behaviour) in the context of 
economic development. Although this was mostly implicit, the context was one of 
industrialised countries. It was also a micro-economic framework which 
abstracted from considerations of society-wide and historical phenomena and 
developments. In recent years, however, the way of theorising reproductive 
262 
behaviour characteristic of the “New Home Economics”, with the Beckerian 
“economic” way of reasoning as basis (the term having been employed by him in a 
presentist sense referring to the behavioural model of 20th century mainstream 
economics), was applied to an analysis of such macro-economic and macro-
historical phenomena as the demographic transition and the industrial revolution. 
Examples are Lucas (1996), Galor and Weil (2000), Galor (2005), Bar and 
Leukhina (2010), and the literature around the “demographic dividend” (Mason 
1988 ; Kelley & Schmidt 1995 ; Higgins & Williamson 1997 ; Bloom & Williamson 
1998 ; Bloom et al. 2001).  
The first exposition of the precise sequence of events that constitute the 
demographic transition, and the prediction that it would proceed in a similar 
manner in all human societies, is attributable to three authors, who apparently had 
not read each other (Kirk 1996):  William Thompson in 1929, Adolphe Landry in 
1934 and Frank Notestein in 1945.1 Simply put, the theory states that every 
society, as an intrinsic part of its socio-economic development (its 
“modernisation”), will proceed from a pre-transitional stage, where both fertility 
and mortality rates are high, to a post-transitional stage, where both are low. The 
transition itself is characterised by a stark decline in mortality, followed after a 
certain delay by a strong fall in fertility, with population growth occurring in the 
interval.2 This theory of the demographic transition was essentially an observation 
of what had actually taken place in the industrialised countries up to this date. The 
                                                        
1 A large part of Landry’s 1934 book is constituted of texts already published as articles in 
1909, 1924 and 1933. In parallel with Notestein, Kingsley Davis (1945) published a brief 
article in an issue of the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 
solely dedicated to demographic matters, of which he was the editor. The title of the 
article, ‘The World Demographic Transition’, is possibly the origin of the term. 
2 Adolphe Landry and William Thompson, unlike Notestein and later writers, did not think 
that population growth would stabilise around zero but that fertility would pass below 
mortality and population consequently decline, which is what effectively happened in 
some industrialised countries (some compensating the decline by immigration). 
Demographers are today divided over the temporary or permanent character of this 
decline. Landry attributed the fall of the Roman and Egyptian empires to population 
decline; he thus thought a demographic transition had already occurred there. Fertility 
and consequently population declined, he thought, and was progressively replaced by 
immigrants from the conquered nations. Both Thompson and Landry also saw this as the 
risk attached to declining fertility in Europe. The same idea had been developed by Ibn 
Khaldun in the 14th century, who also attributed the decline of societies to a decrease of 
their population and their subsequent invasion by surrounding tribes. Alarmist theses like 
those of Landry and Thompson continue to be defended today mostly by political parties 
on the extreme right. When Landry was writing, the French fertility rate was indeed fairly 
low, which worried many observers. But it redressed and is today the highest in Europe. 
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theory did not point out in any detailed way what were the underlying causal 
mechanisms.3  
The precise mechanisms underlying the demographic transition have been 
the subject of much debate since. The conceptions of many economists today still, 
however, can actually be traced back directly to the classical wage doctrine. In the 
modern literature, one can still find many references to (although seldom citations 
of) Malthus. Malthus is thereby presented as a sort of monolith, sole representative 
of the whole of economists’ writings on population throughout the 18th and 19th 
century, totally disregarding the great controversy that his ideas on population — 
themselves having been many times previously expressed in various ways, and as 
often times disputed — stirred in their midst. In this extraordinary act of historical 
simplification, the other prominent classical writers are simply “Malthusianised” 
for convenience (as denounced notably by Himmelfarb 1984 ; the expression is by 
Winch 1995).  
Smith, Malthus and Marx (who in most aspects resembles Smith in this 
regard), and the recent literature cited above, which is linked to Malthus’ (an 
affiliation with Malthus was claimed by Becker in 1960), are picked out here for 
closer scrutiny in order to highlight two main points of divergence of the 
Malthusian from the Smithian and Marxian positions. The first is the predominant 
attention paid to fertility by the Malthusians, while Smith and Marx were more 
concerned with mortality (and morbidity). The second is the belief in decreasing 
returns to population, while in the Smithian framework (adopted by Marx) there 
are increasing returns to population size and concentration via the productivity-
enhancing effects of the division of labour, largely ignored (or dismissed) by 
Malthus and the Malthusians. When the two points are combined, the Smithian and 
Marxian position offers a radically different way of theorising the interaction of 
population growth and economic development, which, it is held, is much more in 
line with historic and contemporary developments than the Malthusian theory that 
features so prominently in the economic literature to this day.  
 
 
                                                        
3 “Stripped to essentials [demographic transition theory] states that societies that 
experience modernization progress from a pre-modern regime of high fertility and high 
mortality to a post-modern one in which both are low. The term 'modernization', is not 
defined, nor does it include the crucial questions about causation that form the subject of 
much modern demographic literature” (Kirk 1996, p. 361) . Notestein and others however 
identified urbanisation and industrialisation as important factors. 
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2. Smithian Ambiguities 
Adam Smith saw population growth as a response to a higher labour demand, this 
demand being expressed through a rising wage level. The idea had been expressed 
similarly by Richard Cantillon, whom Smith cites. In this framework, supply of 
labour does not manifest itself principally through the willingness of workers to 
work more or less, which is what has been retained in the contemporary 
(neoclassical) version, but through actual supply of workers, i.e. their births and 
deaths, which is a point all classical economists shared. In times of higher wages 
more of the workers’ children (and more workers) would survive, and in times of 
lower wages more of them would die, which thus would make the wage rate return 
to its “natural” level. In his explanation of the link between wages and population 
growth, however, Smith was not utterly specific.  
 In an observation about North America, Smith thus first held that the high 
wage rate prevailing there was the main motivation for bearing children and 
therefore early marriage:  
Labour is there so well rewarded that a numerous family of children, 
instead of being a burthen is a source of opulence and prosperity to the 
parents. The labour of each child, before it can leave their house, is 
computed to be worth a hundred pound clear gain to them.  . . .  The value 
of children is the greatest of all encouragements to marriage. We cannot, 
therefore, wonder that the people in North America should generally marry 
very young. (WN I.viii.23, p. 88) 
Smith thus believed that high wages were an incentive to marry, and marry 
young, in order to have (more) children and send them to work, so the high wages 
of the children could contribute to the income of the household. On the other hand, 
Smith noticed that wealth, especially that of women, could limit fertility:  
Poverty, though it no doubt discourages, does not always prevent marriage. 
It seems even to be favourable to generation. A half-starved Highland 
woman frequently bears more than twenty children, while a pampered fine 
lady is often incapable of bearing any, and is generally exhausted by two or 
three. Barrenness, so frequent among women of fashion, is very rare 
among those of inferior station. Luxury in the fair sex, while it enflames 
perhaps the passion for enjoyment, seems always to weaken, and 
frequently to destroy altogether, the powers of generation.  (WN I.viii.37, p. 
97) 
If we consider these two quotes from Smith in terms of the determinants of 
population growth, i.e. fertility and mortality, an imprecision in his thought 
265 
becomes apparent. Indeed, the first passage tells us that high wages in North 
America made large families an economic asset, and inversely, it is implied, large 
families are a “burthen” where this is not the case (where wages are low), and that 
this is the reason for people in North America to marry young. Marrying young, 
seems to be implied, makes it possible to have more children, i.e. to raise the 
couple’s fertility. Smith thus draws a link between the intensity of the desire for 
children (augmented by the potential gain to be obtained from their labour) and a 
younger age at marriage, suggesting that the younger couples marry, the more 
children their marriage will produce, i.e. the higher the couple’s fertility. This, 
however, stands somewhat in contradiction with the second passage quoted 
above. It is indeed contradictory that a higher wage should increase fertility, on the 
one hand, as we have just deduced from the first quote, but that wealth should 
reduce fertility, on the other hand, as the second quote implies.  
Of course, Smith was reasoning in terms of social classes that were rather 
stable. Social mobility was not very developed in 18th century Britain. It was rare 
for an individual to be born a “half-starved Highland woman” and become a 
“pampered fine lady” during her fecund lifetime. And, then as now, one would 
hardly, if ever, become rich through wage labour. Smith could therefore well 
regard fertility to be universally high among the poor and low among the rich, 
without having to worry too much about the fertility of individuals that would pass 
from one category to the other, as these were rare. Still, if one observes a negative 
relationship between fertility and material well-being, it is contradictory to affirm 
at the same time that higher wages should raise fertility. Smith indeed explicitly 
considered high wages in connection with raised material well-being for the 
labouring population.  
Smith does not seem to consider any adaptation of reproductive behaviour to 
higher wages of couples that are already married. It appears, indeed, that Smith 
saw the rate of conception of children (through time) as a constant. Hence the only 
way for couples to increase fertility would be to increase the length of their union, 
which explains the link Smith draws between the desire to have (more) children 
that could be sent to work for higher wages and the desire to therefore marry 
young. Whether Smith was aware of the possibility for couples to exert some 
control over their reproductive behaviour at any given moment of their union 
(hence not solely by its length) is of course up for debate. He himself was never 
married and might not have given this question much thought at all. His 
observation about “fine pampered lad[ies]”, however, seems to suggest that he 
knew that at least the rich had ways to control their fertility. Malthus followed 
Smith in seeing the rate of conception of children as a constant, and therefore 
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advocated delaying marriage as a “preventive check” on couple’s fertility (while 
refusing to consider birth control as such). 
To obtain more precision about Smith’s thoughts on these matters, one must 
look at a further passage in the Wealth of Nations, following shortly after the one 
quoted above (WN I.viii.37, p. 97). It becomes apparent therein that Smith saw 
population growth as a function of wages, principally, not because of the effect of 
higher wages on fertility, but because of their effect on mortality. Families would 
be more numerous when wages are higher because this would permit them to 
keep more of their children alive, not because they would bear more children. 
Hence Smith’s sentence, quoted by Malthus in the preface to his second essay, 
“every species of animals naturally multiplies in proportion to the means of their 
subsistence, and no species can ever multiply beyond it”, is directly followed by a 
qualification:  
But in civilized society it is only among the inferior ranks of people that the 
scantiness of subsistence can set limits to the further multiplication of the 
human species; and it can do so in no other way than by destroying a great 
part of the children which their fruitful marriages produce. The liberal 
reward of labour, by enabling them to provide better for their children, and 
consequently to bring up a greater number, naturally tends to widen and 
extend those limits. (WN I.viii.39-40, 97-8)  
Smith here first observes that “poverty  . . .  seems even to be favourable to 
generation” (I.viii.37).  He rightly deduces that “among the inferior ranks of people  
. . .  the scantiness of subsistence can set limits to the further multiplication of the 
human species  . . .  in no other way than by destroying a great part of the children 
which their fruitful marriages produce” (I.viii.39), i.e. that poverty limits 
population growth exclusively by raising mortality, not by reducing fertility.  
Yet, this does not fully resolve the incongruity. First, Smith’s explanation of 
mortality being the sole determinant of family size stands in conflict with his own 
earlier assertion that higher wages are an incentive to marry young and thereby 
increase fertility. Second, even if the number of children labourers have is 
determined solely by the infant mortality rate, which itself depends on the wage 
rate, then fertility (at least among the lower classes) must be considered a 
constant. And this still stands in conflict with Smith’s observation on the negative 
influence of wealth on fertility. Indeed, if fertility is a constant, then it cannot vary 
according to material well-being. If fertility varies according to material comfort, 
on the other hand, then it can have as much of a bearing on population growth as 
can mortality. Smith neglected this. He did not take into account that the negative 
effect of rising material well-being on fertility that he himself pointed out could 
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well result from higher wages, which could thus potentially reduce, rather than 
increase, population growth.  
This neglect does not necessarily disturb the general framework of Smith’s 
theory, as applied to the context of 18th century Britain. Indeed, to be able to result 
in lesser population growth and hence the abortion of Smith’s theory of labour 
market adjustment, the reduction in fertility during times of higher wages would 
have had to be so strong as to compensate for the reduction in child mortality that 
increased well-being also brings about. In Smith’s time, this was probably not yet 
the case anywhere. After Smith’s death, however, (infant) mortality decreased in 
Europe to an extent Smith could hardly have foreseen. In that context the negative 
effect of wealth on fertility that Smith observed comes increasingly to stand in 
conflict with the positive effect of wealth on population growth that Smith 
theorised. Thus, while Smith’s incongruity did not invalidate his theory of the 
interaction of wage and population growth with regard to 18th century Britain, it 
does invalidate this theory as a general theory independent of historical 
conditions. This points to Marx’s critique of Malthus: that an abstract population 
law cannot exist for humans independently of historical conditions (see section 3 
below).  
As later demographic developments unfolded in Europe, repeated since in all 
other regions, it became more and more apparent that there indeed exists a 
negative correlation between fertility and income. This, however, does not inform 
us on the direction of causality between the two (or whether there is in fact such a 
causality). Smith’s ambiguities can be thought to have given rise to both of the two 
converse explanations offered for the relationship between fertility and incomes 
by Malthus and by Marx. It appears, indeed, that, at least in their premises, both the 
views of Marx and Malthus on the relation between income and fertility — 
however diametrically opposed — can be found in Smith. Malthus thought of high 
fertility as a factor of impoverishment; consequently, the fall in fertility could be 
seen as a factor of rising wealth. Marx thought on the contrary, that poverty was 
the reason for high fertility, hence that causality ran in the opposite direction, and 
offered an explanation for it. 
 
3. Malthusian Explanations of the demographic 
transition — fertility decline as the cause of 
income rise
Malthus saw children merely as a cost to parents. He also thought that it was the 
natural desire of man to have as many children as he possibly could.  Malthus 
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concluded, therefore, that a rise in wages would not make workers better off, but 
that they would only have more children as a result, which would cancel out any 
higher material well-being that they could otherwise have gained through this pay-
rise. As Malthus did not, like Smith, believe in increasing returns to a larger labour-
supply (population), but on the contrary in decreasing ones, he also thought that 
the additional child-bearing of parents earning higher wages was a factor of 
impoverishment, rather than enrichment, as much for the households themselves 
as for society as a whole. This mechanism, then, would ensure that the poor would 
always stay poor, and that any attempt at the betterment of their condition 
through policy measures would turn against society as a whole, by depressing 
overall productivity through excessive population – a bleak response to Godwin’s 
(1793) and Condorcet’s (1794) prospects of the voluntaristic progress of society 
toward increasing equity, well-being and equality.4  
Malthus was heavily criticised after the first edition of his essay (1798) — 
written in the form of a pamphlet with very few references and original data and 
unsigned (but he was quickly identified as the author) — for presenting a dilemma 
between food availability and population growth, but refusing to consider any 
solutions other than catastrophe, euphemiously termed “positive checks”. He was 
notably opposed to any measures of birth control, which he thought of as 
blasphemous.5 Malthus reacted to his critics by offering, from the second edition of 
his essay (1803) onwards, a text much broader in scope and extent of original 
research and referencing, and developed the theme of “preventive checks” to 
population growth, mainly in the form of delayed marriage (and, also, 
prostitution6). The position today commonly thought of as “neoMalthusian”, the 
promotion of birth control and family planning measures in developing countries, 
was never accepted as an option by Malthus himself. The justification of this 
                                                        
4 The role of human knowledge and reason, on which Godwin and especially Condorcet 
based their argument, however, was ignored by Malthus, therefore his theory does not as 
much represent a response as a simple rejection of Godwin’s and Condorcet’s views. 
Indeed, Malthus takes up and develops what Condorcet had already described as the 
menace facing humanity in the absence of the expansion of human knowledge and reason; 
the latter was, however, the central feature of Condorcet’s theory. The opposition between 
the two authors thence really boils down to the changeability or unchangeability of human 
nature, a theme that would be taken up again by Marx, in stark opposition to Malthus 
precisely on this point. 
5 The reasons for this, directly related to Malthus’ economic theory, were analysed in the 
first chapter. See above p. 142. 
6 Smith had also exposed a belief in a negative effect of prostitution on population growth, 
in his lectures on jurisprudence (LJ(A) iii.95, p. 178). This seemed to have been a common 
belief in the 18th century. 
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position, however, remains a direct following of his line of thought. In this 
perspective, if excessive population growth is the main element holding back the 
growth of per capita income, as Malthus argued, then it should suffice to cut back 
the population growth rate to achieve higher per capita economic growth.7 
In a 1997 lecture at Yale University, Robert Lucas underlined the necessity to 
understand the sustained income per capita growth since about 1800 in 
industrialised countries, after millennia of stagnation, in terms of the demographic 
transition (Lucas 1996). Lucas depicts the neoMalthusian worry about population 
eventually outstripping resources as “simply nonsense” (ibid.). Population has 
been rising, he points out, and so has income. Moreover, if current trends in the 
growth of population and income were extrapolated into the past, we would obtain 
quite ridiculous results. Today’s situation in the developing countries, like the one 
of Europe during the industrial revolution, thus has to be understood in terms of a 
transition. The event Lucas identifies as the salient feature of this transition, 
however, is the decline in fertility. It is the decline in fertility, Lucas advances, that 
made incomes finally outstrip population growth, after the millennia where 
population growth has kept up with income growth. In other words, Lucas thinks 
that for the millennia preceding the demographic transition, the relationship 
between population and economic growth was basically “Malthusian” (economic 
growth was “consumed” entirely by population growth), but that at some point 
fertility started to decline and that this is what finally made incomes rise more 
than proportionally to population. Recent models that have followed Lucas’ 
account about the relation between the demographic transition and the Industrial 
Revolution (Becker, Murphy, & Tamura 1990b ; Galor & Weil 1999 ; Mokyr 2005), 
use the same Malthusian logic of the relationship between population and 
economic growth.    
A Malthusian outlook is also observable in recent work about what has been 
dubbed the “demographic dividend”, where it is held that the period of fertility 
decline, i.e., the second phase of the demographic transition, by reducing the 
number of young dependents, is an opportunity for countries to realise larger 
investment, as a larger working age population relative to the total population will 
                                                        
7 It should be noted that this view rests on the additional assumption that the total 
economic growth of a region itself is independent of the size of the population. It is only 
under this condition that it is possible to augment per capita economic growth by reducing 
the population. When the link between economic growth and the division of labour, and 
the link between the division of labour and the extent of the market, determined in large 
parts by the size and proximity of the population (i.e. Smith’s view of economic growth), is 
upheld, however, this view must be rejected. The neoMalthusian perspective, in other 
words, is incompatible with Smith’s theory of economic growth by division of labour 
limited by the extent of the market as laid out in Chapter 2. 
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realise larger savings. Earlier, Coale and Hoover (1958) had made the same 
argument in reverse for India and Mexico: the high number of dependents, Coale 
and Hoover advanced, inhibited savings and thus investment and ultimately 
economic growth. The demographic transition, indeed, has an important influence 
on a population’s age structure. During the first phase of the transition, only 
mortality falls, which concerns chiefly infant mortality, and this makes the 
proportion of children in the population rise. The dependency ratio, i.e. the ratio of 
the fraction of a population too young and too old to work — referred to as 
“dependent” — to the working-age population (by definition the ages 15 to 59), 
thus rises. Coale and Hoover advanced that then-high dependency ratios in India 
and Mexico were an obstacle to economic growth in these countries and that 
economic growth would be enhanced if fertility was reduced (which would reduce 
the proportion of children). Their argument was inspired by the life-cycle 
consumption models of Brumberg and Modigliani (1954) and Friedman (1957), 
which hold that individuals consume during their whole life but save only during 
their working life, as well as by the Solow (1956) model and the general belief in 
the importance of savings (and conjointly investment) for economic growth. The 
recent literature about the “demographic dividend”8 focuses instead on the phase 
in the demographic transition whereby working-age population comes to exceed 
the non-working-age (dependent) population for a certain time as a result of 
declining fertility. Following the argument of Coale and Hoover, this particular 
period of time is supposed to offer great opportunities of increased growth and 
development. One of the recommendations is therefore to sustain efforts in fertility 
reduction, notably in Africa, through family planning programs.  
The problem with this analysis, as John C. Caldwell (1976) convincingly 
argued, is that it takes people’s fertility behaviour as an irrational response to 
economic conditions.9 Economists, generally holding dear to the hypothesis that 
people are rational, should be sensible to this. Indeed, if people could escape 
poverty by simply having fewer children, it would be quite irrational to have many 
– unless people really wanted to be poor, or were simply ”primitive”, hence 
irrational, which is indeed what Malthus believed.  
                                                        
8 Alternatively referred to as the “demographic bonus”, “demographic gift” or 
“demographic window” ; see for instance Mason (1987); Higgins and Williamson (1997); 
Bloom, Sachs, Collier, and Udry (1998); Bloom and Williamson (1998); Bloom et al. 
(2001); Mason (2001); Malmberg (2006). 
9 Caldwell made the same reproach to the original formulations of demographic transition 
theory, in which Notestein in particular — and Caldwell cites many others following him 
— had seen the demographic transition as part of a general move toward a more rational 
apprehension of the world by hitherto primitive societies. 
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The “New Household Economics” initiated by Becker (1960) hold that 
fertility falls when parents replace child quantity with “child quality” (i.e., 
investment in their children’s human capital – meaning mostly education for 
Becker). Following from the general microeconomic framework underlying the 
“New Household Economics” literature, this begins to be the case when returns to 
human capital start becoming high in society – which they would be in an urban 
industrial society. Becker saw his theory basically as an extension of Malthus’:  
Malthus’ famous discussion was built upon a strongly economic 
framework; mine can be viewed as a generalization and development of his  
. . .  I will try to show that the theory of demand for consumer durables is a 
useful framework in analyzing the demand for children. (Becker 1960, p. 
209-11).  
This view of Becker (1960,1991 (1981)) that children could be considered 
consumption goods, however, would imply that in poorer societies people should 
actually have fewer children. Indeed, if rearing children is costly, and if it is held 
that people naturally desire to have as many children as possible, as Malthus 
thought, then the rich should have more children than the poor. Yet today the rich 
in general seem to have fewer and not more children than the poor, as Smith 
already noted to be the case in the 18th century. Becker’s theory resolves this 
patent conflict with reality by introducing ‘human capital’ into the explanation of 
fertility decisions and positing a trade-off between “child quality” and child 
quantity. As human capital becomes more valuable, parents would start investing 
more in the human capital of their children and have fewer children to compensate 
for the costs of these investments. That is, this trade-off would weigh more than 
the pure demand-framework just laid out, so much so as to revert it: the rich would 
as a result of it have less rather than more children than the poor (as is observed in 
reality).
For what reason returns to human capital augment, however, is not identified 
by the theory. While an urban industrial society is identified as being the one 
where returns to human capital would generally be higher, indeed, this does not 
explain how a society passes from an agricultural subsistence economy to an urban 
industrial one. With regard to this augmentation or “improvement”, in other 
words, the “New Household Economics” are not less vague than were the early 
theorists of demographic transition with regard to the meaning of “modernisation” 
and the cause of fertility decline. 
In a comment on Nerlove (1974), Griliches (1974) observed what he thought 
was the “main shortcoming of the "new home economics"”:  
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The basic postulates are that children are goods, that all goods are subject 
to two constraints—time and money—and that children are relatively 
time-intensive goods. But this does not distinguish children from hi-fi sets!  
. . .  My belief is that if we want to study the demand for children, we have to 
put more content into the theory and start asking why do people want to 
have children; what are the returns and not just the costs of this activity?  . . 
.  If we are studying the demand for children rather than for hi-fi sets, we 
have to ask ourselves what it is about children that distinguishes them 
from other time-intensive durable goods.  . . .  I would distinguish at least 
three interdependent motives: (1) economic security (current labor and 
old-age provisions), (2) the production of reciprocal caring, and (3) an 
attempt at immortality via one's offspring. 
Griliches’ motives are in line with Marx’s analysis rather than with Malthus’s.  
 
4. Marxian explanations of the demographic 
transition — income rise as the cause of 
fertility decline 
For Malthus, the poor were the cause of their own poverty because they 
reproduced too much in the face of limited food supply. Marx pointed out that the 
inverse relationship was true: it was because people were so destitute that they 
had such a high fertility rate. Marx observed that children’s work is the more 
necessary in order to sustain the family household the more the household is poor, 
and that this is the primary motive for having children. This also implies that there 
can be no trade-off between having many children and spending more on a few. 
The money to spend on children, whether few or many, is not available in the first 
place. Children, on the contrary, are supposed to complement the household’s 
income. The level of income must therefore rise first before a reduction in fertility 
could occur. It is clear, then, that income cannot rise as a consequence of fertility 
decline. It is the rising income that brings about the fall in fertility, and not the 
inverse.  
Malthus’s “principle of population” rested on two assumptions. One was 
explicitly postulated by him: the passion between the sexes and hence human 
reproduction could be considered a constant. The second was implicit but was 
later developed by Malthus, and was to be more consequentially exposed by 
Ricardo a few years later: the law of diminishing returns. Engels refuted this law by 
the invocation of science (see above, p. 142). Malthus’ postulate concerning human 
reproduction, moreover, was rejected by Marx for its ahistorical character. As for 
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Godwin and for Condorcet, so for Marx, human nature was not a constant, but was 
itself subject to change. Marx pointed out that there were no natural laws that 
apply to man outside the precise historical context in which he evolves: 
every particular historical mode of production has its own specific 
historically valid laws of population. An abstract law of population exists 
only for plants and animals (as long as man does not intervene 
historically). (Marx 1996 [1887], p. 626)  
Marx held that as capitalism had brought the larger number of people into 
relationships of employment (he defined the advent of capitalism as the moment 
when labour was commodified), those people that were on the employee side of 
the relationship, i.e. those that were thus deprived of capital and had little prospect 
of acquiring it, would attempt to accumulate the only factor of production that they 
could bring under their control: namely labour. Hence having a high number of 
children was motivated on the part of parents by the possibility to make them 
work and thus complement the family’s income, and to be able to continue 
perceiving an income in old age, there being no generalised pension system as yet. 
In other words, Marx saw childbearing and -rearing as an investment on the parts 
of parents, not as a mere expenditure as did Malthus.10  
That the children of the poor would work was the normal state of affairs in 
Europe until the late 19th century. Wages for children were lower than for adults, 
even when carrying out the same work than adults or work that adults could not 
(some machines having been specifically designed to be possibly operated only by 
children). The cost of maintaining children, however, was merely the cost of food, 
which was lower than the wage (or other income) that children could earn. The 
lower the wage, then, the more pressure rested on workers and their spouses to
have more children, so as to be able to pay for food and shelter at least for 
themselves and the children they already had. A higher wage would instead release 
this pressure, and couples might be content to have fewer children instead of 
many, which would crowd already small accommodations. Thus Marx brought 
forth an explanation for what Smith had observed without being able to properly 
incorporate it into his theory: that poverty seems to further both mortality and 
fertility and wealth limit them both — an observation in line with modern 
demographic transition theory, where rise of living standards is taken as one 
                                                        
10 Brezis and Young (2003) devise a model of the demographic transition in which 
children are represented as “production goods”, in line with the Marxian analysis. This, 
they hold, can better explain the demographic transition than a Malthusian view 
representing children as “consumption goods”. 
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explanatory variable of the passage from high death and birth rates to low death 
and birth rates (Burkett 1998).  
It is still an integral feature of societies in developing countries today that 
children work for the household or community, and often very hard. Widespread 
child labour and particularly such phenomena as street kids, child prostitution and 
child soldiers trouble the observer from industrial societies, where these 
phenomena have largely disappeared today. They were equally present in today 
industrialised countries during their own demographic transition, however, as the 
literature of the time (Dickens, Hugo, Zola...) amply testifies. Also, homelessness, 
prostitution and warfare are still features of industrial societies, but the difference 
in the age structure makes these phenomena be largely (though certainly not 
exclusively) confined to the adult world. It is evident that in societies where the 
majority of the population is still below the age of 20, the different occupations will 
also be carried out to a larger degree by people of young age than in those societies 
where the mean age is much higher.  
The neoMalthusian reaction to this situation is to prescribe birth-control 
programs with the goal of reducing the fertility rate so as to lower the proportion 
of children in these societies. In the Marxian perspective, by contrast, measures to 
limit fertility before incomes have risen are likely to accentuate the phenomenon 
of child work rather than to reduce it. The lessened income accruing to households 
which will have had fewer children as a result of these measures would indeed lay 
even more pressure on the remaining children to provide for the household.  
Other factors have to be taken into account, moreover, in line with the 
general transformation of society that took place during the demographic 
transition in Europe and again recently in Latin America and East Asia. The setting 
up of a generalised system of old-age care (relieving the necessity of having 
children to provide in old age) has thus notably accompanied the fertility-
transition in all countries that have today reached low fertility. This coincidence of 
the society-wide change in reproductive behaviour and the structural change of 
the political-economic system which the rise of attributions of the public sector 
represents is in line with Marx’ analysis of human reproduction as being 
conditioned by the historical evolution of the system of production. As Taylor 
(1998) notes, the large size of the public sector in all contemporary industrial 
societies would have amply sufficed for Schumpeter to consider these economies 
as “socialist”, in line with his (2003 [1943]) predictions of the fate of capitalism. In 
this perspective, Marx’s and Engels’ predictions that the birth rate would naturally 
decline in such “socialist” societies are confirmed. 
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Furthermore, as has become apparent from the consideration of Smith’s 
wage theory above, fertility cannot satisfactorily be analysed in isolation from 
mortality when population growth is considered, as the latter is always 
determined jointly by these two variables. The (neo)Malthusian perspective in fact 
pays insufficient attention to the role of mortality.  
 
5. The critical role of mortality 
The predominant attention given to fertility is a salient characteristic of the 
Malthusian tradition. As Chesnais (1985) argued, this preoccupation with fertility 
is an obstacle to a proper understanding of the demographic transition. It diverts 
attention from the fact that what has historically preceded fertility decline, often 
by a considerable time span, is always a decline in mortality, of which the 
implications for a developing country are much more considerable than the decline 
in fertility, which comes into the picture, indeed, only once a country has already 
gone through the great part of the process. Marx, and Smith, in contrast, paid close 
attention to mortality and morbidity. The high mortality rate of children and adults 
in the cities of industrialising England indeed are a central feature of Marx’s 
critique of capitalism.  
Looking exclusively at fertility will inevitably give a very partial view of both 
historical demographic developments and the current situation of Sub-Saharan 
Africa and other regions. It is the fall in mortality which marks the beginning of the 
demographic transition and it is this fall in mortality which is primarily the main 
determinant of population growth, which in turn is the principal agent for the 
growth of the labour supply. For an illustration of this point, it is useful to consider 
a contribution by Nerlove (1974; on which Griliches [1974] mentioned above is a 
comment), who made some pioneering “speculations on how the "new home 
economics" may be integrated in a theory of economic growth and development”. 
From these “conjectures and speculations”, he held, the “outlines of a revised 
Malthusian model begin to emerge, albeit dimly,” which he described thus:  
In this model, the value of human time and changes in that value over time 
are pivotal, and the limitations imposed by natural resources are mitigated, 
if not eliminated, by technological progress and increases in the stock of 
knowledge and of capital, both human and nonhuman.  . . .  [T]he increased 
value of human time results in fewer children per household, with each 
child embodying greater investments in human capital which in turn result 
in lower mortality and greater productivity in the economically active 
years. Such greater productivity in turn further raises both the value of a 
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unit of time and income in the subsequent generation and enables persons 
of that generation to make efficient use of new knowledge and new 
physical capital.  . . .  over time the model does predict in rough qualitative 
fashion declining rates of population growth (perhaps eventually zero rates 
or even negative rates for a time) and declining rates of infant mortality. 
These are the main features of the demographic transition. (emphasis 
added) 
What is apparent from the passages put in italics (by me) is that the “New 
Household Economics”, as outlined here by Nerlove, represent mortality decline as 
a result of fertility decline, or at least as subsequent to it. This totally inverts the 
sequence historically observed in all societies during roughly the past two and a 
half centuries! It is a matter of common sense, moreover, that before other factors 
come into play, the primary condition for the reduction of fertility can only be the 
reduction of mortality, and in particular of infant mortality. Before mortality 
declines, there can be no question of having fewer children, as having many 
children is a necessity simply for generations to renew and avoid population
decline11.  
Further, what is apparent from the passage just quoted is that technological 
progress is regarded by the “New Home Economics” literature (as by 
neoclassical/modern mainstream economics generally) as an exogenous factor. 
This is not the case in the Smithian nor the Marxian model (Marx having adopted 
the Smithian explanation in this regard), where the degree of technological 
                                                        
11 Whether people actually care about population rising, declining or remaining constant 
as a consequence of their reproductive behaviour is of course a question which remains 
unresolved. Parents in many industrialised countries today, notably, do not seem to be 
utterly concerned about the fact that their current fertility rate does not suffice to 
maintain the level of population of these countries (not counting immigration). Authors 
worried about too large a population often thought that people’s reproductive behaviour 
would bring about excessive growth if unchecked (for example Hardin 1968), while those 
concerned with too low a population similarly thought people would naturally have too 
few children (for example Sauvy & Debré 1946). Quite naturally, those that worried about 
excessive growth tended to write when population increased while those that worried 
about insufficient growth were facing a static or declining population. As was observed in 
the previous section, both sets of writings can be seen as a fearful reaction in the face of 
important structural changes affecting society and the ignorance of the underlying causes. 
A useful assumption to make when exploring those underlying causes is that people’s 
reproductive behaviour is a rather reasonable response to changing economic and social 
conditions. This assumption, however, should not be taken as a synecdoche for the idea 
that every human action is necessarily in the interest of society as a whole. Smith’s theory 
of the “invisible hand” is often caricatured as implying that all individual action is 
necessarily beneficial to society. Demeny (1986) applies this view, which he attributes to 
Smith, notably to reproductive behaviour. It is quite absurd to infer such a view from a 
book (The Wealth of Nations) that goes to such lengths in denouncing the nefarious 
consequences of special privileges and monopoly power.   
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sophistication is a corollary of the division of labour, and as such depends on the 
extent of the market, which, as we saw in Chapter 2, is determined primarily by the 
size of population. 
The question whether, during the Industrial Revolution in England, i.e. 
between about 1750 and 1815,—the time that also saw rising levels of fertility—
the standard of living for the masses of people was rising or declining, has given 
rise to a controversy in Economic History, of which Hartwell (1961), answering 
Hobsbawm (1957,1963), were the instigators. The answer to this question can be 
thought to support either Malthus’ or Marx’ position on the relationship between 
fertility and wages. Fertility and wages, however, are only partial aspects of the 
broader context of population and income dynamics, from which they can hardly 
be separated. Even if it was proven that fertility and wages were moving, for the 
given time, in either the same or opposite directions, this would not prove, in and 
of itself, that either Marx or Malthus were right, without checking at the same time 
for the variation in mortality. Thus mortality may temporally increase as a side-
effect of industrialisation and urbanisation associated with poor hygiene and 
adverse living conditions, before the development of a public sector able to 
provide social services on a large scale12. This supports Marx’s explanation of 
fertility behaviour, independently of any possible decline of the real wage in early 
19th century Europe. Indeed, even if it was the case that the real wage was rising at 
this time, which Marx thought would offer incentives to lowering fertility, fertility 
could still have risen as a result of the temporal rise in mortality more than off-
setting the effect of a rising wage. This temporary set-back effect induced by 
industrialisation is also consistent with Kuznets’ (1955) observations on the 
effects of the early stages of growth. Structural Adjustment Policies are indeed 
likely to have accentuated this effect, where they have led to cuts in the health 
                                                        
12 When the decline in infant-mortality slackened in sub-Saharan Africa in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, which many attribute to the adverse effects of Structural Adjustment 
Programs on the quality and availability of health services, and overall mortality actually 
increased (largely as a result of the AIDS epidemic, combined with the former), fertility 
decline also slowed. It accelerated again since the mid-1990s, together with GDP per 
capita growth. As Malmberg (2006) notes: 
the kind of set-back that Sub-Saharan Africa suffered during the closing 20th 
century is not a unique event. A similar increase in mortality affected England 
(Huck 1995) and the United States during the 19th century (Haines and Steckel 
2000). Mortality increased as a consequence of rapid urbanization and poor health 
conditions in urban areas. Large reductions in infant mortality in these countries 
didn’t start until the end of the 19th century, and then, in response to ambitious 
efforts to improve public health (Cain and Rotella 2001).  
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budget. If a comprehensive view of “standards of living” is adopted, such as 
reflected by the Human Development Indicators collected by the United Nations 
Development Programme, moreover, a rising level of mortality would of itself have 
a negative incidence on measures of the standard of living. The net effect would 
depend on the different weighting one ascribes to the separate indicators. 
Furthermore, following the Smithian framework, the rise or decline of wages 
itself is not independent of the growth of population. In the Smithian wage-
mortality-population mechanism, outlined in the first section above, population 
seems to be a passive effect of economic factors for Smith. As such, it is indeed a 
“Malthusian” way of theorising. And Malthus indeed cited Smith as one of his main 
mentors. But Smith’s overall view on population includes the positive effect of 
population on the size of the market (analysed in Chapter 2), which determines the 
scope for division of labour, capital accumulation and thus economic progress, and 
through this effect also the rise in wages (Lowe 1975). 
By the time we are much more certain that rising standards of living set in, 
i.e., during the later part of the first half of the 19th century, when laws were also 
notably promulgated in Europe that limited both the legality of child labour and 
the duration of the working day, and as notably the first pension systems came into 
being, rising material well-being for the masses of people was accompanied by a 
decline of average fertility. 
 Arthur Lewis (1954) explicitly recognised that his theory of economic 
development with surplus labour applied specifically to countries under 
“population pressure”13, and that mortality decline was the main factor of this 
labour force increase: 
There is no evidence that the birth rate ever rises with economic 
development. In Western Europe it has fallen during the last eighty years. 
We are not quite sure why; we suspect that it was for reasons associated 
with development, and we hope that the same thing may happen in the rest 
of the world as development spreads. Of the death rate we are more 
certain. It comes down with development from around 40 to around 12 per 
thousand; in the first stage because better communications and trade 
eliminate death from local famines; in the second stage because better 
                                                        
13 Interestingly, he thought there was at this time “an acute shortage of male labour in 
some parts of Africa”, which he thus did not count among the countries to which his theory 
applied. This situation has certainly changed today, after six decades of sustained 
population growth on the continent. (Ironically, Lewis did include Egypt and India into the 
list of countries his theory could apply to, the latter in fact having had a population growth 
rate between 1950 and 1955 considerably lower than that of sub-Saharan Africa – 1.73 as 
compared to 2.21; figures from UN DESA). 
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public health facilities banish the great epidemic diseases of plague, 
smallpox, cholera, malaria, yellow fever (and eventually tuberculosis); and 
in the third stage because widespread facilities for treating the sick snatch 
from the jaws of death many who would otherwise perish in infancy or in 
their prime. Because the effect of development on the death rate is so swift 
and certain, while its effect on the birth rate is unsure and retarded, we can 
say for certain that the immediate effect of economic development is to 
cause the population to grow; after some decades it begins to grow (we 
hope) less rapidly. Hence in any society where the death rate is around 40 
per thousand, the effect of economic development will be to generate an 
increase in the supply of labour. (Lewis 1954).14  
With regard to his classification of the three different stages in mortality 
decline, it may be observed that Sub-Saharan Africa today notably still has some 
way to go to reaching the second one. 
The neoMalthusian approach pays insufficient attention to the role of 
variations in mortality. It also ignores another important aspect of demo-economic 
dynamics, namely the effect of population growth (and the population size thus 
attained) on the growth of markets, directly related, in the Smithian perspective, to 
the growth of the economy. As noted, in Smith’s work the growth of population 
entertains relations of causality with the growth of income. Population increase is 
in Smith’s theory a central feature of the “progressive state”, of which it is both 
cause and effect (as developed in the preceding chapters). We shall at present 
examine what a comprehensive analysis of the socio-economic dynamics 
underlying the demographic transition, combining insights from Smith and Marx 
(counter Malthus and the Beckerians), could look like. 
 
6. Endogeneity of income growth, and a 
Smithian-Marxian theory of the demographic 
transition and the industrial revolution 
                                                        
14 Lewis identified two other potential factors of a continuous labour supply: the 
integration of women into the workforce (whereby he noted the enormous efficiency gains 
that could be reaped from specialisation and the division of labour by outsourcing the 
chores traditionally carried out by women, such as rearing children and housework – an 
idea also expressed, interestingly, by Godwin, in the book that Malthus' Essay on the 
Principle of Population, at least in its first edition, was a response to); and the fact that 
small entrepreneurs and artisans would be unable to compete with the efficiency attained 
by large scale urban industries and thus join the “reserve army”, as analysed by Marx 
(Lewis remarked, however,  that this mechanism was probably not as straightforward as 
Marx had advanced).  
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In the Smithian perspective, population size (and hence -growth) and productivity 
(and through it incomes) entertain relations of causality that make it problematic 
to consider these two variables independently from one another. As population 
grows and concentrates in urban areas, this permits a wider division of labour 
throughout society and renders the industrial organisation of production 
profitable, which entails enormous productivity gains. The Malthusian analysis 
relies on the assumption that average production is negatively correlated with the 
number of people (every additional person adds less to overall production than the 
previous one, i.e. there are decreasing returns to labour). This is necessary for it to 
make sense that a smaller population should be able to produce (and thus 
consume) more on average, and that reducing population (or at least stopping its 
expansion) could hence have positive effects on average well-being. In the 
Smithian perspective of increasing returns to labour, conversely, the higher the 
number of people engaged in a productive process, whether at the level of the 
household, the firm, a city or the whole economy, the higher will be the overall 
productivity under the effect of the division of labour. When population is reduced, 
absolutely or relatively, productivity will be respectively lower. This is indeed 
were the Smithian logic of increasing returns and the Malthusian/Ricardian logic 
of decreasing ones are diametrically opposed, and correspondingly have opposite 
implications for the effects of population growth. Malthus never explicitly rejected 
this part of Smith's analysis, but he did so somewhat covertly by downplaying this 
part of Smith's theory and emphasizing those that (considered independently of 
the first) gave support to his own.  
In Smith’s theory, it is precisely the productivity gains brought about by an 
increased division of labour, furthered by population growth, which translate into 
higher standards of living; and it is these same productivity gains from an 
increased division of labour in a larger population that make more resources 
available to a society for investing in children, rather than being dependent on 
children’s work, as Marx would have it. This includes parents being able to transfer 
income to their children rather than having to rely on them to complement theirs. 
In a perspective combining the insights from Smith on the positive correlation 
between population and productivity and the one of Marx on poverty, mortality 
and fertility, first, it is the increase in population, not the fall in fertility, which 
makes incomes rise, as population increase permits a deepening of the division of 
labour raising productivity throughout the economy; second, investments in 
human capital (intergenerational transfers from parents to children) become 
possible only as a result of these productivity gains. Thence they cannot be their 
cause.  
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Another criticism of the “demographic dividend” theory comes from someone 
theoretically much closer to the authors who have formulated it. Bloom, Canning 
and Sevilla (2001) hold that the fall of fertility, producing a less youthful 
population, will augment the economic growth rate through the rise of the savings 
rate. As Paul Schultz (2005) points out, however, the life-cycle savings model, on 
which the mechanism relies, by which a rise in working-age population is 
supposed to raise savings, does not include children. Relying on a model that 
excludes children—and thus the economic behaviour of children and the economic 
behaviour of adults towards children—for the analysis of the economic 
implications of certain phases of the demographic transition is odd, as the number 
of children is precisely what differentiates families in the different stages of the 
demographic transition. The representation of the household as an individual, 
which the life-cycle theory is based on, indeed, comes much closer to modelling the 
type of household characteristic of contemporary industrial societies (with few 
children)—societies, that is, which have already completed the demographic 
transition—than to modelling the numerous households of transitional societies. It 
is highly problematic, therefore, to infer from precisely this model how families in 
transitional societies react to the age-structural shifts that are characteristic of the 
demographic transition. Treating saving-behaviour as an exogenous variable, then, 
the theory of the “demographic dividend” ignores the probable adaptation of 
savings behaviour to the changes in age structure brought about by the 
demographic transition15.  
                                                        
15 In addition to a theoretical critique, Schultz (2005) also attacks the evidence offered for 
the savings argument in the “demographic dividend” literature both on empirical and 
methodological grounds. Himself applying the method of the authors that Bloom, Canning 
and Sevilla (2001) rely on for their data (Higgins and Williamson 1996), Schultz (p. 21-22) 
finds:  
The long-run effect of the age composition on savings, under the hypothetical 
assumption that it is exogenous, is a fourth the magnitude reported by Higgins and 
Williamson (HW,1996, 1997). Instead of attributing a third of the increase in Asian 
savings and growth in this period to the exogenous change in the age composition, 
as HW do, my estimate in Table 2 (X-1) accounts for a tenth of the rise in Asian 
savings rates, according to their calculations.  When linear time trends are 
introduced, which are allowed to vary for each country, the estimated effect of the 
age composition on savings is reduced by another two-thirds. 
Before (p. 21) he noted that the “treatment of a lagged dependent variable as exogenous in 
an adaptive behavioral model of savings is implausible, both conceptually in a macro 
economic model, and empirically according to a Hausman test of exogeneity”. Further 
(p.22):  
Including time trends specific to each country, a common practice in panel data 
studies to check the robustness of estimates, the age composition has unstable 
and imprecise effects on savings. Finally, if the model is estimated in first 
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In the Smithian-Marxian perspective outlined here, the defining triggers of 
the industrial revolution and sustained per capita economic growth are not the 
decline in fertility, as is the case in the neoMalthusian model. The main 
characteristics of a country’s settlement and development process are, in this 
perspective, population growth, the division of labour and urbanisation. It is these 
circumstances that cause incomes to rise. And it is only the rise in incomes, in turn, 
which eventually can let fertility subside. Attempting to precipitate fertility decline 
by large scale public and private (often foreign) intervention (as is still advocated 
by major international organisations to developing countries, notably in Africa) — 
rather than directing these measures at the improvement of general health 
conditions, including notably the reduction of infant mortality — does not, in this 
light, appear as a useful policy. It would only absorb energies critically needed to 
facilitate the peopling process underway, which are amply more likely to further 
economic and social progress. In Africa, notably, if we follow the Smithian (and 
Marxian16) perspective on this, with the delay attending on the region’s particular 
historical circumstances, the process of the social division of labour and the 
settlement process that is concomitant to it will be able to aptly unfold only during 
the present century. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                  
differences to remove bias from dynamic autoregressive components, the age 
composition effects on savings appear to be statistically insignificant.  
16 Marx, as is well known, predicted the eventual collapse of capitalism out of its own 
internal dynamic. But, before this can occur, the capitalistic system (or commercial society, 
as Smith called it) must first have arisen. It is on this phase that this paper has focused 
with regard to Marx. (Most of what Marx wrote was indeed about capitalism; he wrote 
rather little—and what he wrote was rather vague—about the attributes of the communist 
system which he thought society would culminate in). For a reading of Marx’s historical 
materialism as an extension of Smith’s “conjectural history”, see Meek (1954c). 
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Conclusion 
 
In classical economics population was an important variable. It was also so in 
Adam Smith’s work. The Glasgow editors of the Wealth of Nations, notably, have 
disputed that population played a large role for Smith and have denied to 
population the status of an independent element in Smith’s thought (Campbell and 
Skinner 1976, p.48). It is in fact questionable if anything could be deemed an 
independent element in Smith’s thought (Lowe 1975).1 Smith’s is a monumental 
theory of human society and its progress, encompassing demographic, economic, 
geographic, sociologic, psychological and political aspects. It is the all-inclusive 
“science of man” called for by Hume. His system is a finished one (despite the fact 
that much of it was not published, and he did not himself consider it completed). It 
is not without incongruities — Smith was certainly brilliant, but not omniscient. 
But it is the dominant opinion — to which this work adhered — among historians 
of thought today, as opposed to the 19th century in particular, that, overall, the 
many congruities in Smith’s system, in the form of complex yet coherent multiple 
interrelationships, outweigh and are much more impressive than the incongruities 
(on which economists, in particular, have spent a lot of ink over the past two 
centuries and a half). Most of the incongruities that have been at various times 
discerned and highlighted, in fact, are the product of anachronistically reading 
back into Smith’s writings arguments about issues and debates which only arose 
after his death in this form and to which he could hence not have intended to 
contribute, and these purported incongruities disappear when a contextual and 
well-disposed reading of his texts is substituted for the former. Read as a coherent 
whole, Smith’s “system of social science” (Skinner 1996 [1979]), presented 
throughout his entire oeuvre, shows to be one of the grand systems of philosophy, 
comparable, in the degree to which it comprises different aspects of reality in its 
interpretation and explanation of human history, to the likes of Hegel and Marx 
after, Vico in his own century, and Ibn Khaldun four centuries prior to Smith (not 
to go back even further). Smith’s system has the merit of explaining, with the aid of 
a large but limited amount of cause-and-effect relationships, the entire human 
experience since its inception (variously defined). This is a grand claim, and Smith 
himself never made it explicitly. Yet his system of thought truly mobilises aspects 
of all of the current social sciences in its design, and population is an important 
piece of the puzzle. 
                                                        
1 Lowe also recognised the central role played by population in the Smithian system. 
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In recent decades, with the revival of interest in Adam Smith’s work in 
general, and in the non-economic aspects and the coherence of the whole of his 
oeuvre in particular, and after the rediscovery of many parts of his work before 
unknown or thought destroyed, there have been many, more complete, 
reconstructions, aiming at reconnecting the well-known to the lesser-known and 
neglected aspects of Smith’s work (on the theme of the coherence of Smith’s work 
specifically, see notably Skinner (1976), Coats (1979) and more recently 
Haakonssen (2006)). Population, however, remains, overall, one of the most 
ignored constituents of Smith’s system of thought. This neglect is understandable, 
possibly, given that, overall, despite their importance, population aspects are 
largely implicit in Smith’s writings. Moreover, there has been a more pronounced 
disconnection of demography or population science from other social science, and 
economics in particular, in recent decades, and coeval with it a relative 
disengagement from population questions from the part of economists. This 
neglect of population aspects in Smith’s work is unwarranted, however — it was 
argued, and hopefully shown in this work —, given the importance of population 
as an all-connecting element in Smith’s system. The present work has aimed to 
bring the importance of the element of population in Smith’s system back into the 
light. 
Although the focus of the present study have been Smith’s ideas as relating to 
the theme of population and development, many related topics have been touched 
upon, sometimes between the lines. Some of these themes (related or not to the 
topic of population) I would like to take up here again, with no aim at 
exhaustiveness and irrespective of the precise order they appear in the present 
work. (This order is in any case somewhat random if we rely on the idea, defended 
in the preceding chapters, and especially in Chapter 3, that the elements of Smith’s 
system are all interrelated to an important degree — even though Smith himself 
did in fact pay great attention to the order in which ideas are presented, a theme 
he elaborates on in his lectures on rhetoric). The topics I have picked here for 
some concluding (re)considerations are: the relationship between Smith’s “stages” 
and “states” of society in his theory of population and development (1); the 
relationship between circular cumulative causation and equilibrium (2); 
population and the extent of the market (3); migration and urbanisation (4); Smith, 
the demographic transition and the stages of society (5). 
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1. Population, stages and states of society 
In his lectures on jurisprudence, as known to us through the published student 
notes, Smith laid out an elaborate description of his version of what has commonly 
been called the “four stages theory” of economic development (or socio-cultural 
evolution) since the foundational work of Ronald Meek (1971, 1976b). As was 
considered in Chapter 1, Smith, in line with other contemporary writers who made 
use of this theoretical framework, such as Kames, Helvétius and Blackstone, 
stressed one causal element in the succession of socio-economic stages: 
population. Thus, in Smith’s account, the ages of hunters, shepherds, agriculture 
and commerce are actually instigated by the growth of population, in a Boserupian 
fashion. Precisely as in the theory of Esther Boserup (1965), it is hence the 
pressure of population on subsistence which provokes technological change and 
thus initiates a new technological age, by inciting people to find a new mode of 
subsistence consistent with the need to feed higher numbers on the same territory.  
While the mechanism by which population furthers economic progress in the 
Wealth of Nations is quite distinct, the two are not mutually exclusive and can be 
considered as two alternative explanation for the correlation between population 
growth and technological progress — or simply as two ways of looking at the same 
phenomenon. The main element through which population growth furthers the 
economic progress of society in the Wealth of Nations is thus through the extension 
of the market that population growth brings about, centrally examined in Chapter 
2, which shall be reconsidered here too shortly. Smith also makes it clear in the 
Wealth of Nations that he believes population growth to be a feature of a society in 
what he called the “progressive state”, which he contrasted with the “stationary” 
and “declining” states. How, then, do these “states” of society correlate with Smith’s 
“stages” of society? 
Wages are directly correlated, for Smith, to the level of economic growth. 
This is because economic growth determines the demand for labour, which 
establishes the level of wages. Demand for labour is for Smith a function of capital 
accumulation (or rather the accumulation of “stock”, what Smith himself called 
“capital” forming only a part of it), because Smith thought that it was out of 
accumulated stock that wages were paid (the later controversial “wage fund”). If 
wages are higher in times of economic growth according to Smith, it is because 
demand for labour is higher in this “progressive state” relative to labour supply. 
And this is because a growing stock will be used by those in possession of it to 
employ more labour (I.viii.19-21, p. 86-7).   
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Wages are determined by a bargain between the masters and the workmen. 
The relative position of power of workmen and masters, however, is — besides the 
legal and political framework which is also important2 — determined by economic 
conditions, i.e., in Smith’s words, by whether the state of the economy is 
progressive, declining or stationary, and whether the fund out of which wages can 
be paid is therefore growing or not. In the progressive state, according to Smith, 
the immediate effect of a growing stock is that it stimulates labour demand, while 
population (labour supply) can only respond with a lag, which shifts the bargaining 
positions between employers and wage earners in favour of the latter, and this is 
the mechanism that ensures high wages and thus the growth of population. Since
this effect is obtained by a growing stock, what matters for the level of wages is not 
so much the absolute wealth of a country, but whether this wealth is increasing or 
decreasing. It is the growing state of the economy which maintains a high demand 
of labour relative to labour supply (WN I.viii.24, p. 89). 
It naturally follows that it is in the progressive state “that the condition of the 
labouring poor, of the great body of the people, seems to be the happiest and the 
most comfortable.” (WN I.viii.43, p. 99). As was examined in Chapter 3 (above p. 
249), whether an economy is in fact progressing, stationary, or declining, seems to 
be, for Smith, mostly related to political conditions, and more particularly to 
whether a system of “natural liberty” is in place. In an often quoted passage he thus 
remarked: 
China has been long one of the richest, that is, one of the most fertile, best 
cultivated, most industrious, and most populous countries in the world. It 
seems, however, to have been long stationary. Marco Polo, who visited it 
more than five hundred years ago, describes its cultivation, industry, and 
populousness, almost in the same terms in which they are described by 
travellers in the present times. It had perhaps, even long before his time,
acquired that full complement of riches which the nature of its laws and 
institutions permits it to acquire. (WN I.viii.24, p. 89) 
Smith contrasted the progressive state, which characterises a society which 
experiences economic growth, with the stationary (no growth) and declining 
(negative growth) states, without however going into much detail about either of 
the latter two. The most detail that is provided about them is to be found, in fact, in 
Smith’s chapter on wages, from which has here been quoted from and referred to, 
and these states are directly related, thus, to the progressive, stationary and 
                                                        
2 Smith complained about the laws that forbade the congregation of large numbers of 
workers to prevent the formation of unions pressing for higher wages, while no similar 
law did and probably could prevent employers to contrive to keep wages low. 
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declining state not just of economic growth but of population, which forms the 
main subject of this chapter. These “states” are loosely correlated with Smith’s 
“stages”, in that the progressive state will lead a society to progress through the 
different stages, as long as a system of natural liberty is in place that allows the 
division of labour and market growth to unfold (see Stull (1986) and Reid (1989). 
However, Smith believed that even under restrictive political conditions, some 
progress was inevitable, for:  
the natural effort which every man is continually making to better his own 
condition, is a principle of preservation capable of preventing and 
correcting, in many respects, the bad effects of a political oeconomy, in 
some degree, both partial and oppressive. Such a political oeconomy, 
though it no doubt retards more or less, is not always capable of stopping 
altogether the natural progress of a nation towards wealth and prosperity, 
and still less of making it go backwards. If a nation could not prosper 
without the enjoyment of perfect liberty and perfect justice, there is not in 
the world a nation which could ever have prospered (WN IV.ix.28, p. 674).  
Thus, while the progressive state is the most favourable to population, and 
Smith actually describes, in his chapter on wages, stationary and declining states as 
ones where population is respectively stationary and declining, in Smith’s more 
long-term view of historical development, as described in the preceding quotation 
from Book IV of Wealth of Nations, he expresses a view of population having likely, 
through the ages (despite certain setbacks and reversals) continuously increased 
(and contributed to society’s progress as well as being an outcome of it) even if 
perfect conditions were not in place (which indeed Smith thought to never be, 
which was the cornerstone of his critique of the physiocrat’s “system”). This fits 
well with the picture of population growth leading society through the different 
economic stages discussed in Chapter 1.  
 
2. Circular causation and equilibrium 
“The most decisive mark of the prosperity of any country”, Smith held, “is the 
increase of the number of its inhabitants” (WN I.viii.23, p. 87-8). In this sentence, 
again from the chapter on wages in the Wealth of Nations, population is presented 
by Smith (although not entirely unambiguously) as an effect of economic progress. 
This does not mean, however, that it is exclusively its effect, and not also its cause. 
Many commentators (notably Campbell and Skinner (1976), more recently Sunna 
(forthcoming)) have in fact interpreted Smith to view population only as a 
consequence of economic growth. But there are ample passages even in the Wealth 
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of Nations that show this not to be true, and many more can be found in the rest of 
Smith’s writings. As Hansen (1939, p. 2-3) recognised (quoted in the General 
Introduction p. 28 above), population was thus seen by Smith as both cause and 
effect of economic progress, a view that was indeed common at the time Smith 
wrote (General Introduction p. 29). It was the aim of Chapter 3 to examined this 
theme of circular causation in Smith’s work more generally, and establish through 
several examples that this was indeed the general mode of causation employed by 
Smith. 
What characterises economic growth for Smith is the continual accumulation 
of capital (or stock). The accumulation of capital is also tightly linked with the
division of labour, and together these determine economic growth, which 
determines the demand for labour and thus the wage rate. Capital accumulation 
and division of labour are thereby more closely intertwined than is commonly 
appreciated. Indeed, rather than one causing the other in a one-way relationship, 
they are mutually determining, in the characteristic way of Smith’s circular system 
(Chapter 3, p. 223). 
Jacob Viner  wrote in 1927 that “an economist must have peculiar theories 
indeed who cannot quote from the Wealth of Nations to support his special 
purposes” (1927, p. 207). Indeed, a great variety of subjects are treated in the 
Wealth of Nations, and a great variety of ideas are expressed by Smith, some of 
which appear contradictory. Historians of thought and economists have tried in 
various ways to resolve these apparent conflicts. The most prominent of these was 
the famous Adam Smith Problem, discussed in Chapter 1 (above p. 97), to which 
Viner indeed adhered and which he helped to perpetuate in 20th century America 
(above p. 102). But there are many other conflicts and apparent contradictions in 
Smith that have been noted and continue to be noted. Anthony Waterman, for 
example, recently (2014) asked the question, forming the title of his article: “Is 
there another, quite different, "Adam Smith Problem"?”, which he takes to be the 
inconsistency between Smith’s view of increasing returns contained in his growth 
theory and his price theory, implying according to Waterman constant returns.3 
                                                        
3 This is in fact a misconception based on a reading of Smith from the vantage point of 
modern micro- and macro-economics (Waterman explicitly refers to Samuelson’s 
formalisation of Smith and classical economics). The confusion (which Allyn Young 
already commented on in 1928, as noted in the General Introduction, see above p. 30) 
arises because of considering competition and technical progress as being determined by 
entirely different causes and not causally interacting with each other (and technology in 
fact being exogenous to the model), whereas in Smith’s theory these elements are all 
endogenous and interact with one another, and there is no conflict between technical 
progress and competition. (The conflict-view can be taken to have been introduced into 
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One such seeming inconsistency is the view of causality presented by Smith. Thus, 
there are very strong statements throughout Smith’s work that point to a definite 
sequence in a causal relationship described (such as the necessary precedence of 
capital accumulation to the division of labour), but these same statements are 
sometimes contradicted a few hundred pages later, or in other works of Smith, 
where he holds that causation works the other way round (i.e. that what was 
previously or elsewhere clearly labelled as the effect causes what was in that other 
instance strongly emphasised to be the cause). This can only be construed to be a 
contradiction, indeed, when a strictly linear and one-directional view of causation 
is upheld (i.e. when a retroaction of the effect on the cause, amplifying the latter
and then again the former, etc., is ruled out). It is here, I venture, that the idea of 
circular causation is helpful. With regard to population, notably, in Smith’s view 
the growth of population is conditional on economic progress, but economic 
progress itself is furthered by population growth. This is paradoxical — or so it 
appears to modern economists trained in the tradition of ‘equilibrium’ economics, 
where negative feedback effects dominate. The apparent contradiction can be 
resolved and the underlying theory uncovered by recognising the presence of 
circular causation in Smith’s theory. Effect and cause — in the present example, 
population growth and economic progress — are causing each other, in a chain of 
continual circular causation, or a continual feedback mechanism. And, moreover, in 
each cycle, there is not merely simple reproduction and repetition, but the sum or 
end result is greater than its part, the output is greater than the sum of the inputs. 
It is the principle of a virtuous circle, where synergy between the different 
elements working in conjunction produces an outcome that is greater than the sum 
of the individual inputs contributed by the different elements. This is precisely the 
mechanism that is at work in Smith’s theory of economic progress, epitomised by 
the constant interplay between the deepening of the division of labour and the 
growth of the market, a mechanism famously pointed out by Allyn Young in his 
celebrated article of 1928.   
Population in Smith’s theory is thus both a cause and an effect of the progress 
of society. For this to ensue, there must be a positive feedback process at work. 
And as was examined in detail in Chapter 3, this is indeed the fundamental 
mechanism behind Smith’s theory of development. But population growth is not 
only cause and effect of economic progress (and hence economic progress cause 
and effect of population growth) in Smith’s theory. Population concentration (i.e. 
urbanisation) is also cause and effect of economic progress, and thereby cause and 
                                                                                                                                                                  
economic thought principally through the work of Karl Marx in fact, before neoclassical 
economists took it up for distinct reasons.) 
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effect of population growth. The division of labour is cause and effect of population 
growth and concentration. The growth of the market is cause and effect of 
population growth and concentration and of the division of labour. The 
accumulation of capital is cause and effect of population growth, the division of 
labour, and economic growth. Trade is cause and effect of the division of labour, 
the growth of the market, population growth, urbanisation, and economic 
progress. Population is thus at the centre of a large network of interconnected 
positive feedback loops, which expand and complexify as society itself expands and 
complexifies, which is what the theory sets out to explain. This complex system, 
much like the Darwinian system, which it might have contributed to inspire (see
Annex to Chapter 3, above p. 256), is driven by a general process of what was later 
to be called “spontaneous order”. At the same time, negative feedback mechanisms 
introduce setbacks and inertia into the system, which make the overall 
directionality and outcome of the process uncertain. 
A subject that was merely grazed in the present work (in Chapter 2, p. 183), 
but on which much more could and should certainly be written, is the intricate 
relationship between Smith’s writings on the extent of the market, Say’s 
conception of the interrelationship of supply and demand, having given way to the 
famous (19th century) “law of markets”, and 20th century debates about balance 
and imbalance in economic growth (considered in Chapter 3 p. 254) and the 
related ones on equilibrium versus disequilibrium as the more appropriate frame 
of reference for economics. These questions, if they are not much more ancient 
still, can well be thought to commence with the Newtonian theory, in which 
equilibrium and turning points are central. Both Adam Smith and Robert Malthus 
are said to have been strongly influenced by Newton (on Smith see Montes (2003b, 
2006, 2008, 2013); the relation between Malthus and Newton is discussed by 
Donald Winch (1992b) in his introduction to the shortened variorum edition of 
Malthus’ Essay). The question of the proper balance between population and 
resources is ubiquitous in Malthus’ Essay, and has continued to be at the centre of 
debates about human progress and environmental degradation in the 20th and 21st 
century. These questions, concerning equilibrium or disequilibrium, balance or 
unbalance, proportionality or disproportionality of major economic variables, are 
certainly among the most vexing question in economics to this day, touching upon 
the most fundamental principles of the discipline. Ricardo and Malthus in their 
debates, Karl Marx, and later J. M. Keynes, are among the major thinkers who 
grappled with them and invoked these questions, often to highlight a fundamental 
difference of their own theory against the supposed orthodoxy of the day. These 
debates are certainly not ready to subside. The division of labour, which, through 
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its relation to the extent of the market in Smith’s foundational work and Marshall’s 
and Young’s reconsiderations of Smith’s insights on which so many 20th century 
economists drew, is at the centre of the issue, “will probably supply sufficient 
questions to keep researchers going to 2076”, as Peter Groenewegen remarked in 
his “Bicentenary Estimate” (Groenewegen 1977, p. 162).  
As was noted in the General Introduction (p. 39), population questions were 
always intimately linked to these debates about increasing and diminishing 
returns and their mutual articulation in the conceptualisation of economics and 
economic change. These links — between population and increasing/diminishing 
returns, as much as between balance and equilibrium, necessity being the mother
of invention and invention being the mother of necessity, i.e. the interplay of 
negative and positive feedback — have not always clearly been discerned by the 
protagonists of these debates, especially in the 20th century and 21st century thus 
far. It has been at least partly the aim of this work to bring more clearly to light 
some of these links. It is likely that these questions will keep researchers occupied 
well beyond 2076, indeed, in the history of economic thought as much as in 
economics and science and philosophy more generally. 
 
3. Population and the extent of the market 
“That the Division of Labour is limited by the Extent of the Market”, title of Chapter 
3 of Book 1 of the Wealth of Nations, is one of the most famous observations of 
Adam Smith. The extent of the market, if not identical with the size of population, is 
highly correlated with the latter, as Smith makes clear at several instances in the 
Wealth of Nations (see quotations at p. 169 above). This connection between 
population and the extent of the market was readily recognised by many of Smith’s 
contemporaries and followers, notably Alexander Everett in his criticism of 
Malthus, holding that  
an increase of population on a given territory is followed immediately by a 
division of labor; which produces in its turn the invention of new machines, 
an improvement of methods in all the departments of industry, and a rapid 
progress in the various branches of art and science.  The increase effected 
by these improvements in the productiveness of labor is obviously much 
greater in proportion than the increase of population, to which it is owing. 
(Everett 1823, p. 13) 
But it was largely ignored by Ricardo and Malthus, which most probably 
contributed to this connection seldom if ever being taken notice of in 
contemporary readings of Smith and being entirely ignored in modern economics. 
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It was the aim of Chapter 2 to bring this connection between population and the 
extent of the market to light, making use of the entirety of Smith’s work. 
Chapter 2 began by highlighting the change in meaning of the concept of “the 
market” between Smith’s writings and modern economics, from a notion grounded 
in physical reality, notably geographical and demographic, to one almost 
exclusively nonmaterial, describing an institution in and mode of functioning of 
society (p. 169). While the meaning of institution was sometimes intended, too, in 
a figurative sense, by Smith, he used the concept of the market generally in a 
material sense (of area and place), without which the concept of the “extent of the 
market” becomes largely meaningless, or at least conveys an entirely different
meaning, as is often observed in modern readings of Smith not taking into account 
this difference in meaning (Chapter 2, p. 171). Many equate the concept of market 
with the one of demand. But while this surely goes some way towards what Smith 
expressed, it is not the whole story. Significantly, in the whole chapter titled “That 
the Division of Labour is limited by the Extent of the Market”, the word “demand” 
does not appear a single time. Smith states at the beginning of this chapter that:  
As it is the power of exchanging that gives occasion to the division of 
labour, so the extent of this division must always be limited by the extent of 
that power, or, in other words, by the extent of the market. (WN I.iii.1, p. 
31) 
He does not use that same formulation again until the beginning of the next 
chapter on money, but throughout the chapter in question he establishes what 
determines the power of exchanging (i.e. the extent of the market). And for Smith 
this power of exchanging is directly related to geography, and more specifically to 
population. Smith thus first contrasts the larger possibilities for specialisation in a 
town, where the market is larger, to the restrained opportunities of similar 
specialisation in the Highlands of Scotland, using the examples, respectively, of a 
porter, and of a nailmaker:  
There are some sorts of industry, even of the lowest kind, which can be 
carried on no where but in a great town. A porter, for example, can find 
employment and subsistence in no other place. A village is by much too 
narrow a sphere for him; even an ordinary market town is scarce large 
enough to afford him constant occupation.  . . .  It is impossible there should 
be such a trade as even that of a nailer in the remote and inland parts of the 
Highlands of Scotland. (WN I.iii.2, p. 31-2) 
The importance of both population and space become apparent here. Indeed, 
if the market for any particular trade is larger in a town than it is in the country, it 
is because there are more people there (and therefore, some will argue, potential 
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demand is higher — but this demand is directly tied up with demographic and 
geographic considerations, and cannot be considered independently from them). 
The porter needs a large pool of customers in order to be able to exert his trade on 
a permanent basis. But in the highlands of Scotland, taken as a whole, there could 
be as many people as in Smith’s unnamed town. If demand is higher in towns than 
in the country it is because there are more people in towns who are in the 
immediate vicinity of any particular business and hence do not encounter large 
additional costs in terms of time and transport spent to purchase particular goods 
and services. Potential buyers in a close enough range are so few in the Highlands 
of Scotland that it hardly pays off to specialise in any one particular trade. The
“power of exchanging”, then, is greater in towns because of high population 
density, which makes more people with the same needs be in such a range of each 
other that transaction costs are low enough to make the transaction worthwhile 
for both parties. It is population density, then, which is the decisive element in the 
“power of exchanging” and hence the extent of the market, at least for common 
goods which do not have such a high value and are so particular to certain 
locations that it is worthwhile transporting them over great distance. And this 
represents the larger a proportion of goods produced the less advanced the society 
in question is. Smith further talks about navigable rivers, which make for larger 
markets in some continents than others. Thus Smith already held that the low level 
of economic development on the African continent was due to the absence of many 
navigable rivers, which are close enough together to permit inland trade between 
them (Chapter 2, p. 192).  
From this we can establish that there are three elements determining the 
power of exchanging: general population density (relative to the territory, this 
amounts to population size), urbanisation rate, and natural ease of conveyance 
(expressed notably by the amount and relative distance one from another of 
navigable rivers, but including logically also other geological elements such as 
presence or absence of mountains, deserts, swamps and other man-unfriendly 
terrain). Together, what we get is a measure of the average proximity of economic 
agents in terms of transaction costs. The reason to include both population density 
(on average) and urbanisation rate is to get a measure of the actual average 
amount of proximity between people — that is to say: a measure of how costly it is 
in terms of time and energy, on average, for a member of the society in question to 
get in touch with any other, or, expressed differently, an average measure of how 
costly it is for a given member of the society to get in touch with all others. If vast 
stretches of land on a given territory are unoccupied, for example, but most people 
on this territory live in cities (hence close together), the average population 
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density (obtained by dividing the total population by the total surface of the 
territory) would be much lower than the actual average proximity, and the more so 
that more people live in fewer cities, and ones closer or better connected to each 
other, and vice versa if people live in a relatively small territory but mostly in 
villages quite distant from each other. 
The measure of the extent of the market (or the “power of exchanging”) then, 
is obtained by compounding population size and distribution, taking into account 
the natural ease or difficulty of transportation over that territory and its size. At 
any particular moment in time, we also need to add to this the level of 
technological development and the standard of living (or level of wealth). The
further a society is technologically developed, indeed, the cheaper transportation 
in general becomes. And the wealthier the society in question, the more its 
members can consume and therefore the greater the outlet for production. 
However, the progress of both technology and wealth are part and parcel of the 
process of economic growth, steered by the cumulative advance of division of 
labour and capital accumulation (Chapter 2, p. 194). Insofar, they are, like the 
division of labour itself, conditioned by the extent of the market. Thus, the level of 
both technology and wealth is itself constrained by the size of the market, and can 
thus not be analytically included into the concept of the size of the market. In the 
circular cumulative process which development represents for Smith, of course, 
the level of wealth and technology will be progressively incorporated into the 
measure of the extent of the market with each cycle of enlarged reproduction. But 
there has to be an analytical distinction between the level of wealth and technology 
at the beginning of the cycle, which, incorporated into the extent of the market, 
form a cause of the further progress of wealth and technology, and that very 
progress, measured at the end of the cycle, which is an effect of the extent of the 
market at the beginning of the cycle.  
 
4. Migration and Urbanisation 
Considerations of population density and distribution over a territory take us to 
the next theme, which was considered in Chapters 2 and 3. It has often been stated 
that in Smith’s work migration does not play a large role. This is inferred from a 
statement in Chapter 8 of Book 1 of Wealth of Nations, the chapter where Smith 
describes the interaction of economic growth, wages and population, where he 
holds that: 
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After all that has been said of the levity and inconstancy of human nature, it 
appears evidently from experience that a man is of all sorts of luggage the 
most difficult to be transported. (WN I.viii.31, p. 92-3) 
This observation, however, was made by Smith to explain the persistence of 
geographical wage differentials (McNulty 1973, Sunna 2012). It was not a denial of 
the reality and importance of migratory movements. Moreover, in book 3 of Wealth 
of Nations, where Smith develops his theory of the “natural progress of opulence” 
through the dynamic interplay of the division of labour between town and country, 
Smith has a different take on migration. In this book, Smith spends a great deal of 
time uncovering whether it is urbanisation that causes the progress of the country 
or the progress of the country that causes urbanisation. If we accept the idea of 
circular causation, the question does not seem utterly important (the development 
of the town and the country will work in mutually reinforcing ways). In fact, Smith 
seems to formulate his whole theory of the “natural” progress of opulence to 
denounce the actual development of Europe, which runs counter to this model. But 
in acknowledging that the “unnatural and retrograde order” (from the 
development of commerce, to manufacture to agriculture, instead of the other way 
round) characterised Europe’s development, Smith concedes, of course, that the 
development of commerce and manufacture may well, and indeed has had, positive 
feedback effects on the development of agriculture. Yet, Smith is not, thereby, 
proving the opposite of what he seems to set out to prove, when seen against the 
other elements of his theory of trade and economic progress, as Blecker (1997) for 
example held. Here too, a reading in terms of circular causation is useful to 
understand the full extent of Smith’s argument (Chapter 3, p. 241). In fact, and this 
is the crucial point to unravel what many have perceived as a paradox, Smith’s 
criticism concerns not so much the order of development as the policy choices that 
have led to it. Smith believed, indeed, that the policy environment of Europe 
favoured the “mercantile system”, where large public expenses were undertaken to 
favour the activities of merchants and manufacturers, located essentially in cities, 
and agriculture was on the contrary restrained by excessive taxes. Had neither of 
the three sectors (agriculture, manufactures and trade) been given any 
encouragement or restraint through bounties and taxation, Smith believed, 
economic development would have run naturally from agriculture to manufacture 
to commerce (with constant feedback effects on the other sectors) and 
development in such a system of “natural liberty” would actually have been faster. 
Smith looked to the “American colonies” for an instance where the “natural 
progress of opulence” was unfolding unhindered. 
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By not giving any particular impetus to foreign trade beyond that which 
would “naturally” occur, Smith expresses a priority for the development of the 
interior market. This makes sense in the light of the fact that what are today called 
urban-rural linkages are at the core of Smith’s conception of the development 
process (as examined in Chapter 3 p. 241). In his digression on silver, in Chapter 
11 of Book 1 of the Wealth of Nations, Smith explains how this precious metal 
warrants far distant trade, and how the market of a silver mine most anywhere is 
thus likely the whole world, as the high value of this metal relative to its cost of 
transportation makes exchange over great distance remain profitable. This is the 
same reason, however, why the direct vicinity of a silver mine does not seem to
benefit very much from its presence in terms of economic development. Thus the 
goods that it is profitable to trade even in backward nations do not seem to be the 
ones that have the most forward and backward linkages, to employ Hirschman’s 
(1958) vocabulary. While there is no reason to discourage the trade in silver, then, 
it is also not particularly useful, for the development of a country, to artificially 
boost this particular trade, at the expense of agriculture notably, as Smith 
denounced. 
The particular dynamic of economic progress that Smith described, and that 
he called the “natural progress of opulence”, was thus a phenomenon concerning 
mostly, and essentially taking place within, the interior market of a nation or 
territory, at least until a fully fledged commercial society had been naturally 
attained. And for Smith, the dynamic division of labour within society which 
defined this process was at the core of the phenomenon not just of economic 
growth, but also of urbanisation, the two being intricately linked one to the other. 
The way this worked out more specifically is that as specialisation beyond 
agricultural activities progressed, those no more employed in agriculture would 
find it advantageous to congregate in central places, so to make it easier to defend 
themselves, and to exchange with one another. More non-agricultural workers 
would join them bit by bit, making for the growth of cities (WN III.i.4, p. 378; see 
Chapter 2, p.209 above). 
The towns eventually come to be the main markets for the produce of 
farmers, who, notably by utilising tools and inputs purchased from manufacture in 
the towns, come to improve yields, and hence progressively liberate more and 
more people to work in the other sectors. As agricultural output per man 
continually improves the towns keep growing, one being each other’s natural 
cause and effect. As wages in this progressive state of affairs remain high, 
population keeps growing, which feeds into the process by further augmenting the 
towns, which further augments agricultural output, etc. The same phenomenon 
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that raises productivity and thus produces economic growth — the division of 
labour — is hence at the same time at the root of urbanisation. It is thus misleading 
to say that either urbanisation causes economic growth or that economic growth 
causes urbanisation. Rather, the correlation between the two phenomena is 
explained by the fact that they both have the same cause, or rather still are both an 
expression of the same phenomenon: the division of labour. 
 
5. Smith, the demographic transition and the 
stages of society 
It is seldom noted that Smith wrote about fertility. He did so, of course, mostly 
incidentally. In one passage of his chapter on wages (WN I.viii.37, p. 96-7), Smith 
mentions the “pampered fine lady” having fewer children than common workers, 
who have many children but many of them die. And although the rich could rear 
more children, as they are able to cater for them more unsparingly, they do not 
actually bear more children. It seems then that to Smith poverty was seen as 
favourable to population, and luxury, though it might enflame other passions, does 
not ignite the passion for procreation. Here Smith does not venture into giving any 
cultural, religious, moral or other non-material explanation for the matter he 
observes (other than speaking of “passion”), but, as was analysed in Chapter 4, this 
might indeed be where Malthus took off to explore precisely these (notably in 
terms of the higher prudence of certain parents, waiting to have sufficient means 
to properly raise a limited number of children, a theme — prudence — that Smith 
also wrote about at large, in the Theory of Moral Sentiments, though not in this 
connection). Interestingly, Malthus thought that more wealth for the poor (notably 
in terms of poor relief) would actually augment their fertility, at the opposite, 
seemingly, of Smith (for Smith higher wages were thought to be favourable to 
population, but through the mechanism, mostly, of the reduction of mortality, in 
particular of infants; his remarks on the lesser fertility of the rich would suggest an 
opposite effect on fertility).  
Smith observed that labourers in America were incited to marry younger by 
the prospect of the high wages their children could earn (implicitly stating that 
earlier marriage would allow them to bear more children). Malthus observed that 
higher wages would incite labourers to bear more children, but he thought of these 
children, it seems, exclusively in terms of costs, not additional revenues, to parents. 
For this he got severely criticised by Marx, notably. As was argued in Chapter 4, 
Smith’s observations about wages, fertility, and mortality, although much more 
298 
tentative than Malthus’, are easier to reconcile with the reality of the demographic 
transition that took place after his lifetime, but partly during the one of Malthus. 
When we think Smith’s observation about the relationship between wealth 
and fertility out in a dynamic way, it actually comes to conflict, potentially, with the 
rest of his theory of the labour market. This is because if wages increase, labourers 
will also become richer. And if wealth limits both fertility and mortality, then the 
end result in terms of population growth is indeterminate. It will depend on 
whether it is fertility or mortality that is more elastic to the change in standard of 
living. We can safely assume that in Smith’s time this was not of great consequence. 
Even though Smith believed in continuously high wages, he did not believe in a
classless society, where wage earners would one day nearly catch up with the 
higher classes in terms of basic material comforts (today, of course, this is still not 
nearly the case, and recent decades have witnessed a regain in a phenomenal 
degree of inequality, both on a global scale and within societies;4 but the larger 
part of the people, in the industrialised countries, have certainly attained a level of 
material comfort that would have been hard to imagine even for Smith, with his 
optimistic outlook, although such speculations are necessarily merely that).  
There is thus another potential conflict (‘another, yet quite different, Adam 
Smith Problem’) in the views of Smith on the interplay of material comfort, fertility 
and mortality. Following this lead, one would hold that it did apparently not 
appear to Smith that if the rich have lower fertility and infant mortality than the 
poor, and fewer surviving children in the final outcome, then with increasing 
wealth for the larger part of the population, which indeed was his own definition of 
economic progress, the labour supply to labour demand adjustment mechanism 
via the wage rate which he pointed out would eventually be disturbed; that once 
the poor have reached a certain standard of living, higher wages would reduce 
rather than augment population growth. 
Yet the conflict can be resolved, once again, by looking at the entirety of 
Smith’s work, and in particular his four stages theory (though establishing this 
connection goes beyond what Smith himself wrote and is reported to have taught, 
and is thus, again, of a highly speculative nature). In his four stages theory, indeed, 
Smith presented population as the driving force for society to move from one stage 
to the next. Yet, this element of population is conspicuously absent from Smith’s 
introduction to the commercial stage. While population growth is presented as the 
causal element in the progression from the hunting to the shepherd, and the 
shepherd to the agriculture stage, it does not feature in the presentation by Smith 
                                                        
4 See on this notably the recent book by Branko Milanović (2016). 
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of “commercial society” (see the quotes in Chapter 1, p. 108). Could it be that while 
population is a necessary element in the progression of society — notably because 
it is the only one akin to augment the market, in the absence of division of labour 
and stock — it becomes less and less important as society progresses, and ceases 
to be absolutely necessary to the development of society (a possibility explicitly 
denied by Malthus! see the quote p. 146 in Chapter 1) in commercial society? So 
that we end up with the situation presented, once again, by Allyn Young: 
Even with a stationary population and in the absence of new discoveries in 
pure or applied science there are no limits to the process of expansion 
except the limits beyond which demand is not elastic and returns do not 
increase.5 (Young 1928, p. 534) 
And: 
just as there may be population growth with no increase of the average per 
capita product, so also, as I have tried to suggest, markets may grow and 
increasing returns may be secured while the population remains 
stationary. (Young 1928, p. 536) 
While Smith did not formulate out and maybe did not think out his tentative 
ideas on the differential mortality and fertility of the rich and the poor, it is very 
interesting nonetheless that if one does pursue this line of thought, combined with 
the general Smithian theory of economic progress pointed out above, one arrives 
precisely at the outcome which demographic history has followed in the Western 
world and everywhere else ever since: namely the demographic transition. Indeed, 
in this Smithian model of the relation between wealth on the one hand and both 
fertility and mortality on the other, population growth will, through the 
enlargement of the market and the economic progress this engenders and the 
consequent increase in the general level of wealth, eventually provoke its own 
stall, as higher wages come progressively to have a stronger reducing effect on 
fertility relative to their effect on mortality in the same direction.6  
                                                        
5 Young distinguished “new discoveries” in this instance from “such new ways of 
organising production and such new "inventions" as are merely adaptations of known 
ways of doing things, made practicable and economical by an enlarged scale of 
production”, a theme which had earlier been discussed by Marshall. The concept of 
‘demand elasticity’ as here used by Young is distinct from the way this concept is generally 
used in modern microeconomics. He discussed it at some length in his article and 
presented a short mathematical model, which has yet to find a fully satisfactory 
interpretation. 
6 This is an alternative explanation to the one of Heilbronner, discussed in footnote 146 in 
Chapter 1 (p. 162), of how population growth brings about its own stall. The present 
explanation is based on Smith’s considerations of the interplay between fertility, mortality, 
population growth and the extent of the market in the Wealth of Nations and Lectures on 
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6. Final thoughts 
Let us then recapitulate the circular cumulative process operating in Smith’s 
account of population and development that was described in the present work. 
Starting with population growth (but we could start anywhere, of course, if the 
relation is circular): population growth (mechanically) augments the market, both 
through the overall augmentation of producers and consumers and through the 
densification of population attendant to population growth, which reduces the 
mean distance of individuals from one another and with it the cost of exchanging, 
thereby raising the power of exchanging (Chapter 2). This makes more division of 
labour and capital accumulation possible. Productivity and thus wealth increases, 
and there is therefore a higher demand for labour. Thus wages increase. This 
makes (infant) mortality decrease and population grows some more, initiating a 
new cycle (Chapter 4). 
While this dynamic unfolds, structural changes are ongoing throughout 
society. Not just do people become wealthier, but they change their occupations, 
and society thus progressively changes its mode of subsistence (Chapter 1). This 
has a further effect on the geographical distribution of the people. Being less and 
less tied to the land for subsistence, as it takes fewer and fewer people to produce 
the necessary subsistence for all by augmented productivity through the division 
of labour, more and more people come to leave the countryside and congregate in 
central places to form ever-growing towns and cities (Chapter 3). This further 
enlarges the market through the densification of population, and further division 
of labour can take place, including between town and countryside at the micro- 
and macro-level, which feeds back into agricultural productivity and releases yet 
further people from the land, continuing the upwards cycle.  
Finally, something Smith did not formulate out, yet which follows from his 
observations on wealth and human reproduction, is that as wealth has a negative 
effect on both mortality and fertility, when wealth increases throughout society, 
this can potentially both have an accelerating and a decelerating (and possibly 
even stalling) effect on population growth, according to which effect dominates. 
Although Smith did not predict a spread of material wellbeing throughout society 
as consequential as the one that was observed following the industrial revolution 
in the industrialised nations, it follows from his observations that with such a 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Jurisprudence, while Heilbronner’s explanation ignores the interplay of fertility, mortality, 
population and the extent of the market and relies on Ricardo’s rather than Smith’s own 
theory of the relationship between profits and economic growth.  
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spread of wealth throughout society fertility could eventually stall, thus providing 
a possible explanation of the demographic transition (Chapter 4). 
The benefit of considering Smith’s account of history and progress not just in 
its economic dimension, but taking geographic and demographic (as well as social 
and political) factors into account, while keeping the whole picture in mind, then, is 
that the Smithian model thus takes on an enormous heuristic power with regard to 
economic history: three fundamental transitions of the past few centuries 
concerning economy, geography and demography — namely the spectacular 
growth in the standard of living, the shift from rural-agricultural to urban-
industrial societies in terms of both modes of subsistence and population
distribution, and the demographic transition — can in this way be explained by 
causal relationships pointed out in Adam Smith’s different works, shining more 
light on the true range of the philosopher’s oeuvre. 
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Il fut un temps, pendant l’âge d’or de l’économie classique, où la 
démographie appartenait à l’économie politique. L’offre de travail était 
l’une des variables endogènes importantes dans les systèmes de Smith, 
Malthus, Mill et Marx  . . .  Une caractéristique de la théorie économique 
néoclassique qui la distingue de la version classique est l’élimination de la 
population en tant que variable (Samuelson 1985, p.166-7). 
le lien entre croissance démographique et développement économique  . . .  
n’est pas un sujet qui apparaît très fréquemment dans les discussions 
modernes de la théorie du développement  . . .  Mais il figure de manière 
importante dans la pensée antérieure sur notre sujet. Dans la perspective 
classique, discuter du développement sans tenir compte des tendances de 
la croissance de la population aurait été omettre l’ingrédient le plus 
essentiel ; et à cet égard, je suis enclin à penser que, avec toute son 
imperfection évidente, la pensée classique avait une beaucoup plus ample 
signification pratique que la plupart des modèles théoriques de notre 
temps. (Robbins 1968, p. 22) 
La séparation actuelle entre la démographie et l’analyse économique peut 
difficilement conduire à une théorie soutenable de la croissance 
économique. (Kuznets 1954, p. 167) 
Les théories de la population  . . .  ont reçu relativement peu d’attention de 
la part des historiens de la pensée économique au cours des 25 dernières 
années  . . .  les critères de l’analyse économique moderne ne sont peut-être 
pas les plus appropriés pour évaluer ces écrits. (Black 1985, p. 5) 
il ne faut pas admettre sans conteste l’hypothèse commune selon laquelle 
les continuités entre l’entreprise de Smith et celle de ses successeurs du 19e 
siècle — ceux avec lesquels il est habituellement regroupé en tant 
qu’économiste « classique » — sont plus impressionnantes que les 
discontinuités. (Winch 1997, p. 385) 
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Traduction française d’une  
partie de l’introduction1 
 
Les œuvres classiques grandissent avec le temps, littéralement et 
métaphoriquement, à travers le volume croissant autant des commentaires 
adossés à leurs rééditions que celui de leurs interprétations, distorsions, 
appropriations et réinterprétations. L’œuvre d’Adam Smith est une telle œuvre par 
excellence. Le volume de la littérature secondaire sur Adam Smith a pris des 
proportions indigestes aujourd’hui, à même de remplir une bibliothèque 
municipale de taille moyenne. Il semble donc difficile de dire quoi que ce soit de 
pertinent ou de significatif sur cet auteur monumental aujourd’hui qui n’ait pas 
encore été dit ou écrit quelque part, par quelqu’un d’autre. Pourtant, Adam Smith 
reste l’un des auteurs les plus commentés des sciences sociales. À ce jour, des 
dizaines d’articles, des livres entiers et des thèses doctorales sur Smith sont écrits 
chaque année dans le monde, ce qui montre à la fois la vitalité de ce champs 
disciplinaire et peut-être combien il reste à dire sur cette figure majeure de 
l’histoire intellectuelle mondiale. Il n’empêche que, même en supposant une 
contribution très modeste de chaque nouvelle étude, il semble particulièrement 
important, dans un tel domaine, de préciser en quoi consiste précisément la valeur 
ajoutée d’encore un nouveau travail sur Adam Smith, en vue de l’immensité de la 
littérature secondaire existante sur cet auteur. 
Les économistes sont sans doute le groupe de chercheurs qui se sont le plus 
intéressés, au cours des deux derniers siècles, à Adam Smith. Pour la plupart des 
19e et 20e siècles, la grande majorité de la littérature sur Smith a ainsi été l’œuvre 
d’économistes. Et les économistes, aujourd’hui encore, sont considérés par le 
public comme les experts les plus évidents sur Smith. Les économistes, par ailleurs, 
sont depuis longtemps intéressés aux questions de population. Robert Malthus, 
l’écrivain probablement le plus étroitement associé, dans l’opinion publique, au 
sujet de la population, et considéré également par beaucoup de démographes 
comme le père fondateur de leur discipline (tout comme Smith est considéré par 
beaucoup d’économistes comme le père fondateur de la leur), a également été le 
premier à détenir une chaire d’économie politique dans une université. En 
                                                        
1 Toutes les citations dans cette partie ont été traduites en français par mes soins. Il s’agit 
ici d’une traduction d’une sélection du contenu de l’introduction. Les notes de bas de page 
ont été omises en totalité. Il est renvoyé à la version anglaise en début du document pour 
les références et explications plus détaillées. 
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formulant son célèbre principe de population, Malthus nomma Smith comme l’une 
de ses principales sources d’inspiration. Pourtant, malgré la vastitude de la 
littérature secondaire sur Smith, qui couvre aujourd’hui les sujets les plus variés, 
très peu d’écrits traitent directement des contributions de Smith aux idées sur la 
population. Il existe d’innombrables articles, chapitres et livres entiers sur la 
théorie de la population de Malthus, mais remarquablement peu de publications 
qui traitent spécifiquement des idées de Smith sur ce sujet. La référence à la 
population est pratiquement absente des écrits plus récents sur cet auteur. 
Il a fallu plusieurs centaines de milliers d’années à l’humanité pour atteindre 
une population d’un milliard d’individus. Il a fallu un peu plus d’un siècle pour que
ce nombre double. Ce siècle était le 19e. On estime que la population mondiale est 
passée d’un milliard à près de deux milliards d’individus entre 1804 et 1927. Cette 
croissance extraordinaire de la population mondiale au 19e siècle a été largement 
surpassée encore au cours du 20e. La population mondiale a plus que triplé, 
passant de 1,65 à 6 milliards de personnes entre 1900 et 2000 (Secrétariat des 
Nations Unies, 1999). En parallèle, le monde a connu, au cours de ces deux siècles, 
une poussée d’urbanisation et d’industrialisation et une croissance sans précédent 
de l’espérance de vie et du niveau de vie matériel, accompagnés, d’abord dans les 
pays les plus riches puis partout ailleurs ces dernières années, par une baisse 
saillante et sans précédent des taux de natalité. Comment se fait-il qu’en cette 
période d’intenses changements démo-économique, si peu de l’immense corpus de 
commentaires sur Adam Smith ait porté sur ses idées sur la population et le 
développement ? 
L’absence générale du sujet de la population des études récentes sur Smith 
ne peut s’expliquer que par la combinaison de deux facteurs : le divorce croissant 
de l’économie de la démographie au cours du siècle dernier (dans une certaine 
mesure un effet normal de la division du travail entre disciplines académiques) et 
le fait que Smith a été principalement étudié, pendant cette période, par des 
économistes. Le rôle de la population dans l’œuvre d’Adam Smith est ainsi un sujet 
largement négligé à ce jour autant par les démographes que par les économistes. 
Par les démographes, Adam Smith est considéré principalement comme un 
économiste et un partisan du libéralisme. La plupart des économistes, j’ose 
l’affirmer, bien qu’ils puissent voir Smith comme le père fondateur de leur 
discipline et en premier lieu comme un important contributeur à la pensée 
économique, sont au courant qu’il était avant tout un philosophe moral, ayant écrit 
un traité de philosophie morale — pour lequel il est devenu célèbre — avant de se 
consacrer au sujet de l’économie politique. Mais très peu de chercheurs dans les 
deux domaines n’admettraient que Smith était aussi un démographe, ou que quoi 
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que ce soit de conséquent sur le thème de la population soit une partie importante 
de son travail. Pourtant, le sujet de la population faisait partie intégrante de la 
philosophie morale et de l’économie politique au 18e siècle (Tomaselli 1988, 1995). 
Il eût été étrange qu’Adam Smith, l’un des plus éminents philosophes moraux et 
économistes politiques de ce siècle, n’ait rien eu à dire sur le sujet. 
Pour illustrer l’omission quasi-totale d’Adam Smith dans les considérations 
contemporaines touchant à la population en économie, on peut noter que dans la 
Population and Development Review, revue phare dans ce champs d’étude par 
nature interdisciplinaire qu’est la population est le développement (une grande 
sinon la plus grande partie des contributeurs à la revue sont cependant des
démographes et des économistes), un seul article sur les idées de Smith sur la 
population a été publié à ce jour (Spengler 1976). La revue publie pourtant un 
nombre d’articles conséquent portant entièrement ou en partie du moins sur 
l’histoire des idées (par rapport au Journal of Population Economics par exemple, 
dans lequel cet intérêt est extrêmement marginal). Il y a même une série spéciale 
dans la Population and Development Review intitulée « Archives », dans laquelle de 
courts extraits du travail de grands penseurs du passé sur le thème de la 
population sont publiés et commentés. Un tel extrait de l’œuvre de Smith fut 
également publié en 1978. Mais même ici, dans une revue entièrement consacrée, 
en principe, aux questions de population et de développement, ce ne sont pas les 
idées de Smith sur ce thème plus large qui ont été retenues, mais un extrait de 
Smith dans lequel il fait un plaidoyer en faveur de la mobilité libre des travailleurs, 
alimentant l’idée, aussi fausse que commune, que tout ce que Smith avait à dire sur 
les questions relatives à la population se limitait à son traitement du marché du 
travail. 
Au cours des quarante dernières années, il y a eu un intérêt renouvelé et 
accru pour Adam Smith de la part des historiens de la pensée, parmi lesquels non 
seulement des historiens de la pensée économique, mais aussi des historiens de la 
pensée philosophique et des sciences sociales et humaines (et même des sciences 
naturelles). La publication des œuvres et de la correspondance d’Adam Smith, à 
partir de 1976, pour le bicentenaire de la publication de la Richesse des Nations, en 
particulier, a suscité un regain d’intérêt pour la pensée de Smith et a initié une 
grande vague de nouvelles études sur ses œuvres qui se poursuit à ce jour. Cela a 
notamment conduit à une réhabilitation de la philosophie morale de Smith, qui 
depuis le 19e siècle avait pris un rang largement secondaire par rapport à ses idées  
« économiques » dans l’étude et l’enseignement de son œuvre. A été révisé le vieux 
« Adam Smith Problem » du 19e siècle qui décrivait une prétendue contradiction 
entre la Théorie des sentiments moraux de Smith et sa Richesse des nations, la 
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première œuvre étant soi-disant basée sur la sympathie en tant que principe 
central du fonctionnement de la société alors que dans la seconde œuvre ce 
principe central était supposément représenté par l’intérêt personnel. Le nouveau 
consensus parmi les historiens de la pensée est qu’aucune contradiction n’existe de 
fait entre ces deux ouvrages, la sympathie n’étant aussi peu le seul principe 
directeur de la philosophie morale de Smith que l’intérêt personnel n’est le seul 
principe à l’œuvre dans sa théorie économique et politique. Plutôt, ces penchants 
humains jouent tous deux un rôle important dans la vision générale de Smith sur la 
société, les conséquences sociales involontaires des actions individuelles et 
« l’ordre émergent » de la somme des comportements individuels formant un
thème transversal dans ses travaux. En d’autres termes, dans cette vague plus 
récente des études sur Smith, une cohérence est recherchée entre ses différentes 
œuvres, la nouvelle édition de Glasgow de ses œuvres et de sa correspondance 
présentant pour la première fois une collection complète de tous ses livres et 
essais publiés et non publiés ainsi que de sa correspondance, et surtout la totalité 
des notes d’étudiants retrouvées de ses leçons sur la jurisprudence et sur la 
rhétorique. Les différents éléments du grand récit de Smith, qui avaient été pour la 
plupart oubliés par les spécialistes des sciences sociales, Smith étant invoqué alors 
presque exclusivement par les économistes (et rarement lu, encore moins en son 
intégralité, par la majorité de ces derniers), ont donc été réévalués chacun 
individuellement, et l’articulation entre eux est devenue un thème majeur de cette 
nouvelle vague d’études sur Smith. Le présent travail s’inscrit pleinement dans 
cette tradition. 
Il reste que l’opinion selon laquelle le thème de la population ne joue pas un 
rôle important dans le système de pensée de Smith est à ce jour largement 
répandue y compris chez les historiens de la pensée. Parmi le grand volume de 
commentaires sur Smith qui ont été pris en compte pour la présente étude, seule 
une poignée de contributions publiées traitent principalement du sujet de la 
population. Un court article paru dans les années 1950 sur Smith et la population 
est, comme à son habitude, essentiellement limité aux vues de Smith sur le marché 
du travail (Nilson, 1952). Deux articles (tous deux du même auteur) et un chapitre 
de livre (Spengler 1970, Bowen 1976, Spengler 1976), qui examinent la question 
plus en détail, datent de l’époque des célébrations du bicentenaire de la Richesse 
des nations. Deux autres contributions qui traitent directement des idées de Smith 
sur la population sont très récentes et, de fait, ne sont pas encore publiées 
(Brennan 2013, Sunna à paraître). Schumpeter (1986 [1954]) et Robbins (1968) 
ont également traité de Smith de manière assez détaillée dans leurs chapitres 
respectifs sur le thème de la population dans l’histoire de la pensée économique. 
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Mais globalement, le sujet de la population semble avoir été laissé de côté dans la 
littérature secondaire sur Smith au cours du 20e siècle, de même que Smith a été 
généralement omis des traitements du thème de la population dans l’histoire de la 
pensée (ou mentionné seulement en passant, en rapport avec ses théories du 
marché du travail supposées pointer vers Malthus). 
Il semble y avoir un intérêt accru ces dernières années pour « l’économie 
géographique » ou la « géographie économique » de Smith (voir notamment le 
Rapport sur le développement dans le monde 2009 de la Banque mondiale). La 
contribution de Smith dans ce domaine est reconnue. Mais ce thème n’est pas 
explicitement lié par la grande majorité des auteurs qui en parlent à ses idées sur
la population. Des sujets tels que la répartition de la population sont traités de 
manière statique et en tant que « données ». Dans l’ensemble, un traitement 
intégral des idées de Smith sur la population et le développement fait cruellement 
défaut. Ce travail vise à contribuer à combler ce fossé. 
Le sujet du rôle de la population dans le travail d’Adam Smith est 
particulièrement important en raison de deux raisons confluentes. Tout d’abord, la 
démographie (ou ce qui est plus communément appelé, aux États-Unis, 
« population science »), étant l’une des plus récentes des sciences humaines à 
devenir une discipline autonome, est généralement retracée par ses praticiens au 
travail du début du 19e siècle de Malthus, plus rarement à des auteurs antérieurs 
(en particulier John Graunt et/ou William Petty) (Demeny & McNicoll 2003, p. 7), 
mais qui sont généralement considérés isolément, c’est-à-dire indépendamment 
du mouvement intellectuel plus large de leur période respective. En revanche, les 
idées démographiques du 18e siècle, de la part de David Hume, Montesquieu et 
Adam Smith notamment, est relativement peu connue des démographes. Plutôt, de 
la même manière qu’Adam Smith et d’autres économistes classiques sont 
généralement considérés par les économistes actuels seulement comme des 
précurseurs primitifs des idées plus élaborées des théoriciens économiques 
ultérieurs — illustré par l’affirmation influente de Schumpeter que « de loin la 
meilleure partie de la théorie économique d’A. Smith » était « la théorie de 
l’équilibre rudimentaire du chapitre 7 » qui « pointe vers Say et, à travers le travail 
de ce dernier, vers Walras » (1986 [1954], p.183) — les auteurs antérieurs sur les 
questions de population sont considérés par la plupart des démographes comme 
des précurseurs et des versions plus rudimentaires des idées plus complètes de 
Malthus et des néo-malthusiens. La controverse du 18e siècle sur la population 
comparée de l’Europe ancienne et moderne, impliquant notamment Montesquieu, 
Hume et Wallace, par exemple, est généralement considérée simplement comme 
un sorte de bizarrerie, et regroupé avec tout ce qui a été écrit sur la population 
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avant Malthus dans  la catégorie générale d’« idées préscientifiques », menant à 
Malthus. Cette vue est implicite dans les titres des études de ces idées contenant 
les mots « pré-Malthusien » (Stangeland 1904) ou « avant Malthus » (Gonnard 
1929a, 1929b ; Black 1985 ; Hecht 1986) — de la même manière que les théories 
économiques « pré-smithiennes » sont souvent ainsi étiquetées et traitées —, 
négligeant à la fois combien Malthus lui-même s’inspirait de- et reprenait des 
thèmes précédemment ressassés (notamment la question de la population et des 
inégalités traitée de la même manière que dans l’Essai de Malthus par Wallace dans 
son Various Prospects of Mankind, Nature, and Providence écrit quatre décennies 
plus tôt) et comment, inversement, ces débats antérieurs portaient sur des thèmes
qui n’étaient pas inclus dans l’approche de Malthus. 
Pourtant, cette façon téléologique de concevoir l’histoire intellectuelle (et 
l’histoire en général) — comme une progression linéaire ou une chaîne 
d’événements qui, par amélioration constante, a produit la situation ou le 
paradigme actuel, plutôt que comme un débat ou une confrontation de points de 
vue divergents avec beaucoup de réitérations sous différentes formes dans des 
périodes successives —, alors qu’elle est toujours la vue dominante de l’histoire de 
leurs disciplines respectives tenue par la plupart des chercheurs dans les sciences 
naturelles et humaines, est aujourd’hui largement rejetée par les historiens (de la 
pensée) eux-mêmes. Herbert Butterfield a nommé la vision téléologique de 
l’histoire « Whig History », dans son The Whig Interpretation of History en 1931, et 
le terme a été largement adopté comme une dénomination péjorative de la 
pratique par les historiens des idées. Ceci est pertinent, en ce qui concerne la 
théorie de la population, en particulier dans la mesure où une grande partie de la 
théorie de Malthus elle-même va largement à l’encontre du paradigme néo-
malthusien actuellement prédominant. Et ceci est vrai d’autant plus des œuvres de 
Smith, Hume et Montesquieu qui constituent le contexte immédiat dans lequel 
Malthus a écrit. 
La première raison pour la pertinence d’une étude des idées de Smith sur la 
population est donc l’importance de ces idées pour elles-mêmes, c’est-à-dire en 
tant que théorie de population, distincte de celle de Malthus et d’autres auteurs. 
Cette raison est, en d’autres termes, de découvrir la dimension démographique de 
la pensée de Smith, afin de déterrer la contribution de Smith à l’histoire de la 
pensée sur la population, sa contribution — encore pertinente aujourd’hui — à la 
discipline de la démographie, qui n’était pas une discipline distincte au moment où 
il écrivait, comme c’est le cas pour l’économie. 
La deuxième raison de l’importance d’une étude sur les idées de Smith sur la 
population est que, dans l’œuvre de Smith, les concepts aujourd’hui englobés sous 
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la notion de population sont intimement liés à tous les aspects du « progrès de la 
société ». Ce sujet, « le progrès de la société », doit sans aucun doute être reconnu 
comme le thème dominant de la pensée politique et économique de Smith. Ce 
thème comprend des facteurs politiques, économiques, sociologiques, culturels, 
démographiques et géographiques, à savoir le développement : du gouvernement 
et des institutions gouvernementales (y compris les lois) ; du marché ; de la 
division du travail ; de l’inégalité (des classes sociales) ; des mœurs et les 
coutumes ; du capital et de la technologie ; tous ces éléments étant connectés dans 
la théorie de Smith au thème général de ce que j’appellerai désormais « le 
processus de peuplement », à savoir la population, dans son sens originel non 
d’une quantité de personnes se trouvant sur un territoire particulier, mais du 
processus par lequel un territoire se peupla, y compris la croissance, la 
propagation et la concentration de la population dans son sens contemporain. 
Foucault (2004 [1977-78], p. 69) nota que le mot population, qu'il considérait 
comme une grande innovation conceptuelle du 18e siècle, se référait à l'origine, en 
français et en anglais, au « processus de peuplement d'un territoire » (McNicoll 
2007, p. 829), dérivant (plutôt que, comme on pouvait s'y attendre, l'inverse) du 
mot « dépopulation », qui dénote encore exclusivement l'idée de processus. Mais 
selon Théré et Rohrbasser (2011, p 141-2), bien que le mot « dépopulation » 
apparaisse dans les dictionnaires avant le mot « population », il n’y a pas lieu 
d’affirmer que ce dernier dérive du premier. En outre, la signification autant de 
quantité que de processus aurait une longue histoire selon ces auteurs. Mais celle 
de processus semble être plus répandue au 18e siècle. Un parallèle intéressant de 
cette double signification — de processus et d’état — d’un concept utilisé au 18e 
siècle peut être trouvé chez Hume, qui affirma d’une passion qu’elle est « une 
existence originale, ou, si vous voulez, une modification d’existence » (Hume 1888 
[1739], page 415). À noter que la signification de processus du mot « population » 
est également présente dans le « principe de population » de Malthus. Pour 
exprimer le concept ultérieur de « surpopulation » (entendu comme quantité 
statique), Malthus lui-même utilisa le mot « over-populousness » dans la première 
édition de l’Essai. 
Dans les toutes premières lignes de la Richesse des nations Smith nous dit : 
« Ainsi, selon que ce produit, ou ce qui est acheté avec lui, est en proportion plus ou 
moins grande avec le nombre de ceux qui le consomment, la nation sera mieux ou 
moins bien fournie avec toutes les nécessités et convenances ». Cet accent mis sur 
le revenu par habitant comme mesure de la richesse par Smith a souvent été noté. 
Mais le lien avec la population est rarement discerné. Foucault, au contraire, 
considérait que l’engagement de Smith avec la population à cet égard était 
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déterminant dans le sens établi que le concept de population acquis (2004 [1977-
78], p.70-81), Smith représentant, selon lui, un moment déterminant dans le 
développement de la science sociale moderne (1966). 
Le fait qu’il existe un processus de peuplement, c’est-à-dire un processus de 
croissance et d’établissement d’une population sur un territoire, inhérent et 
inséparable du processus de développement économique et social dans son 
ensemble, est une notion entièrement étrangère à la plupart des économistes 
modernes, plus habitués à voir la croissance de la population en termes de 
« pression démographique », un obstacle à surmonter plutôt qu’une force positive 
dans le développement économique. Pourtant, dans la pensée du 18e siècle relative 
au « progrès », et certainement dans le travail d’Adam Smith, cette notion est non 
seulement présente, mais joue un rôle déterminant dans sa théorie générale, même 
si les récits modernes ne s’y intéressent quasiment jamais. La théorie du 
développement économique des « quatre étapes » du progrès de la société de 
Smith, notamment, est essentiellement structurée autour d’un récit du processus 
de peuplement d’une nation. 
Adam Smith est donc considéré à tort comme une figure mineure de l’histoire 
de la pensée sur la population. Les commentateurs de Smith sur le thème de la 
population ont par ailleurs trop insisté sur son chapitre sur les salaires et le 
marché du travail dans la Richesse des nations, dans lequel Smith décrit la demande 
de main-d’œuvre et son offre (la population) comme étant ajustée par le taux de 
salaire. De fait, la théorie de Smith donne un rôle beaucoup plus important à la 
dynamique de la population. En effet, la population joue un grand rôle dans la 
définition même du concept possiblement le plus fondamental de la Richesse des 
nations : le marché. L’étendue du marché est ainsi décrite par Smith comme 
déterminée en grande partie par la proximité physique des agents économiques 
individuels les uns par rapport aux autres, c’est-à-dire la concentration de la 
population. Au cours du « progrès naturel de l’opulence » d’une société rurale-
agricole vers une nation commerçante urbaine-industrielle, « l’état progressif » est 
maintenu par la croissance démographique continue et la division du travail qui 
s’ensuit entre ville et campagne, à l’origine de la croissance des villes. Ainsi, Smith 
ne formule pas seulement une théorie de la croissance démographique dans la 
Richesse des nations, mais les travaux de Smith comprennent aussi des éléments 
fondamentaux d’une théorie des mouvements de population et de l’urbanisation. 
L’œuvre de Smith n’accorde pas seulement un plus grand rôle à la population 
qu’une vision déconnectée de ces éléments dispersés, chacun considéré 
séparément, pourrait suggérer, mais ces éléments sont en fait reliés les uns aux 
autres dans la théorie de Smith du développement économique et social, de 
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manière à pouvoir affirmer que Smith a développé une véritable théorie de la 
population, qui d’ailleurs lui est propre — même si cette théorie n’est 
qu’accessoire à son souci plus large du progrès matériel des nations et des moyens 
de le favoriser. Je ne prétends pas que cette théorie de la population est tout à fait 
originale ni particulièrement remarquable, étant donné le travail des 
prédécesseurs de Smith. Plutôt, la population, comme le commerce, joue un rôle 
important dans sa théorie du développement économique — sa théorie du 
commerce (international) étant un autre élément pour lequel Smith a longtemps 
été critiqué comme n’étant ni original ni remarquable, et le thème du commerce 
étant, lui-aussi, étroitement lié à la théorie générale du progrès de la société de 
Smith.  
Je ne prétends pas non plus que la population est une variable indépendante, 
ou qu’elle est à elle seule une force motrice ou le premier moteur dans la théorie de 
Smith (bien que cette idée puisse être défendue, en particulier en ce qui concerne 
l’état primitif). Plutôt, la théorie de Smith du progrès implique une série de 
facteurs qui sont si intimement liés et dépendants les uns des autres qu’ils ne 
peuvent augmenter d’autre façon que proportionnellement les uns aux autres. 
Ainsi, la division du travail, l’accumulation du capital, la population et le 
développement des lois et du gouvernement dépendent tous les uns des autres. En 
tant qu’élément de la vision systémique que Smith développe dans la Richesse des 
Nations (ainsi que dans la Théorie des sentiments moraux et les Leçons sur la 
jurisprudence), le traitement de la population par Smith mérite toute l’attention 
des chercheurs spécialistes de Smith et de tous ceux qui s’intéressent à la 
perspective Smithienne sur le développement économique. 
Le sujet de la population est donc d’une grande importance pour l’étude de 
l’œuvre de Smith et, inversement, le travail de Smith peut être d’une grande 
importance pour l’étude du sujet de la population. Ce que l’on pourrait appeler la 
« perspective smithienne » est, en effet, à bien des égards une heuristique plus utile 
pour comprendre l’interrelation des différentes variables qui affectent et sont 
affectées par les questions relatives à la population que la perspective dominante 
néo-malthusienne. Il est donc important de repérer le rôle crucial de la population 
dans le travail de Smith, à la fois pour une meilleure compréhension de Smith et 
pour le rétablissement d’une vision alternative importante des interrelations entre 
population et économie. 
Cependant, l’importance de l’élément de la population dans la pensée de 
Smith a été pendant longtemps minimisée. Une déclaration caractéristique de cette 
minimisation est faite dans l’introduction à l’édition Glasgow de la Richesse des 
nations  (Campbell & Skinner 1976, p. 48). Puisque « Le spectre de la famine et de 
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certaines maladies avait été supprimé », et « la forte augmentation de la population 
et les problèmes de sa concentration étaient encore à venir » Campbell et Skinner 
croyaient qu’« il était facile [pour Smith] de concevoir le problème de la croissance 
économique comme correspondant à l’utilisation de la force de travail d’une 
manière qui répondrait le plus efficacement possible aux opportunités offertes par 
l’expansion du marché ». Ce traitement par Smith du « problème de la croissance 
économique » est présenté par les éditeurs de Glasgow comme étant déconnecté 
de la question de la population. Pourtant, les deux éléments invoqués, la force de 
travail et l’expansion du marché, sont directement liés, dans la théorie de Smith, au 
sujet de la population. La croissance démographique, en effet, augmente à la fois la
force du travail et l’étendue du marché, de sorte que ce qui est à l’origine de 
l’expansion des opportunités de marché sert également à répondre à ces 
opportunités. Plutôt que d’ignorer la question de savoir si « L’augmentation de la 
population » est « une cause de la croissance économique, ou quelque chose à 
craindre », Smith répond en fait directement à cette question dans sa théorisation 
du développement économique. Comme Smith l’exprime dans les quatre phrases 
finales de son chapitre sur les salaires: 
Ce qui se produit entre les ouvriers dans un atelier particulier a lieu, pour 
la même raison, parmi ceux d’une grande société. Plus leur nombre est 
grand, plus ils se divisent naturellement en différentes catégories et 
subdivisions d’emploi. Plus il y a de têtes occupées à inventer les machines 
les plus appropriées pour l’exécution des travaux de chacun, plus leur 
invention est probable. Il y a beaucoup de produits, donc, qui, à la suite de 
ces améliorations, viennent à être produit par tellement moins de travail 
qu’auparavant que l’augmentation de son prix est plus que compensée par 
la diminution de sa quantité. (WN I.viii.57, p. 104) 
A l’inverse de ce que Campbell et Skinner prétendent, une population plus 
nombreuse est ici très clairement présentée par Smith comme une force positive 
dans le développement économique, approfondissant le développement 
technologique (l’invention) et la division du travail (les deux étant intimement liés 
dans la théorie de Smith plus généralement). 
Conformément à la façon dont le sujet a été traité par les éditeurs Glasgow, la 
population est généralement considérée comme étant simplement un effet passif 
du développement économique dans la théorie de Smith. Cette déclaration ne 
présente qu’une vue partielle sur le rôle de la population dans la théorie de Smith,
et il est étrange que les éditeurs de Glasgow, familiers avec les Leçons sur la 
jurisprudence (référencés par eux tout au long de la Richesse des nations), où la 
population est articulée avec les arguments de Smith en ce qui concerne la 
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croissance et le développement de manière beaucoup plus explicite que dans ses 
publications, aient présenté une vision si incomplète du sujet. Il est difficile, bien 
entendu, y compris pour les historiens, d’échapper à leur propre époque, et la 
façon dont le sujet est introduit et présenté par les éditeurs de Glasgow est très 
caractéristique du point de vue néo-malthusienne qui était prédominant tout au 
long du 20e siècle, mais en particulier dans les années 1970 — lorsque le taux de 
croissance de la population mondiale, plus élevé que jamais avant ou depuis, était 
un grand facteur de préoccupation au niveau international. Ainsi, le « spectre de la 
famine » qu’ils évoquent fait très clairement allusion aux œuvres d’Ehrlich et des 
Meadows publiés quelques années avant l’édition de Glasgow. Alvin Hansen, au
contraire, avait remarqué qu’« Adam Smith considérait la croissance de la 
population à la fois comme une conséquence et une cause du progrès 
économique » (1939, p. 2-3). 
Les remarques de Hansen demeurent pertinentes aujourd’hui et sont 
illustrés et développées dans le présent travail. Lors de la présentation des ces 
idées sur Smith ― énonçant que la population est un élément important dans son 
système de pensée et qu’elle joue un rôle positif dans le cercle cumulatif ou la 
« spirale » de progrès qui caractérise la théorie de Smith de la croissance, au moins 
dans ce qu’il appelait l’« état progressiste » ― j’ai souvent entendu l’objection « si la 
population était un élément aussi important pour Smith, jouant un rôle positif pour 
la croissance économique, il l’aurait déclaré sans équivoque » ; ou bien, « si Smith a 
énoncé le rôle positif de la population pour la croissance économique de manière 
moins équivoque dans ses leçons sur la jurisprudence et d’autres travaux 
antérieurs à la Richesse des nations, il doit avoir changé d’avis à ce sujet dans 
l’intervalle. » Mais ce sont là des objections trop simples. Non seulement cela n’a 
pas empêché des auteurs dans le passé de reconnaître ce rôle important de la 
population chez Smith, comme ce fut le cas de Hansen, mais l’un des rôles 
primordiaux des historiens de la pensée est précisément d’examiner le travail des 
auteurs historiques de telle manière à mettre en évidence ce qui, bien qu’implicite 
dans leurs écrits, doit avoir été évident pour un public contemporain à ces auteurs, 
mais a cessé de l’être au fil du temps, parce que les références souvent tacites aux 
auteurs, œuvres, débats, controverses et événements contemporains sont devenus 
incompréhensibles pour les lecteurs de nos jours. La récupération de ces indices 
contextuels peut être effectuée uniquement en resituant l’œuvre dans le contexte 
de son temps : en la replaçant dans le cadre des débats auxquels elle a contribué, 
en divulguant quel public a été visé et quelle position a été appuyée dans le cadre 
de ces débats, en déchiffrant le vocabulaire caractéristique de l’époque et le sens 
contemporain des mots utilisés par l’auteur et qui sont encore utilisés aujourd’hui 
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mais dont le sens a évolué. Bien que chaque auteur puisse avoir l’espoir intime 
qu’elle sera encore lue deux siècles après sa mort, en effet, aucun auteur, à moins 
d’être divinatoire, peut contribuer sciemment à des controverses qui ne verront le 
jour que dans un avenir distant. En règle générale, les auteurs, que ce soit de 
littérature, de science ou de philosophie, s’adressent à un public contemporain et 
font référence à des idées et des événements de telle sorte qu’ils puissent être 
compris par leurs lecteurs au moment de la publication. Faire des références 
implicites plutôt qu’explicites peut être autant un choix stylistique, épargnant au 
public des spécifications fastidieuses et superflues, que ça peut être une stratégie 
délibérée pour créer une complicité avec le lecteur en flattant son intelligence. Ça
peut aussi être simplement la manière habituelle, au moment de la composition de 
l’œuvre, de traiter de certaines idées et relations entre idées connues et nullement 
polémiques à cette époque, mais qui le sont devenus à une date ultérieure. En dépit 
de quelques déclarations explicites à cet effet, le rôle positif de la population dans 
ce qui est aujourd’hui considéré l’œuvre principale de Smith est en effet largement 
implicite, ce qui justifie qu’on s’efforce à le déterrer. 
En effet, en matière de population étant à la fois l’effet et la cause du 
développement économique, Smith n’avait pas de position très controversée à 
faire valoir. Malgré des préoccupation face à une possible menace de surpopulation 
— par une expression implicite de l’idée de rendement décroissants d’une 
population croissante — véhiculée notamment dans les travaux de Wallace, 
Quesnay, Cantillon et Steuart, l’avis que la population était à la fois la cause et 
l’effet du développement économique était largement partagé au 18e siècle. 
Comme Schumpeter (1986 [1954], p 240-1) l’écrit : 
au cours des dix-septième et dix-huitième siècles  . . .  Les 
économistes  . . .  Sauf rares exceptions  . . .  étaient enthousiastes à l’idée 
d’état « populeux » et de l’augmentation rapide du nombre des habitants. 
De fait, jusqu’au milieu du dix-huitième siècle, ils étaient aussi quasi-
unanimes dans cette attitude « populationniste » qu’ils l’ont jamais été en 
quoi que ce soit. Une population de plus en plus nombreuse était le 
symptôme le plus important de la richesse ; c’était la principale cause de la 
richesse ; c'était la richesse elle-même — le plus grand atout pour toute 
nation à posséder. Les déclarations de ce genre étaient aussi nombreuses 
que de rendre les citations superflues. 
* 
« Mon sujet peut apparaître formidable de façon alarmante, mais je ne voulais pas 
qu’il en soit ainsi. » Ainsi commence le discours présidentiel d’Allyn Young devant 
la section F (Economie et Statistiques) de l’Association britannique pour 
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l’avancement des sciences, tenue à Glasgow le 10 Septembre 1928, et publié la 
même année (Young 1928). La même année aussi ont été publiés les actes de la 
conférence commémorant le cent-cinquantième anniversaire de la Richesse des 
nations, tenue à Chicago deux ans auparavant (Hollander et al. 1928). Que le 
prochain anniversaire majeur de ce travail (le bicentenaire de la Richesse des 
Nations, en 1976) allait avoir lieu là où il parlait, Allyn Young ne pouvait pas le 
savoir, bien sûr. Mais qu’il ait choisi de faire du « célèbre théorème d’Adam Smith 
selon lequel la division du travail dépend de l’étendue du marché » le leitmotiv de 
son discours, « de la même façon dont certains compositeurs mineurs empruntent 
un thème de l’un des maîtres et ajoutent certains développements ou variations
propres », était probablement lié à la tenue de son discours dans la ville où Smith 
avait étudié et enseigné. « Ce théorème, je l’ai toujours pensé, » écrit Young, « est 
l’une des généralisations les plus illuminantes et les plus fructueuses que l’on 
puisse trouver où que ce soit dans la littérature économique en son ensemble » 
(Young 1928, p. 529). 
 Le « théorème » de Smith selon lequel la division du travail est limitée par 
l’étendue du marché a donc été porté à l’attention des économistes dans l’article 
justement célèbre de Young, au milieu d’une controverse qui faisait rage à ce 
moment au Royaume Uni (et aux États-Unis) en sciences économiques sur la 
question des coûts et des rendements croissants et décroissants et des économies 
externes, souvent appelée la controverse des coûts des années 1920. Alors que 
Young écrivit au cours de cette controverse (qu’il avait lui-même contribué à 
susciter, dans une recension remarquée du livre La richesse et le bien-être de 1912 
de Pigou, en 1913), il a de fait commencé son discours (et article) de 1928 en 
déclarant qu’il n’avait pas pour but de contribuer à ce débat, que Young trouvait 
trop limité, mais plutôt de montrer que ce débat lui-même devait être resitué dans 
une perspective plus vaste, celle de la croissance et du développement, le thème 
central de la Richesse des nations de Smith (et peut-être de la science économique 
classique dans son ensemble). Ce thème avait alors été largement mis à l’écart, s’il 
n’avait pas été abandonné complètement, par une classe professionnelle qui — 
comme Nicholas Kaldor, un étudiant de Young quand il tenu son discours, fit 
remarquer cinquante ans plus tard — était habitué à « focaliser l’attention sur les 
fonctions allocatives des marchés à l’exclusion de leurs fonctions créatives » 
(Kaldor 1972, p. 1240). 
Young est mort en 1929. Il était donc incapable de réagir lui-même aux 
utilisations et lectures qui ont été faites de son travail — ou bien de lui-même 
contribuer au « formidable » programme de recherche qu’il aurait pu susciter par 
le rappel des idées de Smith sur la division du travail et de l’étendue du marché. 
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« En relisant ce papier après une période de plusieurs années », écrit Kaldor (1972, 
p. 1243), « je suis convaincu qu’il était tant d’années en avance sur son temps que 
le progrès de la pensée économique lui est passée à côté, en dépit de l’attention 
qu’il a reçu au moment de sa publication originale. Les économistes ont cessé de lui 
prêter attention bien avant qu’ils aient pu en saisir toutes les conséquences 
révolutionnaires. » Robbins (1968, p. 40) déclara de manière similaire : « cela a 
toujours été une chose stupéfiante pour moi que ce développement 
révolutionnaire ait attiré relativement si peu d’attention. » Ceci n’est pas tout à fait 
exact. Joseph Schumpeter, lui aussi, avait mis en garde, dans son traité  posthume 
sur l’histoire de l’analyse économique, que « Ce grand économiste et brillant 
théoricien est en danger d’être oublié » (1986 [1954], p. 842). Mais ce qu’il a écrit à 
propos de Young dans un article publié quelques années après la mort de Young 
est peut-être plus pertinente, à savoir que le travail de Young « survit dans le 
travail d’autres dans une mesure qu’il est impossible d’estimer » ; et : « Rarement, 
sinon jamais, une renommée comparable à la sienne a-t-été acquise sur la base de 
si peu de travail publié » (Schumpeter 1935, p 514-5). Il n’est pas exagéré de 
déclarer, en effet, que le papier de Young de 1928 à lui seul a profondément 
marqué la pensée de toute une génération d’économistes du développement (la 
première telle génération, en fait). Lauchlin Currie (un autre des étudiants de 
Young) observa plus tard que « les économistes qui, comme moi-même, ont 
souligné l’importance d’un taux de croissance initial élevé et continu (le Big Push 
de Rosenstein-Rodan, l’Effort Minimum Critique de Leibenstein, ma stratégie de la 
Percée ou du Secteur Entraînant, et d’autres qui prônaient des politiques 
d’exportation ou d’autre type sans leur donner des noms spéciaux) ont sans doute 
à un moment donné lu Young sur Smith » (1981, p. 59). Ainsi, alors que l’article de 
Young ne trouva pas beaucoup de résonance dans la théorie économique générale 
au cours du 20e siècle, il influença fortement les économistes de ce siècle qui 
étaient préoccupés par les questions de croissance et de développement, 
acquérant davantage de présence institutionnelle après la fondation des Nations 
Unies suivant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale et l’inscription du développement du 
« Tiers-Monde » comme un objectif majeur de la diplomatie internationale au 
cours (et dans le cadre de) la Guerre Froide. Young a ainsi profondément influencé, 
notamment, les deux grands économistes du développement d’après-guerre Paul 
Rosenstein-Rodan et Ragnar Nurkse. Un autre économiste du développement 
remarqué, Hla Myint, a également été inspiré par la contribution de Young de 1928 
(une influence qu’il n’a reconnu lui-même que de manière oblique) à reconnecter 
le thème smithien de la division du travail et de l’étendue du marché à la question 
du commerce et du développement, alors le sujet d’un important débat 
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international. Le papier de Young n’est pas non plus tombé dans l’oubli après que 
la vague de l’économie du développement des années 1940-60s se soit estompée. 
Au cours des décennies plus récentes, les économistes associés à ce qui est devenu 
connu sous le nom de « nouvelle théorie de la croissance » et « nouvelles théories 
du commerce » (et la « nouvelle géographie économique »), tels Paul Krugman et 
Paul Romer, ont à nouveau connecté leur projet de recherche au nom de Young — 
et, parfois, à travers Young à Smith. 
Kenneth Boulding (1971, p. 229) observa que « dans la théorie du 
développement économique, on doute parfois si tous les raffinements modernes et 
des modèles mathématiques sont beaucoup plus que des exercices talmudiques à
propos de l’idée fondamentale d’Adam Smith sur la division du travail, l’étendue du 
marché, l’impact de l’accumulation et les effets de l’accroissement de la 
connaissance ». En effet, comme Santayana (1905, p. 284) l’écrit de manière 
célèbre : « Ceux qui ne peuvent se rappeler le passé sont condamnés à le répéter », 
et ce n’est pas diffèrent pour l’histoire de la pensée. Il n’est pas surprenant, donc, 
que les économistes du 20e siècle, insuffisamment instruits dans l’histoire de leur 
discipline, aient continué à réinventer la roue — un processus qui n’a pas pris fin à 
la fin du siècle. Mais réinventer la roue sans réinventer aussi l’essieu et le palier 
laisse les véhicules difficiles à manier. 
La question des rendements — leur caractère croissant ou décroissant — 
était depuis le début connecté à la population. C’est d’une population croissante et 
de la nécessité qui en découle de cultiver des terres agricoles d’une qualité 
décroissante que résultent les rendements décroissants dans la théorie de Ricardo 
sur la rente (et, avant celle-ci, dans celles identiques d’Anderson [1777] et de West 
[1815] (Schumpeter 1986 [1954], p. 252-4)). Et dans la conception de Smith des 
rendements croissants, c'est par une population croissante que le résultat opposé 
est obtenu : en augmentant les possibilités de division du travail, la croissance 
démographique occasionne une production et un revenu par habitant plus larges. 
Une plus grande offre de travail (soit une population plus importante), selon Smith, 
permet une plus grande division du travail, ce qui augmente le niveau général de la 
productivité. 
Sans cette intégration dans le processus de peuplement, la théorie de Smith 
des rendements croissants obtenus par la division du travail reste incomplète. 
Young a fait allusion à ce lien entre la division du travail et de la population. Il a fait 
remarquer que « la doctrine positive de Senior est bien connue, et il y a eu d’autres 
qui ont pris acte de la circonstance selon laquelle avec la croissance de la 
population et des marchés de nouvelles opportunités pour la division du travail 
apparaissent et de nouveaux avantages en découlent » et que « Ils n’ont rien ajouté 
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au fameux théorème d’Adam Smith » (Young 1928, p. 529). Mais en écrivant ainsi 
de la « population et des marchés » (une distinction répétée à plusieurs reprises 
dans le document), et par la référence très périphérique au sujet de la population 
tout au long de son article célèbre, Young a en réalité davantage détourné la 
question de la division du travail et de l’étendue du marché du lien étroit avec les 
facteurs géographiques et démographiques qu’elle entretenait dans la théorie de 
Smith que d’attirer l’attention sur ce lien. 
Les économistes du développement comme Rosenstein-Rodan et Nurkse qui 
ont construit leurs théories sur le réexamen par Young des idées de Smith sur la 
division du travail et l’étendue du marché ont encore davantage négligé le lien 
entre l’industrialisation et le processus de peuplement, ce qui est l’une des raisons 
pour lesquelles ils ont été amenés à considérer la dépendance de la division du 
travail de l’étendue du marché comme une contrainte plutôt qu’une opportunité. 
L’autre raison pour laquelle ils ont ainsi reconsidéré la question, raison à laquelle il 
a déjà été fait allusion, était leur croyance — caractéristique de l’économie du 
développement du milieu 20e siècle et diamétralement opposé à la pensée de 
Smith (et de Young) — que le développement économique est un processus qui 
devait être inauguré et soutenu par les gouvernements plutôt que de procéder 
graduellement et de manière autonome à partir de dynamiques présentes 
naturellement au sein des sociétés. Du point de vue smithien, Rosenstein-Rodan 
(1943) présente ainsi un faux dilemme en faisant remarquer que l’industrie lourde 
ne peut pas être lancée ex nihilo dans une économie essentiellement agricole et 
rurale. Sans parler de l’idée que des gens puissent continuer à travailler sur la terre 
s’ils n’y produisent rien — qui avait notamment été contestée par Schultz (1932), 
de sorte que le consensus des économistes agricoles mentionné par Rosenstein-
Rodan (1944, p 160), selon lequel il y aurait eu une importante réserve de main-
d’œuvre inexploitée en situation de chômage déguisé dans les zones rurales, 
n’existait pas de fait —, le point de vue de Rosenstein-Rodan semble équivaloir à la 
proposition selon laquelle, puisque, comme Young, inspiré de Smith, avait avancé, 
tout dans le processus de développement dépend de tout le reste, pour qu’il y ait 
une transformation de quoi que ce soit, tout doit changer à la fois, et cela pourrait 
être provoquée uniquement par une influence extérieure. Il n’y a pas de place dans 
ce point de vue pour le changement autonome, progressif, de type organique. 
Young, en revanche, avait remarqué, en phase avec Smith, que la conclusion 
« qu’aucun réel progrès économique puisse advenir par l’opération de forces 
générées au sein du système économique » était « répugnant au bon sens » (1928, 
p. 535). Pour Smith, l’urbanisation et l’industrialisation dépendaient l’une de 
l’autre et l’urbanisation était le résultat naturel du progrès de la société — un 
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processus qui pouvait être entravée par de mauvaises politiques, mais n’avait pas 
besoin d’être implanté ou assisté par le gouvernement pour voir le jour, comme il 
l’a développé notamment dans le livre III de la Richesse des nations. Le processus 
de peuplement (dont l’urbanisation n’est qu’un aspect) était considéré par Smith 
comme partie intégrante du progrès de la société, comme il ressort clairement de 
l’examen de l’histoire conjecturale de l’humanité développée dans ses Leçons sur la 
jurisprudence. Pour Smith, donc, l’industrialisation et l’urbanisation étaient les 
deux faces d’une même médaille : on ne construit pas une usine de chaussures 
dans un espace déconnecté (le dilemme de Rosenstein-Rodan), et pour de bonnes 
raisons. L’industrie (l’équivalent du siècle 18e étant désigné comme « les
manufactures » par Smith) a besoin de l’épine dorsale que représente 
l’agglomération de la main-d’œuvre et de l’infrastructure, le développement de l’un 
de ces éléments nourrissant progressivement celui des autres, et vice-versa. Le 
processus de peuplement est donc un élément central de la transition d’une 
économie « arriérée » (dans le langage du 20e siècle) à une économie moderne, et 
les villes peuvent naturellement se développer dans une relation symbiotique avec 
leur arrière-pays seulement (ou des terres plus lointaines par le commerce 
extérieur) et ne sont pas créés ex-nihilo. 
 
* 
 
Les deux idées fondamentales concernant la population et le développement 
contenues dans l’œuvre d’Adam Smith sont aujourd’hui, toutes deux, largement 
inconnues par les économistes comme par les démographes. Mettre au jour ces 
deux idées fondamentales et leur redonner une place appropriée dans le corpus 
académique sur Smith en les reconnectant au reste de son œuvre est le but 
principal du présent travail. Il est espéré, en outre, que cela contribuera à raviver 
l’intérêt pour ces idées de manière plus générale, et plus particulièrement dans le 
domaine des études aujourd’hui communément appelé « population et 
développement ». Ces deux idées sont conformes à ce qui est souvent appelé la 
position « populationniste ». Cependant, la première de ces deux idées pourrait 
être assimilé à la position « anti-populationniste » (à tort appelé « malthusienne ») 
si elle est lue de manière incomplète (et elle a en effet pu être lu de cette manière 
et inspirer ce point de vue). 
La première de ces deux idées fondamentales est le plus souvent associée, 
aujourd’hui, avec le nom d’Ester Boserup (bien que, comme nous c’est illustré dans 
le premier chapitre, c'était une idée commune depuis des millénaires avant ses 
écrits) : à savoir que l’innovation technologique dépend en large partie (au niveau 
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de la société dans son ensemble) de la pression de la population. La croissance de 
la population, selon cette idée, a un effet perturbateur sur la relation entre 
l’homme et la nature. L’homme, au début — définie de diverses manières, soit (en 
termes religieux abrahamiques) comme avant « la chute », soit (avant l’avènement 
des religions abrahamiques et dans les récits profanes de l’existence humaine 
depuis) comme un « état de nature » ou « état sauvage » — vit en petits groupes, de 
la chasse et de la cueillette, de la main à la bouche, de la nature directement, tout 
comme les animaux qu’il chasse. Il n’y a pas de surplus de nourriture dans cet état 
des choses, ou seulement un très petit, mais pas nécessairement de pénurie non 
plus. Quand la population humaine croît, cependant, tout comme c’est le cas pour
d’autres espèces animales, l’équilibre entre l’homme et son écosystème est 
perturbé. Les animaux et les plantes dont subsiste le groupe humain se feront de 
plus en plus rares et il y aura pénurie de nourriture. Cette pénurie de nourriture, à 
son tour, stimule l’homme (qui, à la différence des autres animaux a la capacité 
d’aller au-delà de son état naturel) à développer des technologies supérieures de 
procuration ou de production alimentaire, notamment, et d’évoluer ainsi vers un 
état plus avancé de la société. 
Cette idée, qui peut être considérée comme une idée « population push » du 
développement technologique (Simon 1978), constitue le principal mécanisme de 
cause à effet de la progression des étapes socio-économiques dans la théorie des 
« quatre stades » du développement des sociétés d’Adam Smith, à laquelle est fait 
référence de manière implicite tout au long de la Richesse des nations, mais énoncé 
de la manière la plus complète dans ses leçons sur la jurisprudence, dont le 
contenu a été récupéré que récemment sous une forme plus complète grâce à la 
découverte d’un deuxième cahier de notes d’étudiants. Cette idée se rencontre 
dans les travaux de nombreux autres auteurs de l’époque, et même chez Malthus 
en effet (inspiré, ainsi qu’il l’était, par Smith et ses contemporains), bien que, en 
partie par le comportement de Malthus lui-même (comme cette idée n’apparaissait 
pas comme parfaitement compatible avec les conclusions qu’il voulait tirer de son 
travail à ses contemporains), et en partie par l’appropriation des travaux de 
Malthus par les néo-malthusiens, avec leur insistance sur les effets d’épuisement 
des ressources et de création de pénurie de la croissance de la population et leur 
négligence totale de l’aspect en question, à savoir l’effet stimulateur sur le 
développement technologique de la croissance démographique (qui est lui-même 
un effet du premier aspect), cette idée est tombée en grande partie dans l’oubli — 
aussi bien que le travail d’Ester Boserup au 20e siècle, dans lequel cette idée joue le 
rôle central, pouvait être considéré comme à la fois nouvelle et comme « prenant 
Malthus à contre-pied ». 
321 
La deuxième idée fondamentale sur la population et le développement qui se 
trouve dans l’œuvre de Smith pourrait, par analogie avec le terme « population 
push » être appelée une idée « population-pull ». (Simon (1978) appelait la théorie 
du développement technologique qu’il associait — à tort, ou en tout cas avec 
insuffisamment de justification — avec Malthus « invention-pull » par opposition à 
la théorie « population push » de Boserup.) L’idée d’Adam Smith est que ce qu’il a 
reconnu (après d’autres) être le principal moteur du développement économique, 
soit la division du travail, dépend de la taille de la population. Bien qu’elle en forme 
la base, comme il est expliqué dans le Chapitre 2, cette idée est aussi en partie 
occultée par la célèbre expression par Smith de cette idée avec la formule « la
division du travail est limitée par l’étendue du marché ». L’étendue du marché, en 
effet, alors qu’elle dépend dès le départ, et le plus fondamentalement, de la taille de 
la population, vient intégrer de nombreux autres éléments au fur et à mesure que 
la société progresse : l’infrastructure physique, la technologie, la richesse, le 
capital. Ces éléments sont cependant largement liés les uns aux autres, et leurs 
définitions se chevauchent à un degré important, et ils sont inséparablement liés, 
en tout cas, avec la relation fondamentale décrite par Smith : que pour diviser le 
travail, plus d’une personne est nécessaire, et plus d’individus existent, plus le 
travail peut être divisé. L’étendue du marché, qui tient un rôle central dans 
l’explication de Smith à la fois du commerce et du développement économique, est 
définie au niveau de base par la taille et la concentration de la population. D’une 
certaine manière, bien sûr, le principe selon lequel la division du travail est limitée 
par l’étendue du marché est tout simplement une autre façon d’exprimer la 
proposition selon laquelle « la nécessité est la mère de l’invention ». Lorsque la 
nécessité et l’ocpportunité sont tenus comme équivalents (ou différentes manières 
de considérer la même réalité) les deux propositions expriment essentiellement la 
même idée. En d’autres termes, les deux points de vue de la population exerçant 
soit une force « pull » soit une force « push » sur le développement économique 
peuvent être conçus comme décrivant en réalité deux facettes d’un même 
processus, de manière analogue à ce que la description d’un verre rempli à moitié 
de sa capacité comme à moitié vide ou à moitié plein corresponde simplement à 
deux manières différentes de décrire le même état. 
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Grandes lignes du travail 
 
Au cours des « quatre stades » caractéristiques de la théorie du développement 
socio-culturel des Lumières, utilisée par Smith, est contenu une théorie du 
développement technologique de type « population-push » (chapitre 1). Le 
développement technologique y est décrit comme un effet de la pénurie provoquée 
par la croissance de la population, conformément au principe selon lequel « la 
nécessité est la mère de invention ».  
Mais non seulement la nécessité est-elle la mère de l’invention pour Smith, 
l’opportunité l’est également. La division du travail est limitée par l’étendue du 
marché, et l’étendue du marché décrit pour Smith le « pouvoir d’échanger », soit 
les opportunités d’échange qui se présentent à un producteur pour ses produits. Or 
cette étendue du marché est, elle aussi, déterminée en grande partie par la 
population. Ainsi, les possibilités de division du travail et donc d’avancement 
technologique sont augmentées à la fois par l’augmentation du nombre de 
personnes et par la concentration et la réduction des distances entre les individus 
que celle-ci occasionne (chapitre 2).  
La population est donc à la fois ce qui crée des difficultés par un mécanisme 
de rendement décroissant et ce qui soulage ces difficultés grâce à un mécanisme de 
rendements croissants. Bien que cela puisse sembler contradictoire aux 
économistes des 20e et 21e siècle, conditionnés par une vision du système 
économique comme tendant perpétuellement vers l’équilibre (sans jamais 
l’atteindre forcément), vision dont l’idée de rétroaction négative est le fondement, 
la théorie de Smith, et plus généralement sa façon de concevoir la causalité, est 
principalement structurée par le mécanisme opposé de rétroaction positive, 
faisant que différents éléments se renforcent mutuellement de façon cumulative 
(chapitre 3). 
De plus, le 18e siècle a vu un grand débat sur le rôle du luxe sur la société, et 
notamment sur la population. Comme Rousseau et Price, Smith pensait ainsi que le 
luxe était susceptible d’« affaiblir les pouvoirs de la procréation ». Cela peut 
sembler fort éloigné des conceptions du 20e siècle de la transition démographique, 
mais la façon dont l’interaction de la richesse, la fécondité et la « modernisation » a 
été théorisé au 20e siècle est en fait dans la lignée directe des conceptions du 
progrès du 18e. Alors que les idées de Smith sur la population ont jamais (à ma 
connaissance) été étudiées du point de vue de la théorie de la transition 
démographique, ses idées sur ce sujet, complétées par les développements de 
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Marx, peuvent donner une théorie plus compatible avec le bilan historique, il est 
avancé, que la théorie répandue néo-malthusienne (chapitre 4). 
Chapitre 1 
Ce qui a été fait? 
Dugald Stewart, le premier biographe de Smith, a souligné le rôle dans l’œuvre de 
Smith de ce que Stewart a nommé « l’histoire conjecturale » : une théorie du 
développement dérivé, tout comme la théorie économique moderne, d’une théorie 
particulière du comportement humain supposée universellement applicable. Étant 
donné que cette théorie, utilisée par de nombreux penseurs antérieurs et 
contemporains à Smith, comportait (la plupart du temps) quatre stades de progrès, 
Ronald Meek (1976b), l’appela la « théorie des quatre stades » dans les années 
1970. Ni Stewart, ni Meek ont prêté une attention particulière au rôle de la 
population dans cette théorie. Plus récemment, Craig Smith (2006b) et Gavin 
Kennedy (2008) ont tous deux mentionné ce rôle de la population, mais sans le 
décrire comme un élément central de la théorie, cependant. Pourtant, la théorie 
des quatre stades est autant une théorie du peuplement qu’une théorie du 
développement économique. L’utilisation par Malthus des catégories de la théorie 
des quatre stades a récemment été remarquée, mais là aussi la connexion avec la 
population n’a pas été établie. 
Ce que je fais 
En établissant un lien entre le traitement par Smith du sujet celui de beaucoup de 
ses contemporains et prédécesseurs qui ont utilisé la théorie des quatre stades, 
avec une attention particulière portée à l’élément de la population, la fonction de 
cette théorie, y compris dans la Richesse des nations, peut davantage être illuminée. 
Bien que totalement ignoré au cours du 19e siècle, pour la simple raison que les 
leçons dans lesquelles elle a une place aussi importante ne sont devenus 
accessibles aux chercheurs, en partie, par les notes d’étudiants récupérés par 
Cannan à la fin du 19e siècle seulement, la présence et l’importance des quatre 
étapes de la théorie du développement de Smith dans la Richesse des nations a été 
contestée au 20e siècle, notamment par Hollander (1998 [1976]). Stewart et 
d’autres contemporains de Smith tels que Millar avaient insisté sur la connexion 
entre les cours de Smith et ses œuvres publiées en insistant, notamment, sur 
l’importance de l’histoire conjecturale comme élément de liaison. En analysant la 
théorie des quatre stades à travers le prisme de la théorie de la population, comme 
quoi elle a cessé d’être considérée au cours des 19e et 20e, davantage de 
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connexions peuvent être récupérés entre cette tradition théorique et les 
arguments présentés dans la Richesse des nations. 
La pensée de Malthus, à travers sa réinterprétation par le néo-
malthusianisme, a été associée principalement avec l’idée d’une influence négative 
de la croissance démographique sur la société et la nécessité de freiner cette 
croissance. Mais cela n’a jamais été la position de Malthus lui-même. La menace de 
la surpopulation a été invoquée par Malthus principalement pour réfuter la 
perspective d’une abolition des classes sociales présentée par Godwin et 
Condorcet, ce qui explique la colère qu’il récolta de la part de Marx. Il n’a jamais 
plaidé en faveur de la fin de la croissance démographique, qui dans sa perspective
du 18e siècle marquait la fin du progrès lui-même. Au cours des décennies passées, 
une certaine attention a été accordée aux idées de Malthus en faveur de la 
croissance démographique formulées sous forme de théodicée dans les deux 
derniers chapitres de la première édition de son Essai sur le principe de la 
population. Bien que l’utilisation par Malthus des catégories de la théorie des 
quatre stades a été notée, le rôle de la population dans la théorie des quatre stades 
n’a cependant pas été lié à sa pensée. En comparant les arguments de Malthus avec 
les idées d’auteurs précédents dans le cadre de la théorie des quatre stades, on 
peut montrer que Malthus s’est inspiré significativement de cette tradition 
intellectuelle, ce qui jette plus de lumière sur la configuration théorique de son 
argumentation. Toute l’argumentation de l’Essai, y compris son élément anti-
égalitaire, peut être démontré dériver de la théorie des quatre stades en effet, avec 
de légères déviations en des jonctions particulières (si même significatives) 
seulement. 
Chapitre 2
Ce qui a été fait? 
Young (1928) a redécouvert l’importance du « théorème » de Smith selon lequel 
« la division du travail est limitée par l’étendue du marché ». Il a mentionné la 
population à cet égard, mais à travers son engagement distancié et furtif avec ce 
thème (dans l’article 1928 tout au moins), il a davantage détourné l’attention de la 
connexion démographique que de l’y attirer. Il a entièrement ignoré l’élément 
géographique. Les économistes du développement ultérieurs qui se sont inspirés 
de Young, tels Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) et Nurkse (1952), et plus récemment 
Krugman, ont accordé plus d’attention aux éléments géographiques, mais ont 
entièrement ignoré l’élément démographique. En dehors de la littérature qui traite 
spécifiquement du développement économique, on a donné aux idées de Smith sur 
la division du travail et l’étendue du marché, interprétées à travers Young et plus 
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tard à travers le prisme des théories keynésiennes, des significations entièrement 
différentes. Comme le marché est un concept qui au cours des siècles passés a 
évolué à partir d’une conception principalement géographique et matérielle du 
processus d’échange — les canaux physiques par lesquels le commerce est effectué 
— vers une désignation symbolique du processus d’échange lui-même et une 
synecdoque pour les institutions du système économique capitaliste, l’expression 
de Smith a été réinterprété, anachroniquement, en accord avec cette nouvelle 
conception du marché. Bien que cela puisse avoir mieux convenu aux besoins de la 
macroéconomie moderne, soucieuse de la croissance économique dans les pays 
capitalistes avancés, c’est devenu largement hors de propos par rapport à la
question du développement économique, et en tant que tel est devenu, aussi, 
largement déconnecté des idées originales de Smith, préoccupé comme il l’était, 
principalement, avec la question du progrès de la société (dans l’Ecosse d’avant la 
Révolution Industrielle). 
Ce que je fais 
Pour récupérer le sens du mot « marché » qu’il avait pour Smith et ainsi de son 
idée que « la division du travail est limitée par l’étendue du marché », le Chapitre 
2 resitue la question dans le cadre de la théorie du développement de Smith, en 
reconnectant le marché avec sa dimension autant géographique que 
démographique. En déconnectant le concept des acceptions modernes 
d’« institution capitaliste » et de « demande globale » et en le reconnectant à ce que 
le marché décrivait pour Smith — un véhicule d’échange, essentiellement de 
nature physique —, l’idée d’une limitation de la division du travail par l’étendue du 
marché peut être reconnectée de manière plus pertinente à l’ensemble de la 
théorie du développement de Smith, telle qu’elle figure dans sa théorie des quatre 
stades, décrivant à la fois le processus de croissance économique que de 
peuplement. C’est par la croissance de la population, en effet, que l’étendue du 
marché est (et ne peut seulement être) augmentée à l’origine, dans le cadre des 
premières étapes de la société, où la technologie, le capital et les interventions 
politiques à grande échelle ne sont pas encore accessibles. Vu sous cet angle, 
reconnecté à sa dimension démographique et géographique, la théorie smithienne 
d’un progrès naturel de l’opulence — lui-même une partie de la théorie des quatre 
stades — s’intègre parfaitement avec ses idées sur la division du travail et de 
l’étendue du marché, sans aucun besoin d’invoquer la nécessité d’un « Big Push » 
(Rosenstein-Rodan 1961) ou d’un « effort minimum critique » (Leibenstein 1957) 
qui sont tout à fait étranger à la conception de Smith du processus de 
développement. 
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Chapitre 3 
Ce qui a été fait? 
Schumpeter (1986 [1954]) et Hollander (1973) ont fait l’éloge de Smith 
principalement pour sa théorie du prix d’équilibre, basé sur le mécanisme de 
rétroaction négative. Ce mécanisme allait sous-tendre, dans une large mesure, la 
manière dont les théories et modèles économiques ont été construits au 19e et 20e 
siècle, dont Smith peut ainsi être interprété comme un précurseur. 
Une grande partie du débat sur Smith au 19e siècle a concerné les éléments 
responsables de la réalisation de changements au sein des relations entre les 
éléments théoriques du système décrit par Smith. Cela concerne notamment la 
relation entre la division du travail et l’accumulation du capital. L’accumulation du 
capital (Brewer 1989) et la division du travail (Loasby 1997) ont été diversement 
tenues comme le premier moteur, ou comme l’élément le plus important 
responsable de la croissance économique chez Smith. Les pensées de Smith sur 
l’accumulation primitive étaient, de manière célèbre, le point de départ de 
l’examen de Marx du sujet. Marx a parlé d’un « cercle défectueux », une 
formulation reprise par Nurkse dans ses réflexions sur la question, inspirées par 
Young. La relation division du travail – étendue du marché était ici essentiellement 
conçu comme une impasse de laquelle il s’agissait de sortir, et c’est ainsi qu’elle est 
entré dans l’économie du développement du 20e siècle. 
De même, dans la théorie de l’interaction ville-campagne en jeu dans la 
théorie de Smith du « progrès naturel de la société » et de « l’ordre contre nature et 
rétrograde », les contributions récentes ont examiné le sens de la causalité et la 
direction de la causalité cumulative entre le développement rural et urbain, et si 
Smith peut être considéré comme ayant été en accord avec la façon dont son 
objectif dans le livre III de la Richesse des nations est interprété (Bowles 1986, Bell 
1992, Pack 1995, Blecker 1997, Paganelli 2013, Schumacher 2013). 
Enfin, beaucoup a été dit et écrit sur la possibilité d’un progrès continu dans 
la théorie du développement de Smith, avec des interprétations très divergentes 
entre ceux qui mettent l’accent principalement sur les limites à la croissance 
(Heilbroner 1975, Wrigley 1988, Alvey 2004) et ceux qui insistent sur les 
perspectives de croissance continue dans la théorie de Smith (Himmelfarb 1984 ; 
Winch 1992a , 1996). 
Ce que je fais 
Le Chapitre 1 et le Chapitre 2 décrivent, respectivement, une action de poussée et 
de traction de la population sur le progrès économique et technologique. Ces deux, 
alors qu’ils sont les deux faces d’une même pièce, sont également intégrés par 
327 
Smith grâce à un mécanisme de rétroaction positive, ou ce que Gunnar Myrdal a 
appelé « le principe du cumul ». 
Cette façon circulaire de concevoir la causalité (avec la population vu 
notamment comme effet et comme cause du développement économique) ne se 
limite pas à la population, mais concerne tous les éléments interconnectés dans la 
théorie de Smith du développement économique. 
Ainsi, entre la division du travail et l’accumulation de capital comme 
éléments causaux fondamentaux, il n’y a pas besoin de choisir. Tout comme la 
population, et tout élément du système théorique de Smith, ils sont reliés entre eux 
et dépendent mutuellement l’une de l’autre. Cela peut être montré en connectant la
question de la dépendance de la division du travail, de l’accumulation du capital et 
de l’étendue du marché les unes des autres au thème de la « lente progression de 
l’opulence » ainsi qu’elle est conceptualisée par Smith, plus clairement que dans la 
Richesse des Nations, dans ses cours de Glasgow et le « Early Draft » de la Richesse 
des nations. Ici aussi, donc, les travaux plus anciens de Smith sont une source 
importante. La science économique moderne occulte la question par sa 
dépendance du mécanisme de rétroaction négative. La « lente progression de 
l’opulence » ainsi que conceptualisé par Smith peut être mieux comprise en la 
concevant comme une boucle de rétroaction positive : dans les premiers stades de 
la société, le processus de développement est très lent et progressif, parce que tous 
les éléments nécessaires pour le développement (division du travail, capital, 
commerce, population, etc.) sont présents seulement en petite quantité et limitent 
ainsi la progression des autres. Lorsque tous ces éléments augmentent de concert, 
le processus prend de l’ampleur et « prend son envol ». Les économistes du 
développement du milieu du 20e siècle (et les économistes jusqu’à ce jour) ont mal 
interprété les premières étapes du développement comme stades de stagnation 
(comme dans le « piège de l’équilibre de bas niveau » de Nelson (1956)), au lieu de 
les voir comme étapes graduelles vers une progression accélérée. 
Chapitre 4 
Ce qui a été fait? 
Ni Smith, ni Malthus, ni Marx ont théorisé sur la transition démographique qui ne 
pouvait être discernée qu’après leur mort (elle a pour la première fois été 
conceptualisée dans les années 1920), bien que la baisse des taux de mortalité 
avait en effet commencé à baisser alors qu’ils étaient encore en vie. Tous les trois 
penseurs, cependant, ont théorisé sur l’interaction entre les salaires, la richesse, la 
mortalité et la fécondité. Les idées de Smith sur cette question n’ont jamais été 
analysées sous l’angle de la transition démographique. 
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Il y a eu un intérêt accru de la part des économistes, au cours des dernières 
décennies, pour la question de l’interaction de la transition démographique et de la 
révolution industrielle (Lucas 1996, Galor et Weil 2000, Galor 2005, Bar & 
Leukhina 2010). Un thème particulier a été celui du « dividende démographique » 
(Mason 1988, Kelley & Schmidt 1995, Higgins & Williamson 1997, Bloom et 
Williamson 1998, Bloom, Canning and Sevilla 2001) : quand le nombre de 
« personnes à charge » (les enfants et les personnes âgées) diminue dans une 
société, ce qui se produit lorsque le taux de croissance de la population a été élevé 
pendant un certain temps, en raison de la diminution des taux de mortalité, mais 
commence à diminuer en raison de la baisse des taux de natalité, ceci est censé 
ouvrir une fenêtre d’opportunité pour une société, une proportion 
particulièrement importante de la population étant en âge de travailler et pouvant 
ainsi contribuer à la formation de la richesse nationale. A l’inverse, avoir un grand 
nombre de personnes à charge en raison soit de naissances élevées par rapport au 
taux de décès (de nombreux enfants à charge par rapport aux adultes qui 
travaillent) ou à de faibles taux de natalité et de décès ayant été observés pendant 
un certain temps (beaucoup de personnes âgées par rapport aux adultes qui 
travaillent) est pensé offrir de mauvaises bases pour la croissance économique. Ce 
modèle est ensuite utilisé pour expliquer la révolution industrielle en Europe et le 
décollage plus récent de certains pays en développement. L’argument avait déjà 
été utilisé négativement par Coale et Hoover (1958). 
La façon dont la question est formulée par la littérature autour du 
« dividende démographique » et la littérature connexe sur la question de la 
relation entre la transition démographique et la révolution industrielle repose sur 
l’« analyse économique » de la fertilité et du capital humain de Becker (1960, 
1962), la première desquelles il prétendait avoir dérivé de Malthus. Dans cette 
théorie, les enfants sont considérés comme des « biens de consommation » pour 
les parents, mais ils peuvent être des « biens de production » grâce à des 
investissements par les parents dans la « qualité d’enfants » (capital humain) qu’ils 
substituer à la « quantité d’enfants », ce qui réduit les coûts et augmente les 
revenus des familles. Becker n’a pas divulgué pourquoi les familles s’engageraient 
(ou ne parviendraient pas à s’engager) dans une telle substitution. Dans la 
littérature récente sur l’interaction de la transition démographique et de la 
révolution industrielle, la théorie de Becker est reliée à la « nouvelle théorie de la 
croissance » de Lucas (1988) et Romer (1989) : les parents commencent à investir 
dans leurs enfants à cause des « économies externes » qui le rendent lucratif. Ceci 
est conjecturé avoir provoqué la transition démographique, où et quand elle a eu 
lieu. Le principal problème avec cette théorie est que la transition démographique 
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a été déclenchée non pas par une baisse du taux de natalité, mais par une chute 
antérieure des taux de mortalité, qui reste inexpliquée et ne joue aucun rôle dans 
la théorie. 
Ce que je fais 
Alors que la pensée de Smith sur l’interaction des salaires, la richesse, la fécondité 
et la mortalité n’a jamais été analysé sous l’angle de la transition démographique, il 
semble que, surtout s’il est lu à travers l’interprétation de Marx plutôt que de 
Malthus (les deux étant possibles), une théorie de la transition démographique 
alternative à celle proposée par la « nouvelle économie domestique » au cours des 
dernières années peut être tiré des réflexions de Smith sur la question. Dans cette 
théorie, plutôt que la baisse de la fécondité étant occasionnée par des 
investissements dans le capital humain, qui occasionnent alors une hausse du 
niveau de vie, c’est au contraire l’élévation du niveau de vie, rendue possible par la 
plus grande division du travail dans les pays modernes plus peuplés, qui 
occasionne à la fois une baisse de la fécondité et rend possibles les investissements 
dans le capital humain, à l’échelle de la société entière plutôt qu’à l’échelle de la 
famille. À la différence de la théorie micro-économique qui a été dérivée de la 
« nouvelle économie domestique » et des « nouvelles théories de la croissance », 
cette théorie tient compte de l’évolution de l’environnement institutionnel qui à la 
fois occasionne et provient des changements associés au développement 
économique. 
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 Population Growth, the Settlement Process and Economic Progress 
 — Adam Smith's Theory of Demo-Economic Development 
 
Population ― in its original sense of the process of peopling ― is a topic surprisingly absent from 
the huge volume of scholarship on Adam Smith. This topic was central to 18th century moral 
philosophy and political economy, the two fields Smith most famously contributed to. Its 
importance in Smith’s work was obscured in the 20th century by a narrow focus on economic 
matters in the secondary literature. For an undivided analysis of Smith’s oeuvre it is crucial that the 
central position of the peopling process be brought to light. Three topics that are today recognised 
as essential to Smith’s project are thus intimately connected to population: the relation between the 
division of labour and the extent of the market; the stadial theory of progress; and the link between 
the development of town and country, itself central to Smith’s advocacy of the freedom of trade. 
The market is a concept read today through an institutional lens linking it to the functioning of the 
capitalist economic system; Smith conceived of it as facility for trade, with essentially demographic 
and geographic vectors. The progress of society is both cause and effect of the growth of population. 
At its core is the symbiotic interrelationship between rural and urban development that Smith 
called the “natural progress of opulence”. In turn, looking at dynamics of population and 
development — including the analysis of the demographic transition — through a Smithian rather 
than a neo-Malthusian lens leads to a fundamental reconsideration of causal interactions between 
mortality, fertility, wealth and institutional variables. 
 
Keywords 
 
Adam Smith ; population and development ; conjectural history (four stages theory) ; lectures on 
jurisprudence ; division of labour - extent of the market ; cumulative causation ; rural-urban linkages ;  
demographic transition theory 
 
 
Progrès et peuplement — la théorie démo-économique d’Adam Smith 
 
La population — en son sens originel de processus de peuplement — est un sujet étonnamment 
absent de l'énorme volume d’études sur Adam Smith. Ce thème était au centre de la philosophie 
morale et de l'économie politique du 18e siècle, les deux domaines auxquels les contributions de 
Smith sont les plus connues. Son importance dans l’œuvre de Smith a été obscurcie au 20e siècle 
par une focalisation étroite sur les questions économiques dans la littérature secondaire. Pour une 
analyse intégrale de son œuvre, il est essentiel que la place centrale du peuplement soit révélée. 
Trois thèmes aujourd'hui considérés comme essentiels au projet de Smith sont ainsi intimement 
liés à la population : le lien entre division du travail et étendue du marché ; la théorie des quatre 
stades du progrès de la société ; et le lien entre développement rural et urbain, lui-même au centre 
du plaidoyer de Smith pour la liberté du commerce. Le marché est un concept aujourd'hui assimilé 
au fonctionnement du système économique capitaliste ; pour Smith, il décrivait la faculté de 
commercer, aux vecteurs essentiellement démographiques et géographiques. Le progrès de la 
société est à la fois cause et effet de la croissance de la population. En son sein se trouve 
l'interrelation symbiotique entre le développement rural et urbain que Smith appelait le « progrès 
naturel de l'opulence ». Adopter l’optique smithienne plutôt que néo-malthusienne dans l'examen 
des dynamiques de population et de développement — y compris l'analyse de la transition 
démographique — conduit alors à une reconsidération fondamentale des interactions causales 
entre mortalité, fécondité, richesse et variables institutionnelles. 
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